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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of the US Congress on the process of 
Sino-American  rapprochement  and  diplomatic  normalisation  during  the  period 
1969-1980. Thus far, research on Sino-American rapprochement and normalisation 
has focused on the role played by the Executive Branch, ignoring the role played by 
Congress. This study aims to place Executive Branch actions with regard to China 
policy in the context of domestic political  trends and Congressional actions and 
attitudes,  and  locates  the  process  of  Sino-American  rapprochement  and 
normalisation in the broader context of shifting domestic attitudes toward the Cold 
War. This thesis demonstrates that rapprochement would not have been possible in 
the absence of dramatic domestic political changes in the United States, particularly 
important shifts of perspective within Congress toward the Cold War in general and 
China in particular. It traces the development of Congressional attitudes towards 
China, and examines the interaction between Congress and the Executive Branch 
with  regard  to  China  policy.  This  study  argues  that  the  interplay  between  the 
Executive and the Legislative Branches during a decade in which Congress was 
asserting its views on foreign policy is central to understanding the development of 
China policy during the 1970's. One of the most effective means by which Congress 
shaped China policy during the period of this study was by means of its ability to 
define the political space within which the Executive Branch was able to operate 
with respect to China policy. Attempts on the part of the Executive Branch to deny 
Congress influence were only partially successful, and although there were limits 
on  Congress's  ability  to  directly  influence  policy  in  the  1970's,  this  thesis 
demonstrates that Congress had a much greater impact on the development of China 
policy during the decade than has previously been acknowledged. 
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GRC Government of the Republic of China 
ISA International Security Affairs (Pentagon)
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LOC Library of Congress 
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R Republican 
ROC Republic of China (Taiwan)
RPC (Senate) Republican Policy Committee 
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SCC Special Coordinating Committee 
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation 
SFRC Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Telcon Telephone Conversation
TRA Taiwan Relations Act
UN United Nations 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
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INTRODUCTION
The late Daniel Patrick Moynihan noted that 'the neglect of congressional 
history is something of a scandal in American scholarship'.1 The field of diplomatic 
history has particularly felt the lack of attention to a Congressional role in foreign 
policy, especially as regards US-China relations. The Congressional contribution to 
Sino-American relations during the Cold War is the focus of this present study.
Historiography
While there have been biographies of major Congressional actors who 
influenced foreign policy during the Cold War, including Senators Mike Mansfield, 
William Fulbright, Frank Church and Henry Jackson, and there is a growing body of 
political science literature examining the role played by the Congress in foreign 
policy, only one study of the role played by Congress as an institution and from an 
historical perspective during the Cold War has been undertaken to date - Robert 
Johnson's Congress and the Cold War.2 Johnson's study is exhaustively researched 
and has the strength of recognising that the Congressional impact on foreign and 
national security policy should be measured by more than simply the amount of 
legislation addressing foreign and national security issues, but also by other more 
subtle ways that Congress can influence the direction of such policy, including 'the 
ability of individual legislators to affect foreign affairs by changing the way that 
policymakers and the public thought about international questions'.3 Johnson's study 
is the first to not only examine the role of Congress in shaping foreign and national 
security policy during the Cold War, but also to assert that the Congress played a 
pivotal role in the shaping of such policy. Valuable a work as it is, however, his 
1 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, On the Law of Nations (Cambridge, 1990), p.50. 
2 Robert Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (London, 2005). 
3 Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, p.xxiii. 
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purpose is to give a broad overview of the Congressional role during the Cold War 
and he therefore gives almost no attention to Congressional attitudes toward China.
Congress has, however, historically played a significant role in China policy. 
Michael Oksenberg, President Carter's China specialist on the National Security 
Council staff, noted not long after he left the White House that:
While the executive branch is constitutionally charged with management of foreign 
policy, on several occasions the Congress has decisively intruded into the 
management of China policy. When the Congress has chosen to immerse itself, its 
impact has been proven profound and lasting.4 
It is surprising, therefore, that although voluminous literature on Sino-American relations 
exists, so little has been written on the topic of the Congressional role in the development 
of Sino-American relations and American policy toward China during the Cold War, 
either by political scientists or by historians. Partially, this can be attributable to the fact 
that the Executive Branch has historically been responsible for creating and formulating 
foreign policy. The Executive Branch's primacy in this area has particularly grown since 
the Supreme Court ruled that the Executive Branch had primary authority over foreign 
policy decision-making in the 1936 case United States vs. Curtis-Wright Export 
Corporation (which ruled that the President had broad powers to conduct foreign policy, 
regardless of whether Congress had delegated such power to the Executive), which 
decision was followed by the Second World War and the subsequent Cold War 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, crises that demanded strong executive leadership 
and resulted in an almost unquestioned Executive Branch authority over foreign policy. 
Accordingly, it has been more tempting for scholars to focus their attention on that branch 
4 Michael Oksenberg, 'Congress, Executive-Legislative Relations, and American China Policy', in 
Edmund Muskie, Kenneth Rush and Kenneth Thompson, eds., The President, the Congress, and 
Foreign Policy (Lanham, Maryland, 1986), p.218.
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of the government at the expense of Congress. The diffusion of authority within the 
Congress, which makes researching that body a daunting task given the large number of 
power centres and the vast material that require consultation, provides another reason for 
the lack of scholarly attention to the Congressional role in foreign policy. 
There have been numerous historical studies of the process of Sino-American 
rapprochement and normalisation, but each of these gives little or no attention to the role 
played by the Congress. This is also the case with the memoirs of each of the Executive 
Branch officials involved in the process of rapprochement and normalisation.5 Historical 
studies of the process of rapprochement include: Hao Yufan, Dilemma and Decision: An 
Organizational Perspective on American China Policy Making (Berkeley, 1997); Harry 
Harding, Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 (Washington, 
D.C, 1992); Robert Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity 
and Policy Making in the Cold War (Armonk, New York, 1993); Robert Ross and Jiang 
Changbin, eds., Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 
(Cambridge, 2001); and Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, 
and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, 1990). 
Several historical studies touch on the role of Congress in the first few years after 
the establishment of the People's Republic of China, including Nancy Bernkopf Tucker's 
Patterns in the Dust, which focuses on the period 1949-19506; Thomas Stolper's China, 
Taiwan and the Offshore Islands, which examines on the Taiwan Straits crises of the 
5 See Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York, 1978); Henry Kissinger, White House 
Years (Boston, 1979, Year's of Upheaval (London, 1982), and Years of Renewal (New York, 2000); 
Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York, 1979); Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York, 
1983); Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York, 1982); Cyrus Vance, Hard 
Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York, 1983). 
6 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition 
Controversy, 1949-1950 (New York, 1983). 
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1950's7; David Finklestein's Washington's Taiwan Dilemma: 1949-1950, which focuses on 
the formation of policy toward the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists, 
respectively, during and immediately after the establishment of the PRC;8 Chang Tsan-
kuo's The Press and China Policy, which is the only history to give attention to the period 
of rapprochement9; and Thomas Christensen's Useful Adversaries, which covers Sino-
American relations in the first decade of the Cold War.10 These studies disagree on the 
extent and nature of Congressional influence, with some, such as Tucker and Christensen, 
arguing that Congress was able to significantly shape China policy during the Truman 
Administration,11 and others, such as Chang Tsan-kuo, whose work focuses on the press, 
arguing that Congress did not play a significant role.12 
A few scholars have addressed the Congressional role during the opening and 
normalisation process very briefly, including Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang in United States-
China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Denver, 1986), 
pp.342-4; Robert Ross in Negotiating Cooperation: the United States and China, 1969-
1989 (Stanford, 1995), pp.55-7; Robert Sutter in The China Quandary: Domestic 
Determinants of US China Policy (Boulder, 1983), pp.3-5; and Rosemary Foot in The 
Practice of Power: US Relations with China Since 1949 (Oxford, 1995) pp.100-1. Nancy 
Bernkopf Tucker's recent work, Strait Talk, includes some discussion of the role of 
Congress in the history of the Sino-American-Taiwan triangular relationship, but that 
discussion is primarily limited to Congressional action surrounding the Taiwan Relations 
7 Thomas Stolper, China, Taiwan and the Offshore Islands (Armonk, New York, 1985). 
8 David Finklestein, Washington's Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950: From Abandonment to Salvation 
(Fairfax, Virginia, 1993). 
9 Chang Tsan-kuo, The Press and China Policy: Illusion of Sino-American Relations, 1950-1984 
(Norwood, New Jersey, 1993). 
10 Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American 
Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, 1996). 
11 Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, pp.162-8; Christensen, Useful Adversaries, pp.58-66. 
12 Chang, The Press and China Policy, p.244. 
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Act of 1979.13 Only one historical study has been published to date that concentrates 
wholly on the Congressional role through the 1970's, Guangqiu Xu's Congress and the 
US-China Relationship: 1949-1979.14 While admirable for its attempt to address a 
yawning gap in the literature, and including some evidence from Chinese sources, this 
lone study for the most part ignores the interplay between the Legislative and Executive 
Branches and the broader political backdrop to the development of China policy. In 
addition, it makes use of a very limited range of archival resources, virtually ignoring the 
archival materials available in the papers of various Senate and House leaders as well as 
those of relevant private individuals such as Edgar Snow and Executive  Branch officials 
such as Averell Harriman, thus leaving vast swaths of material unexplored. It also 
includes no oral interviews or correspondence with former Members of Congress, 
Congressional staff members or Executive Branch officials. Finally, only the last chapter 
and a half of Xu's study examines the period 1969-1979, making that examination brief. 
Three recent historical studies have noted the limited movements within the 
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations toward a modification of the policy of 
containment and isolation of China. Evelyn Goh's Constructing the US Rapprochement 
With China examines the various contending conceptions of China from the Kennedy, 
Johnson and Nixon Administrations to show that official conceptions of China evolved 
slowly throughout the 1960's and early 1970's, from the perception of China as an 
aggressive, expansionist state to a weak, cautious state, helping to set the stage for 
Richard Nixon's dramatic and fundamental policy shift.15 As innovative and valuable as 
Goh's approach is, however, it focuses on the what she terms the policy 'discourse' 
13 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China 
(Cambridge, 2009). 
14 Guangqiu Xu, Congress and the US-China Relationship: 1949-1979 (Akron, Ohio, 2007). 
15 Evelyn Goh, Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit 
Ally' (New York, 2004). 
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regarding China within the Executive Branch and ignores the debate occurring regarding 
China within Congress and the manner in which that debate may have shaped the White 
House  pursuit of rapprochement. James Peck's Washington's China examines an 
evolution of policy toward China from the 1950's to the mid 1960's, taking a different 
approach than does Goh by focusing on the role played by nationalism and ideology in 
constructing and maintaining the structure of containment around China and pursuing its 
isolation.16 Pecks' study, however, gives no attention to the role played by the Congress 
both in helping to construct and maintain the policy of containment and isolation and in 
then turning against that policy, challenging it and helping to prepare the political 
environment in Washington for the fundamental policy shift that occurred under Richard 
Nixon. The most recent study touching on Sino-American rapprochement was Michael 
Lumbers' Piercing the Bamboo Curtain, which examines moves within the Johnson 
Administration toward a re-evaluation of China policy, which Lumbers convincingly 
argues was a precursor to the fundamental policy change that took place under Johnson's 
successor, Richard Nixon. Although Lumbers does acknowledge the significance of the 
1966 China hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the study has as its 
focus the debate over China policy within the Executive Branch.17  
Two political scientists have written on Congress and China policy. The first of 
these was Yang Jian's Congress and US China Policy:1989-1999, published in 2000.18 
Yang examines the influence of three structural factors in domestic politics that influence 
China policy: partisanship, constituency interests and committees, and his analysis 
revolves around the debate over 'Most Favored Nation' (MFN) trade status for China and 
16 James Peck, Washington's China: The National Security World, the Cold War, and the Origins of 
Globalism, (Boston, 2006). Peck's discussion of the evolution of thought toward China within the 
Johnson Administration is found on pages 226-59.
17 Michael Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative Bridge-Building to China During the 
Johnson Years, (Manchester, 2008). Discussion of the Fulbright hearings is found on pages 154-6. 
18 Yang Jian, Congress and US China Policy: 1989-1999 (Hauppauge, New York, 2000). 
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the issue of Taiwan. As the title describes, however, the book is limited to examination of 
the Congressional role during the Administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill 
Clinton. More recently, Tao Xie's US China Relations: China Policy on Capitol Hill, 
touches briefly on the period prior to 1989, but his focus, too, is the period from 1989 
onward (he argues, based on the lack of significant legislative action in comparison to the 
post 1989 period, that Congress had little influence on China policy prior to 1989).19 Tao 
examines roll call votes, bills, resolutions and amendments, but notes the limitations that 
the committee system, differences between the two chambers, and the general diffusion of 
power within the Congress place on Congress's ability to legislate policy. Despite arguing 
that Congress had little influence on China policy prior to 1989 due partially to the dearth 
of China-related legislation from that period, Tao does give attention to the importance of 
some of the non-legislative means of influencing policy. While Tao's study very briefly 
addresses Congressional action in relation to China during the 1970's, that attention is 
brief and, as a work of political science, it lacks historical perspective, neglecting an 
analysis of the broad historical context for the types of Congressional interventions 
considered.
A limited literature, beginning with writings by Arthur Waldron and Rosemary 
Foot, has begun to develop which gives some attention to changes to the domestic and 
strategic context within which China policy was considered in the Executive Branch in 
the mid and late 1960's, which changes helped to pave the way for Nixon's opening.20 
19 Tao Xie, US-China Relations: China Policy on Capitol Hill (New York, 2008). 
20 Arthur Waldron, 'From non-existent to almost normal: US-China relations in the 1960's', in Diane 
Kunz, ed., The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960's (New 
York, 1994); Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China Since 1949 (Oxford, 
1995); Robert Garson, 'Lyndon Johnson and the China Enigma', Journal of Contemporary History 32:1 
(1997), pp.63-80; Victor S. Kaufman, Confronting Communism: US-British Policies Toward China 
(Columbia, Missouri, 2001), chapters 7-8; Robert Schulzinger, 'The Johnson Administration, China, 
and the Vietnam War', and Rosemary Foot, 'Redefinitions: The domestic context and America's China 
policy in the 1960's', both in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Re-examining the Cold War: US-
China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge, 2001); and Goh, Constructing the US Rapprochement with 
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Within this underdeveloped body of literature, however, no one has yet focused their 
attention on the Congress, nor carried such a study through the whole process of 
rapprochement and normalisation. As we shall see, the study of the evolving 
Congressional attitudes toward China during this period can help to illuminate the 
domestic political environment that provided Nixon with the political freedom to consider 
change of policy and, to a limited degree, also provided partial motivation for such 
change. A focus on domestic politics and evolving Congressional attitudes during the 
1970's also sheds light on the ongoing process of normalisation and the development of 
the Sino-American relationship that unfolded after Nixon's trip to China under Presidents 
Ford and Carter. This thesis attempts to fill the gap in rapprochement literature by 
examining the role played by Congress and that of domestic politics in the process of 
Sino-American rapprochement and normalisation, arguing that without paying attention 
to this factor only a truncated picture of the process of Sino-American rapprochement and 
normalisation emerges. As historian Jason Parker has written, 'Given that both American 
leaders and foreign actors alike were paying close attention to [American domestic 
politics], we [historians] should ourselves do no less.'21
Although little has been written on the nexus between domestic politics and China 
policy, a relatively new and growing body of literature does exist in the area of domestic 
politics and foreign policy in general. Formerly given little attention, recent scholarship 
has begun to show increased attention to this area, arguing forcefully that knowledge of 
domestic politics can play a significant role in increasing our understanding of foreign 
policy and hence of international history. Fredrik Logevall and Craig Campbell have 
termed the area within which the international and domestic political dynamics intersect 
China, pp.17-98. 
21 Jason Parker, '”On Such a Sea Are We Now Afloat”: Politics and US Foreign Relations History Across 
the Water's Edge', Perspectives on History 45:9 (May 2011). 
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the 'intermestic'.22 Logevall and Campbell have even asserted that 'for much of the Cold 
War the domestic variables predominated over the foreign ones.'23 While domestic 
variables could not be said to dominate foreign variables during the period of Sino-
American rapprochement and normalisation, they certainly were far more powerful 
shapers of the relationship during this period than has previously been acknowledged. 
Melvin Small has authored a significant body of literature examining the impact of 
domestic politics on foreign policy.24 Other scholars to examine aspects of this 
'intermestic' include Steven Casey25, American political historian Julian Zelizer, who has 
written in Arsenal of Democracy about the manner in which domestic politics has 
impacted national security policy26, Dominic Sandbrook, who has written on the many 
ways that domestic politics informed Nixon's approach to foreign policy27, and Andrew 
Johns, whose recent work on the domestic politics of the Vietnam War significantly added 
22 Fredrik Logevall and Campbell Craig, America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, 
2009), pp.10-2. 
23 Fredrik Logevall and Campbell Craig, America's Cold War, p.6. 
24 See Melvin Small,'Historians Look At Public Opinion', in Melvin Small, ed., Public Opinion and 
Historians (Detroit, 1970), pp.13-32; 
'Public Opinion on Foreign Policy: The View From the Johnson and Nixon White Houses', Politica 16:2 
(1984), pp.184-200;
Johnson, Nixon and the Doves (New Brunswick, 1988); 
'Public Opinion', in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of 
American Foreign Relations (New York 1991), pp.165-76;
'Richard Nixon and the Containment of Domestic Enemies', in David L. Anderson, ed., Shadow on the 
White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975 (Lawrence, Kansas, 1993);
Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement (New Brunswick, 1994);
'The Politics of Foreign Policy', in Stanley Kutler, The History of the United States in the Twentieth 
Century (New York, 1995);
Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics in US Foreign Policy, 1789-1994 
(Baltimore, 1996);
The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence, Kansas, 1999); 
Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battles for America's Hearts and Minds (Wilmington, 2002); 
and At Water's Edge: American Politics and the Vietnam War (Chicago, 2005)
25 Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion and the War 
Against Nazi Germany (New York, 2001); and
Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953 
(New York, 2008) 
26 Julian Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security From World War II to the War 
on Terrorism (New York, 2009)
27 Dominic Sandbrook, 'Salesmanship and Substance: The Influence of Domestic Policy and Watergate', 
in Frederik Longevall and Andrew Preston, eds., Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 
1969-1977 (New York, 2008), pp.85-106. 
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to scholarship of this topic which Melvin Small had previously undertaken.28 Lastly, 
Jeremy Surri, in Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente, has 
examined the manner in which the domestic political and cultural turmoil that spanned 
the globe during the late 1960's was a significant domestic shaper of the foreign policy 
choices of many states from the late 1960's well into the 1970's.29 Although Surri's work 
does not focus on Sino-American rapprochement and normalisation, the story of Sino-
American relations from the late 1960's through the 1970's fits well within his conceptual 
framework. Indeed, the cultural ferment of the late 1960's and early 1970's played a 
significant role in shaping the political environment within which the new Nixon 
Administration approached the issue of China. 
The Executive Branch, Congress, and Foreign Policy: A Brief Overview of Approaches 
Although historically the Executive Branch has been seen as the branch of 
government most responsible for formulating and implementing foreign policy, the 
Congress has exerted considerable influence over foreign policy throughout the history of 
the United States, particularly, as Michael Oksenberg noted, in the area of China policy. 
Regarding its ability to influence foreign policy in general, former Representative Lee 
Hamilton, a past chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has noted that: 
Notwithstanding the key role of the President, most of the foreign policy powers 
enumerated in the Constitution are with Congress. In general, Congress is 
instructed to provide for the common defence and to declare war. It also has great 
power because of its control of the purse.30 
Given the high profile enjoyed by the Executive Branch in the creation and 
28 Andrew Johns, Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party and the War 
(Lexington, Kentucky, 2010). 
29 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente (Cambridge, 2003) 
30 Address by Lee Hamilton at the Thirteenth Annual Student Symposium, sponsored by the Center for 
the Study of the Presidency, Washington, D.C., 13 March 1982, published as 'Congress and Foreign 
Policy', in Presidential Studies Quarterly 12:2 (Spring 1982), p.133. 
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implementation of foreign policy, it has been easy to miss the major foreign policy-
making powers enjoyed by the Congress, of which Hamilton lists the most prominent. 
There are, in fact, many other ways in which the Congress can play a critical role in the 
foreign policy process and many levers at its disposal with which it can influence policy 
outcomes. Some of these are worth reviewing briefly, since they form the mechanisms by 
which Congress shaped US policy towards China during the Cold War. In the remainder 
of this study such levers will be discussed in greater detail. 
One important area in which the Congress plays a vital role is in the importance of 
public and congressional support to the success or failure of an Administration's foreign 
policy initiatives. This is both due to Congress's power in its own right, and to the fact 
that attitudes in Congress many times reflect the predominant attitudes on the part of the 
public at large, without whose support any administration's foreign policy is doomed to 
failure. Because of this, Congressional and public opinion are generally conceded to be 
important considerations of any administration's formulation of security and foreign 
policy.31 Christian Herter, who succeeded Dulles as Eisenhower's Secretary of State, 
argued that 'a successful foreign policy must . . . to be effective, command the support of 
a vast majority of the American people'.32 Charles 'Chip' Bohlen, after a distinguished 
diplomatic career, wrote regarding foreign policy that 'the most carefully thought out 
plans of experts, even though 100 percent correct in theory, will fail without public 
support'.33 There are a number of theories among political scientists regarding the role 
played by public opinion in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Hans 
Morgenthau, the founder of post-World War II realist thinking in international relations, 
31 Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam, (New York, 2001), 
p.17. 
32 Schuyler Foster, 'American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy', Department of State Bulletin, XLI 
(1959), p.797. 
33 Charles Bohlen, Witness to History (New York, 1973), p.177. 
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held a sceptical view of the influence of public opinion, viewing it as ill-informed and 
volatile.34 Scholars from the liberal-democratic school of thought have tended to hold a 
more positive view of the impact of public opinion on foreign policy, seeing public 
opinion as less volatile and uninformed than did Morgenthau. There is consensus, 
however, that public opinion matters, even if there is disagreement on the precise nature 
of the influence that it exerts.35 There is also wide recognition of a close relationship 
between public and Congressional opinion. Lee Hamilton has asserted that: 
The accessibility and representativeness of Congress . . . guarantee that the people 
will have input into foreign policy-making. . . . The Executive Branch cannot 
effectively pursue any policy for an extended period without support from the 
American people. Congressional support is the primary expression of the people's 
approval. A President is not likely to gain the support of the American people if he 
cannot gain the support of Congress.36 
Complementing Hamilton's view of the centrality of Congress to the healthy functioning 
of a republican form of governemnt and emphasising the role played by Congress in 
giving the public influence over the direction of policy, Juilan Zelizer has described 
Congress as 'the heart and soul of democracy, the arena where politicians and citizens 
most directly interact over pressing concerns'.37 
The assumption by many within the Executive Branch that Congress has little or 
no legitimate role to play in foreign policy, and the consequent neglect (and in many 
cases conscious shunning) of Congress in the process of policy development, undermines 
34 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, 1973), 
pp.146-7. 
35 For a summary of theories on the interrelation of public opinion and foreign policy, see Ole Holsti, 
'Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus', International 
Studies Quarterly 36 (1992), pp.439-66. 
36 Address by Lee Hamilton, 'Congress and Foreign Policy', p.135. 
37 Julian Zelizer, ed., The American Congress: The Building of Democracy (Boston, 2004), p.xiv.
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an Administration's own foreign policy by denying it the legitimacy that Congressional 
approval provides, and sets the stage for foreign policy failure. An example of this was 
the decision by the Carter Administration not to fulfil its promise to consult with 
Congressional leaders prior to making a decision to break official US diplomatic and 
security ties with Taiwan and to recognise Mainland China in Taipei's stead, which 
resulted in a Congressional backlash and the loss of an opportunity to create domestic 
political consensus behind the new China policy. A particular policy of the Executive 
Branch, therefore, must enjoy the support of the public, as well as of the Congressional 
leadership and the majority of the Congressional rank and file. If a proposed policy of the 
Executive Branch does not enjoy such support, there are several options. It can attempt to 
convince a substantial proportion of the public and the Legislative Branch that the 
proposed policy is wise (such as took place in President Nixon's attempts to convince 
those conservatives opposed to an opening to China to support such an opening), or it can 
change its course so that it will conform to Congressional and/or public wishes (as when 
President Ford's and Henry Kissinger's hopes to normalise relations with China had to be 
postponed due to the lack of a supportive domestic political climate in 1975 and 1976), 
or, at times, the Congress forcibly reshapes the policy that had been pursued by the 
Executive Branch (the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in response to President 
Carter's pursuit of normalisation of Sino-American relations is an example of this). 
In addition to the role of either providing or denying consensus to a policy 
proposed by the Executive, one of the primary and most powerful means of 
Congressional influence over foreign policy is through its constitutional power over the 
purse. Most activities of the federal government must be authorised and funded through 
Congressional legislation. This results in annual requests from the Executive Branch for 
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funds, an explanation of the reason those funds are needed, and the manner in which they 
are to be used. Such budget requests are an important opportunity for the Congress to help 
determine policy outcomes. As everyone familiar with the workings of Washington 
knows, the President may submit his budget request to Congress each year, but Congress 
many times uses that request as a general framework or starting point and then changes, 
sometimes dramatically, the shape of the budgets of the various Executive Branch 
departments and agencies with its own policy preferences guiding the shaping process. 
Thus, the annual budget process is an important and effective way in which Congress 
makes its policy preferences known and can exert an influence on the direction of policy. 
Amendments to the authorisation and appropriations bills for the Departments of State 
and Defense, for example, can have long-lasting impact on foreign and national security 
policy – a fact that was just as real during the Cold War as it is today.38 
One of the key areas of funding that gave Congress a lever over both foreign 
policy in general and China policy in particular during the Cold War was the annual 
foreign aid bill, which was regularly used as a vehicle, by both conservatives and liberals, 
for expressing their policy preferences. During the 1950's and 1960's, foreign aid 
legislation directed aid in Asia primarily to American allies such as Taiwan, Japan and 
South Korea largely for the purpose of assisting Washington in the goal of containing 
Chinese communist influence in the region.39 During the 1950's and early 1960's the 
38 James Lindsay, 'The Shifting Pendulum of Power: Executive-Legislative Relations on American 
Foreign Policy', in James McCormick, ed., The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights  
and Evidence (New York, 2012), p.225.
39 See Senator William Fulbright's 1962 speech in support of the foreign aid bill for FY1963, in which 
Fulbright affirms that most of the then $7 billion US aid to East Asia has gone to American allies 'upon 
which we depend to check the Chinese Reds'; Undated 1962 speech,  RG 46, Records of the US Senate; 
1958-1965, Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, Chairman Fulbright's statements on foreign 
affairs, Box 1, National Archives and Record Administration, Washington, D.C. (hereafter, NARA I); 
See also 5 April 1963 statement of Dean Rusk before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Box 499, 
Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (hereafter, LOC), Washington, 
D.C.
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foreign aid bill was used as a vehicle by conservatives to constrain any potential moves 
the Executive Branch might make in the direction of a more flexible China policy. By the 
early 1970's, however, while the foreign aid bill continued to be a vehicle for the 
expression of Congressional attitudes toward China, the attitudes expressed were very 
different. The failure of the Nixon Administration's foreign aid bill in the autumn of 1971, 
largely due to anger over the manner of China's seating and Taiwan's expulsion from the 
UN, is one example. Another example is that of amendments attempting to cut off 
funding for American military operations in Vietnam and elsewhere in Indochina, which 
were introduced by liberal Senators and House members with increasingly regularity in 
the early 1970's, each of which failed until an amendment to cut off funding for the 
bombing operations targeting the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia succeeded in the summer of 
1973 as the Nixon Administration was weakening due to the Watergate scandal. This 
example illustrates the fact that Congress has the ability, although it has rarely been 
utilised, to refuse to pass requested funding legislation in order to provide a particularly 
strong challenge to the foreign policy preferences of the Executive Branch. One of the 
primary ways in which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee took advantage of the 
legislative process in order to challenge Nixon Administration foreign policy under the 
chairmanship of William Fulbright was through amendments attached to the annual 
foreign aid appropriations bill. By the early 1970's Senate liberals regularly attempted to 
attach to it various amendments challenging key aspects of the Nixon Administration's 
foreign and national security policy, including at various points amendments demanding a 
withdrawal of all American troops from Indochina40, the withdrawal of a significant 
number of American troops from Western Europe, etc. 
40 This unsuccessful amendment to the FY1972 foreign aid appropriations bill was sponsored by Senate 
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield. 
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The strategy used by individual Members of attaching amendments to legislation 
that reflect the Member's particular policy preferences became common during the Cold 
War, with amendments many times being added to otherwise unrelated legislation. Such 
amendments can be legally binding requirements for the Executive Branch to operate in a 
certain way, or they can merely be expressions of Congressional intent, such as 'sense of 
the Senate' amendments that express a desire that policy move in a certain direction. An 
example of this was the Dole-Stone amendment to the International Security Act of 1978, 
which had been intended by its authors to be legally binding, but was watered down until 
it became an unbinding declaration expressing the expectation that the Senate expected 
consultation from the Carter Administration prior to any proposed changes to the US-
Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty (proposed changes to the treaty also being a signal that a 
change of recognition from Taipei to Peking was imminent). 
Reporting requirements added by the Congress to authorisation and funding 
legislation, which requires the Executive Branch to report on the status of affairs or 
progress made in various areas, are also a means that Congress uses to shape the direction 
of foreign policy. Over the years thousands of reports on a wide variety of topics have 
been required, many on an annual basis. One such prominent area of Congressional 
interest during the 1970's was that of human rights, with legislation creating a new office 
responsible for human rights in the State Department and an annual report on global 
human rights practices required of that office. These reporting requirements lead to 
increased Congressional oversight over Executive Branch activities, an important area of 
authority granted by the US constitution to the Congress. 
Another constitutional area of authority is granted solely to the Senate, and is a 
primary reason the Senate tends to view itself as the body constitutionally charged with 
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having the greater influence over foreign policy (to the irritation of the House). This is the 
Senate's role in providing 'advice and consent' on treaties with foreign governments, and 
ambassadorial and other presidential appointments. The Senate has also historically 
enjoyed greater prestige than has the House, with the consequence that Senators have 
been granted access to global leaders much more readily than have House Members. 
During the 1970's, for example, when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev visited Washington, 
he met with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but not with members 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. As another example, during the trips of 
Congressmen (called 'Congressional Delegations' or 'CoDels') to China following Sino-
American rapprochement, Senators were given much more access to senior Chinese 
leadership than were members of the House. These differences between the chambers 
have consistently caused friction over the issue of authority in foreign policy. 
Conflict between the Executive Branch and Congress over treaties with foreign 
governments was one of the key areas of the battle over control of foreign and national 
security policy during the late 1960's and early 1970's. Facing increasingly strong 
scrutiny from an antagonistic Senate to Executive Branch relationships with Cold War 
allies, the White House sought to pursue secret 'executive agreements' that were not, 
legally speaking, treaties, and thus technically not subject to Senate consent. In response, 
William Fulbright created an investigative subcommittee under the Foreign Relations 
Committee, chaired by Fulbright's political ally, Stuart Symington, the staff of which 
travelled the world attempting to uncover such agreements. The Symington 
Subcommittee would investigate such agreements from 1969-1971 in an attempt to bring 
them under Senate scrutiny, and its investigation would criticise Washington's continuing 
covert security cooperation with Taipei.
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In addition to the above-mentioned mechanisms for influencing policy, there are 
numerous other ways in which the Congress can exert influence over the direction of 
foreign policy and in so doing either challenge or support the foreign policy espoused by 
a given Administration. Such means include the publicising of a policy issue by such 
means as committee or subcommittee hearings, speeches given on the House or Senate 
floor, particularly by high profile Members of Congress, speeches given by Members in 
outside forums to private groups, and other actions including resolutions submitted in the 
Congress, participation in symposiums on a given topic, and even leaking information to 
the news media in such a way that is calculated to portray the policy preferences of a 
Member or coalition of Members in as positive and appealing a light as possible. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings of 1966 on the subject of 
Vietnam and China are an example of Congressional hearings being used to publicise a 
particular policy issue, to educate, and to attempt to shape political debate. Likewise, 
speeches made repeatedly by liberal Democratic Senators such as Edward Kennedy, Mike 
Mansfield, William Fulbright, George McGovern and others sought to push the debate 
over China policy in the direction sought by them – toward the ending of the American 
policy of isolation of China and of opposition to its entry into the United Nations, and in 
favour of US recognition of Peking. Liberal advocacy of these positions brought 
sympathetic media coverage, creating an atmosphere in which such questions could be 
seriously addressed as possibilities, and signalling to the new Nixon Administration that 
domestic political attitudes toward China policy were changing significantly. These 
examples also highlight the manner in which individual legislators can affect the thought 
and debate of policymakers and the public regarding foreign affairs through individual or 
collaborative action, as well as through leveraging the capabilities of a committee or 
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subcommittee. 
A means of Congressional influence on policy that is not often recognised, but 
nevertheless can be very effective, is the inhibiting nature of known policy views of 
Congressional leaders, which can  help determine the legitimate policy options open to 
the Executive Branch. This type of influence was evident in 1974 when the Department 
of Defense (DOD) was interested in pursuing an aggressive American military posture in 
Asia as a means of containing growing Soviet power in the region by taking advantage of 
Sino-Soviet hostility and pursuing an informal cooperative military relationship with 
China. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was favourably disposed towards an idea 
that involved an increased American force posture in Asia as part of a framework of 
military cooperation with the People's Republic of China in late 1974. However, the 
major American military effort in Indochina had just ended, partially through the efforts 
of the Congress. In this context, Congress's known distaste for any military spending and 
Pentagon initiatives of any kind, as well as its overall support for US-Soviet détente in 
1974, and the lack of Congressional support for such a cooperative relationship with 
China, had a major impact on Schlesinger's thinking. Because of this political 
environment, he decided not to pursue this option in internal policy discussions within 
DOD and elsewhere within the Executive Branch, despite the fact that fairly senior 
Pentagon officials supported this policy option as being the one that would best protect 
Washington's security interests in Asia. Likewise, the views of leading Senators regarding 
potential political appointees to foreign and national security policy roles can heavily 
influence the choice of which nominees are named by the President. It was widely 
believed during the 1970's, for example, that a major reason that James Schlesinger was 
appointed to a series of increasingly high-profile posts by President Nixon was due to the 
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influence of Democratic Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson, who shared a very similar 
foreign policy outlook with Nixon.41 
Thus, as has been briefly shown, there are many ways in which the Congress can 
exert a powerful influence over foreign policy. This system of checks and balances that 
characterise the government of the United States has been called an 'abiding mystery',42 
and has been a source of frustration not only to American government officials but also to 
foreign leaders. Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping, told Vice President Walter Mondale in 
1979 that he was beginning to understand that the Executive Branch did not hold all 
power in the American political system, but that 'you really have four branches of 
government: the executive branch, Congress, the courts and the media!'43 
Political Science Scholarship Relating to the Congressional Role in Foreign and 
Defence Policy 
While the historical literature examining the Congressional role in US foreign 
policy is lacking, there is a growing body of political science and legal literature studying 
the Congressional role in foreign and defence policy. In relation to this body of literature, 
this thesis is in harmony with the views of Louis Fischer, the leading scholar on 
constitutional prerogatives in foreign and defence policy, whose work has emphasised the 
largely ignored role of Congress.44 
This body of literature has taken a wide variety of views on the patterns of 
Executive-Legislative interaction over foreign policy and of the possible reasons for 
41 Internal office memorandum from the office of Senator Walter Mondale, reporting on a conversation 
with Richard Perle, a Jackson staff member, 26 February 1974, Location 153.L.13.6F, Walter Mondale 
Senatorial Papers, Minnesota State Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota; Interview with former 
Jackson staff member Charles Horner, 27 August 2009, Washington, D.C.
42 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Alfred De Grazia, Congress and the Presidency: Their Role in Modern 
Times (Washington, D.C., 1967).
43 Interview with former Vice President Walter Mondale, 17 November 2010, Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
44 See Louis Fisher, On Appreciating Congress: The People's Branch (Boulder, 2010); and Defending 
Congress and the Constitution (Lawrence, Kansas, 2011) 
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Congressional behaviour in these areas. Common issues addressed include that of the 
balance of power between the Legislative and Executive branches vis-a-vis foreign and 
defence policy, the various motivations of Congressional leaders regarding such policy, 
and how policy decisions are reached within the Congress. 
One group of scholars argue that relative power between the Executive and 
Legislative branches in these policy areas is cyclical. The 'pendulum theory', which 
argues that relative power in the area of foreign policy swings back and forth between the 
two branches in historical cycles like the pendulum of a clock, is perhaps the best-known 
of these views.45 Proponents of this view typically argue that such swings in relative 
power are a natural result of the American system of governmental checks and balances 
as the American government faces various domestic and international challenges. A 
second school of thought argues that the presidency is perpetually superior to the 
legislative branch in terms of authority over foreign policy, regardless of historic trends. A 
third group of scholars argues  that each branch has areas in which it is the strongest with 
regard to foreign policy. According to this 'complimenting view', which has been most 
prominently advocated the work edited by Lindsay and Ripley in 1993, Congress 
Resurgent, the presidency is most powerful at times of crisis, the two branches share 
power more evenly in the area of strategic policy, and Congress is at its most powerful in 
the making of long-term, structural policy.46 Lindsay and Ripley define structural policy 
as determining the manner in which resources are used. 
Others, focusing more heavily on Congress itself rather than the relative 
authority of Congress and the Presidency over foreign policy, have studied 
45 The pendulum theory is described in, among other places, Cecil Crabb and Pat Holt, Invitation to 
Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy, (Washington, D.C, 1980); See also Thomas 
Frank and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress, (New York, 1979). 
46 James Lindsay and Randall Ripley, eds., Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol 
Hill (Ann Arbor, 1993). 
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determinants of the legislative behaviour of individual Members – examining why 
they vote the way that they do. The first major study of this issue was Warren Miller 
and Donald Stokes' 1963 article, 'Constituency Influence in Congress',47 which was 
followed by a number of other studies. Studies that have focused on determining the 
causal factors behind a given Member's votes in the area of defence spending have 
disagreed over whether Member attitudes are primarily determined by ideology or 
by constituent interests (such as the amount of economic activity in a given state or 
Congressional district that is related in some way to defence spending).48 Despite the 
fact that conventional wisdom has held that the amount of money which flows to a 
given state or Congressional district as a result of defence-related contracts is the 
major determinant, the majority of such studies have tended to conclude that the 
'parochial hypothesis' (that constituent interests are the primary causal factor) has 
little factual basis and that ideology plays the dominant role. The attitude of many 
House Members to defence spending in the early 1970's, which was extremely 
critical despite defence-related spending in their districts, supports this view. The 
role of ideology was evident in intra-governmental consideration of a potential 
military relationship with China, as well as in the critical attitude of liberal House 
47 Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, 'Constituency Influence in Congress', American Political Science 
Review 57 (1963), pp.45-56. 
48 For arguments against the 'parochial hypothesis' and in favour of the view that ideology is the major 
determinant, see Stephen Cobb, 'Defense Spending and Foreign Policy in the House of 
Representatives', Journal of Conflict Resolution 13 (1969), pp.358-69;
Wayne Moyer, 'House Voting on Defense: An Ideological Explanation', in Bruce Russett and Alfred 
Stepan, eds., Military Force and American Society (New York, 1973);
Robert Bernstein and William Anthony, 'The ABM Issue in the Senate, 1968-1970: The Importance of 
Ideology', American Political Science Review 68:3 (September 1974), pp.1198-1206; 
James McCormick and Michael Black, 'Ideology and Senate Voting on the Panama Canal Treaties', 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 8:1 (February 1983), pp.45-63.
For arguments that constituent interest is the primary causal factor see Charles Gray and Glenn 
Gregory, 'Military Spending and Senate Voting: A Correlational Study', Journal of Peace Research 5 
(1968), pp.44-5; and 
Bruce Russett, What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense (New Haven, 1970), 
particularly chapters 2 and 3. 
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and Senate Members to any aggressive American military posture in post-Vietnam 
war Asia, which affected the Pentagon's consideration of a potential relationship of 
security cooperation with China in Asia in 1974. 
By contrast, research into Congressional behaviour in the area of trade policy 
has tended to show that constituency interests are the major determinant of 
legislative behaviour.49 The case of the opening to China illustrated the influence of 
constituency interests on foreign policy attitudes when Members from states which 
were likely to benefit from the opening of relations, such as Western states oriented 
toward trade with the Pacific and Midwestern agricultural states hoping for grain 
sales to the world's most populous nation, advocated for the breaking down of trade 
and diplomatic barriers. 
A few scholars have looked at the role of partisan concerns and 
Congressional committees in foreign and defence policy decision-making on Capitol 
Hill. Areas examined have included the relationship between relevant committees 
(such as the Senate and House Armed Services Committees) and the full 
chambers,50 and the role of party leaders and partisan concerns in the formulation of 
49 Suzzane Tosini and Edward Tower, 'The Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinants of Congressional 
Voting Patterns', Public Choice 54, pp.19-25;
Richard Smith, 'Interest Group Influence in the US Congress', Legislative Studies Quarterly  20:1 
(February 1995), pp.89-139; and
In-Bong Kang and Kenneth Greene, 'A Political Economic Analysis of Congressional Voting Patterns 
on NAFTA', Public Choice 98:3-4 (March 1999), pp.385-97. 
50 Bruce Ray, 'The Responsiveness of the US Congressional Armed Services Committees of Their Parent 
Bodies', Legislative Studies Quarterly 5:4 (Nov. 1980), pp.501-15.; 
Arthur Denzau and Robert Mackay, 'Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of 
Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior', American Journal of Political Science 27:4 (Nov. 1983), pp.740-
61; 
Keith Krehbiel, Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'Why Are Congressional Committees Powerful?', 
American Political Science Review 81:3 (September 1987), pp.929-45; 
Keith Krehbiel, 'Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?', American Political 
Science Review 84:1 (March 1990); 
Christopher Deering, 'Decision Making in the Armed Services Committees', in James Lindsay and 
Randall Ripley, eds., Congress Resurgent, pp.155-82;
Barbara Sinclair, 'Congressional Party Leaders in the Foreign and Defense Policy Arena', ibid., pp.207-
31;
Joseph White, ' Decision Making in the Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense and Foreign 
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foreign and defence policy, a trend that has been particularly apparent due to the 
increasing polarisation of the parties since the 1960's.51 
The clearest characteristic of Executive-Legislative interaction over China policy 
in period, however, is the constructive role that Congress can play in questioning the 
basic assumptions and logical underpinnings of Executive Branch foreign policy. 
Constitutional scholar Edward Corwin famously wrote regarding Congress and the 
Presidency that the Constitution was 'an invitation to struggle for the privilege of 
directing American foreign policy',52 and the struggle between the two branches has 
occupied the focus of most legal scholars and political scientists who have sought to 
investigate this area. Most scholarship on Executive-Legislative relations over foreign 
policy understands the relationship as a zero-sum game in which a gain by one branch 
represents a loss by the other. However, the pattern of Congressional influence on Sino-
American relations supports the argument that Executive-Legislative interaction on 
foreign policy tends to be more complimentary than each side appreciates.53 Due to 
Constitutional vagueness, tension between the two branches over their respective foreign 
policy roles has existed since the time of George Washington. The Executive Branch 
tends to see the Congress primarily as a nuisance that interferes with Executive Branch 
prerogatives, and the Congress tends to see Executive Branch officials as arrogant and 
Operations', ibid., pp.183-206; and 
Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions', Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, 19:2 (May 1994), pp.149-79.
51 Barbara Sinclair has been one of the most prominent of such scholars. See Barbara Sinclair, 
Congressional Realignment: 1925-1978 (Austin, Texas, 1982); 
'Congressional Party Leaders in the Foreign and Defense Policy Arena', in James Lindsay and Randall 
Ripley, eds., Congress Resurgent, pp.207-31; and 
Do Parties Matter? (Irvine, Calfornia, 1998). 
See also Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New 
York, 1970), p.10. 
52 Edward Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957 (New York, 1957), p.200.
53 It must be pointed out, however, that the complementarity evident in Congressional consideration of 
China policy during the 1970's is not identical to that described by Lindsay and Ripley, who define 
structural policy, which they identify as an area of Congressional strength, as policy which 'governs 
how resources are used'; 'How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy', Congress Resurgent. 
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uncommunicative. Despite these mutual, institutionally-based biases, however, each 
branch can play a complimentary role in the development of  foreign policy. 
Often, Congress's contribution in the area of foreign and security policy is one of 
raising the 'big picture issues' that those in the Executive Branch, who have become 
wedded to a given policy view, and/or are so at the mercy of constant crises that they do 
not have sufficient time to reflect on many of the larger issues underpinning their 
preferred policies. Consideration of China policy during the period of rapprochement and 
normalisation illustrates the constructive role that can be played by the Congress in the 
development of sound policy. Examples of this type of Congressional contribution 
include the many Congressional hearings which attempted to examine the various aspects 
of China policy, at times challenging Executive Branch policy and at times hoping to 
question the underlying assumptions of such policy in order to strengthen a policy the 
basic direction of which was supported by the panel. The issues raised in many of these 
hearings were deserving of public debate and involved fundamental questions such as the 
nature of the American approach to communism and the interrelation of Sino-American 
relations with Soviet-American relations. 
Aim of This Thesis
This thesis attempts to fill the gap in rapprochement literature by examining the 
role played by Congress and domestic politics in the process of Sino-American 
rapprochement and normalisation. Filling such a gap is important for several reasons. One 
is the vast swaths of unexplored primary source material related to Congressional 
attitudes toward China and to Legislative-Executive interaction over China policy.  A 
wealth of primary source material is available from a wide variety sources, including 
numerous collections spread around the United States belonging to various former key 
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Senators and House Members; committee records and papers of various committee 
chairmen housed in the Legislative Division of the National Archives in Washington, 
D.C., including the documents of Record Group 46 (the records of the United States 
Senate, which contain the records of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee); committee 
prints, reports, and hearings, most of which are now available to researchers, including 
many of the executive (closed) sessions of the various committees, available in the U.S. 
Senate Library; the Congressional Record; collections contained at the Library of 
Congress, which include the papers of former Members of the Senate and House as well 
as those of relevant former executive branch officials such as Averell Harriman; the 
papers of Record Group 59 (State Department records) in the National Archives in 
College Park, Maryland; materials in the Nixon, Ford and Carter Presidential libraries, 
which contain an increasing number of documents related to Presidential dealings with 
Congress which have recently been processed and opened to researchers; and the 
collections of private individuals who were involved in China policy, those of Edgar 
Snow being the most prominent example. Other materials not normally accessible to 
researchers, such as privately held records of former officials and the uncatalogued and 
private records of the Senate Republican Policy Committee were made available to this 
researcher and shed light on the attitude of Senate Republicans to the opening to China in 
1971 and 1972. This thesis will draw significantly on this largely unexplored material. 
Another reason that this research gap needs to be addressed is the importance of 
Sino-American rapprochement and normalisation both to Cold War history as well as to 
an understanding of the present day. Sino-American rapprochement and normalisation is 
correctly regarded as a watershed period of international history. The fact that the United 
States took advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to eventually build a 'tacit alliance' with 
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Communist China against the Soviet Union was a key turning point in the Cold War, and 
without the entry into the world community of the world's most populous nation and its 
subsequent adoption of a form of capitalism, the world that we now know would not have 
been possible. Gaining a fuller understanding of this paradigm shift in Cold War history, 
therefore, is crucial. 
A third reason that this research gap should be addressed is that, as mentioned 
above, without understanding the Congressional role that was played in this drama only a 
truncated picture of Sino-American rapprochement and normalisation emerges. This 
thesis will, therefore, examine the attitudes and actions of Congress with respect to China 
policy, paying special attention to: the political and strategic environment within which 
China policy was created, the role of ideology and partisan considerations, institutional 
differences, the nature of interaction with the Executive Branch, and the impact that the 
advocacy of certain points of view on the part of individual Members and staff had on the 
consideration of policy options, the expression of policy preferences, and on policy 
outcomes. What emerges as a result of this approach is a more holistic picture of the 
development of US-China relations. This new approach contrasts with historical and 
political science studies that have over-emphasised the role of the Executive Branch 
and/or under-emphasized the domestic political process that impacted on Congress’s role 
in shaping that relationship. 
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HISTORICAL PROLOGUE: CONGRESS AND CHINA, 1949-1968 
Prior to 1969, Congress played a major role in the development of Washington's 
China policy, a role that went through two distinct phases. In the early period of the Cold 
War, when the 'China Lobby' was so influential, Congress was at the heart of the effort to 
isolate Peking, and in many ways constrained what few impulses occurred within the 
Executive Branch to re-examine any portion of the policy of the 'containment and 
isolation' of the new Chinese Communist regime. From the mid 1960's onward, due to 
dramatic changes in the strategic environment and equally dramatic changes within the 
Democratic Party, Congress became a driving force behind a movement to break down 
barriers and to seek more normal relations with Peking. 
Congress Helps Build Structure of Containment and Defines Political Space for 
Permissible Executive Action
From 1950 through the early 1960's, Congress enacted an interlocking network of 
laws that created a total trade embargo with regard to China either through directly 
restricting trade or by authorising the Executive Branch to do so. At the same time, using 
its power of the purse, it pushed for increased economic and military aid to the 
government and military of the Nationalists on Taiwan. The foreign assistance program 
was also used as a means to strengthen American allies on China's periphery through 
economic and military aid, the purpose of which was to contain China.54 Congress also 
funded a ring of military bases surrounding China and partnered with the Eisenhower 
54 William Fulbright affirmed in the early 1960's that the containment of China was the goal of US foreign 
aid to Asian allies, as did Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Congressional testimony. See undated 1962 
Fulbright speech, Record Group 46, Records of the United States Senate (hereafter, RG 46); 1958-1965, 
Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, Chairman Fulbright's statements on foreign affairs, Box 1, 
NARA I; 
Senate floor speech by William Fulbright, 1 August 1964, ibid.; and   
Dean Rusk statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 5 April 1963, Box 499, Averell   
Harriman Papers. 
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Administration to create SEATO, which was meant to be the Asian equivalent of NATO, 
aimed at containing China's military power, to confirm the Sino-American Mutual 
Security Treaty of 1954, and to pass the Formosa Resolution, which gave the Executive 
Branch Congressional authority to introduce American armed forces into the Taiwan 
Straits area to defend Taiwan and an undefined number of islands under its control in the 
event of an attack by the Mainland. Lastly, from January 1951 onward, both chambers of 
Congress went on record, sometimes several times annually, opposing recognition of 
Peking and the admission of Mainland China into the United Nations through the passage 
of various resolutions. Each annual foreign aid bill from the early 1950's onward 
contained such language, and Congress also passed numerous 'sense of the Congress' 
resolutions expressing this attitude. Figures who would later challenge the anti-
Communist assumptions that undergirded, and reinforced Executive Branch policy 
toward China, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee (hereafter SFRC) chairman 
William Fulbright and Senator Mike Mansfield, strongly supported the policy of the 
containment and isolation of China through the early 1960's.55 
Congressional sentiment was so strongly in favour of placing as much pressure on 
Peking as possible that it served as a major inhibiting factor on any possibility that the 
Executive Branch might consider slightly more flexible policy options in the areas of 
trade, travel restrictions, UN membership, etc. President Eisenhower, for example, 
displayed some interest in allowing the same limited level of trade with Peking as was 
allowed with Moscow, yet complained that 'our trouble was that our domestic political 
55 Senators Mike Mansfield (D-MT) and Alexander Smith (R-NJ) took part in the negotiations which 
created SEATO at the invitation of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and were original signatories, 
see Don Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield: The Extraordinary Life of a Great American Statesman and 
Diplomat (Washington, D.C., 2003), pp.121-4; and
Senate floor speech by William Fulbright, 12 May 1959, Congressional Record; undated 1962 
Fulbright speech, RG 46, Committee on Foreign Relations, Chairman Fulbright's speeches, Box 1, 
NARA I.
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situation . . . compelled us to adopt an absolutely rigid policy'.56 A few years later, when 
members of President Kennedy's Administration considered such initiatives as 
recognition of Outer Mongolia, a move to which Chiang Kai-shek strongly objected, 
taking a 'two Chinas' approach to the Chinese representation ('Chirep') issue at the UN, 
providing food aid to China in the midst of the famine caused by Mao's 'Great Leap 
Forward', and lowering restrictions on travel to China, the negative reaction from 
Congress was immediate, unified and strong. 
Roger Hilsman, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research in Kennedy's first two years, records that a bipartisan coalition of Congressional 
members of the China Lobby informed the Administration in 1961 that 'they intended to 
destroy Kennedy's foreign aid program with crippling amendments unless the 
administration abandoned its plan to recognize Mongolia'.57  First the Senate and then the 
House overwhelmingly passed a concurrent resolution which reaffirmed support for the 
Republic of China and opposition to UN membership for Peking, pointedly  supporting 
the existing policy of non-recognition. From 1961 through the remainder of the 1960's 
more than fifteen resolutions and amendments restated Congressional opposition to UN 
membership for China, continuing even after Congressional liberals began to question the 
wisdom of current China policy in the mid 1960's. 
Harbingers of Change 
In spite of strong opposition to a critical re-evaluation of China policy, first the 
56 22 December 1955 Memorandum of Discussion, 271st Meeting of the National Security Council, 
FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. III, China, Document 124;
See Simei Qing, 'The Eisenhower Administration and Changes in Western Embargo Policy Against 
China', in Warren Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960 (New York, 
1990), for detailed information on Eisenhower's attitude on trade with China. 
See also Rosemary Foot, 'The Eisenhower Administration's Fear of Empowering the Chinese', Political 
Science Quarterly 111:3 (Autumn 1996). 
57 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics and Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. 
Kennedy (Garden City, New York, 1967), p.307. 
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Sino-Soviet split and then the Vietnam War gradually generated pressure for change. 
Some Members of Congress began to gain an awareness of the rift in the early 1960's and 
to follow its evolution, with the SFRC using hearings to aim detailed questions at 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk about the nature of the split.58 In March 1962 Senator 
Hubert Humphrey noted that the Sino-Soviet split was causing 'a fundamental change in 
the world balance of power' and that:
There is reason to believe . . . that a Sino-Soviet split could be to our advantage. . . 
. . . The centralised Soviet empire might never be the same again . . . with the 
defection or outright hostility of China, the cohesiveness of the Communist bloc 
would be broken, perhaps forever.59 
As evidence accumulated of growing Sino-Soviet hostility, an increasing number 
of Members began to understand the seriousness and permanence of the dispute, and the 
opportunities it provided for American foreign policy, which dynamic began to place 
China policy in a different strategic context than had existed earlier. In light of the Sino-
Soviet split, Humphrey surmised that reaching out to Peking could provide benefits to 
Washington, writing to Fulbright in 1963 that a review of China policy 'may very well 
merit consideration'. He simultaneously acknowledged, however, that the ability to begin 
a public debate over policy remained constrained, and expressed a reticence to publicly 
advocate in favour of policy reform.60 Domestic political changes were beginning, 
however, in response to growing American involvement in Vietnam, that would create a 
much more favourable climate for reconsideration of China policy. 
As the Sino-Soviet split became increasingly bitter, undermining the conviction 
58 SFRC staff memorandum, 11 January 1963, f.2115, Accession C3974, Stuart Symington Papers, 
Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri-Columbia. 
59 Senate floor speech by Hubert Humphrey, 16 March 1962, Congressional Record. 
60 Hubert Humphrey to William Fulbright, 18 September 1963, RG 46, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Chairman's Correspondence (1963-1967), Box 2, NARA I. 
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that communism was monolithic, growing American involvement in the war in Vietnam 
provided the other factor that would facilitate a shift of opinion, beginning within the 
Democratic Party, regarding how best to approach communism. William Fulbright's 
March 1964 Senate floor speech, 'Old Myths and New Realities', was the first major 
speech given by a Democratic leader indicating the start of the unravelling of the 
domestic political consensus that had supported US foreign policy since the 1940s. The 
themes touched upon in Fulbright's speech were expanded upon and published as a book 
later that year.61 It marked the beginning of a thought process among liberals that would 
develop more fully as the Johnson Administration committed the United States more 
deeply to the defence of South Vietnam. Fulbright came to personify the ideological shift 
within the Democratic party, and to some degree among some liberal Republicans as well, 
against the aggressive containment of communism that had characterised American 
foreign policy to that point in the Cold War. 
The changing foreign policy perspectives among liberal Democrats, which was 
first publicly articulated by Fulbright, had obvious implications for China policy. As early 
as late 1963 and early 1964, a few Democratic senators began to indicate that they 
believed China policy to be symbolic of the broader change that was needed. 
Simultaneous with Fulbright's speech, three other liberal Senators, Edmund Muskie, 
Frank Moss, and Warren Magnuson, secretly contacted Edgar Snow, the American 
socialist journalist known to have the trust of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, asking 
whether Snow might intercede on their behalf to obtain visas to China. Although Snow 
wrote to his contact at the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the response was negative.62 China, 
61 William Fulbright, Old Myths and New Realities (New York, 1964). 
62 Edgar Snow to Kung Peng, 26 March 1964, f.53, Edgar Parks Snow Papers, University Archives, 
University of Missouri, Kansas City, Missouri; 30 April 1964 letter from Kung Peng to Edgar Snow, 
ibid.
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on the cusp of the Cultural Revolution, was not yet ready to host a group of Senators from 
China's 'imperialist' enemy, since this would have undermined Mao's claims to be the 
leader of the global revolutionary movement.
1965 and 1966 House and Senate Hearings Reshape the Terms of Debate
The beginnings of ideological change among liberals of both parties, the changing 
strategic environment caused by the Sino-Soviet split, and America's growing 
involvement in the war in Vietnam, led to a series of committee hearings in both the 
House and Senate that challenged, for the first time, existing policy toward Asian 
communism. The three sets of hearings have been largely overlooked by historians, 
despite the fact that together they symbolise a paradigm shift in Washington's thinking 
toward China policy and successfully reset the terms of debate. All three sets of hearings 
were designed to be educative, both of the Congress as a whole and of the US public, and, 
hopefully, to create pressure on the Executive to reform policy toward China.63 Together, 
these hearings reshaped public perceptions of China policy and set the agenda for 
discussion of China policy within Washington – a trajectory that ultimately resulted in the 
opening to China in 1971. 
The first of these hearings was held by the House Foreign Affairs Committee's 
Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, chaired by Clement Zablocki. Zablocki 
was a Cold War liberal who remained convinced of the need to contain Chinese 
communism.64 The Zablocki hearings' impact on the evolution of US China policy has 
been overlooked by historians likely due to the fact that little overt movement to lessen 
tensions with Peking took place in their immediate aftermath. However, they were the 
63 Interviews with John Sullivan, the House Asian and Pacific Affairs subcommittee chief of staff who 
organised both sets of House hearings, 30 June 2009, Alexandria, Virginia; and Richard Moose, SFRC 
staff member, 26 June 2009, Alexandria, Virginia. 
64 Speech by Clement Zablocki, 27 January 1964, Series PR-3, Speeches, 1949-1983, Box 4, Clement 
Zablocki Papers, Raynor Memorial Library, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
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first time that the Congress had publicly questioned China policy and advocated for 
policy change. The portion of the subcommittee report that made the largest impression, 
both in the media and within the Johnson Administration, was the suggestion that 'The 
United States should give, at an appropriate time, consideration of limited but direct 
contact with Red China'.65 It was significant that the suggestion was made by a 
subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which was not known to 
challenge Executive Branch policy and whose chairman, Thomas 'Doc' Morgan, was 
close to President Johnson, rather than by the SFRC, whose chairman, William Fulbright, 
had begun to challenge the full range of Washington's foreign policy, particularly policy 
toward Asia. 
The hearings also marked the first time that a Congressional panel sought to 
address the Sino-Soviet split and its potential implications for American foreign policy – 
the issue that would lay at the foundation of the Nixon White House's China initiative 
several years later. The subcommittee report and subsequent book based on the hearings 
contained the first public reference to what became known as the 'triangular relationship' 
between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The concept for which Kissinger 
is many times given credit with creating, therefore, that of a Sino-Soviet-American 
diplomatic and strategic triangle, had actually been made part of the policy discourse by a 
Congressional panel long before Kissinger took office. 
If the goal of the hearings was to raise awareness within Congress of the Sino-
Soviet split and to spark a public debate of China policy, those goals were met. The 
subcommittee expended significant energy seeking media attention and, while it received 
(in keeping with the House's inability to gain as high a media profile as the Senate) only a 
fraction of the attention that its Senate counterpart did a year later, the subcommittee did 
65 Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict and its Implications, p.15R. 
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receive some media attention.66 The New York Times, writing in the midst of the Fulbright 
hearings a year later, referred to the Zablocki hearings of 1965 as 'important, though little 
noted', and noted that those hearings, together with the Zablocki and Fulbright hearings of 
early 1966, was evidence that 'the Congress, which has conventionally relied upon 
Presidential initiative in complex foreign-policy matters', was beginning to take the lead 
in driving debate on potential reform of China policy.67 
The hearings also received the attention of other Members of the House, resulting 
in Congressional requests for information on the Sino-Soviet split from the State 
Department's office of Mainland China Affairs.68 Most importantly, the hearings began 
the process of change, accelerated by a second round of subcommittee hearings as well as 
by SFRC hearings the next year, by which time it had become more acceptable both for 
Members of Congress and for non-governmental groups to speak publicly in favour of 
policy reform. A month after the end of the hearings, two unprecedented 
recommendations were made by non-governmental groups urging a fresh look at existing 
policy. In late April the US Chamber of Commerce, interested in potential trade 
opportunities, urged the Johnson Administration 'to explore steps designed to more 
66 The subcommittee released multiple press releases over the course of the hearings which were meant to 
raise the media profile of the hearings, found in Series FA-2.1,  Box 2, Clement Zablocki Papers;
See 'Relations With China', Washington Post, 23 May 1965; 'Possible Russian Turn to West Forecast by 
House Subcommittee', Journal Wire Service, 16 May 1965; 'A Time for Reappraisal?', New York Times,  
20 March 1966; Washington Post, 1 March 1965. Regarding the differential in media attention granted 
to the 1966 Zablocki and Fulbright hearings, respectively, see 'These Days: “Live” News and TV 
Objectivity', Washington Post, 26 February 1966; and Joseph Kraft, 'Insight and Outlook: The Other 
Hearings', Washington Post, 26 February 1966, in which Kraft asserts that the Zablocki hearings were 
'less dramatic, but far more illuminating' than the hearings held by Fulbright. 
The Providence [Rhode Island] Journal praised the Zablocki hearings, saying that the Subcommittee 
'has taken a cautious but courageous step in becoming the 1st congressional group to publish a report 
urging' contact with China, 9 May 1965, f.60, Edgar Snow Papers. 
67 'A Time for Reappraisal?', New York Times, 20 March 1966. 
68 Lindsay Grant, Officer in Charge, Mainland China Affairs, to 'The Files', re: 'Briefing of Congressmen 
on Policy Toward Communist China', 17 May 1965, Lot File 70D248 and 71D423, Subject Files of the 
Office of Asian Communist Affairs (hereafter, ACA), 1969-1973, Box  1, Record Group 59, Records of 
the US Department of State (hereafter, RG 59), National Archives and Record Administration, College 
Park, Maryland (hereafter, NARA II).
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effectively open channels of communication with the people of mainland China'.69 The 
same week, a joint conference hosted by Georgetown and American Universities, 
including speakers from business associations, academia, and the Senate, all similarly 
urged the Administration to lower trade barriers with China as a first step toward 
rapprochement, with Senator George McGovern (D-SD), a Midwesterner hoping for grain 
sales for farmers from his home state, calling for a first step of removing the restrictions 
on selling surplus grain to China.70 
As the New York Times recognised, the hearings evidenced Congress taking the 
initiative from the executive branch in the area of foreign policy in general, and policy 
toward Asia in particular. The hearings sparked a debate within Washington over China 
policy that had previously not existed, and were quickly followed by calls on the part of 
business, agricultural and religious organisations for policy reform. Most importantly, 
these hearings, and the calls for policy reform that accompanied them, prodded discussion 
within the Johnson Administration of China policy. Two months after the hearings ended, 
Marshall Green, Johnson's ambassador-designate to Indonesia, noticed the change in 
Congressional attitudes, which were communicated by William Fulbright, whose views 
on China had been evolving for at least the previous year. Fulbright, with whom Green 
met ahead of Senate confirmation hearings, had read speeches made by Green in which 
Green had recommended expanding official contacts with China. To Green's surprise, 
Fulbright expressed agreement. After the meeting, Green advised the State Department 
that changing sentiment on Capitol Hill regarding China policy was broader than even 
that indicated by Zablocki's hearings, noting pressure from Fulbright to expand contacts 
69 'Leaders of US Chamber Urge Steps to Ease Peking Embargo', AP, 24 April 1965; 'Chamber Bids US 
Ease Peking Curb; Asks “Communication” with the People of Red China,' New York Times, 29 April 
1965. 
70  'Peking and Washington', Washington Post, 5 May 1965. 
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with  China.71 
The changing environment caused Green to perceive an opportunity to propose 
that the travel ban to China be lifted.72 The next day, NSC aid James Thomson, who had 
long argued in favour of a more flexible China policy, took advantage of the indications 
of changing Congressional sentiment and a more propitious domestic political 
environment to press for incremental policy changes.73 Two weeks later, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, William Bundy, also reacting to the calls for 
policy reform emanating first from Congress and then business organisations, wrote to 
Dean Rusk also recommending that the Administration pursue some minimal changes, 
arguing that 'We have had recommendations for increased efforts at contact from various 
quarters, including the US Chamber of Commerce and the Zablocki subcommittee'.74 
Rusk initialled at the bottom of the memo his disapproval of the Bundy's 
recommendation,75 and Johnson rejected these potential policy changes a couple of weeks 
later.76 Despite Johnson's rejection of minimal policy changes then, a series of small travel 
regulation liberalisations were gradually introduced from late 1965 through the summer 
of 1966. 
 The Sino-Soviet split was the initial inspiration for the beginnings of a 
Congressional challenge to existing China policy. The sustained Congressional challenge 
emerged, however, out of the Johnson Administration's growing commitment of 
American troops to the conflict in Vietnam, which raised the possibility that a Sino-
71  Marshall Green to Lindsay Grant, 1 June 1965, Lot File 72D175, Subject Files of the Office of ACA, 
1969-1973, Box 3, RG 59, NARA II. 
72  ibid.
73 James Thomson to McGeorge Bundy, 2 June 1965, Document 88, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXX, China. 
74 William Bundy to Dean Rusk, 16 June 1965, Document 89, ibid.
75  ibid.
76 McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, 24 August 1965, cited by Lumbers, Michael, Piercing the 
Bamboo Curtain:Tentative Bridge-building to China during the Johnson Years (New York, 2008), p.94, 
f.50. 
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American military conflict might result as it had from the last Asian land war in which 
Washington had been involved on China's periphery – the conflict in Korea. Given the 
fact that one of the primary rationales used by the President and senior Administration 
officials for involvement in Vietnam was the need to contain Chinese influence in Asia 
and the conviction that Hanoi was merely a proxy for Peking, it is ironic that the war also 
became the primary reason for the Congressional challenge of existing China policy. The 
question of whether the Administration's strategy in Vietnam would lead to military 
conflict with China became a key point of contention between Senate liberals, on the one 
hand, and the Johnson Administration and the House leadership, on the other. Fulbright 
used his position as SFRC chairman to advance his thesis, backed by such liberal allies as 
George McGovern and Edward 'Ted' Kennedy, that escalating American involvement in 
Vietnam was likely to lead to Chinese intervention and a direct military clash with 
China.77 Administration officials and other leading Democrats, including Zablocki and 
House Democratic leaders, completely rejected this.78 79 
The subject of China policy in the context of the growing commitment to Vietnam 
was addressed by two sets of hearings in early 1966, one by Zablocki's subcommittee and 
the other by Fulbright's committee. The Zablocki hearings continued the discourse that 
had been initiated the previous year regarding China policy, advocating a re-evaluation of 
Asia policy.80 Zablocki continued to garner media attention in his push for a re-evaluation 
77 'China and the Vietnam War–Will History Repeat?' Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
United States Senate by Senator Joseph Clark, 29 March 1968 (Washington, D.C., 1968); 
'Six Senators Warn President on War:Say Escalation May Bring in Chinese and Russians', New York 
Times, 15 May 1967. 
78 Walt Rostow to Averell Harriman, 11 August 1966, Box 462, Averell Harriman Papers; see also Averell 
Harriman memo for Personal Files, 6 October 1966, ibid.
79  'US Policy in Asia: What Do We Do With China?' a speech by Clement Zablocki at the National 
Eagles Convention, Kansas City, Missouri, Thursday, 27 July 1967, Series PR-3, Speeches, 1949-1983, 
Box 4, Clement Zablocki Papers.
80 'United States Policy Toward Asia', Report by the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C., May 1965).
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of China policy, telling an interviewer from the Washington Post, 'We must come to grips 
with the inevitable rise of China as a power'.81 The set of hearings that had the greatest 
impact on the embryonic debate over China policy reform were those held by Fulbright, 
whose hearings on Vietnam and China were designed to challenge the Administration's 
Vietnam policy as well as its China policy, and to express the liberal belief that American 
involvement in Vietnam would lead to war with China.82 The hearings were the most 
well-publicised of the sets of hearings dealing with Asia policy in 1965 and 1966 and had 
the greatest impact on public and Congressional thinking. The Vietnam hearings began in 
January and ended in March, with hearings on China immediately following. Fulbright 
designed his hearings to educate and alter thinking about China within the Congress, the 
media and the general public, and to advocate for the United States to change its China 
policy and break down barriers with Peking.83 In this sense, the hearings were wildly 
successful. Polling taken during the hearings showed that fifty four percent of the 
American public were aware of the televised hearings. They received extensive, mostly 
positive, response from the media (much of which joined the Congressional advocacy for 
change)84, with most witnesses suggesting that the Johnson Administration show 
increased flexibility in its China policy and seek greater avenues of communication with 
China. 
The key phrase to come out of the hearings that represented a general consensus 
on a revised direction for China policy was 'containment without isolation', which was 
meant to denote that Washington should no longer attempt to isolate China economically 
81 'US Policy on China Studied by House Unit', Washington Post, 7 February 1966; see also 'House Panel 
Finds US Limited in Asia', UPI, 21 May 1966.
82  Interview with former SFRC staff member James Lowenstein, 9 March 2010, Washington, D.C. 
83  ibid., and interview with Richard Moose, 26 June 2009, Alexandria, Virginia; Fulbright himself stated 
this purpose in Senate floor statements announcing the hearings. 
84 Harrison Salisbury to Edgar Snow, 14 April 1966, f.64, Correspondence, January 1–May 31, 1966, 
Edgar Snow Papers; among the many media articles supporting policy change see 'A Time for 
Reappraisal?', New York Times, 20 March 1966. 
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and diplomatically. Witnesses generally supported the Administration's goals in Vietnam, 
as well as the idea that China needed to be contained and its influence in Asia balanced 
due to its aggressive behaviour, revolutionary rhetoric, possible expansionist intentions 
and potential to dominate Asia due to its massive size. They also suggested, however, that 
isolating China would only serve to exacerbate Peking's aggressive tendencies. Breaking 
down the barriers of communication, it was argued, would serve to socialise China, 
moderate its behaviour and gradually ease its hostility to the established global order.85 
The Fulbright and Zablocki hearings sparked a period of intense public discussion of Asia 
policy in general, and China policy in particular, that brought about a paradigm shift 
regarding thinking about China and the acceptability of public debate over possible 
alternative policies. The two sets of hearings, and the public debate that they sparked, 
took the initiative away from the Johnson Administration, and brought significant 
pressure to bear on the Administration to reconsider policy. In March, the President was 
asked at a press conference to respond to calls for a more flexible China policy. While 
Johnson said that while he 'had watched with interest and complete understanding the 
testimony of various committees', it was China that bore primary responsibility for the 
alientation of the two countries, not the United States.86 The hearings had begun a national 
conversation, however, which would grow in the coming weeks, months and years, the 
pressure from which would continue to force debate within the Johnson Administration 
regarding reform of policy toward China. 
The most important policy suggestion to come out of the Fulbright hearings, that 
Washington pursue 'containment without isolation', became the goal toward which policy 
85 'US Policy with Respect to Mainland China', Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US 
Senate (Washington, D.C., 1966)
86 President's News Conference, 22 March 1966, Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
1963-1969.  
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evolved through the remainder of the Johnson Administration, setting a trajectory of 
policy reform that would be followed by Johnson's successor.87 On 1 March 1966 NSC 
aide James Thomson, responding to a request by Johnson assistant Jack Valenti for 'some 
informal thoughts on the China problem', used the Congressional agitation in favour of 
policy reform to continue his crusade in favour of initiatives toward Peking. He first 
acknowledged the domestic political constraints that had dominated China policy to that 
point, particularly  the understandable sensitivity of the Democratic Party to advocate on 
behalf of policy change. He argued, however, that the domestic political environment no 
longer foreclosed consideration of a more flexible policy, noting the weakening of the 
China Lobby (which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter), changing 
public attitudes toward China, 'widespread press support' of the Administration's 
reduction of travel regulations, and 'no Congressional criticism whatsoever'. He also 
emphasised the Zablocki subcommittee recommendation for increased contacts with 
Peking.88 
As Thomson noted, public opinion in the spring of 1966, in part as a result of the 
hearings and their accompanying publicity, showed a new receptivity to relations with 
China, with fifty six percent saying that they would favour China's admission to the UN if 
it would result in improved relations with China. Further public opinion polls, which 
Johnson aid Bill Moyers requested, showed similar results, with a Harris poll published in 
June resulting in fifty seven percent favouring diplomatic recognition with forty three 
percent opposed.89 
Vice President Humphrey helped lift the profile of his former Senate colleague's 
87 Allen Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence:India and Indochina (Ann Arbor, 1981), pp.186-
90; see also 'US and China: Policy Shift Based on “Containment Without Isolation”', New York Times, 
27 July 1969. 
88 James Thomson to Jack Valenti,1 March 1966, Document 129, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXX, China.
89 Poll results found in Location 153.L.10.2F, Senatorial Papers, Walter Mondale Papers, Minnesota State 
Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota. 
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hearings further by immediately repeating the phrase 'containment without isolation' in 
public, helping to popularise it.90 Following Fulbright's hearings, the State Department 
began a series of meetings to consider China policy, chaired by Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State (DAS) for Far Eastern Affairs Robert Barnett. Illustrating that the 
Fulbright hearings had had their desired effect in spurring greater flexibility in Executive 
Branch consideration of China policy, conversation in the first meeting questioned long-
held assumptions undergirding China policy. One of the topics discussed was 'the 
proposition that none of our unilateral trade controls can be shown to have had an 
appreciable effect on Communist China's war-making potential; that controls, to be 
effective, had to be multilateral'.91 Also questioned was the 'extent our trade controls 
might be said to express our own disapproval of Communist China rather than reflecting 
an objective judgement about their effectiveness for dealing with the threat of Chinese 
Communism'.92 Foreshadowing the Congressional debate over policy toward China and 
the Soviet Union, respectively, in the 1970's, the meeting participants debated whether 
trade policy toward China should not be brought into line with that governing trade with 
the Soviet Union.93 Guiding these discussions was a keen awareness that potential policy 
changes could only go so far as domestic political attitudes allowed. While the obvious 
change in attitude among Democrats in both the Senate and the House provided some 
support for policy reform, meeting participants noted the 'need for a new US public 
opinion poll on China policy', noting 'that at some stage it would be very useful, if not 
imperative, for the White House to have a reading on US public opinion on China dealing 
with this matter'.94 
90 New York Times, 14 March 1966. 
91 Meeting notes, US Department of State, 'US Trade and Other Controls Directed Against Communist 
China', 12 April 1966, Box 442, Averell Harriman Papers.
92  ibid.
93  ibid.
94  ibid.
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At the June meeting, major topics of discussion included the Department's 
response to the Fulbright hearings, advocacy on the part of liberal Senators for 
liberalisation of trade policy toward China, new pressure from agricultural and business 
interests for liberalisation, and changed public attitudes. Senators from Midwestern 
agricultural states, such as McGovern, sought changes in trade regulations to allow grain 
sales to China, and pressure for trade policy liberalisation was coming from farmers and 
agricultural firms in the Midwest, who were beginning to lobby Congress 'on the benefits 
of opening up trade'.95 Other participants in the meeting also noted an increase in pressure 
from US business interests in general to liberalise China trade controls.96 
In mid July, President Johnson gave a televised address on Asia policy, clearly in 
response to the changed climate, in which he addressed his willingness to lower 
communication barriers with China, while placing the blame for China's isolation firmly 
on Peking.97 Two days later, the State Department spokesman followed up with a 
statement suggesting that controls governing trade with China were under review. At the 
July State Department meeting, DAS Barnett noted that he believed Washington 'was 
receptive now to a detached analysis of the various aspects of US China trade policy', and 
the major topic of discussion was media, public and congressional attitudes toward policy 
reform. The participants noted that the press 'had generally accepted the . . . .thesis (as 
stated before the Zablocki subcommittee . . .) that US policy should aim at breaking 
Communist China's isolation and that increased contacts was the proper way to do this'.98 
It was also noted that the press and the Congress had not reacted negatively to either the 
President's expression of interest in lowering barriers to China, nor to the State 
95  Meeting notes, US Department of State, 'US Trade and Other Controls Directed Against Communist 
China', 28 June 1966, ibid.
96  ibid.
97  Speech by President Johnson, 12 July 1966, Public Papers of the Presidents. 
98 Meeting notes, US Department of State, 'US Trade and Other Controls Directed Against Communist 
China', 21 July 1966, Box 442, Averell Harriman Papers.
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Department spokesman's similar statement. Despite the obviously changed Congressional 
and public attitudes, however, and that it was 'the sense of the meeting' that 'the China 
trade issue was perhaps not as explosive as it once was', participants believed 'that there 
was no groundswell of public opinion favouring the relaxation of the China controls', a 
perception which affected their willingness to pursue policy change.99 The changes in 
Congressional opinion were so new that given the history of nearly unanimous and heated 
opposition to any liberalisation of China policy,  participants were unsure of the extent of 
the shifts in attitude that they were witnessing, with one of the officials expressing the 
belief that 'there is still considerable political heat in the issue'.100 
As the State Department and White House were considering possible conciliatory 
moves toward China, Senate liberals continued to press the advantage they believed they 
had gained due to the success of the hearings. In June 1966 George McGovern was in 
steady communication with the Far Eastern bureau of the State Department and received 
clearance to travel to China, should Peking issue a visa. McGovern was referred to Edgar 
Snow for his intervention with Peking to obtain a Chinese visa. As before, Snow's 
advocacy proved fruitless.101 In a 16 June speech Majority Leader Mike Mansfield 
asserted that the growing conflict in Vietnam necessitated more open Sino-American 
communication in order to avoid war with China, and suggested that to that end Dean 
Rusk meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi.102 Johnson, at a press conference a 
month later, responded to a question on Mansfield's suggestion that he had 'read Senator 
Mansfield's speech with a great deal of interest. . . . [and had] asked Secretary Rusk to 
give the majority leader's observations very careful consideration'. Johnson went out of 
99  ibid.
100  ibid.
101 George McGovern to Edgar Snow, 12 June 1966, f.65, Correspondence, June 2–December 30, 1966, 
Edgar Snow Papers. 
102 China and US Far East Policy, 1945-1966 (Washington, D.C., 1967), p.191. 
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his way to show that the administration was 'delighted to review the Senator's views, any 
information he has, and give careful consideration to them'.103 In the context of his 
escalation of American involvement in Vietnam, the President's seeming solicitousness 
toward the growing pressure from liberal Senators of his own party can probably best be 
explained by his need to maintain support for his escalation in Vietnam by showing that 
he was also willing to pursue initiatives that would reduce tensions with America's 
opponents.104 
Johnson responded similarly to a call by Ted Kennedy for Washington to adopt a 
'two Chinas' policy which would provide for UN membership for both Taiwan and 
Mainland China.105 In keeping with his response to Mansfield's suggestion, Johnson 
responded later that day at a news conference that while the administration would seek to 
'do everything we can to increase our exchanges' with China, it would not adopt a two 
China policy.106 Johnson needed to show himself willing to take some steps in China's 
direction in order to neutralise liberal criticism that his position in Vietnam was 
recalcitrant,  yet Dean Rusk effectively blocked any moves to lower barriers to China, and 
certainly did not wish to countenance fundamental policy change. Following the series of 
meetings, Barnett informed Averell Harriman that the Far Eastern Affairs bureau had been 
preparing a 'memorandum...to the Secretary recommending some minor but useful 
changes in our China trade policy. . . We all agree . . . that success in getting other parts of 
the . . .  Government aboard depends upon the Secretary's personal approval of our 
recommendations'.107 While a significant number of Administration officials favoured 
taking at least limited initiatives that would begin the process of lowering barriers with 
103 President's News Conference, 18 July 1966, Public Papers of the Presidents. 
104 Michael Lumbers also makes this point.
105 Senate floor speech by Edward Kennedy, 20 July 1966, Congressional Record. 
106 President's News Conference, 20 July 1966, Public Papers of the Presidents. 
107 Robert Barnett to Averell Harriman, 4 October 1966, Box 443, Averell Harriman Papers. 
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Peking, the success of these suggestions depended upon support from Rusk, which was 
not forthcoming. Among other things, Rusk argued that any initiatives Washington made 
in the direction of rapprochement faced almost no possibility of being favourably 
received by Peking, making American initiatives a moot point. 
Therein was one of the primary roadblocks to the implementation of even 
relatively minor relaxation of trade controls with China. Over the remainder of Johnson's 
term these suggested policy changes made no headway. Rusk, and other senior policy-
makers, continued to view China policy through the prism of Vietnam, but in a very 
different way than did the new type of Democratic liberal. In one of the last attempts by 
an Administration official to suggest change of policy toward China, William Bundy, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs108, re-recommended in 
March 1968 that the travel ban be revisited.109 While several other officers at the State 
Department concurred with Bundy's recommendation, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Legislative Affairs William Macomber did not. Seeing any potential initiatives toward 
China in the light of the Administration's need to buttress Congressional support for its 
Vietnam policy, Macomber argued to Rusk that 'the proposed policy change would meet 
conservative opposition without gaining liberal support for the administration's Vietnam 
policy'.110 Rusk disapproved Bundy's recommendation. 
The continued opposition to change of trade or travel regulations toward China, 
much less fundamental policy change, on the part of Rusk and other senior 
Administration members, despite the obvious changing of domestic political attitudes, 
became a target of criticism in Washington.111 The Council on Foreign Relations, for 
108 'Far Eastern Affairs' was renamed 'East Asian and Pacific Affairs' in late 1966. 
109 William Bundy to Dean Rusk, 6 March 1968, Document 306, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXX, China. 
110  FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXX, China,. footnotes at bottom of Document 306. 
111 James Thomson, after leaving the NSC, wrote an article in 1967 in which he accused Rusk of being a 
'zealot' who had 'single-handedly obstructed recurrent attempts within the Administration to bring about 
modification of our rigidity on China'. Thomson, James, 'Time for a New China Policy', Atlantic 
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example, undertook a study of Sino-American relations between 1964 and 1968, a portion 
of which was published in 1966. It concluded that there was much potential for a changed 
relationship, but that the public was more receptive to talks with China than were leading 
Administration officials.112 Yet the views of Fulbright and his liberal colleagues were 
becoming more widely shared: a growing range of political voices were questioning the 
broader framework of Washington's approach to the Cold War to date and as part of that 
process were questioning China policy. 
The hearings of 1965 and 1966 had made it more acceptable for those in Congress 
who believed that existing China policy should be questioned to speak out with greater 
freedom in favour of policy reform, and had begun a campaign by liberals to break down 
barriers with Peking. Through 1966, 1967 and 1968 Senate liberals, joined by a few in the 
House, continued to criticise the Johnson Administration's inflexibility on China, urge a 
reconsideration of China policy, and coordinate among themselves, and with like-minded 
academics, members of the media, and others, in order to attempt to  broaden the public 
debate.113 These like-minded individuals perceived that the trend was in their favour.114 
This challenge grew in parallel with the growth of the challenge to Administration policy 
in Indochina.115 House Democratic leaders, like their Senate colleagues, saw China as 'the 
key to this struggle' [in Vietnam].116 By the time Richard Nixon took office, the trend 
Monthly, October 1967. 
112 'The United States and China in World Affairs', Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 1966. 
113 George McGovern to Edgar Snow, 30 January 1967, f.68, Edgar Snow Papers; John  Fairbank to Edgar 
Snow, 25 May 1967, f.68, ibid.; Edgar Snow to William Fulbright, 27 February 1967, f.70, ibid; 
Exchange of letters between Andrew Nathan and Don Fraser, 3 May and 10 May 1966, Box 54, 
Location 145.C.3.1B, Donald Fraser Papers, Minnesota State Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota; 
Memcon between a staff member for Don Fraser and Stuart Innerst, 9 February 1967, Box 55, Location 
145.C.3.2F, ibid.
114 See John Fairbank to Edgar Snow, 25 May 1967, f.68, Edgar Snow Papers. 
115 See memcon between Paul Kreisberg, Officer in Charge, Mainland China Affairs, and Representative 
Paul Findlay, 6 February 1967, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, Political and Defense, 
Box 1972, NARA II; and Representative Thomas Morris to Dean Rusk, 15 December 1967, ibid.
116  'US Policy in Asia: What Do We Do With China?' Speech by Clement Zablocki, 27 July 1967, PR-3, 
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toward breaking down barriers with Peking was obvious. Fatigue among large portions of 
the Congress, media and public with the conflict in Vietnam and with a confrontational 
approach to the Cold War, as well as the implosion of Johnson's presidency and the 
Democratic party over Vietnam, and a contentious domestic political scene in which it 
appeared that the very integrity of the nation may be in question, commended a more 
conciliatory approach to opponents by Johnson's successor. The power of known 
Congressional attitudes to shape the policy agenda was the primary shaping factor in this 
case. Repeated public speeches and sets of hearings from liberal Congressional leaders 
urging reform of China policy had succeeded in setting the policy agenda through 
educating the public and fellow Members and re-defining the terms of the debate. What 
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger subsequently did was not revolutionary, therefore, 
but followed the trajectory which had been set by Congress. 
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CHAPTER 1: 1969-1971–
A NEW DYNAMIC SIGNALS CHANGE
 
This chapter traces the evolution of Congressional debate over China policy from 
President Nixon's inauguration through the announcement of the opening to China in 
1971. It argues that the shift in Congressional attitudes toward the Cold War in general, 
and toward China in particular, was a crucial factor that allowed Nixon to pursue an 
opening to China. As has been acknowledged by many scholars, the driving force behind 
Sino-American rapprochement was the strategic rationale. However, although the 
strategic rationale explains the 'why' of Sino-American rapprochement, it does not explain 
how Sino-American rapprochement was able to take place after so many years of 
steadfast opposition in Congress to even the most minimal suggestion of change. The 
shift in Congressional attitudes from opposition to China policy reform to relatively broad 
support for such reform, and the dramatic weakening in the power of the China Lobby 
from the mid 1960's through the early 1970's, explains how rapprochement was able to 
take place. The seizing by Congress of the initiative in the area of China policy from the 
executive branch during the mid and late 1960's began a growing movement to reform 
China policy and largely reset the terms of debate so that the new Nixon Administration 
faced a very different political environment than that which had been faced by his 
predecessors. 
In tracing the domestic political process that occurred as Kissinger and Nixon 
pursued rapprochement with Beijing, this chapter also shows the divisions within 
Congress, as well as tensions between Congress and the White House, that limited 
Congress’ ability to directly shape the reform. Despite these limitations, Congress did 
exercise influence on the manner in which the White House pursued rapprochement from 
1969-1971, partly because Nixon still feared possible conservative opposition to the 
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opening, and partly because he was concerned that Senate liberals, particularly those with 
competing presidential ambitions, would travel to China prior to himself and gain credit 
for 'opening China'. 
A New Dynamic: Powerful Constituencies for Change and A Weakened China Lobby  
By the time Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger took office, domestic opinion 
with regard to China had been in transition for several years. Much of the media, the 
American public and the Congress was fatigued by the long-running war in Vietnam, and 
the experience of Vietnam had in many ways roused discontent with the underpinnings of 
the whole of American Cold War foreign and national security policy. Many within the 
Democratic party, which held massive majorities in both chambers of Congress, were 
increasingly abandoning the tenets of Cold War liberalism that had defined the party in 
the post-World War II era (the coupling of a hawkish foreign policy predicated on the 
aggressive containment of communism with liberal domestic policy preferences), and 
now openly challenged the way in which American power had been exercised to that 
point, taking what they saw as a less alarmist view (and what critics countered was a 
more naïve view) of communist intentions. Those holding these ideas gradually took 
control of the party between its defeat in the presidential election of 1968 and 1972, when 
Senator George McGovern won the party's presidential nomination. The criticisms of 
Cold War foreign policy made by William Fulbright and his liberal colleagues found 
greater appeal as the nation's experience in Vietnam intensified and as an increasing 
proportion of Congress became radicalised due to deepening, and seemingly endless, 
American involvement in Indochina. The challenge to Executive Branch management of 
foreign and national security policy grew out of this new liberal perspective. 
The turbulent domestic political and cultural dynamic of the late 1960's and early 
1970's, and a sense that the very survival of the nation was in question, helped to shape a 
ready constituency for policies of conciliation with America's opponents, particularly with 
China, containment of which had been one of the primary rationales behind the decision 
to fight in Vietnam. The Zablocki and Fulbright hearings of 1965 and 1966 had spawned 
a growing challenge to existing China policy not just within Congress, but from a broad 
range of sources, all of which served to redefine the space within which the Nixon 
Administration was able to operate in terms of developing China policy. The 
Congressional hearings, the purpose of which was to begin a critical evaluation of China 
policy in light of both the Sino-Soviet split and the American experience in Vietnam, gave 
rise to several private organisations, such as the National Committee on US-China 
Relations, a bipartisan group of respected scholars of East Asia and former government 
officials, which by 1969 had already been working for two years to advance a national 
dialogue on China policy.117 Opinion shapers in the media, including Harrison Salisbury 
of The New York Times, encouraged by the hearings, began to advocate policy change.118 
Public opinion seemed also to have followed the trend begun by the hearings, and in spite 
of the negative publicity China had earned for itself due to the violence and xenophobia 
of the Cultural Revolution, had exhibited a steady trend showing greater favour toward 
the seating of China in the UN since the mid 1960's.119 The broader cultural changes 
taking place within the United States at this time, in which an almost revolutionary fervor 
portended dramatic changes in many areas, harmonised with and buttressed the 
Congressional role in calling for change of policy toward China. 
117 Robert Scalapino to Hugh Scott, announcing the formation of a 'National Committee on US-China 
Relations', 25 May 1967, Accession MSS 10200, etc., Box 117, Hugh Scott Papers, Small Special 
Collections Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. 
118 Harrison Salisbury to Edgar Snow, 14 April 1966, f.64, Edgar Snow Papers. 
119 Gallup Poll No.774-K, released 20 February 1969, cited in Leonard Kusnitz, Public Opinion and 
Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 19491-1979 (Westport, Connecticut, 1984), pp.117-8, and 
p.129, fn.143. 
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All of this contributed to the rise of a powerful lobby (derisively labeled 'The 
Peking Lobby' by conservatives)120 composed of much of the media, Sinologists and other 
academics (who many times coordinated efforts with sympathetic Members of 
Congress121), and a coalition of Democrat and Republican Congressional liberals who, 
with the support (and many times pressure) of the American agricultural and business 
communities that sought to benefit from trade with mainland China, and numerous other 
political, religious and other organisations, placed pressure on the Executive to revise 
China policy. Policy, political and religious groups joining the effort included the Council 
on Foreign Relations, the National Committee on US-China Relations (whose 
membership roles included both liberal and conservative academics), Citizens to Change 
US China Policy, the Committee for a New China Policy, the US-China Friendship 
Association, the League of Women Voters, and the leadership of several major church 
denominations122 (including the Quakers, to which Richard Nixon belonged).123 Added to 
this was active lobbying by powerful business interests including the US Chamber of 
Commerce, the American Farm Bureau Federation, Monsanto, the Emergency Committee 
for American Trade (which was made up of large multinational corporations), General 
Motors, Xerox, Chase Manhattan Bank, several major airlines including Pan American 
Airlines and TWA, Boeing (which, being Seattle-based, heavily lobbied its Senators from 
the state of Washington, Warren Magnuson and 'Scoop' Jackson), Raytheon (which was 
120 'Obituaries for “China Lobby” Are Very Premature', Human Events, 28 March 1970; 'Thinking of 
Chairman Mao', National Review, 11 February 1969. 
121 See Dale MacIver to Donald Fraser, providing a list of Sinologists and other academics who 'would be 
willing to be of help in your efforts to stir up interest in changing our China policy', 12 June 1969, Box 
34, Location 151.I.11.6F, Donald Fraser Papers; 
Jerome Cohen, 'Ted Kennedy's Role in Restoring Diplomatic Relations with China', Legislation and 
Public Policy 14, p.350. 
122 The leadership of the major American Protestant denominations had been trending toward advocacy of 
more liberal political causes since the mid 1960's. See Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American  
Religion: Society and Faith Since World War II (Princeton, 1988)
123 Congress and the Nation:Vol. III, 1969-1972:A Review of Government and Politics (Washington, D.C., 
1973), p.473;
'Recognise Red China, Voters League Proposes', Washington Star, 27 April 1969.
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based in Massachusetts and lobbied Senators Ted Kennedy and  Edward Brooke), and 
numerous others.124 Opposing this powerful campaign was a much smaller grouping 
composed of the now anemic China Lobby, two veterans organisations (the American 
Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars), the American Conservative Union, the American 
Security Council and the staunchly anti-communist AFL-CIO.125 
Even conservative, anti-communist Democrats, such as Senator Richard Russell 
(D-GA), the long-time chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee who took over 
the even more powerful Senate Appropriations Committee in January 1969, had come to 
support opening lines of communication to China by the time that Richard Nixon took 
office.126 Russell's animosity toward 'Red China' had been so great, and his belief (and 
that of most others in Congress) that China was behind North Vietnam's war effort against 
South Vietnam so strong, that just four years previously, he had advocated the use of 
nuclear weapons against China.127 The evolution of the views of such a powerful and 
staunch opponent of Beijing was a stark illustration of the broader changes taking place 
within Washington that recommended policy change to the new Administration. 
Perhaps the most significant symbol of the drastically changed political dynamic 
was the dissipation of the political strength of the China Lobby since the mid 1960's, 
which removed one of the major political obstacles to reform of China policy. While 
individual Members and loose confederations of conservatives opposed the challenge to 
124 Congress and the Nation, p.473;
Edward Brooke to Raytheon, 8 January 1970, in response to a letter from Raytheon to Brooke urging 
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existing China policy, the muscular, organised response that would have been expected in 
earlier years was lacking. By 1969 the movement urging reconsideration of China policy 
had become the far more visible presence both nationally and on Capitol Hill, and the 
Committee of One Million had lost considerable political potency.128 Leading liberal 
Republicans recognised, and called the White House's attention to the fact, that this 
opened the door to a re-evaluation of China policy. Republican Senator Jacob Javits, for 
example, who had himself recently undertaken a high profile resignation from the 
Committee of One Million, noted that the minimal relaxation of travel regulations related 
to China late in the Johnson Administration 'did not evoke the wrath in Congressional and 
editorial circles that some of our higher officials feared. On the contrary, the Congress 
and the nation at large welcomed the changes'.129 
There had been many signs of the weakening of the China Lobby. From late 1966 
onwards, as the liberal challenge to existing China policy was gaining strength on Capitol 
Hill, a number of high profile Congressional resignations from the Committee had taken 
place.130 Those members of Congress publicly supporting the Committee continued to 
drop significantly through the late 1960's, important departures from the Steering 
Committee of the Committee of One Million including, in addition to Javits, Democratic 
Senators Paul Douglas (D-IL) and Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT). The departure of such high 
profile liberal members made it increasingly difficult for the Committee to recruit new 
membership and more difficult for it to claim that it had a broad-based, bipartisan 
membership and not a 'right wing' organisation.131 Support for the Committee's positions 
dropped so significantly on Capitol Hill after the challenge posed by the Zablocki and 
128 'Thinking of Chairman Mao', National Review, 11 February 1969. 
129 Speech by Senator Jacob Javits before the National Committee for US-China Relations, New York City, 
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Fulbright hearings that no attempt was made by the Committee of One Million to poll 
Congressional attitudes on China after 1966 out of fear that the Committee's position 
would no longer enjoy support from a majority of Members.132 Whereas in the late 1950's 
the Committee boasted as many as 349 Congressional supporters, by 1969 its letterhead 
contained only seven names.133 Even Senate Minority Whip Hugh Scott (R-PA), one of 
the few who remained on the Steering Committee of the Committee of One Million, 
declared his support for 'new options' on China policy and encouraged the new 
Republican Administration to move 'in the direction of broadening negotiations with 
Mainland China'.134 The organisation's increasing weakness was also evident in the 
amount of effort it found necessary to dedicate to fundraising. During the 1950's and early 
1960's, the Committee had spent no more than thirty three percent of its annual 
contributions on fundraising. By 1967 this figure had risen to sixty percent, and by 1971 
had increased further to seventy nine percent.135 Faced with this precipitous decline, 
Marvin Liebman, who had run the Committee since its founding, resigned in 1968 to go 
into business as a theatrical producer.136 
In early 1969, former Congressman Walter Judd, the public face of the Committee, 
attempted to revive the Committee's presence on Capitol Hill in an attempt to stem the 
tide in favour of an opening to China. He quickly found, however, that there was little 
interest. Early in the new Congress the Committee sent out meeting notices to all House 
and Senate Members, and Judd personally lobbied the vast majority of Members to attend 
a 26 February meeting in the Capitol meant to mobilise support.137 Hugh Scott sent a staff 
member to the meeting whose report revealed just how far the political strength of the 
132 Staff memorandum to Hugh Scott, 18 February 1969, MSS 10200, etc., Box 117, Hugh Scott Papers. 
133 'Policy on China and How it Grows', Washington Post, 11 April 1969. 
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64
Committee had fallen. The aide reported that 'attendance was sparse and limited mostly to 
staff', and that when the issue was raised at taking a poll to determine Congressional 
sentiment with regard to China policy reform, support for such a poll was weak due to the 
fact that there was 'some doubt that a new Congressional survey at this point would 
produce the desired majority percentage'.138 
The Lobby continued to weaken over Nixon's first three years in office, opening 
the door even more broadly to policy reform. The New York Times, noticing this 
weakening, wrote a story in April 1970 that quoted an unnamed State Department official 
as saying, 'I haven't seen any evidence of the China Lobby in the five years I have been 
working on China. We can now think about China policy without looking over our 
shoulders'.139 That same month Taipei's embassy had a difficult time getting enough 
Members of Congress and government officials interested in attending a breakfast in 
honour of Chiang Kai-shek's son and heir, Chiang Ching-kuo, who was visiting 
Washington.140 In the spring of 1971, just after 'ping-pong diplomacy', the New York 
Times ran a follow-up story on the China Lobby that expressed the widely-held 
perception that Walter Judd, 'once a spokesman for the Nationalist Government's cause, 
has faded from the scene'.141 Support for an opening was broad and growing, while 
opposition to it was much weakened from previous years and continuing to shrink. 
Although Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger later took credit for pushing for 
major policy change in face of bureaucratic resistance and strong resistance from 
Congress142, in truth, although there was conservative opposition to such policy change, 
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the tide of opinion had so shifted in relation to China policy by 1969 and 1970 that the 
direction in which the two men developed policy harmonised with the broader trends 
rather than conflicted with them. No politician, particularly one as shrewd and cautious as 
Nixon, would have risked his political career with a foreign policy initiative as 
revolutionary as a fundamental change of China policy without having reason to believe 
that domestic political opinion would favour his move - that his risks could be minimised 
and the potential reward worth the effort. The evolution of the domestic political 
environment, particularly the altered opinions in Congress and the broad movement that 
the earlier Congressional hearings had spawned, recommended to Nixon the political 
wisdom of attempting to lower barriers between the United States and China.143 An 
editorial by TIME Magazine, which had always been a staunch critic of Mao and 
supporter of Chiang Kai-shek, summarised well the political environment within which 
Nixon found himself upon taking office when it asserted that 'on balance the risks 
involved seem relatively slight and the case for a change in US policy is powerful'.144 
Composition of Congress as an Indicator of Change
The challenge to existing China policy, as well as to Executive Branch leadership 
of foreign policy in general, was strongest in the Senate, in which the new type of liberal 
held many of the leadership positions. William Fulbright, who had been using his 
chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee to the utmost in attempting to reclaim 
Congressional authority over foreign policy formulation, also used it to advocate for a 
radical altering of existing policy toward China. Ted Kennedy, a Fulbright ally who had in 
1966 joined Fulbright in challenging the policy of pursuing China's isolation, was elected 
143 See 'Relations with Peking: Several Factors Favor Conciliation With Chinese Communist Regime', 
Washington Post, 26 January 1969; and 'US and China: Stirrings–and Frustrations–Over Policy 
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Senate Majority Whip in early 1969. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, along with 
many of his liberal colleagues, was an adherent to the 'lost chance thesis' – the idea that 
Washington was most responsible for the twenty years of Sino-American hostility by 
having allegedly alienated Mao's new government in 1949 and early 1950, and that 
rapprochement with China would therefore right a wrong that Washington had 
committed.145 
The substantial Democratic majority was quickly becoming increasingly liberal in 
its foreign policy views, with fewer traditional, Cold War Democrats remaining with each 
passing year. By the spring of 1971 the makeup of the Democratic members of the Senate 
had evolved to the point that a staff member for the Senate Democratic Policy Committee 
stated to an interviewer that 'If something had come out of that caucus with John Stennis 
[the conservative chairman of the Armed Services Committee] and 'Scoop' Jackson [the 
hawkish Senator from the state of Washington] in favour of it, it wouldn't mean 
anything'.146 The questioning of Cold War orthodoxy on foreign and national security 
policy had spread by 1969 to the liberal wing of the Republican Party, which was then 
quite a substantial minority within the Party. By 1969, these Republicans had come to 
share many of the views of their liberal Democratic colleagues and together formed a 
coalition that created a majority within the Senate and a significant minority in the House. 
This majority favoured a reordering of American foreign policy across the board as well 
as an increased Congressional role in the development of policy. Conservative 
Republicans themselves admitted that of the forty three Republican members of the 
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Senate at least fifteen of those were liberals.147 
In contrast with the Senate, in which debate over foreign policy was divided 
according to committee, debate over foreign policy in the House was divided largely 
along generational lines.148 The seniority system in the House had resulted in the 
leadership positions and the committee chairmanships being held by conservative 
Democrats who had risen slowly through the ranks over a period of years and continued 
to hold the traditional hawkish views of communism that had until recently been 
characteristic of the Democratic party as a whole. The House, therefore, was a more 
conservative body than was the Senate and, while concerned about the growth of 
Executive authority in foreign and national security policy, generally agreed with the 
Nixon Administration's policy views and thus challenged the Administration's foreign 
policy less stridently than did the Senate.149 
Despite being the more conservative body, however, changes had been occurring 
within the House, as well. A significant minority of House Members agreed with the 
views of their dovish colleagues in the Senate, and a large number of more hawkish 
Members had begun to believe that China must be more actively engaged in order to help 
minimise its potential threat. Symbolising the growing clout of liberals within the House 
during Nixon's tenure, the liberal Democratic Study Group (DSG) contained 
approximately 120 members as of July 1970,150 nearly half of the Democratic members of 
the that body, growing to 170 members over the next three years.151 One of the leaders of 
the DSG, Donald Fraser, symbolised the changes that had been taking place in 
147 See 22 September 1969 letter from C.Y. Thomas to Senator Robert Dole, Accession 329-73-56, Box 
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of Politics, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas. 
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Congressional attitudes toward China since the mid 1960's. Fraser had unseated Walter 
Judd in 1962, gained an immediate seat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and had 
proven as ardent a critic of Taiwan's lack of political freedoms and proponent of opening 
relations with Mainland China as Judd had proven a supporter of Taipei and a proponent 
of Washington's attempt to isolate Beijing.152 
Another liberal group, the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law (MCPL), 
was founded in 1966 in order to give liberal rank and file Members the opportunity to air 
their policy ideas that were unable to gain exposure in committee or the full House due to 
the complete control of committees by conservative chairmen. As liberal Republican Paul 
McCloskey explained, the group existed in order to get around 'the close tie between the 
Administration and committee chairmen who have a monopoly on information'.153 The 
group was a precursor to the 1975 'democratic revolution' in the House which saw power 
diffused downward from the committee chairmen to subcommittee chairmen and rank 
and file members. MCPL had seventy-seven members as of April 1969 and created a 
Committee on US-China Relations that spring which actively advocated a liberalisation 
of China policy.154 The growing prominence of liberal groups like the DSG and MCPL in 
the House illustrated the fact that the new liberal attitude toward China, although not 
dominant as in the Senate, had become influential in that chamber, as well. 
In both chambers, regional influences also affected attitudes. Members from 
western states, being naturally oriented toward trade with the Asia-Pacific region, tended 
to support China policy reform and pushed particularly hard for the removal of trade 
barriers. The powerful, long-time chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee from the 
152 See Fraser's letter to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) announcing his desire to  'compile a list 
of legislative changes that would be helpful in normalising relations between mainland China and the 
US' and to 'try to re-establish normal trade relations between mainland China and the United States', 14 
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state of Washington, Warren Magnuson, had advocated the removal of trade barriers since 
the late 1950s.155 Magnuson's hawkish Democratic colleague from the state of 
Washington, Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson, despite distrusting Beijing's motives, also 
supported trade policy liberalisation and greater communication with Beijing after 
coming in early 1969 (after the Sino-Soviet border clashes of March 1969) to view the 
relationship with China in terms of its effect on relations with the Soviet Union.156 Mark 
Hatfield, a liberal Republican Senator from Oregon, was also a strong advocate of policy 
reform. MCPL's Committee on US-China Relations was chaired by Representative Patsy 
Mink of Hawaii.157 158 Midwestern Members were initially split on the issue of China, 
usually according to ideology. Liberal Members from the midwest, such as 
Representatives Don Fraser (D-MN) and Paul Findley (R-IL) (Findley was a member of 
the Steering Committee of MCPL) and Senator George McGovern, advocated the 
lowering of trade barriers and diplomatic normalisation, viewing with envy the wheat 
sales made to China by Canadian farmers and hoping that farmers in their home states 
could benefit from a more open trade relationship with China.159 160 Conservative 
Members from the midwest, such as Senator Robert Dole of Kansas (R-KS), would begin 
to advocate for a reduction of trade barriers as they saw the incremental steps that the 
Administration was already taking. Midwestern wheat farmers, a constituency that the 
Washington Post characterized as 'generally thought of as unyielding toward Peking'161, 
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had provided growing pressure on their Congressional representatives to lower trade 
barriers since the mid 1960's. In early 1969 the University of Nebraska undertook a 
survey of wheat farmers, finding 'a softening of attitudes, . . . attributed to the hope of 
following Canada's example and selling China wheat'.162 By the spring and summer of 
1971 conservatives in Congress would join their liberal colleagues in openly advocating 
with the Administration for further trade reductions.163 164 
The Challenge to Nixon From the Left
As has been noted, the greatest pressure for change came from the liberal Senate. 
Institutionally, the Senate has always been more prestigious than the House in public 
esteem and press coverage, which has given the pronouncements of Senate members 
greater public weight. Liberal Democratic senators, joined by their liberal Republican 
colleagues, sensing an opportunity to influence policy with the advent of a new 
Administration, began a barrage of speeches both on the Senate floor and outside the 
Senate in early 1969 advocating rapprochement with China and challenging the new 
Republican Administration. 
The pressure from the left began during the very first week of the new 
Administration with Ted Kennedy calling for the Administration to draft a UN resolution 
allowing both Chinas membership in the General Assembly, William Fulbright suggesting 
the withdrawal of certain US military facilities on Taiwan (attempting to meet Beijing's 
demand that all US military forces be withdrawn from Taiwan) and belittling the 
Nationalist claim to represent the Chinese on the Mainland, Mark Hatfield suggesting that 
the Administration abolish all curbs on travel to China by American citizens, and Senators 
162 ibid. 
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Fulbright, Kennedy, Hatfield, John Sherman Cooper (R-KY) and Alan Cranston (D-CA) 
urging Nixon to use the Warsaw talk scheduled for 20 February to signal the start of a 
new China policy.165 Speaking at a California conference on China in late January, 
Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, and Kennedy, along with Supreme Court Justice William 
O. Douglas and others, all suggested some form of a two-China policy that would allow 
both the Republic of China, on Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China, on the 
mainland, to be members of the UN simultaneously.166 
The Chinese representation ('Chirep') issue would be an important element in the 
domestic debate through 1971, with conservatives arguing that the Mainland did not 
deserve membership due to its alleged aggressive behaviour (proof of which included its 
xenophobic rhetoric and support for insurgencies throughout the Third World) and lack of 
support for the international system, and liberals and moderates arguing that keeping a 
nation of 800 million persons out of the UN merely because Washington disagreed with 
its form of government was both unfair and harmful to the national interest. 
Pressure from the left and evidence that the environment had shifted continued 
throughout that spring. In late March the National Committee on US-China Relations 
held a 'national convocation' in New York, which was attended by 2,500 people including 
Members of Congress, academics, business leaders, journalists, and government officials 
from the United States and other countries. The conference, which had been organized by 
leading Sinologists hoping to use Senate luminaries such as Kennedy, Javits and others to 
pressure the Nixon Administration for change, was successful in this regard.167 On 20 
March, Ted Kennedy gave a speech at the conference in which he stated that the new 
165 New York Times, 25 January 1969. 
166 New York Times, 27 January 1969. 
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Administration had 'a new opportunity to rectify the errors of the past'. He continued by 
laying out the challenge: 'If the Administration allows this time to pass without new 
initiatives, if it allows inherited policies to rush unimpeded along their course, it will have 
wasted this opportunity', and called for the withdrawal of the US military presence from 
Taiwan and the establishment of US consulates on the Mainland.168 Nixon perceived the 
speech by Kennedy, a likely contender for the presidency in 1972, as the beginning of 
Kennedy's bid to take the White House.169 Every few weeks, particularly in response to 
Administration announcements of incremental policy change with regard to China, 
various Democratic senators such as Ted Kennedy, William Fulbright, or George 
McGovern, would make their own policy suggestions, in an apparent attempt to lay claim 
to China policy reform as a Democratic issue. Nixon's chief challenge appeared not to be 
opposition from the China Lobby, but rather finding a way to move towards a 
rapprochement in such a way that his Democratic competitors would not be able to make 
a stronger claim to ownership of China policy reform than could he. 
The sole Democratic Senator generally trusted by Nixon was Mike Mansfield, 
who with the retirement of Lyndon Johnson had become the most senior Democratic 
office-holder nationwide, thus becoming the de facto leader of the Democratic party. 
Mansfield, who had previously been a professor of Asian history, was strongly supportive 
of a fundamental reshaping of American China policy and his constant speeches in public 
and on the floor of the Senate provided a steady barrage of pressure for change. In 
February 1969 Mansfield began, at Nixon's invitation, to meet monthly with the President 
for breakfast, and in their very first meeting Nixon confided in Mansfield that he was 
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hoping to open lines of communication with Beijing.170 Being a private person who 
valued confidentiality and a traditionalist who respected the presidency, Mansfield rarely 
discussed these meetings with fellow Senators and did not even inform is closest aide, 
Frank Valeo, as to the substance of the meetings.171 However, due to Mansfield's belief in 
the importance of China and the need to change Washington's China policy, he did 
repeatedly discuss the topic with the President in their regular, private breakfasts over the 
next two years.172 
Nixon encouraged Mansfield's attempts to gain entry to China, but did not inform 
him of his efforts to establish direct communications with Beijing. Mansfield, in keeping 
with his reputation of deference to the presidency, told Nixon in a meeting in early 1970 
that he believed that, between the two of them, it was the President's right to travel to 
China first, should an opening appear.173 This openness of communication and deference 
to the presidency on the part of the Democratic Senate Majority Leader was remarkable, 
particularly in the context of the trend of the period toward curtailment of executive 
power and a greater Congressional role in foreign policy-development, as well as the 
partisan conflict between the controversial Republican President and strident liberal 
Senate critics. Mansfield's attitude stood in stark contrast to those of some of his liberal 
colleagues, and his regular breakfasts with Nixon were important in that they assured 
Nixon that the most powerful figure on Capitol Hill and in the Democratic party would be 
fully supportive of any moves he made toward China and would not compete with him 
but allow him to take the lead. 
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Vietnam, China and Arguments in Favour of Policy Reform
The criticisms expressed by liberals of existing China policy illustrated the 
dramatic differences between their current views and those which had previously 
predominated on Capitol Hill. They questioned whether China was indeed as aggressive 
in its intent as it had once been perceived to be, whether it had the capability of harming 
American interests as greatly as had been claimed, and also whether the relationship 
between Hanoi and Beijing was as close as had been assumed.174 Liberal recognition that 
Beijing was not the motivator of Hanoi's war effort and new conviction that China did not 
have aggressive designs on the rest of Asia illustrated the ways in which thinking among 
liberals was diverging from its past patterns with important implications for perceptions 
of China. While the extreme rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution was noted, liberals 
stressed the disconnect between this rhetoric and Beijing's cautious behaviour.175 Liberals 
no longer perceived China to be an expansionist threat, but rather a weak, isolated state 
imploding due to the internal chaos caused by the Cultural Revolution, and having a weak 
military.176 
Continuing the attack on the policy of containment and isolation that had been 
begun in 1965 and 1966, liberals kept up a regular barrage targeting the effectiveness of 
that policy. The  obvious trend in the annual vote on the Chinese representation (Chirep) 
issue in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which revealed that the United 
States was fighting a rearguard action in its opposition to Beijing's entry to the UN and in 
defence of Taiwan's seat, was emphasised. Liberals also accurately pointed to the strength 
and staying power of the Communist regime on the Mainland, despite the near civil war 
174 Thomas Hennings Memorial Lecture, 'The War and Why We Must End It',  by Senator William 
Fulbright, 10 December 1969, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, RG 46, Committee on 
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175 For examples see the floor statements by Representative George Brown, 4 February 1969, 
Congressional Record; and by Senator Mark Hatfield, 18 February 1969, Congressional Record. 
176 Senate floor speech by Stephen Young, 27 March 1969, Congressional Record.
75
caused by the Cultural Revolution. Freshman Senator Thomas Eagleton's (D-MO) views 
were typical of those of Senate liberals when he criticised as ineffective the US policy of 
'trying to isolate China from the world community hoping that the Communist regime 
might crumble or evaporate in such a political vacuum'.177 Also typical of liberal 
arguments was Senator Joseph Tydings (D-MD), who, noting that the rationale for both 
the Vietnam War and the proposed ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) system had been to 
guard against Chinese aggression, contended that refusal to countenance diplomatic and 
economic relations with China was 'counterproductive', and denied Washington 'the 
diplomatic and economic means available . . . to affect Peking's behaviour'. Tydings 
concluded that 'By so reducing our options in the Far East, we limit the potential 
effectiveness of our policy in this area'.178 
Liberal Republicans shared this criticism of the policy of containment and 
isolation, as well as the changed perceptions of China. Liberal Republican Senator Mark 
Hatfield asserted in a January 1969 speech to a US-Japanese policy group that:
It has been obvious for some time that our attempts to isolate China have served 
no constructive purpose. . . . The ultimate goal of American policy towards 
Communist China should be to encourage Peking to join the international 
community and accept the attendant responsibilities and limits of acceptable 
action. Attempts to isolate China directly contradict this objective and should, 
therefore, be abandoned.179 
Hatfield's sentiments were echoed by other liberal Republican Senators, such as John 
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Sherman Cooper180 and Jacob Javits, who drew a link between the learning experience of 
the Vietnam War and China policy. In a speech in New York, Javits argued that the 
learning experience the nation had undergone with respect to its involvement in Vietnam 
'could well be used as an instrument for public education with respect to realities about 
China and Asia in general'.181 Javits, like his liberal Democratic colleagues, recognised 
Beijing's violent verbiage and rhetorical hostility, but expressed his belief that China did 
not have the 'actual military capabilities' to 'present a significant military threat to our 
security'.182 
Hugh Scott, who would become Senate Republican leader upon the death of 
Minority Leader Everett Dirksen in September 1969, likewise questioned whether the US 
'boycott of China' had been successful.183 Although conservatives considered Scott to be a 
liberal184, Scott disagreed with his liberal Senate colleagues, believing that not only 
China's rhetoric, but also its actions were threatening to the United States, and therefore 
expressed his continued opposition to 'Red China's admission' to the UN.185 The fact that 
Scott, who held such views and who remained a member of the Steering Committee of 
the Committee of One Million, also doubted the efficacy of the policy of containment and 
isolation and pledged 'to support our efforts to relieve tensions and to improve 
communications with Red China', illustrated the breadth of the support that existed in the 
Senate for building bridges to Beijing.186  The majority of Senate Democrats no longer 
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believed that the policy of attempted isolation had been effective and opposed its 
continuation, including, as has been shown, the hawkish Richard Russell and Scoop 
Jackson. The fact that leading Senate Republicans agreed made clear that by 1969 the 
desire to revise China policy extended far beyond the circles of the new type of Democrat 
represented by William Fulbright, George McGovern, and their liberal allies. 
Support for an opening was also based on the desire to find a way to honourably 
extricate the United States from the conflict in Vietnam. Congressman Michael Feighan 
(D-OH), a conservative Democrat, expressed the hope that an opening to China could 
'provide the US with the opportunity to break the Paris deadlock through Chinese 
intervention with Hanoi'.187 Likewise, House Republican Leader Gerald Ford (R-MI) 
argued in 1971 regarding Nixon's recent announcement of his pending China visit that 'if 
the President's visit can help settle the Vietnam War it would be a great step forward'.188 
Conservatives and Nixon's Lobbying 
Despite the clear signs of a growing consensus in favour of an opening to China 
and of the weakening of the China Lobby, Nixon acted with an excess of caution as he 
pursued the opening and expended great effort to ensure that key conservatives would 
support him. During the summer of 1969 the Administration had several legislative 
priorities that required that Nixon not alienate conservative votes in Congress. Two of 
these were the Export Administration Act of 1969, in which Nixon sought authority to 
open up trade with communist nations, and the fight over funding for the ABM system. 
The critical issue that would determine passage of each Act was the number of 
Republicans and conservative Democrats who could be convinced to vote for them.189 
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Fearing that announcement of small areas of trade liberalisation vis-a-vis China might 
anger enough conservatives to scuttle passage of the Export Administration Act, which 
was the first of the two to be voted on, Nixon ordered that three measures that he 
favoured liberalising trade controls against China be 'held in abeyance . . . until passage 
of the . . . Act'.190 Nixon directed his White House Congressional liaison staff to attempt to 
approach Karl Mundt, Nixon's old Senate colleague and a bellwether of conservative 
thinking in the Senate, to test the waters with relation to a relatively minor reduction of 
trade barriers. Staff member Bryce Harlow reported after a telephone conversation with 
Mundt that Mundt had 'hit the ceiling' at the suggestion that trade controls with the PRC 
be liberalised, and had threatened that, if Nixon did so, he would 'lose the ABM fight, 
lose support of Harry Byrd [a conservative, Democratic Senator from Virginia], 
McCormack [Speaker of the House] will attack openly, etc'.191 In response to this outburst 
from his old colleague, Nixon ordered Kissinger to attempt to convince Mundt that he 
could trust Nixon's intentions towards China and to attempt to 'bring him on board'.192 
After ordering the announcement of the trade liberalisation measures be postponed 
until passage of the Export Control Act, however, Nixon changed his mind and 
announced a small, incremental lowering of trade barriers via cable to all diplomatic posts 
on 21 July193 and published the changes in the Federal Register on 23 July.194 Elliott 
Richardson, Under Secretary of Commerce, argued successfully that, among other things, 
a delay in implementation until after Nixon's planned trip to Romania the decision could, 
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considered together with the Bucharest visit, take on 'overly overt anti-Soviet 
significance'.195 Kissinger recommended telling only 'a few select Congressional leaders' 
in order to minimise potential complications arising from possible conservative 
objections,196 and that the changes should be announced in 'a low-key fashion'.197 The 
announcement, nevertheless, received media attention.198 While Mundt had been correct 
that Harry Byrd, Jr. opposed an opening to China199, the rebellion that Mundt had 
predicted did not occur, evidence that although hard core conservative opposition to an 
opening remained, the number of those steadfastly opposed was relatively low and that 
conservatives as a whole were not strongly opposed to the lowering of barriers with 
Beijing. While the conservative reaction was silence, the liberal reaction to the 
announcement was praise, as Nixon had expected.200 
Although no record exists of the specific rationale used by the White House in the 
attempt to bring Mundt and other conservatives 'on board', there is indirect evidence that 
the White House appealed to the impact on Moscow that the appearance of movement 
toward China could have, and that this appeal was successful. The next time Nixon 
wished to make a move in China's direction, it was to goad the visiting Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Gromyko. On 22 September Nixon wrote to Kissinger, telling him that: 
I think that while Gromyko is in the country would be a very good time to have 
another subtle move toward China made. I would suggest that when it is 
convenient you discuss the matter with Mundt and see whether he would be 
willing to have another move in that direction. On the same subject, I would like 
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for you to see Walter Judd if he calls and asks for an appointment.201 
The memo illustrates that Nixon was being extremely solicitous of conservatives as he 
pursued his incremental policy reforms. It also, however, reveals the belief that Nixon 
believed Mundt to be willing to support further moves toward China out of appreciation 
for the effect such moves might have on Soviet behaviour, which in turn implies that this 
apologetic for change had been used by the White House previously in order to bring 
Mundt around after his outburst in July. 
Just before Thanksgiving 1969 Mundt was felled by a severe stroke which 
permanently incapacitated him. However, the anti-Soviet rationale seemed to have 
successfully mitigated his initial opposition to moves toward China, and it appears likely 
that the White House made use of it with other conservatives, as well. As will be seen in 
the next chapter, a transition among those conservatives who remained opposed to an 
opening to China also occurred due to their becoming convinced that the opening to 
Beijing would not impact US relations with Taipei. Those conservatives who continued to 
speak against an opening to China in 1969, 1970  and early 1971 had, by late 1971 and 
early 1972 changed the tone of their public pronouncements to be more supportive of the 
opening. As with Mundt, while records of the precise White House argument used with 
these conservatives are not available, their subsequent statements, which are uniform in 
nature, provide strong evidence of the substance of White House communications with 
them and of the effectiveness of those communications. 
Nixon's concern over potential conservative opposition to an opening continued to 
shape the Administration's pursuit of incremental policy reform. In November Under 
Secretary of State Elliot Richardson wrote Secretary of State William Rogers with an eye 
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firmly on potential political complications in the implementation of these incremental 
changes. Richardson advised Rogers that the package of reforms that were then under 
consideration should be implemented prior to the planned visit to Washington of Chiang 
Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, in early 1970 so as to make it a fait accompli prior to 
his visit, hence reducing Taipei's ability to complicate Washington's moves toward 
Beijing. Also, Richardson suggested that the reforms be implemented during the 
Congressional Christmas recess so that 'our consultation problems will be much 
reduced'.202 Nixon followed Richardson's advice regarding the timing of the 
announcement. In this case, as in the case of the announcement of trade policy 
liberalisation the previous July, the complete lack of conservative protest reinforced the 
fact that a paradigm shift had taken place in Congressional views of China. 
As with most myths, the myth of Nixon courageously facing down strong 
conservative opposition to rapprochement does contain some truth. The White House did 
not face conservative opposition to the extent that he and Kissinger later intimated, but it 
is true that Nixon's attention to conservative opponents of rapprochement did succeed in 
increasing the level of support for an opening among conservatives. Liberal Republican 
Senator Edward Brooke , who already supported an opening to China, noticed Nixon's 
attention to conservative opponents of rapprochement and credited Nixon with what 
Brooke observed as a lessening of hostility to rapprochement on the part of many 
conservatives.203 
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Conflictual Relationship: The White House and the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee  
William Fulbright and his Senate Foreign Relations Committee was at the centre 
of the Congressional challenge both to Executive Branch management of foreign policy 
in general, and in particular to existing China policy. While the relationship between the 
White House and the SFRC initially improved after Johnson's departure from office, it 
quickly soured during 1969 as Fulbright realised that the White House was concentrating 
control of foreign policy within the National Security Council (NSC), thereby distancing 
the committee further from having influence on the policy process, and as Fulbright 
became impatient with Nixon's approach to extracting the United States from Vietnam. 
The Nixon Administration, for its part, sought to minimise the influence of the committee, 
partially because it viewed Fulbright as antagonistic to Administration goals, and partially 
out of a lack of desire to allow any Congressional committee significant influence over 
policy formulation. Fulbright attempted to frame his conflict with the Nixon 
Administration as an institutional conflict, when it was at least as much an ideological 
conflict. However, the committee correctly drew attention to the constructive role that it 
could play in formulating sound policy when it argued that, 'many of our current 
difficulties might have been avoided if we had taken time to stop, look, and listen'.204 The 
Administration, however, seeing Fulbright and his committee as being primarily driven 
by ideological opposition to the Administration, was not swayed by such appeals.205 
Determined to claim greater control of foreign and national security policy, in 
early 1969 Fulbright created a subcommittee, the goal of which was to examine secret US 
military agreements with foreign governments, of which Taiwan was one. The 
204 SFRC press release, 31 December 1970, RG 46, Committee on Foreign Relations, Chairman Fulbright's 
Speeches/statements on foreign affairs, Box 2, NARA I. 
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Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad 
(generally called the 'Symington Subcommittee') was placed under the chairmanship of 
Fulbright's political ally Stuart Symington. Throughout the 1960's a trend had developed 
in which the Executive Branch had signed with foreign governments a number of 
executive agreements which were not treaties and therefore technically not subject to 
Senate confirmation. Through such agreements, which the executive branch was not 
required to communicate to the Senate, a global web of military relationships had 
developed of which the Congress had little knowledge and therefore virtually no 
oversight. Fulbright and Symington's attempt to gain information, and thereby an element 
of control, on these relationships in order to gain influence over security policy reflected 
Congressional concern over the policy creep that had led to such heavy involvement in 
Vietnam and elsewhere throughout Southeast Asia.206 The committee believed that policy 
creep had taken place because no one within the Executive Branch was questioning the 
fundamental assumptions on which the incremental policy decisions had been made and 
that the committee could contribute to sound policy in this area.207  Not surprisingly, the 
White House saw it differently, and took an extremely wary attitude toward the 
investigation and accompanying hearings, seeing them as being primarily directed by 
Senator Fulbright.208 
Initially, the White House, according to NSC aide John Lehman, saw its primary 
206 Interview with Walter Pincus, 16 February 2010, Washington, D.C.; Interview with Hoyt Purvis, 22 
March 2010, Washington, D.C.; Kissinger wrote a memo to Nixon on 1 October 1969 complaining 
about the amount of information that had been dug up by Mr. Pincus and Mr. Purvis, the 
subcommittee's staff investigators, and accusing them of leaking much of that information to the media 
in order to influence the policy debate. 
207 Carl Marcy to David Abshire, 26 July 1971, RG 46, Committee on Foreign Relations, Carl Marcy Files, 
Box 12, NARA I.
208 Robert McClintock, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to Secretary of State William Rogers 
and Acting Secretary of State Elliott Richardson, 'Meeting of Kissinger Committee on Symington 
Subcommittee', 30 September 1969, RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files 1967-1969, DEF 12, NARA II; 
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role in relation to these investigations as to 'limit the damage' caused by Symington and 
Fulbright.209 But as information on US-Taiwan security cooperation began to leak to the 
press from the committee210, the White House became determined 'that from now on, it 
must deal with the subcommittee on the basis of all-out confrontation'.211 What had begun 
with protestations of goodwill on both sides devolved into a political slug match that 
lasted more than two years, until the subcommittee reports came out in early 1971. These 
supported a reorientation of American Asia policy away from Taipei and towards Beijing, 
and were concerned that ongoing covert military cooperation between Washington and 
Taipei would be considered provocative to Beijing and thus foreclose a potential 
opening.212 The subcommittee reproached the Administration for never having stated 
'public disapproval of provocative action by the Nationalist Chinese' against the mainland. 
The report indicated distrust on the part of the subcommittee of the actual goals of the 
Administration and accused it of a lack of candor with the Congress and of hiding the true 
nature and extent of its military cooperation with and assistance to Taiwan.213 
Conservatives, of course, opposed the report and strenuously disagreed with its 
conclusions. The Administration did not respond to the report's challenge. Despite all of 
the effort by Fulbright and Symington and the political noise created by the hearings, they 
ended up having little effect on either the nature of the security relationship with Taiwan, 
which the White House was seeking to gradually diminish in any case, or the pace of 
movement toward rapprochement with the Mainland. They symbolised, however, the 
growing struggle between the liberal Senate leadership and the Nixon Administration for 
209 John Lehman, The Executive, Congress and Foreign Policy (New York, 1976), p.133
210 'Fulbright Cites China Spy Flights', Washington Post, 13 November 1969. 
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control of foreign policy in general, and the concern of Fulbright and Symington (who 
were unaware of Nixon's behind-the-scenes communications with Beijing) that while 
Nixon was signalling an intent to open relations with Beijing, he was actually continuing 
to pursue the containment of China. 
Ping Pong Diplomacy, Growing Support from Conservatives, and the Race for Beijing
By the spring of 1971 the Administration had made a series of moves lowering 
trade barriers with China, which had met with the approval of business interests, and 
continued lobbying for further reductions of barriers and moves in the political arena. The 
pace of change had been slow, but the 'ping pong diplomacy' of spring 1971 brought 
hopes that a diplomatic breakthrough might be near, which in turn caused increased 
lobbying from business, as well as expressions of interest from Members whose states 
stood to gain from the breaking down of trade barriers. The Administration had followed 
up on the opportunity presented by the success of the visit of the US men's table tennis 
team to Beijing by announcing a further liberalisation of trade barriers with China. This 
was noticed by conservative Republicans from the midwest, such as Senator Bob Dole 
(who was also the head of the Republican National Committee). Dole and other 
midwestern Members of both parties, hoping to benefit their agricultural constituencies, 
immediately began pressing for further reductions in trade barriers so that wheat, grains 
and other agricultural commodities could be sold to China.214 The fact that China was the 
world's most populous nation but also had difficulty feeding its people made it one of the 
world's largest markets for agricultural goods, a temptation too big to ignore, and a flurry 
of activity took place among midwestern Members of Congress, liberal and conservative, 
coordinating efforts and lobbying the Administration. Strategic concerns also continued to 
214 Letter from a Kansas agricultural dealer to Senator Bob Dole regarding meeting with Pete Peterson, 
Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and Dean Hinton the Special Assistant 
responsible for trade regulations, 21 May 1971, Accession 329-82-261, Box 83, Bob Dole Papers. 
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cause the level of support for an opening to continue rising among some conservatives 
and 'ping pong diplomacy' seemed to spark renewed appreciation for this dynamic. Scoop 
Jackson, for example, whose attitude toward rapprochement was based on a desire to 
counter growing Soviet power, called for UN membership for China shortly after the visit 
of the US table tennis team to China.215 
Ping pong diplomacy also reinvigorated the hopes of Senate liberals who had long 
hoped for an invitation to Beijing, and who now saw a new openness on the part of the 
Chinese. Leading Democratic Senators had been attempting to gain entry to China since 
the mid 1960's, and their efforts redoubled beginning in 1969 with many of them 
doubtless believing that an opening to China creditable to themselves would stand them 
well in the 1972 presidential election cycle, in which China policy reform was expected 
to be a major issue.216 Now they saw a hope to take from Nixon the political credit for 
opening China. Seeming to be very aware of this dynamic and appearing to take 
advantage of it in an attempt to play the opposing sides of the American political scene 
off against one another, during the visit of the US men's table tennis team to Beijing Zhou 
Enlai mentioned to an American reporter covering the trip that China might issue an 
invitation to Democratic senators and presidential hopefuls Ted Kennedy, Edmund 
Muskie and George McGovern.217 
Several of these Democratic presidential contenders, hoping to beat Nixon to 
China, turned again to Edgar Snow in an attempt to gain an invitation from the Chinese 
government. George McGovern kept a steady correspondence with Snow in early 1971, 
seeking information on China and hoping to obtain Snow's help in gaining an invitation to 
Beijing. Snow had recently visited Beijing and spent several hours with both Mao and 
215   Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, p.284. 
216 Cohen, 'Ted Kennedy's Role in Restoring Diplomatic Relations with China', p.350. 
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Zhou, and had startling news for McGovern. Despite the fact that Nixon and Kissinger 
had worked hard to keep secret their communications with Zhou Enlai via various 
backchannels, to the extent that they kept in the dark their own State Department and 
even most of the White House and NSC staff, news reached Nixon's opponents on Capitol 
Hill. On 8 March 1971 Snow wrote to McGovern, forwarding to him the full text of his 
recent interviews with Mao and Zhou, and breaking news of Nixon's secret 
communications with Mao and Zhou: 
Incidentally, I can tell you, in strict confidence [emphasis in the original], and not 
to be attributed to me, that I learned in Peking, from sources I consider 
unimpeachable, that President Nixon has sent a message there asking how he or a 
trusted emissary would be received on a 'secret' visit to hold 'serious' discussions. 
It is assumed there that, as the China debate waxes hotter in the US, Nixon may 
attempt to get hold of the China issue through some such stunt. I should like to see 
you get there first.218 
The reference to a 'stunt' such as a high profile visit to China, was Snow's 
acknowledgement that the political drama of such a visit would have enormous political 
benefit to whomever undertook the trip. The 'unimpeachable source' was Mao himself.219 
There is no evidence that McGovern communicated what must have been startling news 
of Nixon's secret communications with Beijing with Fulbright, Kennedy, the Foreign 
Relations Committee, or any of the several other liberal Senators, both Democrat and 
Republican, who had been pushing for some time for the United States to fundamentally 
change its China policy. The temptation to do so must have been great, but the desire to 
honour Snow's confidence may have kept the news from spreading. 
218 Edgar Snow to George McGovern, 8 March 1971, f.80, Edgar Snow Papers. 
219 Edgar Snow to Mao Zedong, 16 May 1971, f.81, ibid. 
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Snow's close communication with liberal Democrat leaders in the Senate, on the 
one hand, and with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in Beijing, on the other, meant that the 
Chinese leaders were kept informed of the manoeuvrings within Washington regarding 
China policy. Nine days after informing McGovern that Nixon had been secretly 
communicating with Mao and Zhou and hoped to visit Beijng, McGovern telephoned 
Snow to inform him that he planned to announce that if elected President he would 
immediately recognise Beijing as the legitimate Chinese government, and that he would 
shortly introduce legislation in the Senate that would recommend a new China policy. 
McGovern ended with another push for Snow's help in obtaining an open door in Beijing 
for a potential visit.220 McGovern's announcement put new life into the partisan battle 
over the claim of leadership over China policy reform. After hearing from McGovern, 
Snow immediately wrote to Zhou, relaying to him McGovern's plans. Snow urged that 
Zhou issue an invitation to McGovern to come to China, arguing that a McGovern visit 
'would be to oblige Mr. Nixon to move faster'. Snow pressed, 'It might be a mistake to 
take the view that because the right and reactionary wing of US politicians is now in 
power, one can deal only with them'.221 Four weeks later, he followed up by advocating on 
McGovern's behalf with Huang Hua, then China's ambassador to Canada.222 Despite 
Snow's energetic attempts, however, Beijing issued no invitation. 
On 19 April William Fulbright wrote to Snow asking him to travel to Washington 
to 'meet with the [Foreign Relations] Committee in informal session, with a view to 
enlightening us about recent developments'.223 Snow responded, saying that he was not 
likely to be in Washington anytime soon.224 Fulbright was also in the midst of planning 
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hearings on China policy in the Foreign Relations Committee, and sought to give a 
platform to several figures who had been purged from government during the era of 
Joseph McCarthy, asking them to testify before the committee on the need to change 
China policy. Fulbright's action in inviting these men who had been purged by the right 
over accusations of being 'soft' on Chinese communism indicate the fact that Fulbright 
saw the current political environment one within which he could safely attempt to 
resuscitate the reputations of these men, and to thereby seek to answer the old Republican 
charge that the Democrats had 'lost China' and to portray the Democrat Party as the party 
that had historically attempted to advocate a more 'reasonable' China policy. 
The Democratic leader who came nearest gaining an invitation to China was Mike 
Mansfield. Nearly two years after turning down Mansfield's request to visit China, on 11 
April 1971, the day after the US men's table tennis team landed in Beijing, Zhou Enlai 
wrote to Mansfield with an invitation.225 In keeping with his characteristic deference to 
the presidency and not seeking to compete with Nixon for the political prize of being the 
first American to visit China, Mansfield immediately shared the news with Nixon. Nixon 
and Kissinger at first encouraged Mansfield to pursue the invitation, although they urged 
him not to make the invitation public.226 
Despite Nixon's determination to gain the political benefit of an opening himself, 
the Chinese had invited Mansfield, not himself, and Nixon may have been calculating that 
he had little choice in the matter. At this point, the White House had not received the 
communication from Zhou inviting the president or one of is advisors to Beijing. Later 
that same day, however, Nixon began to question the wisdom of sending Mansfield or any 
other Democrat to China lest the Democratic party gain political benefit from the 
225 Zhou Enlai to Mike Mansfield, 11 April 1971, text of the letter reproduced in Don Oberdorfer, Senator 
Mansfield, p.393. 
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opening. Meeting in the afternoon with Kissinger and Nixon's chief of staff, H.R. 
Haldeman, Nixon complained that the Democrats wanted to 'be part of breaking the ice 
with China'. Nixon noted that the breakthrough was 'enormous, its an enormous story . . . 
And they didn't have anything to do with the goddamned event, not one goddamned 
thing'. Begrudgingly, Nixon conceded that it was probably inevitable that Mansfield 
would go, although adding, with an eye toward the political benefits of being perceived as 
the leader of the initiative, 'we should cooperate so that it looks like our move rather than 
he did it on his own'.227 
Discussion then moved, at Haldeman's initiative, to whether or not it would be a 
good idea to add Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott to a Mansfield mission to China in 
order to make it bipartisan and reduce the benefit that the Democrats might gain from a 
Mansfield visit. Nixon and Kissinger agreed to ask Corneliu Bogdan, the Romanian 
ambassador to Washington, to communicate to the Chinese that in order to have 'serious, 
measured progress', Scott should be invited along with Mansfield, and that the Chinese 
should be told that Scott was 'an expert in Chinese art and who we know would be happy 
to go'.228 Concern regarding possible invitations to competitors with Nixon for the 
presidency then surfaced, with Kissinger saying that 'I'll also tell Bogdan . . . that if they 
start playing around with [presidential] candidates, this thing will become a political 
football and they'll never get anywhere'. Nixon immediately agreed, worrying, 'What's 
next after Mansfield . . . . . Muskie, Ted Kennedy, Humphrey?'229
The next day Nixon and Kissinger continued to discuss a possible Mansfield visit, 
or the potential of a visit by another of the many Democratic senators seeking entrée, with 
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Nixon concluding, 'We don't want any senators over there, by God . . . Its not to our 
advantage to have Mansfield or anybody else go. We want our own representative to go. 
This has got to be our initiative'.230 Three days later, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the 
issue further. Kissinger promised to 'make it clear to Bogdan that we really don't want any 
political visits'.231 Nixon then noted the political potential of a successful China opening, 
relating it to the boost in the polls that he received after the successful July 1969 moon 
landing, saying that a successful opening to China would be 'an enormous story. Its like 
going to the moon'.232 
While Nixon and Kissinger were worrying about Mansfield or any number of 
potential presidential rivals visiting China first, Zhou sent a message on 21 April via 
Pakistani President Yahya Khan inviting a 'special envoy' of the president's, suggesting 
Kissinger, Nixon or Secretary of State Rogers. The White House received the message on 
27 April, and immediately began discussing who should go. Worry remained that 
Mansfield or another Democrat may still beat Nixon, yet Nixon expressed confidence that 
in the end the Chinese would not allow this to happen as 'they'll know where the power 
is'.233 To ensure that Beijing 'knew where the power was', however, Nixon told Kissinger 
to respond to Zhou's message through the Pakistanis telling Zhou that 'other visits by 
political people, by representatives of this government or the Congress and so forth 
should be held in abeyance'. The message was to be conveyed as the personal opinion of 
the Pakistani president, however, in an attempt to make Nixon's political paranoia less 
obvious.234 235 
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While these discussions were ongoing, the SFRC hoped in the wake of the success 
of ping pong diplomacy and a Washington Post story that President Nixon may name a 
personal envoy to visit Beijing on his behalf, that Nixon would name the Senate Majority 
and Minority Leaders to the task, both of whom were committee members.236 The record 
of the White House discussions regarding a possible Mansfield or Mansfield/Scott trip 
show that such hopes on the part of the committee were not completely misplaced. 
However, no further communications seem to have taken place on this issue between 
Nixon and Mansfield following their April discussions. The two men met for breakfast 
again on 23 June, but there is no record of any discussion of China in that meeting. Once 
the announcement was made that Kissinger had made a secret trip and that Nixon would 
be following in early 1972, Mansfield fully supported the evolution of events, both 
publicly and privately. 
Other Democratic Senators continued to attempt to beat Nixon to Beijing, 
however. The presence in Ottawa of a Chinese embassy provided one avenue through 
which these political figures sought entrance. Stuart Symington wrote directly to Huang 
Hua, the Chinese ambassador to Canada, without result, seeking a visa.237 Democratic 
icon Averell Harriman attempted to use a Canadian diplomat as an communications 
channel with Beijing in an attempt to gain an invitation.238 The Chinese, however, while 
expressing interest in a Harriman visit, were holding him at arm's length, as they were 
with the many other Democratic leaders seeking visas to China in accord with Nixon's 
request. 
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End of Formal Congressional Opposition to UN Membership for China
During the summer of 1971, signals of rapid policy change proliferated. On 10 
June, the State Department announced the end of the trade embargo with the People's 
Republic of China, and on 2 August the State Department made the announcement that it 
would now support the seating of the People's Republic of China in the UN, and would 
pursue a 'two Chinas' strategy, by which it sought seating for the PRC while retaining 
Taiwan's seat. Just as important symbolically, however, was a change that quietly took 
place on Capitol Hill. In every year since the founding of the People's Republic of China, 
Congress had expressed its opposition to China's seating in the UN by means of an 
amendment to an annual appropriations bill (among other means). The tradition had 
continued through the 1970 debate on the FY 1971 appropriations bill for the departments 
of State, Commerce and Justice. During 24 June 1971 House debate on H.R. 9272, the FY 
1972 appropriations bill for State, Commerce and Justice, however, Representative 
Sidney Yates (D-IL) raised a point of order against inclusion of the annual China policy 
statement 'as being legislation on an appropriations bill'. John Rooney (D-NY), floor 
manager of the appropriations bill, responded, 'This provision has been in this bill for 
many, many years. . . . However, I am constrained to have to concede that the point of 
order has merit'.239 The point of order was, therefore, sustained, and the language deleted 
from the bill. This marked the first time since the early 1950s that such a Congressional 
policy statement had not been included, a change that was doubtless noted both in the 
White House as well as in both Taipei and Beijing, as an important signal of 
Congressional sentiment. 
Kissinger's Secret Trip and the Beginning of White House Concessions
When Kissinger secretly visited Beijing in July 1971 Taiwan was one of the first 
239  'China Policy, 1971 Legislative Chronology', in Congress and the Nation, p.875. 
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issues discussed. The concessions made by Kissinger, clearly with Nixon's approval, were 
deep. Kissinger assured Zhou Enlai that Washington would withdraw the American 
military forces on Taiwan which were related to the war effort in Vietnam as American 
involvement in the war wound down, and gradually withdraw the remainder as Sino-
American relations improved.240 He also promised that Washington would not pursue a 
'two Chinas' policy or support the independence of Taiwan, and that it would cease 
intelligence operations run out of Taiwan targeting the Mainland. Crucially, and with the 
greatest political risk to the White House, Kissinger also informed Zhou that the White 
House expected that Taiwan would eventually be absorbed by the Mainland, and did not 
ask for any type of assurance on the part of Zhou that Beijing would seek a peaceful 
reunification with Taiwan.241 Kissinger warned Zhou that 'these are personal decisions of 
President Nixon which have not yet been discussed within our bureaucracy or with 
Congress, and so should be treated with great confidence'.242 The White House, therefore, 
had sought secrecy in order to keep the number and level of its concessions regarding 
Taiwan from sparking public and Congressional outrage, and had enlisted China's leaders 
in the effort. The next day Kissinger conceded even more regarding Taiwan, telling Zhou 
that the Administration was prepared to accept the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN, and 
promised 'to reach normalization . . . in the first two years of the President's next term'.243 
The concessions made by Kissinger would be reiterated during his October 1971 visit to 
Beijing, as well as by Nixon himself the next February, and reveal how little interest the 
two men had for Taiwan's future in comparison to the strategic benefits they believed 
240 The number of American military personnel and total military force levels in Taiwan had been elevated 
significantly beginning in the mid 1960's in order to assist with the war effort in Vietnam. By 1971, 
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would accrue to the United States from rapprochement with China. 
Although a large number in Congress was supportive of the goal of 
rapprochement, and understood the potential benefits to the United States in terms of 
Vietnam and relations with the Soviets, even most liberals would not have supported the 
level of concessions that Kissinger had made, and that he and Nixon would continue to 
make in the coming months, causing the White House to attempt to hide those 
concessions from Congress. Nixon's announcement on 15 July that Kissinger had secretly 
visited Beijing and that he himself would visit early in 1972 came as a political shock to 
most in Washington (excepting George McGovern and anyone in whom McGovern may 
have confided the news from Edgar Snow). Even after Nixon's announcement, the White 
House was given cause to be concerned about a Democrat politician visiting Beijing prior 
to Nixon's announced visit. The Chinese appeared to be holding the possibility of a 
Democratic visit over Nixon's head in an attempt to gain a stronger bargaining position 
with the White House.244 Nixon's fears were not unfounded. In September, Ted Kennedy 
traveled to Ottawa in order to seek an invitation to China from Huang Hua. According to 
Jerome Cohen, an academic who accompanied Kennedy, the Senator was given the 
opportunity to beat Nixon to China if he would 'make a public statement that Taiwan was 
legally part of China and should be returned to it'. As Cohen notes, Kennedy 'did not 
believe that withdrawal of US recognition and diplomatic relations from the Chiang Kai-
shek regime on Taiwan should lead to reunification of the island with the Mainland unless 
the majority of the people on Taiwan made clear this was their wish'. Kennedy, therefore, 
turned Huang down.245 The fact that one of the most liberal Members of the Senate was 
unwilling to compromise Taiwan's position to the extent requested by the Chinese reveals 
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how unwilling was the Congress to hand Taiwan over to the Mainland as the price of 
rapprochement. 
Misleading of Congress Regarding White House Plans to Use a 'China card'
Nixon's announcement brought out a feeling of almost euphoria among many in 
the Congress, particularly liberals, who had been advocating change, but seeing little 
outward signs of progress. The belief that the proper state of affairs for Sino-American 
relations was one of close friendship helped to contribute to an atmosphere of 'Sino-
mania' among many in the Congress, an infatuation which Nixon hoped would help build 
further support for the opening and for his planned attempts to move toward full 
normalisation afterwards. Nixon's announcement received substantial Republican support, 
as well. In the Senate, Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott co-sponsored a concurrent 
resolution expressing support of Nixon's upcoming visit to China, underscoring the 
bipartisan support on Capitol Hill for the opening. Republicans supported Nixon with 
public statements to the effect that he had not, nor would he, abandon Taiwan, doubtless 
reflecting White House assurances given them. Senator Robert Taft, Jr., for example, 
expressed support for the President's trip by asserting that, 'This dramatic action in no 
way represents a lessening of our commitment to freedom'.246 
Four days after Nixon's announcement, he, Kissinger and Secretary of State 
William Rogers met with the bipartisan Congressional leadership, where they received 
bipartisan support for the opening. The next day, Nixon and Kissinger met with 
Republican Congressional leaders, where they outlined the progress of the secret 
communications for the previous year.247 The issue of Taiwan was not raised, although, as 
246 Press release by the office of Senator Robert Taft, 23 July 1971, Box 293, Robert Taft, Jr. Papers, 
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the next chapter will show, the White House had been disingenuously allaying 
conservative fears in private with Members. By pursuing this pattern of deception, 
Kissinger was able to make promises to Beijing regarding Taiwan that he could not have 
had those promises been known within Congress or by the public.248 As both Nixon and 
Kissinger believed that such concessions were necessary in order to reach their larger 
purpose of building a new global security framework with the People's Republic of China 
having a central role, they believed that the only way to do so was to mislead the 
Congress and the American public so that major opposition to Sino-American 
rapprochement, and, hence, to their plans, did not arise. 
The White House also misled Congress with regard to its hopes to use China to 
gain leverage over the Soviet Union. In their meeting with the Republican Congressional 
leadership, Kissinger admitted to the group that he and Nixon hoped that the opening 
would effect Hanoi's attitude at the negotiating table in Paris, a fact which all recognised. 
When the topic turned to Moscow, Nixon warned Republican Members not to 'speculate 
on the impact on other countries'249, an obvious reference to the Soviet Union. Through 
the summer and autumn of 1971 the White House continued to downplay the impact of 
the opening on relations with Moscow, telling a bipartisan Congressional leadership 
group in the White House in early October that the 'journeys to Moscow and Peking are 
independent', and that 'we seek good relations with both, rather than using one against the 
other'.250 As Kissinger later noted in a memo to Nixon, however, such linkage did not 
have to be explained because it was self-evident: 'Pressure on the Russians is something 
we obviously never explicitly point to. The facts speak for themselves'.251 
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Continuing Conflict Between the Administration and the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee 
During the spring and summer of 1971, conflict with William Fulbright and the 
SFRC continued, with Fulbright repeating his regular complaint of a lack of consultations 
with the committee in general, as well as on China policy.252 Conflict between the 
Administration and the committee increased after Nixon's announcement, as Fulbright 
complained about a lack of consultations on China policy and the Administration accused 
Fulbright of seeking to use his chairmanship of the committee for partisan and ideological 
purposes. 
When Nixon made his announcement, the committee was considering the annual 
foreign aid bill, which had proven since the early 1960's to be a regular venue for conflict 
over China policy. Six days after the announcement, the committee approved an 
amendment to the foreign aid bill that would repeal the 1955 Formosa Resolution, which 
Fulbright and his allies saw both as a symbolic move meant to lower barriers to Beijing, 
as well as part of their ongoing attempt to limit Executive Branch authority – this time in 
relation to the use of US military force to protect Taiwan from an attack by the PRC. The 
vote took place as part of extensive committee hearings on China in July and August that 
considered evolving China policy, including legislation on the Chinese representation 
issue at the UN. The Administration had purposefully taken no position on any of the 
Chirep-related legislation so that it would not open itself to a possible rebellion from 
conservatives regarding Taiwan's place in the UN. The committee, on the other hand, 
which wanted to see Beijing join the UN, attempted to push the Administration to go on 
record as taking a position on the legislation.253 
252 William Fulbright to Under Secretary of State John Irwin, 1 May 1971, RG 46, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Carl Marcy Files, Box 12, NARA I. 
253  Carl Marcy to David Abshire, 26 July 1971, ibid.
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Upon hearing of news of committee's vote to repeal the Formosa Resolution, 
William Rogers telephoned Carl Marcy, the respected but highly partisan committee chief 
of staff, telling Marcy that he was 'much disturbed' by the committee's action and 
explaining that he 'was afraid it would be misunderstood – especially since the President 
had asked the [Congressional] leadership to be restrained in comment' after the 
announcement of the opening.254 At least part of the reason for the Administration's worry 
was the fact that it was attempting to convince Taipei that nothing significant was 
occurring with Beijing and that US-Taiwan relations were secure.255 It also sought, as 
Robert Taft's statement regarding the constancy of US commitments to Taiwan 
demonstrated, to convince conservatives that the opening would not harm relations with 
Taiwan. Although Taiwan's security was guaranteed by the 1954 US-Taiwan Mutual 
Defense Treaty, not the Formosa Resolution, repeal of the resolution would send a 
negative message of a symbolic nature to both Taipei and Congressional conservatives. 
Nixon and Kissinger wished to preserve the fiction that Taiwan's interests were being 
protected, both in order to maintain stability in the relationship with Taipei and to avoid 
conservative unrest. Although the White House was aware that the political environment 
was propitious for an opening, it was also aware that conservative support would fall 
away if it were known that Taiwan's interests were not being protected during the process 
of building the new relationship with Beijing.256 
The conflict with the SFRC over China policy continued over the coming weeks. 
Concerned that the manner in which Fulbright was organising his China hearings 
254  Carl Marcy to William Fulbright, 21 July 1971, ibid.
255  Tucker, Strait Talk, pp.37-40. 
256 This repeal of the Formosa Resolution had been introduced in early 1970 by Senator Charles 
McMathias (R-MD), and the State Department had announced that it would not oppose the repeal, 
although Henry Kissinger, realising the importance of maintaining the appearance of continuing strong 
support for Taiwan, had argued that 'Such a concession is in no way necessary to the improvement of 
our relations with Peking.' See Kissinger-Mathias memcon, 22 January 1970, NSC Files, Name Files, 
Box 825, NPMP, NARA II; and memo by Bryce Harlow, 15 January 1970, ibid. 
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illustrated more a desire to engage in partisan conflict than to assist in the constructive 
development of China policy, Secretary of State William Rogers wrote Fulbright 
expressing the hope that this was not the case.257 For its part, the committee wrote to the 
State Department complaining that the committee had been 'isolated in dealing with 
significant foreign policy issues and developments' – particularly, China. The letter from 
Carl Marcy to David Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, 
complained that the Administration had not consulted the committee at all regarding the 
development of China policy, nor communicated its wishes with the committee regarding 
China-related legislation or, more broadly, its goals for the relationship with China.258 
Marcy alleged that the lack of consultations 'isolated' policy-makers in the Administration 
with regards to China policy, and was the same mistake made by Johnson Administration 
policy-makers with regards to Vietnam policy.259 
Marcy was pointing out the danger of creating China policy among a very few 
senior officials with no consultations with Congress and with little public debate, 
resulting in a myopic policy-development process that could easily result in fundamental 
errors. He was attempting to highlight the constructive role that the Congress could play 
in policy formulation, the questioning of the basic assumptions of Administration officials 
in order to strengthen policy - the same role that he and Fulbright had seen themselves as 
playing with their 1966 hearings on Vietnam and China policy. As legitimate as was 
Marcy's appeal to the potential role that could be played by the committee, however, the 
vast ideological and partisan divisions between the Nixon Administration and Fulbright's 
SFRC, and the record of highly conflictual interaction since early 1969, foreclosed the 
257 William Rogers to William Fulbright, 28 July 1971, RG 46, Committee on Foreign Relations, Carl 
Marcy Files, Box 12, NARA I. 
258 Carl Marcy to David Abshire, 26 July 1971, ibid. 
259 ibid. 
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possibility of meaningful consultations.260 Despite the best efforts of Marcy and Fulbright, 
the committee had little direct influence through 1969-1971 on either the direction or the 
pace of US China policy. The pace of the opening was determined primarily by the 
development of the (almost) secret communications with Zhou Enlai, and nothing the 
SFRC or Senate liberals did could quicken that pace. 
Mobilising Conservative Support
While the Administration fought with Fulbright's committee, the ever-cautious 
Nixon continued to guard against a possible conservative backlash. Nixon had thus far 
been able, through a general appeal to the anti-Soviet aspect of an opening and by 
pledging that Taiwan's security would continue to be protected, to minimise much 
potential conservative opposition. There were those who could not be convinced to 
support an opening, no matter the apologetic used, but these were not numerous enough 
to cause significant difficulty. Conservative Congressman John Ashbrook (R-OH) 
grudgingly admitted privately that the reaction to Nixon's announcement had been 
'generally good', before adding 'but I think it is ridiculous'.261 Within a few days of 
Nixon's announcement, the White House invited the AA's (chiefs of staff) of well known 
conservative Senators and House Members who were deemed most likely to cause trouble 
to the White House for a briefing on the opening. Max Friedersdorf, a White House 
Congressional Liaison officer, followed up the next month with letters in an effort to 
create the feeling among these conservatives that they were being consulted and that their 
260 Interviews with key actors from both the Administration and the SFRC revealed that these mutual 
perceptions of the role played by the other side, and the mutual distrust, remained unchanged after forty 
years. Interview with Tom Korologos, 29 September 2009, Washington, D.C.; Telephone interview 
with John Lehman, July 2009; Interviews with David Abshire, 2 and 19 June, 2009, Washington, D.C.; 
Interview with Richard Moose, 26 June 2009,  Alexandria, Virginia; Interview with James Lowenstein, 
9 March 2010, Washington, D.C. 
261 John Ashbrook Diary, 16 July 1971, John Ashbrook Papers, John Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, 
Ashland University, Ashland, Ohio. 
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views were important.262 Kissinger met with a group of conservative Congressmen a week 
after the announcement,  reporting to Nixon what he had told them that they could trust 
Nixon in his ability 'for dealing with these people' [Communists]263, clearly attempting to 
address conservative concerns that Nixon would concede too much with regard to 
Taiwan.
The White House continued its campaign the next week, inviting dozens of 
influential conservative religious, business, and social leaders to the White House to hear 
a Kissinger briefing on the nature of the opening to China. Responses from recipients of 
these briefings, containing comments such as 'we are behind you 100%', seem to indicate 
that the White House effort to convince conservative leaders of the logic behind the 
opening were successful. Unfortunately, no written records have been found indicating 
the precise content of the briefings given by Kissinger, leaving to conjecture the 
apologetic utilised by the White House. The White House kept a close watch on those in 
Congress who were most likely to oppose the opening, and found that China policy was 
behind several other priorities on their list of concerns – a good sign.264 Intelligence such 
as this was valuable – opposition on the part of conservative House Members had been 
expected, but these social evenings told the White House that the issue of China ranked 
behind other issues in level of importance to many of these Members, which 
communicated to the White House that conservative opposition to the announcement was 
likely to be manageable. 
In the weeks after the announcement Nixon and Kissinger continued to tell 
262 Max Friedersdorf letter to the AA's of all of those Members who had attended the August White House 
briefing, 9 September 1971, WHCF, Subject Files, CO (Countries), Box 17, NPMP, NARA II. 
263 White House Tapes, transcript of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, July 22, 1971, 3:49–5:05 
p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 543–1, located in FRUS, 1969-1976,  vol. XVII, China, 1969-
1972, p.459, ff.2. 
264 White House memo to Nixon, 23 September 1971, WHCF, Subject Files, CO (Countries), Box 17, 
NPMP, NARA II. 
103
Congress that the White House would not 'abandon' Taiwan.265 Nixon also used Congress 
to attempt to convince Taipei of Washington's continued support, which served to keep 
relations with Taipei stable at a time when it was feeling increasingly insecure. The first 
Congressional Delegation (CoDel) to visit Taiwan after Nixon's announcement was led by 
no less a personage than Carl Albert (D-OK), the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives. Nixon met with Albert just prior to his departure for Taipei, and Albert 
duly reported to his hosts in Taipei that 'the President told me the day I left to be strong in 
reassuring all our friends that we were not abandoning them but were keeping our 
commitments to them'.266 Although the sincerity of such expressions from Nixon was 
questioned by Chiang and the Nationalists267, they seem to have been accepted by 
Congress. 
China, Taiwan and the United Nations 
The State Department had announced in August that the Administration would 
pursue a 'two China's' policy with respect to Chinese representation in the UN during the 
upcoming General Assembly, seeking to retain a seat for Taiwan while also supporting 
entry for Beijing. While the State Department, which had been shut out of the policy-
making process with regard to China for some time, was genuinely prepared to fight for 
Taiwan's seat, the White House was not, having already made the decision to sacrifice 
Taiwan for the sake of the strategic benefits it assumed would accrue from the opening.268 
Virtually nobody in Congress, however, from the right or the left, was prepared to jettison 
Taiwan in a similar manner. Stuart Symington, one of the Senate's chief liberals, told an 
265 John Lehman to Henry Kissinger, 29 July 1971, 'Talker for 8:45AM Meeting with Senator Buckley', 
NSC Files, Name Files, Brownell, Herbert to Burchett, Wilfred, Box 809, NPMP, NARA II. 
266 Statement by Speaker of the US House of Representatives Carl Albert delivered before the Legislative 
Yuan of the Republic of China, 14 August 1971, Series: Travel, Box 6, Carl Albert Collection, 
University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma. 
267 Tucker, Strait Talk, pp.37-40. 
268 ibid., p.68. 
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aide in August that although he supported the opening to Beijing, he did not wish to see 
Taiwan expelled from the UN.269 
On 28 September, twenty one Senators (most of them Republicans) and thirty 
three House Members (also mostly Republicans) sent a joint letter to the White House 
declaring that, should the UN vote to expel the Republic of China, 'we would feel 
compelled to recommend a complete reassessment of US financial and moral support of 
the UN'. As the time for the UNGA Chirep vote approached, expressions of 
Congressional support for Taiwan became more forceful. On 13 October, a petition was 
sent to the White House signed by 336 House Members (including all of the bipartisan 
leadership) opposing 'strongly and unalterably' the potential expulsion of Taiwan from the 
UN.270 Continuing to express support for Taiwan's seat, despite undermining it through 
scheduling a Kissinger trip to Beijing at the same time as the Chirep vote was to take 
place, Nixon received the petition while expressing gratefulness for Congress's 'support of 
the Administration on this issue'.271 
Beijing's seating and Taipei's departure from the UN on 25 October 1971 caused 
widespread anger within Congress as well as among the American public. Carl Albert 
went so far as to write a letter to the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
Taiwan's Legislative Yuan (Parliament) telling him that he did 'not regard the issue as 
closed by any means', and would attempt to find a way to regain a seat for Taipei.272 
Conservatives, in particular, were angry at the vote and some distrusted the White House's 
protestations of support for Taiwan. After the vote Ashbrook vented, 'What a fraud the 
269 Comments by Stuart Symington, 2 August 1971, Box 265, Stuart Symington Papers. 
270 White House Congressional Liaison chief William Timmons responded to each of the signatories on 18 
October 1971, WHCF, Subject Files, CO (Countries), [EX] CO 34-2 People's Republic of China (Red 
China) 1/1/71-5/31/71 through [EX] CO 34-2 People's Republic of China (Red China) 1/1/73-3/31/73, 
Box 19, NPMP, NARA II. 
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Nixon Administration has perpetuated on us'.273 Ashbrook's diary entry for 27 October 
tellingly recorded, 'Nixon really let us down on this issue, pure and simple. There is just 
no way to trust him anymore'.274 
Ashbrook's reaction to Nixon's China initiatives reflected the beginnings of a 
disillusionment among some conservatives with Nixon's policies, both foreign and 
domestic, that would grow in the coming years – particularly opposition to his pursuit of 
détente with the Soviet Union.275 The vast majority of conservatives, however, continued 
to support the opening to China, partially reflecting the White House skill in organising 
support among conservatives. After the UN vote, Nixon put Kissinger to work ensuring 
the continued support of conservatives such as California Governor Ronald Reagan and 
Senator Barry Goldwater.276 
Congressional anger at the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN held repercussions 
for the FY 1972 foreign aid authorisation bill, being debated in Congress that autumn. 
First, conservatives succeeded in stripping from the bill the amendment added by the 
SFRC in July which would have repealed the Formosa Resolution. Then, when the bill 
was brought to a vote on the Senate floor, for the first time since the inception of the 
foreign aid program in the late 1940s the bill was defeated, an action that partially 
reflected anger with the UN Chirep vote.277 Even more surprising, it was the more liberal 
of the chambers, the Senate, which showed most clearly its distaste with the UN action 
and put the nail in the coffin of the FY 1972 foreign assistance bill. Stuart Symington 
wrote that 'It is unfortunate that the US was forced to accept a defeat on a matter of this 
273 John Ashbrook Diary, 25 October 1971, John Ashbrook Papers. 
274 John Ashbrook Diary, 27 October 1971, ibid. 
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size and importance', and expressed doubt that the Taiwan-US relationship would 
maintain its historic closeness in light of the vote.278 (The foreign aid bill was finally 
resubmitted as two separate bills encompassing economic and military aid, respectively, 
before it finally passed.) 
Despite the widespread discontent over the UN vote, support for a new 
relationship with mainland China was too broad for the Chirep issue to fatally undermine. 
Also, Nixon's show of fighting for Taiwan's seat and protestations that he was attempting 
to retain that seat seemed to convince enough conservatives of his continued support for 
Taiwan that most conservatives did not blame him for the defeat. However, the anger 
within Congress at Taiwan's treatment spanned partisan and ideological boundaries and 
underscored the vast gulf that existed between the White House's attitude toward Taiwan 
and that of the Congress. The Nixon White House, as would the Ford and Carter White 
Houses, viewed Taiwan as expendable to Washington's larger strategic goals, while 
Congress gave greater value to the formal commitments and sense of moral obligation 
that bound Washington and Taipei, as well as concern regarding America's reputation as a 
reliable ally. These fundamental differences would continue to cause  friction between the 
two branches over China policy throughout the 1970's. 
Conclusion
The dramatic change of attitudes within the Congress toward China policy played 
a crucial role in facilitating what has come to be known as 'Nixon's opening'. While it is 
true that White House leadership was essential to effect the opening and that Richard 
Nixon provided that leadership, the opening to China can best be understood in the 
context of a national movement in favour of a fundamental re-evaluation of US China 
policy which had begun several years prior to Nixon's election and was recommended 
278 Personal notes by Stuart Symington, 26 October 1971, Box 265, Stuart Symington Papers. 
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both by strategic and domestic political logic, and not as the courageous vision of one 
man who fought overwhelming odds to bring that vision to fruition. A lessening of the 
vehement Congressional opposition which had previously arisen to signs that a previous 
Administrations had been flirting with re-evaluating aspects of China policy, had 
combined with active support for an initiative aimed at breaking down barriers with 
China to redefine the space within which the Executive Branch could operate. 
Yet in spite of a strong desire on the part of the dominant Congressional liberals to 
force the pace of change, as this chapter has shown, the White House imposed limits on 
Congress’ ability to directly shape the policy-making process. The micromanagement of 
foreign policy in general, and the opening to China in particular, from the White House, 
was a reflection of Nixon and Kissinger's well-known penchant for secrecy. This 
penchant was reinforced, however, by their distrust of the liberal Senate leadership which 
was advocating most strongly for a quickened pace of policy reform, and by Nixon's 
concern that conservatives might still be so strongly opposed to an opening that they 
could turn on him. The White House also saw a need for secrecy in order to hide the 
concessions that the Kissinger had made, and would both Nixon and Kissinger continue 
to make, regarding Taiwan. 
The pattern begun by the Nixon White House in the period leading up to Sino-
American rapprochement would continue to shape Executive-Legislative interaction over 
Taiwan for the remainder of the decade. The  Executive Branch would consistently value 
the American relationship with and commitments to Taiwan far less than did Congress, 
and would consistently mislead Congress regarding its plans for Taiwan. This negative 
pattern would result in a growing dissonance between the branches on China policy as the 
decade progressed, which helped to slow progress toward full diplomatic normalisation, 
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and undermine the opportunity to build a new domestic political consensus behind the 
new relationship. 
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CHAPTER 2: 1972–AUGUST 1974 - 
THE MISLEADING OF CONGRESS, WEAKENING OF THE EXECUTIVE, AND 
DEBATE OVER THE MEANING OF THE OPENING
The period from January 1972 through Richard Nixon's resignation from the 
presidency saw a dramatic turn not only in Nixon's political fortunes but also in the power 
of the Executive Branch relative to the Congress. The new relationship that had been 
perceived through the cloud of euphoria that had surrounded the rapprochement 
increasingly came to be defined by a disappointment on the part of the Chinese with the 
failure of Nixon and Kissinger to follow through on the promises made in late 1971 and 
early 1972. While a combination of factors contributed to the gradual souring of the 
relationship during this period, the key factor was the White House's inability to move 
forward on normalisation on terms acceptable to Beijing. The path to normalisation in 
Washington was blocked by two key factors: the fundamentally differing attitudes toward 
Taiwan on the part of the Executive Branch and the Congress, and the crippling of the 
Nixon presidency due to Watergate. 
This chapter focuses on three aspects of the new relationship from 1972 through 
Nixon's resignation from office in August 1974. The first is the White House's misleading 
of Congress regarding its concessions to China on Taiwan the path to full normalisation 
with Beijing. A second focus of this chapter is the impact of the programme of 
Congressional travel to China, which was begun immediately after Nixon's trip, on the 
early development of the Sino-American relationship. This programme served, as Nixon 
intended it, to broaden Congressional support for the new relationship by familiarising 
Members of Congress with Chinese leaders and vice versa. These trips also, as will be 
shown, had consequences unintended by Nixon and Kissinger. As one example, they gave 
the Chinese leadership insight into the domestic political cleavages in the United States, 
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which the Chinese used to their advantage. The White House and Members of Congress 
also sought to use these trips to advance their own policy preferences, in effect inviting 
the Chinese to become involved in the American intra-governmental struggle over such 
issues as Southeast Asia, US-Soviet détente, and the US defence posture. Most 
importantly, the trips resulted in a gradual realisation on the part of Members that what 
they had been told by Nixon and Kissinger regarding the effect of the opening to China 
on US relations with Taiwan, that the opening had not occurred at the expense of ties with 
Taipei, did not match with the expectations held in Beijing. This realisation that the 
United States would be required to sacrifice much more for the sake of normalisation with 
Beijing than Members had initially been led to believe began a difficult process by which 
Congress attempted to wrestle with the implications, with no easy answer available. 
The third aspect of the new relationship that this chapter discusses is the 
Congressional debate over the strategic implications of the opening to China. The White 
House believed the most important aspect of the new relationship with China to be its 
impact on the global strategic balance and on Soviet-American relations. Significant 
Congressional interest was shown in this central aspect of the relationship, and through 
numerous hearings the Congress sought to examine the interrelationship between China, 
the United States and the Soviet Union, most importantly the effect of Sino-American ties 
on Soviet-US relations. Debate over this aspect of the relationship was interrelated with 
the debate over normalisation, and was one in which Congress's ability to contribute to 
the making of sound policy through examination of the assumptions underlying existing 
policy could have been brought to bear. The ability of Congress to make a substantive 
contribution to policy formulation in this area was constrained, however, by Nixon and 
Kissinger's secretive handling of China policy and their purposeful misleading of 
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Congress regarding their goals for the new relationship, and by the divisions within 
Congress itself over how to approach the Cold War. 
Nixon in Beijing:The 'Tough Negotiator' Makes Concessions and Plans the 
Misleading of Congress
The opening to China pursued by Richard Nixon had been enabled by the 
dramatic shift in Congressional attitudes toward the opening of relations with China. 
Congressional support for an opening had been predicated on the belief, however, that the 
White House would make no concessions to Beijing that would result in Taipei's security 
being compromised and would defend longstanding American commitments to Taiwan – 
a belief the White House encouraged despite the fact that it was making precisely those 
concessions that it had promised it would not make. The record of Nixon's talks in Beijing 
make clear that White House assurances to Congress were insincere, a pattern which 
would be repeated throughout the Nixon and Ford years. 
In Beijing, Nixon affirmed all of the concessions made previously by Kissinger 
and made clear that his concessions could not be made public and hence undermine his 
domestic political position. In order to hide his concessions, the Chinese could not reveal 
them, nor could the joint communiqué indicate that they had been made.279 By linking this 
secrecy with his ability to push Congressional opinion toward an acceptance of Beijing's 
demands for normalisation, Nixon hoped to give the Chinese an interest in supporting his 
domestic political position and collaborating to mislead the Congress regarding the depth 
of the concessions he had made regarding Taiwan.280 
Mao and Zhou were willing to accept, for the time being and for the sake of 
Nixon's domestic political challenges, a de facto 'two Chinas' policy, as well as the fact 
279 Memorandum of conversation (hereafter, memcon) between Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai, 22 
February 1972, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, NPMP, NARA II. 
280 ibid. 
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that Nixon was unwilling to set any deadlines for the withdrawal of US military personnel 
and forces from Taiwan. These were important concessions. The Chinese leaders were 
also willing to allow vague wording in the Shanghai communiqué and to provide the 
protection Nixon sought from domestic political criticism, but wished to ensure that 
Nixon and Kissinger clearly understood that China expected to recover Taiwan in the 
relatively near future and that Beijing expected to have to use force to do so. The removal 
of American troops was merely meant to clear the way for this resolution. It is clear from 
a reading of the talks that Zhou made this clear, and that Nixon and Kissinger both 
understood.281 Zhou reinforced the urgency of this resolution by telling Nixon that it must 
take place within the lifetimes of the now aged leaders of the revolutionary generation –
i.e.–very soon.282 
So focused were the two men on the strategic value they ascribed to the opening 
that not only was Nixon not a 'tough negotiator', as he had promised Members of 
Congress that he would be, but neither he nor his national security advisor objected to 
Zhou's statement that the Chinese expected to use force to accomplish the reunification of 
Taiwan with the Mainland and in the relatively near future. While Congressional liberals 
were less protective of Taiwan than were conservatives, even Senate liberals had shown 
themselves to be unwilling to sacrifice Taiwan to the degree illustrated by Nixon during 
his talks with Zhou. Nixon's response to Zhou's presentation was not to express 
opposition to Zhou's expression that reunification would most likely have to be 
undertaken by force, but to again talk about the importance of hiding his concessions and 
giving him time to 'sell' to Congress a complete US withdrawal from Taiwan, which 
would have signalled American abandonment and the opening of the door to Beijing to 
281 Memcon between Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai, 24 February 1972, ibid. 
282 ibid. 
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take a free hand with Taipei283 The fact that Nixon and Kissinger did not oppose Zhou's 
statement on the use of force did not indicate that the two men would have supported such 
action on the part of China. Kissinger's unwillingness to step aside and give Beijing free 
reign in the coming years, after the Chinese believed that he and Nixon had given their 
acquiescence, would prove to be a point of frustration on the part of the Chinese, who felt 
they had been misled. Nixon and Kissinger's lack of expressed opposition to this potential 
course of action is more likely explained by their desire to let the Chinese believe 
whatever they wanted to believe in order to facilitate the opening and gain the 
geostrategic benefits that the White House expected to accrue from the opening.284 
Believing such concessions to be important at this stage, however, Nixon and Kissinger 
had to hide from Congress and the American public the nature of their discussions in 
China regarding Taiwan. The shortsightedness of this strategy, both with Congress and 
with China, however, would have very negative repurcussions in the coming years. 
Building a Web of Deceit:Nixon's Return and the Debate Over Concessions 
The Shanghai communiqué ended up being vague enough to give Nixon the 
political cover he sought on Taiwan, and Zhou thought that he had gained Nixon and 
Kissinger's agreement to give Beijing a free hand with Taiwan after the American 
withdrawal had been completed. Although some suspected that Nixon had sacrificed 
Taiwan, the attempt to mislead Congress and the public as to the true nature of White 
House concessions regarding Taiwan was successful, with the result that criticism of the 
283 ibid. 
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communiqué was manageable and Nixon did, indeed, buy time with which to attempt to 
fulfil his promises to Mao and Zhou regarding the process of normalisation. Whether such 
deep concessions, so quickly made, were necessary to achieve rapprochement is doubtful. 
Also, Nixon's concessions and deception would have long-term negative repercussions. 
The fundamentally different expectations for Taiwan held by the White House, which was 
willing to sacrifice Taiwan in order to achieve its strategic objectives, and Congress, 
which was more protective of Taiwan, would make the road to normalisation more 
difficult than it would have been had Nixon and Kissinger determined to concede to 
Beijing only as much as they could openly justify to the Congress. Consensus became far 
harder to reach, and the disconnect between White House and Congressional attitudes 
regarding Taiwan and its role in American normalisation with the Mainland provided the 
new relationship an unsure foundation. 
Nixon's negotiating tactics in China would also have negative repercussions with 
Beijing. The Chinese, believing that Nixon would fulfil his promise of quick 
normalisation and had agreed to step aside and allow the Chinese to reunify Taiwan with 
the Mainland on their terms, would later feel deceived when Nixon proved unable to 
quickly normalise and the Nixon and Ford White Houses would not agree to step aside 
and allow Beijing the free hand it thought it had gained. Regarding his deception of 
Congress, Nixon could not have foreseen that it was not leaked news of his promises in 
Beijing that would destroy him politically at home, but that domestic political concerns 
unconnected to his rapprochement with China would force him from power and ruin any 
chance that he could follow through on his promises to Beijing. 
As Nixon's references to the Shanghai Communiqué in his talks with Zhou reveal, 
the communiqué was carefully worded in order to give Nixon domestic political cover in 
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the areas of policy toward Taiwan (as well as Vietnam). Upon Nixon's return, although 
both the trip and the communiqué were generally greeted with approval, the wording of 
the communiqué became grounds for criticism, as Nixon had predicted. Although the 
topic of Nixon's treatment of Taiwan during his trip was the most important issue debated, 
there was also criticism of the apparent lack of progress on Vietnam. Scoop Jackson, a 
Democratic presidential hopeful, questioned why Nixon had appeared to have gained no 
concessions from Beijing on Vietnam.285 Representative Paul McCloskey (R-CA), who, 
like Representative John Ashbrook, was challenging Nixon from the right in the 
Republican presidential primaries, was also critical that no progress seemed to have been 
made on Vietnam.286 
The majority of Congressional  attention was reserved for the issue of Taiwan, 
however. The statement in the Shanghai Communiqué regarding Taiwan's status had been 
carefully worded so that it acknowledged the claim of Beijing to be the legitimate 
government of the whole of a China that included Taiwan without the American side 
taking an official position on the matter. The wording of the communiqué could be 
understood to signify that Nixon had made concessions to Beijing regarding Taiwan, 
which was, indeed, the case, or that he had not made secret concessions and was simply 
seeking diplomatic language to 'acknowledge' the Chinese position, the explanation put 
forward by both Nixon and Kissinger at the time as well as in their memoirs. There were, 
therefore, Members who saw both betrayal and steadfastness in the communiqué. The 
White House strongly asserted the latter interpretation to be accurate. Most Republicans 
rallied in defence of the President, illustrating the power of party loyalty, a factor 
strengthened by the dynamics of a presidential election year. 
285 Congress and the Nation:Vol. III, 1969-1972:A Review of Government and Politics (Washington, D.C., 
1973), pp.893-4.
286  ibid.
116
From the liberal wing of the GOP, Senator Edward Brooke, in a speech to a 
Republican Party gathering four days after Nixon's return, asserted that 'the President, in 
Peking, did not “sell out” Taiwan'.287 Conservatives also defended Nixon against charges 
that he had betrayed Taiwan. From Nixon's announcement of his upcoming trip to Beijing 
and the actual date of his trip, the President, Henry Kissinger, and White House 
congressional liaison officers had continued to lobby those conservatives most strongly 
opposed to the opening to China in order to broaden support for the President's policy 
among his political base. The White House's attempts at such lobbying were successful, a 
testament to Nixon's ability to persuade conservatives that he was not going to 'abandon' 
Taiwan and that the opening served American interests. As one example, the NSC 
recorded in August 1971 that Senator Peter Dominick (R-CO)) was in 'bitter opposition' 
to the China opening: 'His reaction indeed has been rather intemperate, and he has said 
that his non-support of the Administration will spill over to issues like the ABM and 
Vietnam. . . . He warrants special efforts to being him back on the reservation'.288 
By the time Nixon visited China, however, the White House had so successfully 
convinced Dominick that he could trust the President not to bargain away American 
commitments to Taiwan that Dominick delivered a Senate floor speech praising the 
Shanghai Communiqué and declaring that he saw 'no sign of any change in our 
commitments to the Republic of China'. He went on to assert that 'Any contrary view 
simply does not stand up, and the repetition of that concern simply encourages a feeling 
among our allies that they should review their own positions', to Washington's 
detriment.289 Dominick's defence of Nixon was based on the belief that Washington's 
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relationship with Taipei would continue, both diplomatically and militarily: 
We have in no way abrogated our commitments under our Mutual Defense Treaty 
with that government. . . . There should be no concern on the part of our people  or 
on the part of the great people of the Republic of China that we have abandoned 
our commitments. . . . Those who suggest that our initiatives toward world peace 
through expanded communication with traditional adversaries will result in 
abandonment of our friends are doing no favors to the US, to our allies or to the 
cause of world peace.290 
Dominick's statement reflected White House success at broadening the political base of 
support for Nixon's opening to China among conservatives. But crucially, this success 
was dependent upon the White House ability to successfully mislead conservatives into 
believing that no promises had been made to Chinese leaders regarding Taiwan and that 
Nixon did not plan to de-recognise Taiwan or to end the defence treaty with Taipei. 
Nixon, ever concerned to maintain his conservative base, watched carefully for 
signs among conservatives on Capitol Hill that efforts at lobbying their support had been 
successful.291 The story of the White House's successful attempt to gain the support of 
Dominick by promising no concessions on Taiwan was replicated with Senator Barry 
Goldwater, also a staunch Taiwan supporter. In late December 1970, Goldwater had given 
a speech in which he asserted that 'Nothing can be gained, but a great deal can be lost by 
admission of Red China to to the United Nations or its diplomatic recognition by the 
United States'.292 By the time Nixon returned from , however, Goldwater was defending 
Nixon's trip to fellow conservatives and asserting his confidence that 'we have not given 
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away one single thing to the Red Chinese', and that 'we will uphold our treaty 
commitments to the Taiwan government'.293 Other conservative leaders echoed these same 
convictions. House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, for example, wrote shortly after the 
President's return that: ' . . . our interest in Taiwan remains and . . . this nation is not going 
to be left to the communists of Mainland China in a helpless and defenseless position'.294 
The White House records that describe attempts to lobby conservatives do not detail the 
apologetic used to gain their support, but the uniform nature of the statements by 
conservatives in defence of Nixon supports the conclusion that their public statements 
reflect the substance of private White House communications to them and that the White 
House apologetic was effective. 
Conservative criticism had been expected, however, and that offered by John 
Ashbrook was not a surprise. Ashbrook asserted: 
For over two decades it is we who have fostered and supported, both by words and 
deeds, the concept of an independent, Republic of China on Taiwan. Now, in a 
single week, we have abandoned that position – and in doing so we have set up the 
framework to abandon 15 million people to the tender mercies of a regime that 
during its tenure in office – its 23 years of enlightenment and progress – has 
managed to slay, at conservative estimate, 34 million of its own citizens.295
Ashbrook's portrayal of the longtime US government position was, of course, inaccurate. 
Washington had agreed in the past with the Republic of China that Taipei was the rightful 
government of the whole of China, including both the Mainland and Taiwan, not that 
Taiwan was independent of the Mainland. His criticism, nevertheless, reflected fears 
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among some conservatives that despite Nixon's assurances to the contrary, he had in fact 
agreed that he would eventually meet Beijing's longtime demands for normalisation – that 
Washington end its mutual defence treaty with Taipei and withdraw all military forces 
from the island, actions which were intended to give Beijing the ability to reunite Taiwan 
with the mainland on its own terms. Other House conservatives, including 
Representatives Phil Crane (R-IL), John Rarick (D-LA), John Schmitz (R-CA), and 
Robert Sikes (D-FL), echoed Ashbrook's criticisms. Senator James Buckley indicated that 
if Nixon had, indeed, secretly agreed to diminish or do away with the American 
commitment to defend Taiwan, this would 'vastly diminish' his regard for Nixon.296 Much 
of the public was also concerned that Nixon had reached some sort of secret agreement 
regarding Taiwan while in China, as illustrated by the large amounts of constituent mail 
on this topic received by Members of Congress.297 
The strong opposition from a minority of conservatives was not enough to give 
Nixon serious difficulties with the opening. However, their doubts regarding the 
trustworthiness of Nixon's intentions and promises to them indicated the beginnings of a 
larger conservative disillusionment with the foreign policy framework inaugurated by 
Nixon and Kissinger, particularly the policy of détente with the Soviet Union.298 
Conservative opposition to Nixon and Kissinger's foreign policy framework would grow 
as the Soviet Union continued to dramatically increase its military development 
programme and take advantage of opportunities around the globe to increase its influence 
at Washington's expense in the Third World. This trend would also serve to further 
constrain the Executive's ability to convince the Congress and the public to make the 
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sacrifices required by Beijing vis-a-vis Taiwan in order to complete the process of 
diplomatic normalisation with Mainland China. 
Criticism of the Shanghai Communiqué and suspicions regarding possible secret 
concessions by Nixon did not only come from conservatives. Although this may partially 
be explained by partisan election year politics, it also likely reflected genuine concern 
from all segments of Congress that deep concessions on Taiwan not be made. No less a 
personage than Hubert Humphrey, the recent Democratic Vice President, who was once 
again a Senator from Minnesota, questioned Nixon's assertion that the United States had 
not undermined Taiwan during the talks in Beijing nor made any major concessions:
It is now clear that the rug has been pulled out from under the Taiwanese, though 
the people of the island of Formosa once aspired to determine their own destiny. . . 
. . It is apparent from the communiqué as I read it that concessions were made by 
the President and by Dr. Kissinger, but not any, insofar as I have been able to 
interpret, were made by the Chinese.299
Generally speaking, however, Nixon's trip, and the communiqué, received fulsome 
praise from the Democrats. Senator George McGovern, who was on his way to winning 
the Democratic nomination for the presidency and who would oppose Nixon in the 
general election that fall, praised the trip, as did Senators Ted Kennedy, William Fulbright 
and, of course, Mike Mansfield, with whom Nixon had had so many breakfast 
conversations about the desirability of an opening. 
Congressional Delegations to China and Their Effect on the New Relationship
The programme of Congressional visits to China was inaugurated by Nixon and 
Kissinger in the hopes that increasing familiarity with China among Members of 
Congress would result in deepening levels of support within the Congress for completion 
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of the process of normalisation. There was certainly no shortage of Members wishing to 
go. Prior to Nixon's trip the belief that travelling to China would help the career of any 
politician seeking to raise his political profile in the United States had resulted in an 
intense competition for invitations to Beijing, and the political success and theatre of 
Nixon's trip only served to increase the number of Members wishing to visit. A sort of 
'China mania' - an uncritical infatuation with all things Chinese, swept the nation and 
much of the Congress in the wake of Nixon's visit, which was characterised by carefully 
choreographed television coverage meant to produce the maximum political benefit.  As 
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker has written, Nixon and Kissinger had hoped that a combination 
of complete secrecy and a 'China fever' would mask the level of compromises and 
concessions they had made to effect the opening.300 Each year after Nixon's visit saw an 
increase in the number of senators and congressmen travelling to China, which did serve 
to deepen the new relationship by familiarising Members of Congress with the Chinese 
leadership and vice versa (which, as shall be seen, was not always a positive 
development). 
The most important aspect of these trips, however, was that they revealed to 
Members what Nixon and Kissinger both already understood - that Beijing expected 
either to reunify Taiwan by force, and that the withdrawal of American military personnel 
and the ending of the Mutual Security Treaty would make this possible, or that Taiwan 
would collapse due to increasing international isolation and the withdrawal of American 
support. Such a realisation gave many Members who had supported the initial opening 
reason to withhold their support for complete normalisation until a compromise could be 
reached that would ensure that Taiwan was not left at the mercy of the Mainland. 
300 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, 'Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China', The Journal of 
American History 92:1 (2005),  p.110.
122
The trips also highlighted the deep domestic political cleavages in the United 
States, some of which the Chinese could then attempt to use to their advantage. Beijing 
used the talks with Members to work to strengthen support within Washington for 
normalisation on Beijing's terms, to undermine support within the Congress for US-
Soviet détente, and to advocate for an increased American defence budget and strong 
American global position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Both the White House and Members 
of Congress sought to use these trips to advance their own policy preferences. Kissinger, 
who did not wish to allow any Members to compromise his control of the new 
relationship, attempted to micromanage the CoDel programme to this end. He used his 
authority over appointing Members to each delegation agreed with the Chinese to keep 
some Members who had challenged Administration policy too strongly from travelling to 
China, and sought with each delegation as much as possible 'to organize purposefully a 
group which will most effectively support your [Nixon's] programs'.301 Kissinger also 
attempted to coach the Chinese on how to approach specific Members, attempting to 
make the Chinese partners in securing maximum Congressional support for 
Administration foreign policy and attempting to attenuate any temptation on Beijing's part 
to work certain Members against Administration policy with which Beijing disagreed, 
such as US pursuit détente with the Soviets.
Some Members of Congress, in turn, attempted to use their visits to China to 
challenge Kissinger’s foreign policy. Congressional liberals played on what they 
presumed would be Chinese sympathy with their policy preferences in an attempt to gain 
Chinese support for the confrontation with the White House over foreign policy. (These 
attempts tended to backfire as the Chinese leaders, appreciative of Nixon overseeing 
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change of policy toward China did not wish to be seen to be allying against him with 
Senate liberals, whom they viewed as being overly pro-Soviet.) Some foreign policy 
hawks, such as Scoop Jackson, made common cause with the Chinese in criticism of 
Kissinger’s pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union. Experiences such as these served to 
reinforce Kissinger's decision to manage China policy himself and to not allow Congress 
a role in policy formulation. 
The first delegation to travel to China after Nixon was made up of the Senate 
Majority and Minority Leaders, a decision which earned the wire of the House leadership, 
which believed that its support for Administration foreign and national security policy, in 
contrast with the constant challenge to such policy emanating from the Senate, had earned 
it the political prise of being the first Congressional delegation to travel to China.302 After 
Nixon had healed the breach with the House leadership by promising that they would be 
the next to travel to China, discord arose between Mansfield and Scott over whether their 
trip would somehow add to the political benefit to Nixon of the opening. Hugh Scott's 
staff attempted to ensure the trip 'be publicized as an extension of the visit by the 
President' in order to both benefit Scott and also to further ensure that Nixon and the 
Republican Party received continuing credit for the development of the relationship, 
while Democrats, seeking to forestall such an effort, asked that press coverage of the trip 
be minimised.303 Press coverage was extensive, and the dispute was evidence of the 
partisan concerns that still influenced China policy. 
As Nixon had predicted to Zhou in February, Mansfield and Scott spent a 
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substantial amount of time during their 22 April conversation with Zhou Enlai focusing 
on Vietnam and unsuccessfully attempting to gain some kind of Chinese pledge of 
support. As he had with Nixon and Kissinger, Zhou Enlai, with whom Mansfield and 
Scott met, turned away their hints for Chinese assistance. The Administration's primary 
concern in these first talks between the Chinese and Congressional leaders was that the 
Chinese side would leak information regarding the secret agreements between Nixon and 
Zhou, and that this information would find its way into the Congress at large and from 
there into the press, a revelation that would undermine his balance of power goals for the 
new relationship and would prove devastating to Nixon politically. When Mansfield 
pressed Zhou regarding the timetable for the withdrawal of American military personnel 
from Taiwan and asked 'how do you expect to reclaim Taiwan?' Zhou did not reveal the 
agreement reached between Nixon and himself or his expectation to recover Taiwan by 
1976, and offered only that China expected eventually to reclaim Taiwan (giving no 
timetable) and its expectation that Washington would at some future point withdraw all of 
its forces from Taiwan.304 Following their return, Kissinger, ensured that Winston Lord 
reviewed the memcons and trip reports at the State Department. Relieved, Lord reported 
that 'There is nothing in these materials that is particularly sensitive or startling'.305 
Two months after Mansfield and Scott's trip, House Majority Leader Hale Boggs 
and Minority Leader Gerald Ford became the second CoDel to travel to China. The 
divisions between the House and the Senate had already been put on display by the very 
public dispute between the two chambers over which chamber's leadership would be the 
first to travel to China. Once in Beijing, Ford further emphasised to the Chinese the depth 
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of this division when he informed Qiao Guanhua, then Vice Foreign Minister, that 
regarding foreign policy views the House of Representatives 'represent the American 
people more closely than the United States Senate', painting a picture of the more liberal 
Senate as being out of touch with mainstream American public attitudes toward foreign 
policy.306 Ford's intent was to convince Qiao that the US government was not as divided 
on foreign policy as the challenge from Senate liberals might suggest, although in 
actuality he confirmed the chasm that existed between the House and Senate leadership – 
as well as in American politics in general. 
The topics of Vietnam, Taiwan, and growing Soviet power were the primary topics 
of discussion, as they had been during the visit of the Senate leadership. Meeting with 
Zhou, Ford and Boggs were told that Zhou hoped that the United States would maintain a 
strong military position around the globe in order to balance Soviet power. When Boggs 
asked Zhou whether he believed that the lessening of tensions brought about by US-
Soviet détente would bring about a reduction of Soviet defence spending, Zhou replied 
emphatically in English, before the question had even been translated into Chinese, 
'Never! Never! Never!'307 He then intimated that it was folly for the United States to 
consider unilateral defence spending cuts in the face of rapidly growing Soviet military 
spending. This theme would continue in discussions between the Chinese leadership and 
visiting Members of Congress for the remainder of the decade, as China, believing that 
reduced Soviet-American tensions would inevitably lead to increased Soviet military and 
political pressure on itself, sought to undermine détente. 
Regarding Taiwan, Zhou repeated the formulation of the Shanghai Communiqué, 
but again gave no hint of the harsh expectations that he had made known to Nixon and 
306 Memcon between Hale Boggs, Gerald Ford, and Qiao Guanhua, 27 June 1972, Ford Congressional 
Papers, Series B, Legislative File, Box B219, Ford Library. 
307 Memcon between Hale Boggs, Gerald Ford, Zhou Enlai and Qiao Guanhua, 29 June 1972, ibid. 
126
Kissinger. During this trip the Chinese received their first taste of the tendency of 
Members of Congress to be indiscreet in their public statements, a lesson that would 
make the Chinese cautious in what they agreed to share with Members in the future. 
Nixon had warned Zhou that Members of Congress could be indiscreet, and a statement 
by Ford unfortunately validated Nixon's warning. When meeting with Boggs and Ford, 
Zhou had expressed support for a continued strong American military presence in 
Southeast Asia. The Chinese had been worried that the 'Nixon Doctrine' implied 
American retrenchment from Asia, which Beijing feared would leave a vast void into 
which the Soviet Union could move, strengthening its attempted encirclement of China. 
Zhou, therefore, had expressed support for a continuing American military presence in 
Southeast Asia, assuming that their conversation was confidential. As soon as the two 
House leaders had returned to Washington, however, they held a press conference in 
which Ford publicly announced Beijing's private attitude.308 While this was a message the 
Chinese wished to give the Americans in private, it is not one that they wished to give to 
their North Vietnamese comrades nor to the communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia for 
whose sympathies Moscow and Beijing were competing, and Zhou publicly disavowed 
the House leadership's assertion.309 
Subsequent groups of Members would visit China in 1973 and 1974 in increasing 
numbers. Both the White House and the Chinese attempted to use these visits in order to 
advance their respective policy preferences. In his February 1973 visit to Beijing 
Kissinger recommended to Zhou that an invitation be issued to Scoop Jackson, telling 
Zhou that Jackson was supportive of the Administration's goal of strong defence spending 
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and was, like Beijing, critical of Moscow.310 At the same time the White House sought to 
ensure travel to China by Members with views of the global strategic situation 
harmonising with its own, there is also evidence that Kissinger sought to delay or obstruct 
altogether the visits of Members who had strongly challenged Administration foreign 
policy. William Fulbright and Stuart Symington were two prominent examples. 
Given Fulbright's chairmanship of the SFRC, long-time advocacy of improved 
Sino-American ties, and the fact that his committee was the first to openly advocate 
fundamental change of American China policy in 1966, he should have been an obvious 
choice to visit China. Fulbright had long made known his desire to visit China and had 
apparently made known his wish to be given a place on one of the 1973 delegations slated 
to visit Beijing. Not hearing anything from the Administration in response, Carl Marcy, 
the committee's chief of staff, wrote to the White House asking whether Fulbright was 
going to be placed on an upcoming CoDel. Tom Korologos, a White House Congressional 
liaison staff member who shared the general White House distaste for Fulbright, 
responded to Marcy by claiming that, 'We had no inkling in our shop that the Chairman 
had applied so long ago', putting him off by saying that, 'I also regret that he found 
scheduling problems with the trip in July'.311 It seems doubtful that the White House 
would not have been aware of Fulbright's very obvious desire to travel to China. 
Korologos' explanation that he was unaware of Fulbright's desire and that there were 
'scheduling problems' with future planned delegations gives the appearance that the White 
House was purposefully withholding from Fulbright a place on a Congressional trip to 
Beijing due to the fact that his views on the international situation differed completely 
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with those of the White House. 
SFRC member Stuart Symington, whose subcommittee hearings several years 
earlier had earned the ire of the White House, was also not placed on a delegation to 
China, despite his intense interest in going.312 When he complained to Carl Marcy, Marcy 
recounted to Symington his interaction with Korologos on this issue, saying that this 
pattern: 
made it look like there was a clear intent on the part of the Administration to show 
that those who cooperate get good treatment. I pointed out that the Chairman and 
other Committee members not on the list [for upcoming delegations] had taken the 
lead years ago in encouraging an opening to China.313 
Symington never did travel to China with a Congressional delegation, and Fulbright 
would finally travel to China in September 1974 after he had lost the Democratic Senate 
primary in his home state of Arkansas and was a lame duck. 
While Kissinger was apparently attempting to keep Symington and Fulbright out 
of China altogether, he was also micromanaging the visits of those Members who did 
travel to China by preparing the Chinese on their positions on various issues, with the 
obvious intent to elicit Chinese lobbying of these Members in certain areas of mutual 
concern, such as defence spending and American troop levels in Europe. One example 
was Mike Mansfield. Kissinger not too subtly complained to Zhou about Mansfield's 
position on both the issue of US troop levels in Europe, in which Mansfield favoured a 
dramatic reduction, and on reduction of defence spending in general. Each year since 
1970, Mansfield had introduced amendments to various appropriations bills in which he 
had demanded large reductions in the US troop levels in Europe. The White House 
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believed such troop reductions would spark fears among its Western European allies 
about the US commitment to their security and would increase the Soviet ability to apply 
political pressure on them. The Chinese had a vested interest in the maintenance of a 
strong US military presence in Western Europe, as well as in the strengthening of the 
Europeans' own military strength, in order to ensure that the Soviet Union continued to be 
faced with formidable military forces in the West that would constrain the Soviet ability 
to concentrate its growing military power in the East. 
Kissinger, therefore, sought to enlist the Chinese in an effort to lobby liberal 
Members of Congress, such as Mansfield, who were supportive of a reduced US troop 
presence in Europe and who annually attempted to cut the Administration's requested 
defence budget. Speaking of Mike Mansfield in February 1973, for example, Kissinger 
noted the fact that 'Senator Mansfield, who incidentally wants to come back here' was 
advocating force reductions in Europe, adding, 'We will be glad to send him if you 
promise to keep him'.314 The Chinese were perfectly willing to lobby Mansfield and other 
visiting liberal Members of Congress in these areas. Following his November 1973 trip to 
Beijing, Kissinger reported to Nixon that the Chinese were concerned about the 
'Congressional mood' that favoured reduced defence spending and reduced American 
military presence globally, asserting that 'Once they become convinced that we cannot or 
will not act as a major force on a global scale, we will lose our principal value to them'.315 
Kissinger's belief that the Chinese were vitally concerned about the value of the United 
States as a counterweight to Moscow was not incorrect, as illustrated by China's repeated 
admonitions to visiting Members to support stronger defence spending and a strong 
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global American military position vis-vis the Soviet Union. However, he regularly over-
emphasised this aspect of the relationship and ignored the fact that Washington was also 
of value to Beijing in that its attitude was seen as the key to China's ability to recover 
Taiwan. 
Members of Congress, as well, particularly liberals, attempted to use their talks 
with Chinese leaders to challenge Kissinger's foreign policy. The Executive Branch's 
post-Vietnam struggle with the Congress over foreign and national security policy was 
reaching a fever pitch in 1973, just as the Watergate scandal was beginning to severely 
cripple Nixon's ability to lead in both of these areas and to defend against Congressional 
attempts to limit Executive authority.316 One such area that impinged directly on Sino-
American relations was the Congressional funding cut off, led by liberals, for Nixon's 
support of Cambodia's struggle against the Khmer Rouge guerillas. Differences of policy 
toward Cambodia were a source of growing tension between Washington and Beijing in 
the summer of 1973, with Beijing concerned that a continuation of fighting in Cambodia, 
which they blamed on American support for Lon Nol's government, would result in a 
Soviet opportunity to increase its influence in Southeast Asia. Against this background a 
Congressional delegation visited Beijing, that put on display the fissures between the 
Executive Branch and Congressional liberals and attempted to play on the sympathy that 
the Senator leading the delegation presumed Beijing would have for his position on 
Southeast Asia and elicit from Zhou Enlai an expression of support for the position of 
Congressional liberals in their challenge to the Nixon Administration. 
Warren Magnuson, who had advocated the opening of ties with China since the 
late 1950's, led this delegation of both House and Senate Members to Beijing in early July 
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1973, after Congress cut off funds for American air operations over Cambodia. 
Magnuson's behaviour angered the Chinese, was seen by Kissinger as complicating the 
delicate process of developing Sino-American ties, and reinforced Kissinger's belief that 
Congress was primarily a nuisance and not a partner in the policy-making process. David 
Bruce, the head of the newly-established US Liaison Office in Beijing, privately labelled 
Magnuson's behaviour during the trip 'bizarre' 317 and cabled back to Kissinger a scathing 
report of Magnuson's visit.318 
After repeated, loud complaints by Magnuson that he was not given an interview 
with Zhou, the Chinese finally relented and granted him one.319 Magnuson attempted to 
use his advocacy of the funding cut off in order to gain Zhou's support for the position of 
Congressional liberals in the struggle with the Nixon Administration over foreign policy, 
an effort that was not appreciated by Zhou, who attempted to sidestep the issue 
repeatedly. Magnuson, however, continued to press the issue, seeking praise for the role 
of liberals in stopping US involvement in support of Lon Nol and telling Zhou: 'Be 
patient. It will soon all be over'. Other members of the delegation, which included Doc 
Morgan, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, attempted to disagree with 
Magnuson's position on Cambodia, but were overridden by his determination that his 
view be the only one heard. Zhou was so irritated by Magnuson's approach that he took a 
less compromising tone on Taiwan than he had previously taken with visiting Members of 
Congress. Richard Solomon, the NSC officer who had accompanied the Magnuson 
delegation to China recorded that, 'Chou was visibly angered at both the content of the 
discussion and the fact that he had been put in the position of appearing to play the 
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Congress against the White House'.320 
In a banquet on the delegation's last night in Beijing, Magnuson gave the 
impression that he supported an independent Taiwan, a position bound to earn the ire of 
the Chinese and potentially complicate Kissinger's delicate attempts to move forward 
with normalisation while retaining significant American ties to Taipei.321 Solomon, in his 
report to Kissinger, concluded that:  
The Magnuson delegation almost certainly made a negative impact on the 
Chinese . . . . . Magnuson’s repeated assertions of the independence of Congress 
and the obvious interest of many Senators and Representatives in using trips to the 
PRC for their own domestic political purposes, very likely has left PRC leaders 
with a contemptuous feeling toward our governmental system, and a belief that 
they could use these men against an Administration position which they did not 
like.322 
Kissinger concluded that the experience of Zhou with Magnuson and the success of 
Congressional liberals in delimiting Executive Branch freedom of action in national 
security policy had given the Chinese leadership the impression of Executive Branch 
weakness and, hence, a sense of insecurity in the ability of the American government to 
support Chinese security interests.323 Experiences such as this reinforced Kissinger's 
penchant for secrecy and desire to deny Congress a role in policy formulation. 
During 1974, as US-Soviet détente began to falter, Congressional delegations 
increasingly came to address the issue of Soviet pressure on China, with the Chinese 
320 Richard Solomon to Henry Kissinger, 'The US Congressional Delegation's Tour of China: It Might 
Have Been Worse', 18 July 1973, RG 59, PPS, China Exchanges April 1–August 8, 1974, Box 328, 
NARA II. 
321 David Bruce (Beijing) to Henry Kissinger, 8 July 1973, File China Exchanges June 14–July 9, 1973, 
ibid. 
322 Richard Solomon to Henry Kissinger, July 18, 1973, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, 
Far East, China Exchanges, July 10–Oct. 31, 1973, Box 95, NPMP, NARA II.  
323 Memcon between Kissinger and his staff, 19 July 1973, ibid. 
133
leadership using such visits to communicate their message that Moscow's primary 
aggressive focus was in the West, not in the East. Kissinger's diplomatic strategy with the 
Chinese had been to play on Beijing's fear of Soviet encirclement and military pressure in 
order to build up China's appreciation for the United States as a strategic counterweight 
and, hence, attempt to increase China's desire for close relations with Washington. By mid 
1973 two aides to David Bruce reported that the Chinese 'no longer believe a Soviet attack 
is likely, or at least imminent'.324 As Chinese fears of a Soviet attack abated, they began to 
perceive Kissinger as attempting to stoke their fears for his own purposes.325 In order to 
counteract Kissinger's attempt to build a sense of obligation, the Chinese in the spring and 
summer of 1974 began to tell visiting dignitaries and Congressional visitors that the 
Soviet Union's focus was not on China, but on Western Europe.326 An aide to Scoop 
Jackson, who visited China in early July, reported to David Bruce that the Chinese were 
'quite relaxed' regarding the Soviet threat, asserting 'that the Soviets were “feinting to the 
east in order to concentrate against the west”. Thus, Western Europe and not China was 
the danger area'.327 
Kissinger's attempts to manage Congressional interaction with the Chinese in a 
manner that favoured Administration policy preferences were not always successful, as 
the July 1974 visit of Scoop Jackson illustrates. Knowing that the Chinese shared with 
Jackson a scepticism of Kissinger's pursuit of détente with the Soviets, he sought to 
suppress joint criticism of himself. He thus warned Zhou against stoking Jackson's anti-
Soviet sentiment so strongly that Jackson made statements that would alienate important 
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liberals such as William Fulbright, 'whom we need and who is his enemy'.328 Kissinger 
was concerned that the commonality of views on détente held by the Chinese and Jackson 
would serve to undermine Kissinger's position with the Chinese. In reality, his credibility 
had already been severely undermined by his own over-playing of the 'Soviet card'. 
Kissinger had hoped that the fact that he had suggested a Jackson visit to China 
would somehow cause Jackson to lessen his opposition to détente out of appreciation. 
When that appreciation was not forthcoming, Kissinger complained to the Chinese 'Your 
invitation hasn’t changed his behaviour toward me at all'.329 Jackson found his critical 
views of the Soviet Union appreciated in China, noting on his return from Beijing that 'I 
found that many of my own positions on vital issues now being debated in America were 
understood and sympathetically appreciated by the Chinese', and argued that 'We must 
grasp this moment in history when geopolitical considerations have brought our two 
countries closer together to build a web of relations which will promote peace'.330 
Jackson's belief in the value of the Sino-American relationship to the containment of 
Soviet power led him to propose after his trip that: 'On the matter of diplomatic 
recognition, we should try to reverse the location of our embassy and liaison office as 
between Taipei and Peking'.331 While Jackson's support of normalisation and willingness 
to lower the level of diplomatic recognition of Taipei was welcome to Kissinger, his 
criticism of détente and of Kissinger's monopoly on China policy was not. Attempting to 
claim a role for Congress, Jackson declared that: 
I was able to explain to the highest Chinese officials the nature of the American 
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decision-making process and the increasing importance of Congress in foreign 
policy matters. I believe that the US-China relationship must be strengthened by 
moving beyond contacts between a limited number of personalities to a more 
institutionalized process and a far wider range of exchanges and other 
relationships.332 
Jackson's support for lowering the level of diplomatic relations with Taipei and upgrading 
relations with Beijing - essentially switching the current arrangement, was not widely 
supported in Congress, where the dominant view was that relations with Taipei should not 
be downgraded at all. It did, however, evidence at least a small amount of movement 
within Congress in the direction of Beijing's position on normalisation. 
Debate Over Taiwan and the Process of Normalisation
The initial opening to China had enjoyed broad, bipartisan support within 
Congress, and support from much of the media, from academia, and the business 
community. As Mike Mansfield explained in December 1973, Nixon had 'proceeded from 
a base of assured support in the Congress'.333 Mansfield's chief of staff, Frank Valeo, 
echoed his boss's words, describing the national political consensus in favour of 
rapprochement by writing that, 'The shift in China policy sat well with the American 
electorate'.334 The path toward full normalisation, however, due largely to what one 
prominent House Member termed the 'Gordion Knot of our relations with mainland 
China', the issue of Taiwan, would prove much more difficult.335 As Senator Thomas 
Eagleton (D-MO) stated of the initial rapprochement during Nixon's trip, 'This . . . may be 
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the easy part'.336 The souring of Sino-American relations due largely to Washington's 
failure to follow through on its promises to Beijing and the course the debate within 
Washington over normalisation over the next several years would prove Senator 
Eagleton's concern to be well placed. The disconnect between White House and 
Congressional attitudes toward Taiwan was at the heart of the matter. 
In 1972 and 1973 several House panels held hearings in which various aspects of 
the relationship with Taiwan were addressed, as well as the issue of the strategic 
implications of the opening to China. The subcommittees were not convinced that the 
strategic benefits of the opening to China would justify cutting ties with Taiwan, a 
conviction that set them on a collision course with the White House regarding 
normalisation with Beijing. Nixon had seemed confident in February 1972 of his ability 
to convince the Congress to allow a complete severing of military and diplomatic ties 
with Taiwan. Nixon and Kissinger's treatment of Taiwan and concessions to Beijing 
indicate that they would, indeed, have been willing to allow Beijing a free hand with 
Taiwan had they believed that Congress would have allowed them to get away with it. 
Both Beijing's demands and Nixon's concessions were unknown to the Congress 
in early 1972. The increasing access of Members of Congress to Chinese leaders as a 
result of the programme of Congressional trips to China, however, resulted in a gradual 
learning process whereby Members became aware of Beijing's demands for normalisation 
and began to wrestle with the implications. In July 1972 House Members took note of a 
more explicit delineation of Chinese expectations regarding Taiwan that went 'far beyond 
the careful ambiguities of the February 28 communiqué'. Zhou Enlai had at first, as 
pointed out by Selig Harrison in the Los Angeles Times, 'pointedly avoided explicit 
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demands for the abrogation of the US-Taiwan security treaty or the termination of US 
diplomatic ties with Taipei'.337 This was changing. Harrison noted that 'China is now 
saying bluntly that a complete American break with Taiwan must precede the 
normalization of Sino-US relatoins'.338 Representative Robert Leggett (D-CA) responded: 
It should not be inferred that the severance of diplomatic ties with the Taiwan 
Government is being promulgated. Even with our formal agreements, the 
friendship between the US and Nationalist China has endured too long to even 
consider this as a possibility. Our course of action should be to progress instead, in 
a direction which would ensure both the normalization of our Sino-American 
relations and the independence of Taiwan. It is possible to move toward both goals 
at the same time.339 
Both the Nationalists on Taiwan and the Communists on the Mainland believed, as 
the Shanghai Communiqué had acknowledged, Taiwan to be part of China, and each 
rejected the concept of an independent Taiwan. Nixon and Kissinger had pledged to Zhou 
and Mao that they would not support such a move. Yet Members of Congress and 
Congressional subcommittees would repeatedly return to this theme throughout the next 
several years, seeing an independent Taiwan as a means of granting finality to the long-
running issue of Taiwan's status. Such sentiments worried Beijing, as evidenced by the 
very negative reaction to Warren Magnuson's hint during a dinner in Beijing that perhaps 
Taiwan should be independent. 
From the announcement of the Shanghai Communiqué onward the Chinese 
gradually increased the pressure on the White House to fulfil its promises regarding 
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Taiwan and normalisation. At the same time, the Congress provided constant reminders to 
the White House and the State Department how greatly it valued Washington's diplomatic 
and security ties with Taiwan. Broad support existed for normalisation with the Mainland, 
as long as that normalisation did not necessitate the breaking of the relationship with 
Taiwan. Kissinger was left, therefore, to attempt to find a means of moving toward full 
normalisation with Beijing while maintaining relations with Taipei, a difficult task made 
much more difficult by the disconnect between Beijing's expectations, which were created 
by Nixon and Kissinger's promises, and by the expectations of most of the Congress, 
reinforced by very different White House assurances, which was that ties with Taiwan 
would not be sacrificed for the sake of normalisation with the Mainland. 
As many Members recognised, while giving lip service to a one China policy, 
Washington was pursuing a de facto two Chinas policy.340 Kissinger was hoping that 
Beijing's concerns about the Soviet Union would cause Chinese leaders to ignore the 
issue of Taiwan for some time, and perhaps even establish full diplomatic relations with 
Washington while allowing it to maintain ties with Taipei. Pursuant to their promises in 
Beijing, Kissinger and Nixon began to distance the United States from Taiwan little by 
little, gradually withdrawing US military forces and instituting an informal ban on high 
level meetings with Nationalist officials. At the same time, however, US-ROC military 
cooperation continued (the Pentagon remained strongly supportive of the relationship 
with Taiwan).341 342 
By early 1973 Senate liberals were pressing for full normalisation. And even 
though they were willing to go much further than many others within Congress in terms 
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of de-recognition of Taiwan, their calls for normalisation were always tempered by the 
condition that Taiwan's security must be assured – it could not be placed in a position in 
which it would just collapse or be forced to reunify with the Mainland.343 On 21 February, 
while Kissinger was in Beijing negotiating the establishment of joint Liaison Offices with 
Zhou Enlai, Ted Kennedy introduced a bill calling for full normalisation with China. 
Kennedy's bill was willing to 'accept the Government of the PRC as the sole legitimate 
Government of China', and 'reaffirm the commitments contained in the Cairo Declaration 
of 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 that the island of Taiwan shall be restored 
to China'.344 He also, however, called for 'the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with 
mainland China' and declared that 'we should make a unilateral guarantee of the security 
of the people on Taiwan until peaceful reunification has been achieved'.345 Kennedy's 
resolution was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, from which it never 
emerged. However, the resolution did receive support from other liberals, illustrating the 
fact that some support did exist among Congressional liberals for normalisation that 
involved de-recognition of Taiwan and the formal breaking of the Mutual Security Treaty, 
as long as a continuing American security guarantee took its place ensuing that Taipei was 
not forced to reunify with the Mainland on Beijing's terms. Kissinger knew that the 
Chinese would not have accepted a unilateral American security guarantee for Taiwan, yet 
even liberals such as Kennedy were unwilling to go so far as to allow Beijing a 
completely free hand with Taiwan. 
The announcement shortly after Kennedy's speech that Kissinger and Zhou had 
agreed to establish joint Liaison Offices was greeted with approval by liberals and 
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cautious approval by conservatives.346 It appeared to validate Kissinger's claim, made in 
internal White House discussions, that the Chinese were more concerned about the Soviet 
Union than they were about regaining Taiwan. The establishment of liaison offices, which 
were de facto if not de jure embassies, was seen as evidence that the Chinese would 
accept diplomatic relations with the United States even while Washington maintained 
diplomatic relations with Taipei, contributing to hopes that full normalisation might be 
achieved while diplomatic ties with Taiwan continued. 
The Nixon Administration initially hoped to be able to establish liaison offices, 
which were to have all of the legal rights and diplomatic privileges of official embassies, 
without the involvement of the Congress. Administration attorneys, however, informed 
the White House that in the absence of formal recognition legislative action was 
necessary in order to guarantee the diplomatic immunities and various other rights and 
privileges that would be necessary for a fully functioning diplomatic entity. The need for 
legislation was unwelcome by the White House, which was concerned that it not give 
conservatives in Congress a vehicle through which to express support for Taiwan and 
criticism of mainland China through innumerable amendments.347 Finding no way around 
the requirement for legislation, however, White House and State Department 
congressional liaison officers successfully lobbied conservatives (and all others who 
might be tempted to use the legislation to express their  opinions on Sino-American 
relations and normalisation) to allow the legislation to go forward unencumbered by 
extraneous amendments.348 
In mid March the White House turned to two unlikely allies in the Senate, William 
Fulbright and Mike Mansfield, to get the legislation through the Senate cleanly. White 
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House lobbying, together with the efforts of Fulbright and Mansfield, were successful. 
Fulbright introduced White House-authored legislation on 22 March and reported it out of 
the Foreign Relations Committee with no amendments, and Mansfield ensured that it was 
shepherded to a voice vote without debate on the Senate floor on 13 April. The House 
leadership, which unlike the Senate was accustomed to working closely with the White 
House on foreign policy issues, handled the legislation in a similar manner, reporting it 
out of Doc Morgan's Foreign Affairs Committee to passage by voice vote without debate 
in the full House on 17 April. Likely reflecting the verbiage utilised by the White House's 
lobbying effort, conservatives stated that they supported the legislation and its quick 
passage out of the belief that it 'represents no special concession to China' with regard to 
Taiwan.349 This was the last time that a move in the direction of diplomatic normalisation 
with China would receive such broad bipartisan support. It also marked the high water 
mark in the growth of the early relationship. After this point, the relationship was 
characterised increasingly by Chinese disappointment in the lack of progress from the 
American side in fulfilment of the promises made by Nixon and Kissinger. 
Following Kissinger's announcement of the establishment of joint liaison offices, 
Senate liberals followed the pattern they had followed since 1969, challenging the 
Administration to move further and faster and calling for complete normalisation. Unlike 
the case of the initial opening to China, however, this time the liberal position was not 
indicative of a consensus within Congress. With a few exceptions, such as Scoop Jackson, 
attitudes within Congress remained essentially static toward the issue of normalisation on 
Beijing's terms through 1973 and 1974 due to concerns about Taiwan. From the spring of 
1973 onward the White House weakened by the day as the Watergate scandal absorbed 
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ever greater amounts of its attention and foreclosed its ability to take any major foreign 
policy initiative, particularly one that would require so much attention to the domestic 
political scene. Nixon therefore had no political capital to expend on trying to sway the 
views of the many in Congress who were protective of Taiwan, and Kissinger put forth no 
effort to do so. Far more widespread than liberal advocacy for full normalisation with the 
Mainland and de-recognition of Taiwan was the misgivings expressed by the majority 
regarding such a route. Senator Harry Byrd, Jr., expressed the dominant sentiment when 
he responded to the call of Senate liberals by saying, 'Personally, as much as I want to see 
cordial relations established between Red China and the US, I would hope that we would 
not throw over-board our long-time Chinese friends in Taiwan'.350 
Significant numbers in both the House and the Senate went on record as opposing 
normalisation with the Mainland at the cost of ties with Taiwan. In the House, 
conservative Members whose suspicions had not abated sought to foreclose the 
possibility that Nixon and Kissinger would break ties with Taiwan by introducing a series 
of concurrent resolutions 'providing for continuing close relations with the ROC', which 
received broad support.351 Concern was expressed in the introduction of these resolutions 
that the breaking of ties with Taiwan after years of repeated commitments and numerous 
formal agreements would irreparably harm American credibility as a reliable ally, and 
hence that normalisation with China on such terms would harm the national interest far 
more than normalisation would help it.352 In the Senate, a bipartisan group of twenty two 
Senators, including those who had earlier aggressively advocated for an opening to China, 
cosponsored another concurrent resolution, S.Con.Res. 52, 'Expressing the sense of 
Congress relative to friendship with the Republic of China'. Numerous similar concurrent 
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resolutions in both the House and the Senate warned Kissinger not to break ties to Taiwan 
for the sake of normalisation with Beijing. 
Realising that, at least for the foreseeable future, it would be impossible to move 
forward on full normalisation along the lines discussed with Zhou Enlai in 1972, when 
Kissinger travelled to Beijing in November 1973 he made an offer to Zhou in which the 
United States would establish formal diplomatic relations with Beijing while retaining 
diplomatic and military ties with Taipei, with the understanding that as soon as it was 
feasible domestically, Nixon would move to break those ties. Shocked to be receiving 
such a proposal after having believed that the White House had already committed to 
meeting Beijing's demands, Mao gave Kissinger a dressing down after Zhou had relayed 
Kissinger's offer.353 
Frustrated by what he viewed as Congressional obstruction of the path of 
normalisation, Kissinger attempted for Nixon's last few months in office to keep the 
relationship with China moving forward by attempting to create progress in other areas so 
that the perception of forward momentum in the Sino-American relationship would keep 
the pressure on the Soviets. Mike Mansfield had noted earlier in the year that, 'Until the 
Taiwan situation is clarified, we shall find ourselves probably looking primarily to trade 
and other exchanges for the cement of relations with the new China'.354 Kissinger was, 
indeed, limited to that from late 1973 onward. He hoped that attempts to increase trade 
and to strengthen the anti-Soviet aspect of the relationship would help maintain a sense of 
forward momentum. However, in each of these areas he would also be disappointed, with 
significant constraints on the growth of trade (importantly including Congress's 
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unwillingness to pass legislation authorising MFN trade status for China in the absence of 
such an extension to the Soviets), and the Chinese unwilling to allow him to play on their 
fears of possible Soviet invasion.
Small movements of opinion within Congress were seen in 1974 in relation to 
attitudes toward normalisation, but these were isolated instances. Scoop Jackson's July 
1974 announcement of support for a normalisation agreement that saw the United States 
maintain an embassy in Beijing and a liaison office in Taipei was a case in point. 
Although Jackson reaffirmed the American commitment to Taiwan's security, Members of 
Congress who normally agreed with Jackson's foreign policy preferences came out 
strongly against his proposal.355 By the time of Nixon's resignation, the vast majority in 
Congress remained opposed to normalisation at the cost of breaking ties with Taipei 
notwithstanding the support of Senate liberals and Scoop Jackson for this type of move, 
and Kissinger, unsure of what course to take, had made no further approaches to the 
Chinese since the rejection of his November 1973 proposal. The fundamental difference 
between Nixon and Kissinger's willingness to sacrifice Taiwan for the sake of their 
strategic objectives and the unwillingness of the vast majority of the Congress to do the 
same had made forward progress in the area of normalisation impossible, and had 
contributed to the souring of Sino-American relations. 
Congress Wrestles With the Strategic Implications of the Opening
The triangular game was the primary purpose of Sino-American rapprochement in 
Nixon and Kissinger's conception of the relationship. However, they consistently denied 
this intent when discussing their China strategy with Congressional leaders, some of 
whom, ironically, had taken part in the hearings several years previously that had 
publicised the strategic opportunity afforded by the Sino-Soviet conflict before Nixon or 
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Kissinger had recognised such an opportunity. As Kissinger wrote to Nixon, 'the facts 
speak for themselves', and there was wide recognition on Capitol Hill of the triangular 
dynamic and that the opening to China would likely yield benefits in the Soviet-American 
relationship.356 Congress was not aware, however, of the specific way in which the White 
House sought to play China and the Soviets off against one another. 
The focus of the new Sino-American relationship in Nixon and Kissinger's 
conception was on the coercive role it played. The goal was to provide just enough 
pressure on the Soviet Union through the threat of Sino-American collaboration to cause 
the Soviets to be more flexible in the three major forums of Soviet American dialogue 
then ongoing, as well as to prod Moscow to compete with Beijing for Washington's favour 
generally, while not providing so much pressure as to elicit a counterproductive Soviet 
reaction.357 At the same time, Washington needed to convince Beijing that the United 
States was dedicated to containing Soviet power. The White House was convinced that, in 
order to be effective, this strategy could not be made subject to a public debate. The 
reason for  secrecy and the misleading of Congress was more compelling, therefore, than 
that used in relation to Taiwan. By pursuing this pattern of deception, Kissinger and Nixon 
were able to play the two communist giants against one another with no Congressional 
interference. This approach also ensured, however, that there would be no one to question 
their assumptions. 
The White House was concerned that many on the Hill, particularly Congressional 
liberals, would view such a triangular game as dangerous, given its potential to anger the 
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Soviet Union and to alienate Beijing if it came to see itself as being used. It was also 
concerned that sharing this information with even a limited number of Congressional 
leaders would lead to a leak, which would undercut the White House ability to pursue this 
strategy. When meeting informally with the SFRC shortly after his return from China 
with Nixon in March 1972, Kissinger, while acknowledging that 'since his first trip to 
China, relations with the Soviets have improved', went on to tell them that 'it would be 
extremely short-sighted to think that the Administration was attempting to play off the 
PRC against the Soviets because, first, we couldn't do it if we wanted, and second, that 
even if we could do it, it would be a great mistake'.358 In fact, playing the Chinese off 
against the Soviets and vice-versa was precisely was Nixon and Kissinger were seeking to 
do.359 
Within the Nixon White House, while the tactical issues had been addressed, such 
as the fact that the United States would attempt to use its new relationship with China as 
leverage over the Soviet Union in order to further détente and strengthen Soviet-
American relations, more fundamental questions such as whether the development of a de 
facto coalition with China, even a limited one, was consistent with the goal of furthering 
US-Soviet détente, and what the precise role of Sino-American relations would be with 
regard to US strategy towards Moscow, were not answered.360 Later, as détente faltered 
and an increasing number of people both inside and outside of government became 
involved in the debate over the role of China in US-Soviet relations, Congress began to 
make a greater contribution to the debate. With the limited information to which it had 
access, however, various Congressional bodies were able to address in at least a modest 
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way some of the larger issues that did not seem to have been addressed within the 
Executive Branch. Congress's attempt to address these issues were not appreciated by 
Kissinger, or later by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security advisor. 
However, such attempts to question the larger suppositions and unanswered questions that 
lay behind each Administration's policy in this area supports the argument that Congress's 
contribution on the area of foreign policy is many times one of raising the 'big picture 
issues' that those in the Executive Branch, who have become wedded to a given policy 
view, and/or are so at the mercy of constant crises that they do not have sufficient time to 
reflect on many of the larger issues underpinning their preferred policies, do not consider. 
Despite the fact that Congress had only a limited understanding of how the Nixon 
White House was hoping to use the opening to China, and, hence, the path that relations 
with China were taking, the interest shown in this aspect of the relationship illustrated 
Congress's desire to be involved in the policy-making process in this area. Through 
hearings and debate and comments made on the floor of the House and Senate, Members 
contributed to the public education and debate over these issues that were so important to 
American strategy and the course of the Cold War. While the SFRC expended its energy 
continuing the attempt to exonerate the Truman Administration's record on China through 
hearings in early 1972, the House became the first chamber to attempt to examine the 
strategic impact of Sino-American rapprochement when the Subcommittee on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee undertook hearings on 'The New 
China Policy: Its Impact on the United States and Asia' that May. 
The staff who created and shaped these hearings were less sanguine than were 
Nixon and Kissinger regarding the effects of the Sino-American rapprochement on 
America's global position as well as on the overall global balance of power. Henry Lloyd, 
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the subcommittee staff member responsible for organising the hearings, was concerned 
that Nixon and Kissinger had sacrificed Taiwan for the sake of strategic objectives that 
were overly-optimistic. Lloyd and his colleagues sought to dampen what they believed to 
be the White House's overly-optimistic conception of the impact of that Sino-American 
rapprochement would have on the global power structure, arguing that not as much would 
change, implicitly challenging Nixon's characterisation of his visit as 'the week that 
changed the world'.361 The subcommittee invited witnesses with unimpeachable 
credentials to question Nixon's claim in order to make their political point as credibly as 
possible. As Lloyd had planned, the witnesses, in broad agreement, provided evidence 
that Sino-American rapprochement, while a positive development, had also resulted, in 
combination with the American withdrawal from South Vietnam and concerns about 
possible American abandonment of its commitments to Taiwan, in substantial concern 
among Washington's Asian allies in the value of American commitments. The importance 
of American credibility, therefore, normalisation was pursued, was one of the key factors 
highlighted. 
The change in attitude on the part of the House Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Subcommittee between 1969, when it had believed that the United States should pursue a 
sort of tacit alliance with China aimed at containing Soviet power, and 1972, when it 
attempted to minimise the strategic value of Nixon's move, is striking. The difference can 
partially be explained by a change in staff. In 1969 Jack Sullivan, who favoured opening 
relations with China and sought to wean the subcommittee chairman, Clement Zablocki, 
away from the Committee of One Million, was subcommittee chief of staff. In 1972, 
Zablocki had moved to the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on National Security 
Policy and had taken his staff members, Sullivan and Marion Czarnecki, with him. The 
361 Interview with Henry Lloyd, Washington, D.C., 29 September 2009. 
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Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific was now chaired by Robert Nix (D-PA), and the 
senior subcommittee staff member, Henry Lloyd, while supporting the opening to China, 
was also much more protective of the relationship with Taipei and more ambivalent 
regarding the strategic value of the opening. It is also likely that sentiment in the 
Congress, while supportive of the opening to China, was still angry about the undignified 
manner in which Taiwan had been ejected from the UN and Beijing seated in its stead. As 
the decade progressed and the international climate worsened, Congressional sentiment 
would become more positive in its assessment of the potential strategic value to 
Washington of military ties with Beijing, yet remained just as protective of Taiwan. 
While the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee was questioning the strategic 
value of the opening to China, Zablocki's new subcommittee, the Subcommittee on 
National Security Policy, also held a series of hearings examining the strategic 
implications of the opening from May through August 1972. Zablocki's purpose and point 
of view differed from that of the Nix Subcommittee. Zablocki and his staff sought to 
question the assumptions and logical underpinnings of Nixon's implementation of of the 
White House's new security structure. Their intent was not to challenge Nixon's basic 
strategy in Asia, with which they agreed, but to ensure that its implementation would be 
successful, illustrating their belief in the constructive role that can be played by the 
Congress in policy formulation and the Congressional conviction that public debate of 
major policy shifts result in a policy that is ultimately stronger and enjoys greater 
Congressional and public support than one that has not been the subject of an open 
debate.362 Just after Nixon returned from China, Sullivan wrote a memo to Zablocki 
362 Interview with John Sullivan, 1 October 2009, Alexandria, Virginia. See also Clement Zablocki to Dean 
Rusk letter, 2 March 1972, in which Rusk is invited to testify and Zablocki writes that he seeks 
witnesses who can question assumptions and think 'in new and imaginative terms', Series 2.2, Box  2, 
Clement Zablocki Papers. 
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outlining the subcommittee attitude toward the new White House strategy and a plan to 
examine the new strategy in public hearings: 
[The] Nixon-Kissinger policy may prove to be a more rational, less-expensive, 
more peaceful way for the US to conduct policy in the Pacific. . . Nixon and 
Kissinger have, so far, played this thing so close to the vest that none of us can be 
sure that they have thought through the many problems and sticking points which 
could arise in a new system or in the period of transition leading to a new system. 
If that work is not done, we are heading for even rougher times than we are now 
experiencing - rather than Nixon's generation of peace. Your forthcoming hearings 
could be a forum for obtaining expert opinion on some of the ramifications of the 
new system, and getting some of the information in the open for public debate. 
Further, you could use the current hearings on the State Department authorization 
to urge that the necessary back-up work be done there . . . to ensure that the new 
policy can be implemented intelligently and successfully.363 
Sullivan's memo, in addition to affirming the subcommittee's support for Nixon's 
new Asian strategy, also expressed concern that White House use of secrecy had been so 
effective that Congress, particularly the relevant Congressional bodies such as Zablocki's, 
had been unable to gauge whether the White House had adequately considered the full 
implications of its new Asian strategy. Another Member, echoing Sullivan's perspective 
on Congress's responsibility to examine the new policy, noted that: 
There has been . . .  virtually no cogent examination of the political assumptions 
and purposes of the Nixon-Kissinger grand design for the reorientation of 
American foreign policy, or of the place of the Peking initiative in that design.364 
363 John Sullivan to Clement Zablocki, 3 March 1972, Series FA-3.1, Box 3, Clement Zablocki Papers. 
364 House floor statement by Phil Crane, 19 March 1974, Congressional Record, citing an article by James 
Dornan in the February 1974 issue of The Alternative. 
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The subcommittee's extensive hearings were held from May through August 1972 and 
featured numerous high-profile witnesses. The introduction to the hearing report, 
authored by Zablocki, noted that the hearings provided 'more questions than answers', 
explaining that the role of the hearings was to initiate a public debate through asking the 
right questions.365 The hearings were meant to start an ongoing conversation about the 
new departure in Asian policy and, together with the other hearings examining this aspect 
of the relationship, they did so.366 
Congressional inquiry into the meaning of the new relationship for broader United 
States foreign policy was undertaken in the context of a severe weakening of the 
Executive Branch that was brought about both by the debilitating impact of the Watergate 
scandal on Executive Branch authority, and by the increasing Congressional assertiveness 
in the wake of Vietnam. The crippling of the presidency due to Watergate created an 
opening that was successfully used by those in Congress seeking to challenge Executive 
Branch authority in order to increase Congressional power over foreign and national 
security policy. The Executive progressively weakened throughout 1973 and 1974, and 
Congressional assertiveness grew proportionately. From the summer of 1973 onwards, 
such legislation as the War Powers Act, and the Congressional use of its power of the 
purse to cut off funding for American military operations in Southeast Asia and to cut the 
annual defence budget severely curtailed the freedom to control foreign and national 
security policy relatively unhindered by Congress. This dynamic would  shape Executive-
Legislative relations through the remainder of the decade, and create conditions within 
which Nixon's successors would need to work much more cooperatively with Congress if 
365 Clement Zablocki, in the Introduction (p.vi) to 'National Security Policy and the Changing World 
Power Alignment', Hearing-Symposium Before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and 
Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (Washington, 
D.C., 1972). 
366  Telephone interview with George Berdes, a subcommittee staff member who helped organise the        
      hearings, 30 October 2009. 
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they were to achieve their policy goals. This trend would accelerate shortly after Nixon 
resigned when the Watergate scandal decimated Republican ranks in Congress in the 
midterm elections of 1974, giving Democrats more than a two to one majority in each 
chamber and seeing the entrance of an extremely liberal, activist freshman class of 
Democrats determined to shape policy. 
The conversation begun by the various hearings on Sino-American relations 
continued through 1973 and 1974 as various Congressional panels considered the 
strategic aspects of the new relationship from differing perspectives. Beginning in 
September 1973 and continuing through March 1974, for example, the House 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs held hearings on the competition between the 
Soviet Union and China focusing on petroleum as a strategic issue and linking Sino-
Soviet competition to global security trends. The House was much more active in 
pursuing these issues than was the Senate during this period. In the Senate, although 
individual members expressed interest in these issues, no hearings were held. The various 
House panels attempted in a preliminary manner to address issues such as that of the 
nature of the impact of the Sino-American relationship on the US-Soviet relationship – a 
key determination necessary to inform policy and an issue that would grow in importance 
as relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated throughout the decade. Their attempts to 
examine policy were necessarily limited by their lack of knowledge of White House 
intentions. Neither the Nixon nor the Ford White Houses themselves undertook a study of 
these vital questions, as China policy in both was tightly controlled Henry Kissinger, who 
did not wish to share his policy-making prerogatives. 
Unaddressed by the Congress during 1972 and 1973 were any of the issues that 
were related to the development of a de facto coalition with China aimed at curbing 
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Soviet power, which was what Nixon and Kissinger were pursuing, albeit in a very 
limited form. There were three main reasons for this. One was the fact that the Congress 
was unaware that this was the strategy being pursued by the White House. A second 
reason was the fact that an alliance of any sort with Maoist China would have been an 
alien concept to most policy-makers at the time - the idea would not have been something 
that would have been considered a viable possibility. A third reason was the fact that with 
American involvement in the war in Vietnam ending and US-Soviet détente seemingly 
burgeoning, the security environment appeared benign, creating little incentive for 
Members to believe it to be in Washington's interest to create  an informal alliance of any 
kind with China.367 The belief that the security environment was relatively benign, 
combined with a mistrust of the Pentagon in the wake of Vietnam, were two of the 
motivating factors behind Congressional attempts to reduce defence spending and 
suspicion of Pentagon programmes in the early 1970's. This attitude was to play an 
important role in Pentagon policy planning regarding security policy in East Asia and 
delay a more extensive consideration within the Nixon and Ford Administrations of the 
extent to which Washington should attempt to develop a security relationship with China. 
As various Congressional bodies were examining the affect of Sino-American 
rapprochement on the international security environment, the opening salvo was fired in 
what would become a growing debate within the Executive Branch over the desirability 
of military ties with China. A young RAND Corporation analyst and China specialist 
named Michael Pillsbury had been approached by senior Chinese military officers 
attached to China's UN mission. These senior officers (who apparently were 
representatives of the PLA General Staff) met with Pillsbury at regular intervals for 
367 Interview with John Sullivan, 30 June 2009, Alexandria, Virginia. Several other former Members of 
Congress and former senior staff affirmed Mr. Sullivan's perspective. 
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several years beginning in early 1973, an indication that the approval for these contacts 
existed at the highest level in Beijing. They informed Pillsbury that they were interested 
in advanced military technology, technology transfers, US intelligence studies on the 
Soviet military, and technology related to electronic intelligence gathering.368 
Pillsbury immediately made these approaches known and, after each such 
encounter, wrote memcons that were passed to relevant officials at the CIA, the various 
US military intelligence offices, the State Department, the NSC and the Pentagon, where 
they were seen by Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net Assessment.369 370 
Marshall believed the development of Sino-American military ties would be useful in 
efforts to contain the Soviet Union. In an effort to build support within the Pentagon, 
Marshall instructed Pillsbury to author a study, based upon his conversations with the 
Chinese, that would examine the shape that a possible Sino-American military 
relationship might take.371 The study, which was labelled L-32, was completed in March 
1974, and outlined arguments in favour of beginning a limited security relationship with 
China involving intelligence sharing, the export of dual-use technology, both from the 
United States and from western allies, and possibly even the sale of US weapons systems 
to fill weaknesses in PLA capabilities.372 This study, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter, was to become the basis of a presentation made to Secretary of Defence James 
Schlesinger later that year by the Pentagon's office of International Security Affairs, the 
impact of which was influenced greatly by prevailing Congressional attitudes towards 
national security policy. 
368 Garrett, The 'China Card' and its Origins, pp.33-4. Confirmed through extensive communication with 
Michael Pillsbury, 2009-2011. 
369   ibid.
370  These approaches continued for several years. See Michael Pillsbury to Richard Solomon, 27 
September 1974, WHCF, Subject File, Box 13, Ford Library. 
371  Garrett, The 'China Card' and its Origins, pp.42, 45. 
372  ibid., p.42. This and the above footnotes confirmed via extensive correspondence with Michael 
Pillsbury, 2009-2011.
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Conclusion 
Whereas a broad consensus had existed in Congress supporting rapprochement 
with China, that consensus had been based upon the belief that Washington's 
commitments to Taiwan were inviolable and would not be negotiated away by the White 
House. The direct exposure of Congress to Chinese leaders through the programme of 
Congressional visits to China helped to undermine Nixon and Kissinger's claims 
regarding what they had conceded in Beijing vis-a-vis Taiwan and normalisation by 
making plain the nature of Chinese expectations. The realisation on the part of Congress 
that it had not accurately understood the nature of Chinese expectations changed 
Congressional perceptions of the sacrifice that would be required to fully normalise 
relations with Beijing, and gave Congress pause as it wrestled with the implications. 
Congress had been able to claim authority from a drastically weakened Executive 
over important aspects of foreign and national security policy in 1973 and 1974, and 
Kissinger's promotion to Secretary of State improved Congressional access to him, which 
should have resulted in greater influence over the development of China policy. On the 
one hand, the direct Congressional influence over China policy was minimal due to 
Kissinger's continued micromanagement of the relationship. On the other hand, strongly 
expressed Congressional attitudes and the inability of a weakened Nixon to bridge the gap 
in Congressional and White House attitudes toward Taiwan and to build any sort of 
consensus behind normalisation meant that the Congressional influence on the process of 
normalisation was great. 
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CHAPTER 3: AUGUST 1974–1976 -
A LACK OF CONSENSUS OVER TAIWAN, AND CONGRESS BEGINS PUBLIC 
DEBATE OVER SINO-AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONS
Richard Nixon's resignation and Gerald Ford's ascendance to the presidency 
seemed to portend a possible reinvigoration of American foreign policy. Yet nothing had 
changed with regard to the fundamental challenge facing the path to normalisation of 
Sino-American relations. Ford inherited Nixon's foreign policy and his Secretary of State, 
and also inherited Nixon's challenge on Taiwan and China. Despite starting with a clean 
slate, Ford, who as a longtime Congressional leader understood Congress better than 
most, was in no position to confront the issue with conservatives, needing their support to 
win nomination to the presidency in his own right and facing a nomination challenge on 
his right from Ronald Reagan. 
Although one of the first foreign policy acts of the Ford Administration was to 
communicate to the Chinese that the new president was just as committed to the 
normalisation of Sino-American relations as had been his predecessor (and the 
Administration attempted over the next couple of years to move toward that goal), a 
continuation of the de facto 'one China, one Taiwan' policy that tried the patience of the 
Chinese leaders continued to be forced upon the Administration by a reluctant Congress. 
Congressional debate over China became increasingly divisive during the years of the 
Ford Administration. The issues of Taiwan, the terms on which normalisation of relations 
with mainland China should be pursued, a potential military relationship with Beijing, 
and the relationship between China policy and policy toward the Soviet Union were all 
major areas in which consensus was elusive.
This chapter will focus on the two most important aspects of the domestic political 
debate over the new relationship during Gerald Ford's tenure in the White House. The 
157
first is the debate over Sino-American normalisation and the nature of the American 
relationship with Taiwan. The realisation on the part of Congress that Chinese 
expectations regarding Taiwan and the path to Sino-American normalisation differed 
greatly from what Members had been told by Nixon and Kissinger, and the fundamental 
difference between Congressional and Executive Branch attitudes toward Taiwan, 
continued to block the path to normalisation during Ford's presidency. The use on the part 
of Chinese leaders of militant language regarding the forceful takeover of Taiwan 
reinforced Congressional reticence to support normalisation on Beijing's terms. Adding to 
the difficulty was the rise of conservatism within the Republican Party and a growing 
national challenge to Ford and Kissinger's foreign policy across the board. Ford, despite 
his years of experience as a Congressional leader, did not have Nixon's ability to convince 
and cajole conservatives in Congress into following his lead on normalisation. Nixon 
himself would have faced an extremely difficult task in this regard partly due to the fact 
that he created difficulties for himself by telling Congress one thing and the Chinese 
another. Given enough time and a strong presidency, Nixon may have proved capable of 
moving Congressional sentiment in the direction he wished it to go. Ford proved utterly 
unable to do so, having inherited a weakened Executive Branch, holding a weak position 
within his own party, and being unable to build a case for normalisation that could win 
Congressional support. 
The second focus of this chapter is the strategic implications of the new 
relationship with China, and the Congressional debate over the possibility of a security 
relationship with China having as its aim the containment of Soviet power. Congress was 
as divided on this issue as it was on the issue of normalisation. Congress's initial impact 
on Executive Branch consideration of potential Sino-American security ties was to 
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constrain such cooperation as a policy option in 1974 due to Congress's known hostility 
to the Pentagon, to defence spending, and particularly to a muscular American military 
posture in Asia. The deteriorating international security environment in 1975 and 1976, 
however, began to alter Congressional attitudes toward defence spending, as well as 
toward potential Sino-American security cooperation meant to offset growing Soviet 
power. Ultimately, Congressional consideration of the idea of Sino-American security 
ties, sparked by publication of an article in a policy journal in October 1975, played a 
significant role in legitimising a concept that sounded radical when first suggested, 
making it sound plausible and increasing the likelihood that a cautious national security 
bureaucracy would later consider the idea as a legitimate policy option. 
The Continuing Debate Over Taiwan and Normalisation: Militant Language From 
Beijing and An Acute Lack of Consensus
Most of Gerald Ford's Congressional career had been spent advocating for strong 
support for Taiwan and opposing recognition of and UN membership for mainland China. 
In this respect, he was no different from most other Members of Congress during the 
1950's and much of the 1960's. Like many Republicans, however, Ford had supported a 
rapprochement with China out of a hope that it could help the United States in Vietnam373, 
as well as the belief that it was a farsighted move to develop better communication with a 
nation that would only grow in importance in the future.374 Like most Members, however, 
he remained strongly supportive of Taiwan,375 and promised constuents that Nixon 'is not 
going to “let down” Taiwan'.376 Once in the White House, however, Ford's words and 
actions raised fears among many of his former colleagues that he would do just that. A 
373 Gerald Ford to a constituent, 28 July 1971, Gerald Ford Congressional Papers, Series B, Legislative 
File, Box B189, Ford Library. 
374 Gerald Ford to a constituent, 26 October 1971, Ibid.
375 Gerald Ford to a constituent, 30 November 1972, Ibid., and 7 March 1972, Ibid., Box B219; see also 
'House Backers of Aid for Taiwan Knew of Surplus Jets', Washington Post, 14 January 1970. 
376 Gerald Ford to a constituent, 3 March 1972, Ibid., Box B219. 
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few days after taking office, Kissinger prepared a briefing paper for Ford explaining the 
commitments that he and Nixon had made in Beijing and need to make progress in 
meeting Beijing's expectations.377 Although not part of that briefing paper, it seems 
impossible to escape the conclusion that upon taking over the presidency Kissinger also 
would have confided in him the details of the Sino-Soviet-American triangular strategy 
that he and Nixon had been pursuing, and Kissinger's perception of the importance of 
forward momentum in the Sino-American relationship to the success of Soviet-American 
détente. Ford inherited Nixon's foreign policy, and his nearly complete dependence upon 
Kissinger, particularly in the early days of his presidency, for foreign policy guidance 
certainly helped to ensure the new president's changed perspective on Taiwan. 
Gerald Ford's first statement to the Chinese as president was to reaffirm the 
strategic vision of his predecessor, to reaffirm the direction of China policy established by 
Nixon and Kissinger, and to pledge that he would continue to pursue normalisation. Ford, 
however, until recently a Congressional leader himself, was acutely aware of the danger 
of making a major foreign policy move, such as cutting ties with Taipei and recognising 
Beijing in its stead, in the absence of a consensus in Congress willing to support such a 
move. Also, the rise in Congressional assertiveness that had begun in 1973 continued 
unabated after Ford's accession to power, making relations with Congress increasingly 
difficult. The voter backlash against the Watergate scandal decimated Republican ranks in 
Congress, bringing to the House of Representatives a large freshman class of very liberal, 
very activist Members who successfully sought to diminish the authority of committee 
chairman and devolve power downward so that the rank and file, such as themselves, 
could have a greater voice in policy formation. As Robert Johnson has noted, this attempt 
to give themselves greater influence over policy backfired as the resulting diffusion of 
377 'Briefing Paper for the President', 14 August 1974, Box 376, SPC/SP Winston Lord, NARA II. 
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lines of authority in the House ultimately diluted that body's ability to effectively shape 
policy.378 However, it did build on the existing dynamic of Congressional assertiveness, 
and, therefore, heavily shaped the environment within which the Ford Administration 
attempted to shape policy itself. 
A harsher tone on the part of Beijing made Ford's task of attempting to move 
Congress toward acceptance of Beijing's terms for normalisation even more difficult, 
particularly since China used the new, harsh language in meetings with Congressional 
visitors, most of whom were already reticent to cut ties with Taiwan. China's leaders now 
believed themselves to be in a superior negotiating position vis-a-vis Washington because 
US-Soviet détente was encountering difficulty and Sino-Soviet tensions were somewhat 
lessened, with the Chinese no longer believing a Soviet invasion to be a realistic 
possibility. For these reasons, in addition to the rise of leftist radicals to positions of 
prominence in Beijing, the Chinese attitude in talks with Members of Congress was 
uncompromising and militant. In talks with Kissinger, the Chinese held firmly to their 
demands for complete breakage of American diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan, 
rebuffing his argument that Congressional and public opposition to normalisation on such 
terms foreclosed the ability of the new Administration to pursue normalisation in the 
absence of a Chinese willingness to compromise. 
Until September 1974 much of the Congress had hoped that a compromise with 
China over Taiwan might be possible. From late 1974 through 1976, however, Members 
travelling to Beijing encountered a militant tone regarding Taiwan that reinforced their 
concern for Taiwan's security and their determination that it not be left at the mercy of 
Beijing. The Congressional delegation that travelled to Beijing in September 1974 (led by 
William Fulbright, who had finally been given a slot on a delegation to China in his last 
378 Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, pp.205-6. 
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three months in office) was faced with the most uncompromising Chinese statements to 
date regarding Taiwan, the harshness of which shocked the Members. Meeting with Vice 
Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, conservative Republican Senator Hiram Fong (who was 
the only ethnically Chinese member of the Senate) expressed the hope that negotiations 
between the Mainland and the Nationalists on Taiwan would bear fruit and lessen 
tensions. Qiao responded that if normalisation was to take place Washington would need 
to abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty, pairing that pronouncement with the declaration 
that 'peaceful reunification is an impossibility'.379 Kissinger and Nixon had heard Mao and 
Zhou say this in 1972 and 1973 privately, but this was the first time that Members of 
Congress were faced with such a statement of Beijing's uncompromising position. 
Clement Zablocki, next in line to the chairmanship of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, seemed not to believe what he had heard, asking what was the alternative to 
peaceful reunification. Qiao coldly replied, 'It is simple logic. The opposite of a peaceful 
solution is a non-peaceful solution'.380 The bluntness and militant nature of the Chinese 
statements angered the delegation. Even Fulbright, who had held the most benign views 
of China and been one of the strongest advocates of normalisation, was taken aback. 
The American negotiating strength with Beijing was weakened due to the 
abatement of Chinese fears of a Soviet attack, which coincided with worsening Soviet-
American relations. Nor did it help that Kissinger's position with the Chinese was 
continuing to deteriorate. Not only were the Chinese disappointed that Kissinger had 
reneged on the assent they believed that he and Nixon had given to their demand that 
Taiwan be isolated and allowed to fall into their hands, but the Fulbright delegation heard 
the Chinese openly ridicule Kissinger's over-used refrain that a Soviet invasion of China 
379 USLO (Beijing) to State Department, 5 September 1974, NSA, Presidential Country Files for East Asia 
and the Pacific (hereafter, PCF/EAP), Box 15, Ford Library. 
380 Tylor, A Great Wall, pp.186-7. 
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was imminent. The manner in which Kissinger had handled the Chinese, by playing on 
their Soviet fears, undermined his credibility and, hence, his ability to reinvigorate the 
relationship as the Sino-Soviet-American triangle began to deteriorate. Kissinger's 
credibility on Capitol Hill was likewise ebbing, handicapping any ability he may have had 
to move Congressional opinion toward acceptance of Chinese normalisation demands. 
The most obvious way to improve the American position in the triangle and to 
increase American leverage over Moscow was to reinvigorate relations with China. 
Progress on normalisation would be the most effective way to do this, but Congressional 
opposition to normalisation on the terms of cutting ties with Taiwan made this task 
difficult. The State Department was well aware of the difficulties it faced in this regard as 
during the autumn of 1974 it wrestled with possible formulations that would allow for 
normalisation. just prior to Kissinger's November 1974 trip to Beijing, the State 
Department's legal advisor, George Aldrich, noted in particular the problem of attempting 
to gain a pledge of peaceful reunification from Beijing, writing that: 'I have Serious 
doubts that a solution that leaves US dependent solely upon good faith of the present and 
future leaders of the PRC for assurance against invasion of Taiwan will be acceptable to 
the American public and the Congress'.381 
Indeed, a Gallup Poll conducted in August 1974 had recorded that only eleven 
percent of  respondents favoured full normalisation with China if breaking relations with 
Taiwan was required.382 Public opinion polls through 1974, 1975 and 1976 continued to 
show support for normalisation, but not at the price of cutting ties with Taiwan. A Gallup 
poll in the autumn of 1975 resulted in sixty one percent of respondents favouring 
normalisation with China, yet only ten percent favoured normalisation if it meant de-
381 George Aldrich to Arthur Hummel, 14 November 1974, NSA Files, Presidential Name Files, 1974-
1977, Box 38, Ford Library. 
382 Poll results found in WHCF, Subject File, Box 12, Ford Library. 
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recognition of Taipei.383 Congressional attitudes, as they so often do, mirrored those of the 
public.  
In Kissinger's talks with the Chinese in New York in October 1974 and in Beijing 
the next month, he attempted to convince them that Washington should not be expected to 
follow the Japanese formula for normalisation due to the differences between the 
American and Japanese relationship with Taiwan and differing domestic political 
situations. In Beijing, he argued that if the Chinese handled the issue inflexibly (as they 
had with the Fulbright delegation) and with little reference to the sensitivity of the issue 
in American domestic political debate, strong opposition to normalisation could arise out 
of the Congress just as the Congress was now challenging Kissinger's handling of US-
Soviet détente: 
What we have to keep in mind for our common interest is to prevent Sino-
American relations from becoming an extremely contentious issue in the United 
States. It is not in your interest, or in that of the United States, to have emerge a 
Senator or Senatorial group which does to Sino-American relations what Senator 
Jackson has attempted to do to United States-Soviet relations.384 
Kissinger then made an offer based upon the proposal made by Scoop Jackson the 
previous July, and which he had broached the previous month in New York, that 
Washington establish an embassy in Beijing and a liaison office in Taipei, reversing the 
current situation. Knowing that Congress and the public would see the cutting of the 
defence relationship with Taiwan as abandonment of Taiwan to coercion from the 
Mainland, Kissinger explained that the maintenance of the defence relationship with 
383 Poll results found in MSS 10320-a,-b, Box 266, Harry Byrd, Jr. Papers, Small Special Collections 
Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. 
384 Memcon between Henry Kissinger and Deng Xiaoping, 26 November 1974, China Memcons and 
Reports, November 25–29, 1974, Kissinger’s Trip, NSA Files, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and 
Middle East Discussions, Box 2, Ford Library. 
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Taipei was a domestic political necessity for the United States. He believed that the 
Administration could eventually 'condition' public opinion so that the cutting of defence 
ties would be accepted, but that this would take time. 'We need a transition period for our 
public opinion in which this process can be accomplished without an excessive domestic 
strain. . . The question of the defence commitment is primarily a question of the way it 
can be presented politically'.385 
He ended by reiterating his promise that if the Chinese could allow a US defence 
relationship with Taiwan to continue for awhile as a bow to Ford and Kissinger's domestic 
political difficulties, that relationship would at some point end, with the implication that 
Taiwan would then be vulnerable to pressure from Beijing: 'It is not a question of 
maintaining it for an indefinite period of time'.386 Kissinger attempted to make his offer 
more appealing by arguing precisely what many in Congress suspected was his position: 
'There is no doubt that the status of Taiwan has been undermined by the process which we 
have followed. And this process would be rapidly accelerated by the ideas which we have 
advanced'.387 Deng rejected the proposal, and in blunt terms that made clear the depth to 
which his credibility had fallen in Beijing.388 
Mike Mansfield was scheduled to visit Beijing in December, and Kissinger, aware 
that Mansfield was highly susceptible to Chinese attempts at persuasion and concerned 
that Beijing might attempt to use against the Administration Mansfield's greater 
willingness to accede to Chinese demands, attempted to marginalise the views Mansfield 
was likely to express. He also attempted to dissuade Deng from signing any type of 
statement on normalisation with Mansfield, concerned that the Chinese government may 
385 ibid. 
386 ibid. 
387 ibid. 
388 ibid. 
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attempt to do something along these lines in order to pressure the Administration to 
normalise on Chinese terms, declaring that the Administration determined foreign policy 
and that individual Members of Congress did not speak for the US Government nor 
would any agreements signed with Members be valid or express US policy.389 When 
Mansfield visited China the next month Deng was much more diplomatic with him than 
Qiao Guanhua had been with the Fulbright delegation in September. Deng reiterated, 
however, that the Chinese were dissatisfied with the lack of progress toward 
normalisation and expected Washington to agree to 'the Japanese formula' - i.e., the 
formula whereby Tokyo had normalised relations with Beijing in 1972, which included 
cutting diplomatic ties with Taiwan.390 
Mansfield's report to Congress expressed his sympathy with the Chinese point of 
view. In fact, Mansfield was so sympathetic that his statements were cited approvingly in 
the communist Chinese press. The US Consulate in Hong Kong reported that the 
communist press in Hong Kong was quoting Mansfield as stating that the US military 
relationship with Taiwan was 'interference with China's internal affairs'.391 In his report to 
Congress, Mansfield suggested that Washington end its military relationship with Taiwan, 
and decried the Nixon White House's decision to send a new ambassador to Taipei upon 
the retirement of Walter McConaughy and to allow Taiwan to open two new consulates in 
the United States in 1974. These decisions, in his point of view, strengthened the 
relationship with Taiwan, bringing false hope, at a time when the White House should 
have been creating more distance in the relationship with the Nationalists.392 Mansfield 
389 ibid. 
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argued, 'The Shanghai Communiqué was designed as a transitional arrangement; it did 
not predicate an indefinite ambivalence in our China policy'.393 Mansfield, unaware that 
Deng had just rejected Kissinger's November proposal that the status of the US Embassy 
in Taipei and the US Liaison Office in Beijing be reversed, also rejected the idea as 
'unacceptable by the Chinese'.394 He concluded that Washington must in the near future 
meet the three Chinese demands, 'terminating our defense treaty with Taiwan, 
withdrawing all US troops from Taiwan, and severing diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan'.395 
The proposal Mansfield made following his trip reflected thinking among Senate 
liberals. Senator Thomas Eagleton argued in June 1975, for example, that the US should 
remove the remaining US military presence on Taiwan so that 'the Taiwan issue is [not] 
permitted to foment to the detriment of our relationship with . . . China'.396 Throughout 
1975 and 1976 a number of liberals called for the continued removal of the US military 
presence from Taiwan, which they hoped would move the relationship with Beijing 
toward normalisation. Such views were not shared by most of the rest of Capitol Hill, and 
were ridiculed by conservatives. Representative Phil Crane (R-IL) noted with sarcasm 
that Mansfield 'is eloquent in extolling the Peking regime'397, and the conservative 
publication Human Events published in article entitled 'Red China Through Mansfield's 
Rose Glasses'.398 
The reaction to the announcement, made after Kissinger's China November trip, 
that Ford would be visiting China in late 1975 illustrated the depth of concern among 
393 ibid. 
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396 Press release by the office of Senator Thomas Eagleton, 3 June 1975, Accession WUNP4720, Box 91, 
Thomas Eagleton Papers. 
397 House floor statement by Phil Crane, 4 September 1975, Congressional Record. 
398 'Red China Through Mansfield's Rose Glasses', Human Events, 30 August 1975, 
167
many in Congress that a normalisation agreement might be reached that would  involve 
de-recognition of Taipei and the severing of the defence relationship. A New York Times 
article recounted the argument being made by liberals that the US should pursue 
normalisation in order to solidify the position in Beijing of those officials who were pro-
US and to solidify Sino-US relations lest they slide back toward confrontation. The article 
argued, however, that given the fact that Zhou and Mao were about to pass from the scene 
and uncertainty surrounded who would be in control after their passing, now was not the 
time to normalise. The article concluded by pointedly asserting: 'Of China's future, only 
one thing is sure: Neither Mao nor Chou will be around to influence it. By committing the 
US to them, Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger will only make it likelier that the same can be 
said of us'.399 
John Ashbrook read the article into the Congressional Record, intimating that 
Ford's decision on normalisation would affect his political fate.400 For the next two years 
conservatives threatened complete rebellion should normalisation be pursued with China 
in a manner that included the cutting of ties with Taiwan. Although it may not have been 
expressed as strongly by others, conservative reticence to renounce American 
commitments to Taiwan was shared by the vast majority of Members. A large part of the 
concern was the belief that Washington's promises to Taipei carried moral weight, and 
that breaking those promises would be a stain on the national honour.401 Many Members 
also argued that breaking Washington's oft-repeated and long-standing commitments to 
Taiwan would prove the United States to be an unreliable ally and damage her 
credibility.402 Liberals were just as apt to be swayed by this logic as were conservatives. 
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Inter-office policy memoranda from the office of Senator Walter Mondale gave weight to 
this point,403 and Senator Ernest 'Fritz' Hollings (D-SC) considered it to be an important 
factor shaping his attitude toward normalisation.404 Hollings informed Ford that he 'did 
not think the Congress . . . would with the sweep of a hand abandon Taiwan. It wasn't that 
Taiwan was fundamental to national security. It was our credibility in international affairs 
that was at stake'.405 The Chinese were unwilling to compromise, and most of Congress 
supported the status quo.406 
Counsel for caution was received from within the Administration, as well. In 
February 1975, George Bush, who had replaced David Bruce as chief of the US Liaison 
Office in Beijing, visited Washington and also counselled caution on pursuing 
normalisation out of concern for Ford's ability to win nomination in 1976.407 Bush 
repeated that advice in a cable from Beijing four months later, arguing that the Chinese 
needed to compromise and writing that although: 
I would love to find the correct formula so that full diplomatic relations between 
the USA and the PRC can be accomplished when the President comes here . . . . I 
do think we must continue to ask, 'What's in it for the USA?', and the President 
must not be in a position of getting clobbered from his right.408 
The militant Chinese attitudes and intemperate language that were becoming common in 
talks with Members contributed to the unwillingness of Members to meet Chinese 
demands and their lack of sympathy with Beijing's point of view. Congressional 
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delegations travelling to China in 1975 and 1976 continued to hear the Chinese demand, 
with varying degrees of vehemence, that Washington terminate diplomatic and military 
ties with Taipei as a condition of normalisation. House Speaker Carl Albert and Minority 
Leader John Rhodes led a delegation from 29 March to 7 April 1975, during which period 
both South Vietnam and Cambodia were collapsing in the face of communist onslaughts. 
The delegation heard the same message from Deng as that given to Mansfield the 
previous December. The House leadership, however, did not respond to the Chinese 
demands as sympathetically as had Mansfield, recording in their trip report that: 
In our talks, we explained to the Chinese the widespread and bipartisan support in 
the United States for the policy of normalizing relations between our two 
countries. We made it clear that we wished to see further progress, but we were 
also frank in explaining that longstanding involvement necessitated caution and 
gradualism in matters affecting Taiwan.409 
An aged Chiang Kai-shek died on 5 April, while Albert and Rhodes, both of 
whom had close relationships with Chiang, were in China. Chiang's death brought an 
outpouring of sympathy for Taiwan from Congress, and heightened sensitivity to any 
intimation that the Administration was distancing itself from Taiwan.410 The 
Administration's original plan to send as the US representative to Chiang's funeral only 
the Secretary of Agriculture so as not to offend Beijing was reconsidered when 
conservative Members threatened a revolt. NSC staff members counselled Kissinger, 'We 
feel very strongly that we will be making a mistake of the most serious proportions if 
Secretary Butz heads up the delegation'.411 Kissinger and Ford finally backed down, 
409 'China:One Step Further Toward normalisation', Report by Carl Albert, Speaker, and John Rhodes, 
Minority Leader, US House of Representatives (Washington, D.C., 1975).
410 'Tributes by Senators', UPI, 6 April 1975. 
411 Richard Smyser and Richard Solomon to Henry Kissinger, 11 April 1975, NSA, PCF/EAP, Box 4, Ford 
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instead sending Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.412 
Along with Chiang's death, the continued deterioration of the strategic 
environment and of the American position in Asia and globally also contributed to a 
climate within which it would have been extremely difficult to cut ties with Taipei. The 
collapse of three American allies in Asia, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, to 
communism between April and December 1975 contributed, along with the continuing 
massive Soviet military build-up and Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola, to the 
Congressional perception of a deteriorating American position internationally. 
Representative Jack Kemp (R-NY) called it 'a rude awakening'.413 The perception that the 
United States was on retreat throughout the world, and particularly the losses in Asia, 
strengthened the unwillingness of most of the Congress to cut diplomatic and defence ties 
with Taiwan leaving it vulnerable to pressure from Beijing. The Administration, for its 
part, could not be seen to be leaving yet another Asian ally vulnerable to communist 
takeover. 
Still, numerous State Department and NSC officials, while recognising the barriers 
to normalisation, pressed Kissinger in the summer of 1975 to attempt to reach a 
normalisation agreement with China by the end of the year.  A memorandum written by 
Phil Habib and William Gleysteen, Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, respectively, Winston Lord, Director of Policy Planning, 
and Richard Solomon of the NSC acknowledged the domestic difficulties faced by Ford, 
yet urged Kissinger to attempt to move forward:
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The short-run costs of moving to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing are 
substantial for the President, particularly in the wake of developments in 
Indochina and in the context of the approaching 1976 election campaign. All the 
same, we remain convinced that there are strong reasons for attempting to 
negotiate a normalisation agreement within the coming five months which would 
help to stabilize a non-confrontational relationship with PRC.414 
Yet, within a few days of that memorandum Ronald Reagan gave his first foreign 
policy address of his campaign to wrest the nomination away from Ford and attacked 
Ford for ignoring Taiwan and pandering to Beijing.415 Democratic presidential candidate 
Jimmy Carter also expressed reticence to cut ties with Taiwan. Congress continued to 
emphasise its opposition to normalisation on Beijing's terms through concurrent 
resolutions declaring support for Taiwan. In 1973 and early 1974 several concurrent 
resolutions were initiated in both the House and the Senate reminding Nixon and 
Kissinger of the Congressional commitment to Taiwan. The number of such resolutions 
rose during the Ford years as Members grew concerned that Ford was planning to attempt 
to reach a normalisation agreement on Beijing's terms, possibly hoping that a foreign 
policy triumph would help him win election in his own right in 1976, with little or no 
protections for Taiwan. The first of these was introduced in December 1974 at the time 
that Ford's late 1975 trip to China was announced. As this trip neared, the number of such 
resolutions increased. Conservative Republicans, whose support Ford needed in his 
nomination contest with Reagan, made up the bulk of the signatories.416 The names of 
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moderate and liberal Republicans and Democrats were also seen, however, including 
some of those who had advocated along with Senators Fulbright, Kennedy and McGovern 
for an opening to China in 1969 and 1970 (including Mark Hatfield, Daniel Inouye, Jim 
Pearson, Edward Brooke, and Howard Cannon). As Ford's trip neared, on 19 November 
1975 a bipartisan group of twenty seven Senators wrote a letter to Ford in which they 
stated: 
We the undersigned members of the Senate are in agreement with the House 
Concurrent Resolution . . . which states, in essence, what you have said yourself, 
that while engaged in a lessening of tensions with the PRC, nothing will be done 
to compromise the freedom of our friend and ally, the ROC and its people. We 
express this to you in the form of a letter because we would not like to have you 
feel pressured or tied by any formal action of the Senate.417 
The State Department nervously noted to the NSC that the letter 'has some very important 
signatures'.418 Max Friedersdorf, an Presidential Assistant, signed a White House response 
a few days later reaffirming the White House goal of full normalisation with China while 
offering the vague and not very convincing pledge that 'at the same time, however, I 
assure you this policy will reflect a prudent and responsible regard for the interests of 
America's traditional friends and allies'.419 
The plethora of such concurrent resolutions (seven in the House) caused Doc 
Morgan, the chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, who 
maintained a close working relationship with the Administration, to write to the State 
Department asking for its position on the resolutions.420 Robert McCloskey, Assistant 
417 Letter from 27 members of the Senate to Gerald Ford, 19 November 1975, WHCF, Subject Files, Box 
13, Ford Library. 
418 Robert Wolthuis to Les Janka, 22 November 1975, Congressional Relations, Robert Wolthuis, Special 
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Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, responded: 
The perceived need for and passage of the proposed resolutions, in and of 
themselves, could be interpreted as implying a Congressional view of China 
policy at variance with that of the Administration and thus further complicate an 
already complex and delicate situation. We would therefore prefer that the 
proposed concurrent resolutions not be adopted.421 
Of course, the impression that the State Department wished to avoid, that of 'a 
Congressional view of China policy at variance with that of the Administration' reflected 
reality, not just perception - a reality of which the State Department and White House 
were well aware. At the State Department's request, Morgan did not pass the resolutions 
through the committee and on to the full House. Their presence was, nevertheless, 
obviously felt. 
During Ford's December 1975 trip to Beijing, Ford did attempt to reach an 
understanding on normalisation, just as many Members of Congress had feared. 
Abandoning Kissinger's earlier attempts to reach a compromise by which the United 
States could retain some ties to Taiwan, Ford promised to move forward on normalisation 
according to the terms of the 'Japanese formula' following the election if he should win 
the following November. The press contained numerous stories upon Ford's return 
testifying to this part of the talks and to Administration intentions to meet China's 
demands. Barry Goldwater, who had supported Nixon's opening to China due to Nixon's 
promise that the opening would not portend the ending of diplomatic or defence ties with 
Taiwan, had lunch with Kissinger upon his return from Asia and asked him about the 
media stories. Kissinger denied their accuracy. Not completely convinced, Goldwater 
wrote to the President the next day seeking an appointment to speak with him about the 
421 Robert McCloskey to Thomas Morgan, November 1975, ibid. 
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issue, implying that he suspected he was being misled.422 
William Kendall, a Ford assistant, responded briefly to Goldwater within a few 
days letting him know that his letter had been received and that he would be hearing more 
later. The NSC and the State Department then took nearly two months to debate the reply. 
Among their concerns was that 'It is possible, if not likely, that the Senator will provide 
the text of a Presidential reply to the ROC Embassy, and that it will find its way into the 
press'.423 The goal was to calm Goldwater's fears while not putting on paper any firm 
promises, such as had apparently been made to him verbally by both Kissinger and the 
President. The reply finally sent with Ford's signature in mid February was less than 
satisfactory from Goldwater's perspective, as evidenced by his continued, and 
increasingly heightened expressions of concern over the following months. Ford's letter 
concluded with a vague pledge: 'Let me assure you that, as we pursue our goal of a better 
relationship with Beijing, we will continue to be mindful of the interests of our friends 
and allies, including the Republic of China on Taiwan'.424 Goldwater's request for an 
appointment with Ford was ignored. 
Media stories continued throughout the spring of 1976 reporting, accurately, that 
Administration was hoping to pursue normalisation with China on Beijing's terms should 
Ford win in November. Such stories continued to draw a strong conservative reaction. 
Goldwater, openly doubting Ford and Kissinger's repeated verbal commitments to him, 
was feeling angry and betrayed. He wrote Kissinger in late April that he had seen 
evidence that the Administration was planning to do precisely what it had promised 
Goldwater that it would never consider. He ended with a political threat:
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I would like to know immediately the President's position and the Department of 
State's on this because I don't mind telling you if we are going to sell Taiwan 
down the river its going to have a decided effect on what I do for the rest of the 
campaign.425 
Again, the State Department and the White House together crafted a letter designed to 
neutralise Goldwater.426 It was ineffective, however, as one month later, Goldwater, who 
had continued to see news stories regarding Ford's plans to normalise with the Mainland 
on Beijing's terms after the election, concluded that there must be some truth to the 
reports. On 28 May he wrote in a similar vein to Kissinger: 
On numerous occasions you have told me that recognition of Red China was not 
even being considered. I heard on the news this morning that it is being considered 
and that we will recognize her after the elections. I would like to have immediate 
verification or non verification of this because it will strongly affect whether or 
not I support the President. . . . I don't intend to stay quiet about it, so please 
within 24 hours let me know what the truth is – and I mean the truth.427 
A handwritten notation was made on the bottom of the Goldwater letter that read, 'Henry 
called the Senator this afternoon. Says he turned him off'.428 No other record exists of 
Kissinger's conversation with Goldwater, but the only thing that could have 'turned 
Goldwater off' was a promise by Kissinger that the media stories were incorrect, that he 
had not lied to Goldwater in the past, and a pledge that the Administration would not 
consider normalisation with the Mainland and the cutting of diplomatic and defence ties 
with Taipei after the election.
425 Barry Goldwater to Henry Kissinger, 29 April 1976, Counselors to the President, John Marsh Files, 
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Goldwater's reputation as a firebrand may make it easy to dismiss his concerns, 
yet they were widely shared. News reports were published in March 1976 quoting 
unnamed 'senior government officials' to the effect that Ford had made a secret pledge 
while in Beijing the previous December promising to cut the 2,200 remaining American 
military personnel on Taiwan in half during 1976 as a 'holding action' meant 'to show the 
good faith of American intentions while getting the Administration past the presidential 
elections and into a position for more dramatic moves, assuming Mr. Ford is re-elected'.429 
Media reports such as these reinforced the fears that many Members had held since Ford's 
accession to the Presidency, that a secret deal would be made with Beijing and 
Congressional wishes ignored. Within a few days of these news reports, 217 House 
Members had signed on as cosponsors of a concurrent resolution expressing the 
Congressional expectation that the Administration make no agreement with China that 
would involve the cutting of ties with Taiwan. 
As much as significant opposition existed to the cutting of ties with Taiwan, two 
very powerful Senate figures in 1976 each recommended that Ford do just that, signifying 
that at least some in the Congress were willing to meet Beijing's terms. In the latter half 
of 1976 the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders would each travel to China separately, 
would each be confronted by uncompromising and militant Chinese statements regarding 
Sino-American normalisation and the planned recovery of Taiwan, and would each return 
home and recommend to Ford that he undertake normalisation on Beijing's terms. 
Hugh Scott was the first.430 By the time Scott arrived in July 1976, Zhou Enlai had 
died the previous January, Zhou's ally, Deng Xiaoping, had again been purged, Mao was 
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dying and the radical leftists were in the ascendancy in Beijing. The vehemence of the 
rhetoric used by the leaders with whom he met shook Scott. Qiao Guanhua, now the 
Foreign Minister, reiterated Chinese demands, laying full responsibility for the lack of 
progress in normalisation on Washington. Scott attempted to explain the need 'to ensure 
that the American public will not regard as abandonment' the abrogation of the defence 
treaty, and stressed the American expectation of a peaceful resolution to the dispute 
between the Mainland and Taiwan, which demand was rejected by Qiao. Scott explained 
that the presidential campaign would necessarily constrain Ford's ability to move forward 
with normalisation, but pointed out that Ford had made some 'symbolic moves' by having 
'removed a minor presence from Quemoy and Matsu'. He followed this up by explaining 
that no matter the outcome of the election 'we have a public opinion problem', but 
promising that 'we are preparing the minds of the people for normalisation'.431 
The next day, Scott meet with Chang Chun-qiao, the Vice Premier and a member 
of the 'Gang of Four'. Scott reprised the points he had made with Qiao, and then outlined 
the American movement toward fulfilment of its promises to withdraw all American 
forces from Taiwan. Chang responded by saying, 'They should have left a long time ago', 
and pointedly stating that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was 'making preparations' 
for an invasion of Taiwan (indeed, the PLA was undertaking major manoeuvres opposite 
Taiwan, rehearsing an amphibious assault, while Scott was in China).432 Scott again 
attempted to explain the role of American public and Congressional opinion in foreign 
policy-making in the United States, to which Chang retorted, 'You can't place this 
responsibility on the American people'.433 Scott expressed his desire that there would be a 
431 Memcon between Qiao Guanhua and Hugh Scott, 12 July 1976, MSS 10200-n,-p, Box 5, ibid. 
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peaceful solution to the dispute in the Taiwan Straits, to which Chang responded with 
sarcasm, and a threat to invade Taiwan in order to 'help the United States solve the 
problem by our bayonets'.434 
Scott responded diplomatically, given the intemperance of the verbal assault, 
pointing out that 'we stand ready to back up our commitment to Taiwan', and that a 
Chinese assault on Taiwan  'would arouse 215 million Americans'.435 Robert Gates, the 
man who had succeeded George Bush as head of the US Liaison Office, intervened to 
confirm that the US was committed to normalisation and that 'only the timing and 
formula remain indefinite', but to explain that the agreement to abrogate a treaty, as the 
Chinese were demanding, 'ultimately requires the consent of the Congress. . . . What 
[Scott] hopes will happen is that a favorable consensus will develop'. Scott then added, 
'We are seeking a strong majority approval in Congress. We do not want a one vote 
majority which will then result in dispute'.436 This exchange is particularly interesting in 
light of President Carter's later decision to abrogate the treaty without reference to 
Congress and without building a Congressional consensus. 
Scott cabled a report of these difficult conversations to the White House. Brent 
Scowcroft, who had succeeded Kissinger as national security advisor, asked Scott to keep 
'the substance of your talks . . . completely confidential until you can discuss them with 
the President'.437 When Scott talks were transcribed, the State Department note to Scott 
indicated the desire that the specifics of the Chinese statements not be known within the 
US Government, fearing the likely negative reaction. Oscar Armstrong, Director of the 
China desk, noted that the transcripts 'were . . . given very limited distribution, even in the 
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Department of State'.438 Scott abided by Administration wishes that he not publicly 
discuss the content of his talks. The day after his return from China, he joined the weekly 
luncheon of Senate Republicans, reporting only 'that government officials have turned a 
harder line toward the US', and that 'it was apparent that the Chinese leadership intended 
not to wait very long during the next Administration before bringing up the Taiwan 
question'.439 
In his report to the President, Scott argued that the passing of Zhou and Mao 
would not be a threat to Chinese attitudes toward the United States as the relationship 
with the US helped China to meet 'its pressing economic and strategic necessities'. Scott 
wrote: 
Last December, Beijing was prepared to understand and to acquiesce in your wish 
to postpone until after the . . . election . . . a decision to establish full diplomatic 
relations with the PRC and in so doing abrogate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. 
However, Chinese reaction to intimations from Washington that China would be 
willing to acquiesce in a postponement for an indefinite period of time was that 
this was unrealistic and unacceptable. That is, while they have heretofore been 
talking with US about a variety of global strategic concerns, to the apparent 
exclusion of their concern over Taiwan, it was because they believed that their 
unchanging interest in resolution of this part of their unfinished civil war had been 
taken for granted.440 
Scott went on to assert his belief, despite all evidence to the contrary, that 'that there is 
very wide Congressional and public support for rapid movement towards normalization 
of relations with the PRC, even at the price of severing diplomatic ties with our friends on 
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Taiwan'.441 He did advise, however, that in order to further strengthen public support for 
such a move, a case should be made that 'the longer-term interests, safety and prosperity 
of Taiwan are not damaged by terminating our diplomatic relations', and that Taiwan's 
security will not depend upon the existence of the defence treaty.442 
Scott also argued that China was not likely, whatever its rhetoric, to attempt to 
recover Taiwan militarily given the irreparable damage this would do to Sino-American 
relations, to Sino-Japanese relations and Japan's military posture in the region, and given 
huge Soviet military presence on China's northern border, 'where the easing of Beijing's 
present anxieties is not soon probable'. He concluded by urging, 'that on a bipartisan basis 
we make preliminary moves which will envisage the establishment of normal diplomatic 
relations between Washington and Beijing before the end of 1977'.443 
An NSC memorandum to Ford on the results of Scott's trip made the obvious 
point that the result of China's 'toughened language' was 'to complicate the possibility of 
finding a mutually acceptable formula on the Taiwan issue that would meet US political 
needs, both international and domestic'.444 Ford and Kissinger asked Scott to keep quiet 
about the militant attitudes he encountered when they met with him the day after his 
return. Ford asked, 'Do you have to report that to the Senate? I would soften it somewhat'. 
Kissinger immediately followed up by saying 'If you stress their insistence on a military 
solution . . . the right-wingers might say, “Okay, forget it”'. Scott agreed not to detail the 
militant statements made by the radical leaders in Beijing in his Senate report, and 
repeated his belief that the Administration needed a strategy for influencing 
Congressional and public attitudes.445  
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Scott's report to Congress noted the 'vehemence' with which the Chinese 
addressed the issue of Taiwan without giving details, and made the same policy 
suggestion supported by the same reasoning as outlined in the letter to the President.446 
Political conditions, however, and widespread Congressional misgivings about cutting 
ties with Taiwan, minimised the impact of Scott's report and recommendation. Although a 
strategy for attempting to shape Congressional opinion in favour of normalisation was 
needed, as Scott suggested, Kissinger and Ford were too pre-occupied with day to day 
political survival to pursue any type of campaign which might have pushed Congressional 
attitudes in their direction. 
Mansfield, who, like Scott, was soon to retire, travelled to China from 21 
September to 12 October 1976. His visit followed immediately after Mao's death, during 
a time of intense transition in Beijing, with the Gang of Four, led by Mao's estranged 
wife, Jiang Qing, being arrested and removed from all positions of authority on 6 
October. The two substantive meetings in which Mansfield took part were markedly 
different in tone, reflecting the different personalities involved. A meeting with the Vice 
Foreign Minister, Mao's niece, was noted by the White House as being 'somewhat 
contentious' and 'included expressions of Chinese impatience with the pace of US 
disengagement from Taiwan and the inevitability of forceful “liberation” of the island'.447 
The second meeting, with Vice Premier Li Xianian, was more patient in tone and did not 
emphasise forceful reunification. Mansfield left Beijing with a similar impression as Scott 
had gained during his trip, despite the fact that the radicals had been purged from 
government just prior to Mansfield's meetings. In his confidential report to Ford, 
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447 Brent Scowcroft to Gerald Ford, 5 November 1976, NSA, Presidential Name File, 1974-1977, Box 2, 
Ford Library.  
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Mansfield told him that:
It would appear that we remain enmeshed in Taiwan on the basis of past policies 
and because of developments in our own political situation. . . The longer the 
Taiwan issue remains in limbo, the more pressure seems to be building for 
continuing indecision as a substitute for policy.448
Mansfield, showing a greater sense of urgency than even Scott, suggested that Ford 'act 
now' to cut ties with Taiwan and normalise with Beijing.449 In his report to Congress, 
printed three weeks after Ford had lost the presidential election, Mansfield took an even 
more urgent tone than he had in his private recommendation to Ford. Mansfield echoed 
Scott's argument that despite the uncertainty of who would gain ultimate authority in 
China following Mao's death 'It is highly unlikely that . . . it will make any significant 
difference who controls China insofar as United States-China relations are concerned'.450 
After acknowledging that 'we are both greatly concerned about the Soviet Union and its 
intentions', Mansfield concluded: 
The national interest is deeply involved . . . in moving without further delay to 
settle the Taiwan problem. Gambling for more time? For what? Further delay 
could well prove to be another in the long series of disastrous miscalculations 
which have afflicted US foreign policy in Asia since World War II. Solving this 
problem will put the United States in a unique position in the triangular 
relationship.451 
He ended by arguing that normalisation with China was 'fundamental to the safeguarding' 
of 'American interests in the Western Pacific'.452 
448 Mike Mansfield to Gerald Ford, 26 October 1976, Presidential Handwriting File, Box 6, Ford Library. 
449 ibid. 
450 'China Enters the Post-Mao Era', Report by Senator Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, US Senate, to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C., 1976).
451 ibid.
452 ibid. 
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Mansfield and Scott's recommendations marked the most significant movement in 
Congress toward acceptance of Beijing's demands since Congress had become aware of 
those demands and begun wrestling with their implications through direct interaction with 
the Chinese leadership several months after Nixon's trip. Their journey had not been 
shared by many, however. An article in the New York Times a month before Scott's China 
trip encapsulated well the widespread attitude that was at variance with Mansfield and 
Scott's recommendations. The author wrote, 'The geopolitical facts of life in the Sino-
Soviet-American triangle require efforts to improve relations with Beijing. But there are 
many ways to do this short of abandoning 14 million Taiwanese'.453 Mansfield and Scott's 
positions were not widely shared, and Scott's reading of Congressional sentiment was 
clearly flawed. The majority of Congress, while supporting the goal of normalisation, 
continued, as did the vast majority of the US public, to oppose normalisation at the cost of 
ties with Taiwan – particularly since it was now clear that the intention behind Beijing's 
demand that Washington cut all ties with Taiwan was to isolate Taipei and make it 
vulnerable to coercion.454 Even Ford, responding to Scott's report and recommendation, 
noted that 'your proposal regarding Beijing/Taipei negotiations goes somewhat beyond 
the position we adopted in the Shanghai Communiqué'.455 
The 'Abramowitz Study' of 1974 and Congress's role in Pentagon Security Planning
Notwithstanding the stalemate on normalisation, the strategic aspects of the 
relationship with Beijing came increasingly to the fore during 1974-1976 due to 
perceptions of a rapidly deteriorating Cold War environment. The rapid deterioration of 
the international environment, coupled with high inflation and other economic 
difficulties, resulted in a feeling of impotence and insecurity within the United States, and 
453 'The China Knot', New York Times, 17 June 1976. 
454 Harry Byrd, Jr. to a constituent, 1 December 1976, MSS 10320-a,-b, Box 266, Harry Byrd, Jr. Papers. 
455 Gerald Ford to Hugh Scott, 1 September 1976, WHCF, Subject File, Box 13, Ford Library. 
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created the conditions in which Congress, and the national security bureaucracy, began to 
become more accepting of the concept of a possible military relationship with Mainland 
China in opposition to the Soviet Union. 
In late 1974 Congressional attitudes toward defence spending and security 
alliances of any sort were still primarily shaped by the experience of Vietnam and 
suspicion toward the Pentagon, and the international strategic environment was still 
perceived as being relatively benign. These known attitudes on the part of the Congress, 
which were reinforced the overwhelmingly liberal and activist cast of the freshman 
Congressional class who had won election in November due to Watergate, served to 
constrain planning by a few senior Pentagon officials who considered increased defence 
expenditures to bolster the American position in the Asia-Pacific in combination with an 
informal security alliance with China. The debate over potential security ties with China 
that the Pentagon leadership had hoped to enlarge within the Executive Branch, therefore, 
was not initiated out of the belief that with Congressional attitudes to such an idea certain 
to be negative it would have been pointless to fight for a policy that could not gain 
broader acceptance in Washington. 
In late 1974 a study of various policy alternatives for the Asia-Pacific region, 
written by the office of International Security Affairs (ISA), which was then headed by 
Morton Abramowitz, was undertaken on the topic of US security policy in Asia in light of 
the Sino-Soviet split and the new US relationship with China. Labelled 'Defense 
Alternatives for East Asia and the Pacific', it was the first major government study that 
paid attention to the possibility of security ties with the Chinese and the effect of such ties 
on the US position in Asia as well as globally. The study was prepared for the Secretary 
of Defense, James Schlesinger, and shaped the thinking of the Office of the Secretary of 
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Defense on this issue for the rest of the decade.456 
The study argued for the importance of preserving 'China as a significant 
counterweight to the Soviet Union' and 'to exploit the deterrent effect of the Soviet fear of 
a two-front war'.457 It laid out four major defence alternatives in the Asia Pacific region. 
The first was labelled 'Focus on the Soviets'. It noted the growth of Soviet military power 
and, hence, political influence in Asia, and the fact that the European and Asian theatres 
of Cold War conflict were integrally linked, giving American strategic behaviour in Asia 
direct import for Washington's European strategic position. It stated that 'this alternative 
seeks to assure that there are forces that can balance Soviet power by trying to take 
maximum advantage of the Chinese as a counterweight to the Soviets in Asia'.458 
The study then turned to factors that might weigh against the implementation of 
the recommended option. It noted that, although the first defence alternative was the most 
desirable in terms of its ability to counter the growth of Soviet power in Asia, it carried 
with it significant political costs that would not make it an option 'that a policy maker 
could easily choose' given the larger defence spending that it would necessitate in order to 
increase US force structure in Asia. Conceding  that 'we could not be oblivious to current 
trends', the study acknowledged that the force and budgetary increases envisioned to 
implement Option One ran counter to the post-Vietnam war attitude among Congressional 
liberals. Anticipating the likely arguments that opponents of such a strategy, in the 
Congress as well as elsewhere within the Executive Branch, would make against it, the 
study noted that 'some may . . . object to its pro-PRC aspects and its possible adverse 
effects on US-Soviet détente'. One of the biggest objections noted was perhaps the most 
456 Garret, The 'China Card' and Its Origins, p.46. 
457 Abramowitz Study, declassified through a FOIA request made by Banning Garrett and given to the 
author. 
458 ibid. 
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obvious – that, given American retrenchment from Asian commitments following the 
disastrous experience in Vietnam, 'much of the Congress and articulate public is openly 
skeptical about the necessity of our East Asian deployments'.459 
Schlesinger was favourably disposed towards the study's recommendations but 
decided to put those recommendations on hold, at least for the time being, primarily out 
of the belief that Congress was unwilling to support such a policy due to its requirements 
for an increased defence posture in Asia and increased defence spending, as well as due to 
its departure from an evenhanded approach to Beijing and Moscow.460 Schlesinger was 
deeply suspicious of Soviet intentions and knew that he would find some support for the 
policy proposed by the study on Capitol Hill and that he had Congressional allies upon 
whom he could depend to help him to influence the policy debate. One example was 
Scoop Jackson, a close friend who was as sceptical as was Schlesinger regarding Soviet 
intentions and therefore of US-Soviet détente, and had called on normalisation with China 
and a more forceful playing of the 'China card' against the Soviets.461 Members who 
shared Jackson's perspective on the international situation were fighting an uphill battle in 
the Congressional environment of 1973 and 1974, however, and therefore Executive 
Branch officials advocating positions at variance with the dominant trends were unable to 
find sufficiently broad Congressional support for their positions to make them viable 
policy options. The fact that Congress's clear attitudes on an important area of security 
and foreign policy could kill an Executive Branch policy initiative before it had even seen 
the light of day in terms of a real policy debate, illustrates the extent to which Congress 
can constrain policy choices within the Executive Branch merely through its known 
attitudes. 
459 ibid. 
460 Interview with Morton Abramowitz, 27 August 2009, Washington, D.C.. 
461 See 'Jackson on China', National Review, 16 August 1974, pp.907-8. 
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Public Debate Over Sino-American Security Cooperation Legitimises a Radical Policy 
Concept 
Nixon and Kissinger's conception of the role of China in their new security 
framework was altered by deteriorating relations between Washington and each of the 
communist giants in the mid 1970's. The lack of progress toward Sino-American 
normalisation and Kissinger's search for means to reinvigorate relations, on the one hand, 
and the deterioration of US-Soviet détente and Kissinger's need to regain leverage over 
Moscow, on the other, contributed to Kissinger's decision to attempt to build a minimal 
security relationship with China in 1975 and 1976. 
Unlike the early 1970's, a more positive Congressional attitude toward defence 
issues beginning in 1975 resulted in a growing level of Congressional support for a 
potential Sino-American security relationship. Whereas the Congress had been highly 
critical of defence spending and Pentagon initiatives of any kind from the late 1960's 
through 1974, as détente soured and Indochina fell to communism, attitudes changed. 
Sam Stratton, a conservative Democrat who sat on the House Armed Services Committee 
which was later that year to investigate the possibility of Sino-American security ties, 
noted in May that sentiment was beginning to move toward the realisation that 'this is not 
the year to cut back our military strength'.462 That year, rather than fighting heavy 
opposition, as it had in previous years, the defence authorisation bill passed the full House 
by a vote of 332-64, with every amendment by Pentagon foes defeated, most by 
significant margins.463 Republican Senator Howard Baker (R-TN) also saw the change of 
attitude in the Senate, noting that after the spring of 1975 there existed, in stark contrast 
with previous years, 'a comfortable margin in support of the recommended defense 
462 House floor statement by Sam Stratton, 20 May 1975, Congressional Record. 
463 Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, p.208. 
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funding levels'.464 
The change of attitude on the part of liberal House and Senate members was 
particularly illustrative of the effect of the changed strategic perceptions. Liberal 
Republican Senator James Pearson (R-KS) wrote to a constituent in early September 
1974, proud of the fact that 'the entire defense budget was reduced by the largest amount 
in recent years'.465 By the next April, as South Vietnam and Cambodia were collapsing 
before communist onslaughts, Pearson wrote: 
While I am deeply concerned by counterproductive and unnecessary defense 
programs and ensuing costs associated with military hardware, I nevertheless 
believe that . . . US military strength is declining while that of potential enemies is 
increasing.466 
Liberal House Member Les Aspin (D-WI) in early 1976 undertook a comparison 
study of US and Soviet military spending which had minimised the disparity, and excused 
what increases in Soviet military spending he admitted as inspired by an attempt to 
counter the perceived threat to the Soviet Union from China. Stuart Symington's aides 
ridiculed Aspin's study, noted that 'all one has to do is look at the continual rise since 
1965 in most categories of the total Soviet military structure to see the increasing 
imbalance between the East and the West'. The staff memo to the Senator went on to rebut 
Aspin's assertion that the growth of Soviet military power was primarily aimed at China, 
concluding that it was aimed at Europe and the United States.467 
The impression was growing among both left and right on Capitol Hill that détente 
464 Speech by Howard Baker before the Commonwealth Club of  San Fransisco, 6 June 1975, Box 138, 
Howard Baker Papers, Modern Political Archive, Howard Baker Center for Public Policy, University of 
Tennessee, Knoxville. 
465 James Pearson to a constituent, 5 September 1974, Box 148, James Pearson Papers. 
466 James Pearson to a constituent, 14 April 1975, Box165, ibid. 
467 'George' to Stuart Symington, 5 April 1976, Box 281, Stuart Symington Papers. 
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was not resulting in Soviet restraint as had been hoped.468 Senator Edward Brooke, who 
earlier had been critical of defence spending and continued to remain confident of 
American superiority over the Soviet system, was nevertheless also becoming concerned 
about the Soviet buildup. His attitude was somewhat typical of those of many liberals and 
helps to explain why the idea of a tacit alliance with China was beginning to gain 
adherents. In May 1976 Brooke wrote that: 
The task before US now is not to seek to thwart trends over which we have little 
control, but rather to structure our own alliance relationships and the international 
system in such a way that the Soviets Union will not be tempted to seek political 
supremacy through military superiority.469 
Within this environment, the debate over Sino-American security ties that had 
been percolating quietly within hidden corners of the Executive Branch came out into 
public view, and Congress, with its newfound interest in security policy, was eager to 
involve itself in the debate. Michael Pillsbury, the author of the L-32 study that had made 
a big impact within the Pentagon in 1973, wrote an article that was published in the 
Foreign Policy, a respected journal read by academics, members of the informed public, 
and Congressional Members and their staff. Pillsbury had been encouraged to publish the 
article by Andrew Marshall, who had been quietly advocating the concept of a Sino-
American security relationship inside the Pentagon since 1973. Marshall hoped, by 
making public the arguments in favour of developing security ties with China, to place 
political pressure on those within the Administration, primarily Kissinger, who opposed 
any plan to overtly tilt toward China. Marshall and Pillsbury succeeded in this goal. 
Congressional interest in security issues, together with perceptions of a worsening 
468 See 'White House Gaining in Debate on Defense Budget', New York Times, 11 February 1976. 
469 Edward Brooke to Dale Read, 15 May 1976, Box 224, Edward Brooke Papers. 
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strategic environment in 1975 provided the fuel, and Pillsbury's article provided the 
match that lit a major public and Congressional debate over the nature of US-China 
relations and its affect on US-Soviet relations. 
Appearing in the September 1975 issue of Foreign Policy, Pillsbury's article 
advocated the initiation of a limited military and intelligence relationship with China.470 
Pillsbury was unaware at the time that Kissinger had developed a limited security 
relationship himself during his high level talks in Beijing, which Kissinger had kept 
secret not only from the Congress and the public, but even from most other members of 
the Executive Branch. This relationship had begun on Kissinger's 1971 trips, in which he 
took along US satellite imagery of Soviet military emplacements along the Chinese 
border and briefed China's aged Marshall, Ye Jianying, on military issues.471 The scope 
and purposes the security relationship that Dr. Kissinger had initiated was far more 
limited than was that proposed by Pillsbury and Marshall, and sought to do just enough to 
build Chinese confidence in the United States as a counterweight to the Soviet Union 
while not doing so much as to alienate the Soviets and elicit an angry reaction. 
Pillsbury's article made public many of the details of a debate that had been taking 
place within the Nixon and Ford Administrations, primarily within the Pentagon but also 
in the other agencies that had been receiving reports of Pillsbury's conversations for at 
least two years, over the extent to which Washington should potentially collaborate with 
China against the Soviet Union. That debate, however, was still in embryonic form when 
Pillsbury's article publicised it. Pillsbury later noted that during the 1973-1976 period 
'how bizarre the various ideas of security cooperation with China . . . struck literally 
everyone'.472 This is certainly understandable, given the fact that the whole strategic 
470 Michael Pillsbury, 'US-Chinese Military Ties?', Foreign Policy 20 (Autumn 1975), pp.50-64. 
471 Mahmud Ali, US-China Cold War Collaboration, 1971-1989, (London, 2005), p.75. 
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posture of the United States in Asia since 1950 had been formed with the goal of 
containing Chinese communist influence, and that Beijing had been both perceived and 
portrayed in internal government debates, as well as to the public, as a revolutionary state 
bent on overturning the established order and fomenting violent communist insurgencies 
around the region. The idea of having some sort of even informal alliance with Maoist 
China, which, despite the development of Sino-American reconciliation was still 
perceived by most American as an opponent, appeared totally unrealistic. 
The idea was not met with warm approval on the part of the national security 
bureaucracy, partly due to the concept's revolutionary nature but also partly due to the fact 
that the bureaucracy itself was naturally cautious and conservative about new ideas, 
making it very difficult for any new ideas, much less one as seemingly revolutionary as 
this, to gain acceptance.473 Also hindering the ability of the national security bureaucracy 
to think of Communist China as an ally in any sense was the history of close cooperation 
between the US military and the military and intelligence agencies of their Nationalist 
counterparts in pursuit of the goal of the blunting of Communist Chinese power.474 The 
military and intelligence agencies had long viewed Taipei as an important American Cold 
War ally, and their all-consuming focus on the war in Vietnam, which had only just ended, 
had reinforced this sympathetic attitude toward the Nationalist military, intelligence 
services, and government, which had provided unparalleled support and cooperation.475 
473 Chester Bowles said of the introduction of new ideas, 'Getting the bureaucracy to accept new ideas is 
like carrying a double mattress up a very narrow and winding stairway. It is a terrible job, and you 
exhaust yourself when you try it'. Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. 
Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), p.683. 
474 For a popular history of US-ROC cooperation in the area of intelligence overflights of the Mainland, 
see Chris Pocock, with Clarence Fu, The Black Bats:CIA Spy Flights Over China From Taiwan, 1951-
1969 (Atglen, Pennsylvania, 2010). 
475 Much documentary evidence of this attitude on the part of the American military and intelligence 
agencies exists. See the 31 March 1967 briefing notes of Admiral Gentner of the Thailand Defense 
Command of a visiting group of US Senators, in which the admiral praises the speed and quality of 
Taiwan's defence cooperation with the US, Box 259, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers; 
See also the testimony of General Cicolella before the Symington Subcommittee in late1969 and early 
1970, f.2229-30, Start Symington Papers. 
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Taipei had long believed, correctly, that together with the Congress, the Pentagon was its 
strongest base of political support in Washington and was highly sympathetic with 
Nationalist goals.476 
In order for the idea of Sino-American security cooperation to gain credibility 
within the government and be implemented as policy, these ideas needed a much broader 
base of support in Washington. Opening the subject to Congressional debate would raise 
its profile within the media and the informed public. Pillsbury's article began a prolonged 
process by which support was gradually built, a process which was aided by the 
continued degeneration of Soviet-American détente and perceptions of a worsening of the 
strategic environment. 
During the autumn of 1975 the idea of Sino-American security ties was becoming 
a more important issue within the Ford Administration. The two most important 
protagonists in this debate within the Administration were Secretary of Defense James 
Schlesinger and Henry Kissinger, who still jointly held the positions of Secretary of State 
and national security advisor.477  Whereas Kissinger sought to take a strictly evenhanded 
approach to China and the Soviets as part of his triangular strategy that had as its primary 
goal the facilitation of Soviet-American détente, Schlesinger was much more sceptical of 
Soviet intentions and favoured leaning toward the Chinese in order to better balance 
Soviet power. 
After initially putting the idea on hold for nearly a year, by the fall of 1975 
Schlesinger, sensing the shift in public and Congressional sentiment in the past year, had 
begun to advocate within the Administration for the idea of using China as a 
476 See, for example, US embassy (Taipei) to Dean Rusk, reporting that Chiang believed that the 'Pentagon 
are behind him  in his efforts to build up GRC military and his attempt at mainland recovery', 31 March 
1962, Box 442, Averell Harriman Papers. 
477 Tyler, Great Wall, pp.198-9. Interview with James Schlesinger, 8 August 2012, Arlington, Virginia,
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counterweight to the Soviets and making China a stronger partner in the American system 
of containment.478 Schlesinger, who had knowledge of Chinese probes through Michael 
Pillsbury and Andrew Marshall, argued that the Soviets would put up with stronger Sino-
American ties than Kissinger assumed to be the case and that a strengthening of such ties 
would not necessarily result in a worsening of relations with Moscow.479 When 
Schlesinger was fired in early November 1975, although other reasons existed480, a 
significant factor that is often ignored was the impact of his deep disagreements with 
Kissinger over policy toward both the Soviet Union and China.481 Schlesinger's firing 
removed the most powerful Administration proponent of Sino-American military ties, 
although there were those within the CIA (including the National Intelligence Officer 
[NIO] for East Asia, Jim Lilley482) and the Pentagon who still advocated for a tilt towards 
China. Within a very short period of time after Schlesinger's departure, however, the 
increasing coolness of relations with Beijing and the lessening of American leverage over 
Moscow would motivate Kissinger to move in the direction that had been advocated by 
Schlesinger. 
In the Congress, the competing ideas of Kissinger and Schlesinger both found 
advocates. Liberals tended to be most concerned that Sino-American security relations 
would further harm Soviet-US relations. Scoop Jackson, who had long advocated tilting 
toward China, was joined by colleagues such as Republican Senator Robert Taft, who had 
been advocating the sale of military equipment to China since 1974.483 The publication of 
Pillsbury's article initiated a long-term debate over these issues within the Congress and 
478 Garrett, The 'China Card' and Its Origins, p.48. 
479 New York Times, 9 November 1975. 
480 For an overall view, see Bob Woodward, Shadow (New York, 1999). 
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among the informed public that would shift in favour of closer security ties with China 
due to the sustained advocacy of such views by Pillsbury and like-minded individuals, 
and due to steadily worsening relations with Moscow. 
Change in the thinking of the national security bureaucracy took place due to a 
combination of forceful and articulate advocacy of this new idea on the part of Pillsbury 
and like-minded individuals, key support from prestigious security studies and 
international affairs journals, which served to spread the idea among Congressional 
members and key staff as well as among the informed public, and Congressional 
consideration of the idea in public debate. Congressional hearings that examined the topic 
lent credibility to the issue, which, together with its persistent advocacy by key 
intellectual policy journals, such as Foreign Policy and International Security beginning 
in late 1975, played a significant role in legitimising the concept and making it sound 
plausible and less radical, which in turn increased the likelihood that the national security 
bureaucracy might consider the idea as a legitimate policy option.484 Articles in the 
popular media also contributed to 'normalising' the radical concept of Sino-American 
security cooperation. 
Members of Congress and their staffs invariably read policy journals in order to 
keep abreast of the issues involved in the latest policy debates. Foreign Policy was (and 
remains) one of those influential journals regularly consulted by Congressional officials. 
484 A series of articles authored by Pillsbury, whose ideas were supported by the editors of Foreign Policy, 
International Security, and other key policy journals, were published over the next several years, which 
advocacy contributed to acceptance of the growth of a limited Sino-American security relationship. 
Such articles included, in addition to those already cited: 
Michael Pillsbury, 'Future Sino-American Security Ties: The View From Tokyo, Moscow and Peking', 
International Security 1:4 (Spring 1977), pp.124-42;
'A Japanese Card?' Foreign Policy 33 (Winter 1978-1979), pp.3-30; and 
'Strategic Acupuncture', Foreign Policy 41 (Winter 1980-1981). 
It is worth noting that the editor of Foreign Policy during the mid 1970's was Richard Holbrooke, who 
would go on to become Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs under Jimmy 
Carter and would in that position support the development of a prominent security relationship with 
Beijing. 
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In 1975 and 1976 it was edited by Richard Holbrooke, who liked Pillsbury's ideas and 
began to advocate on their behalf, knowing that many among Congressional Members 
and staff read the journal and would be influenced by Holbrooke's editorial advocacy.485 
The editor of International Security, Derek Leebaert, also advanced the idea. Such 
promotion by these two influential journals, as well as by various other media, 
immediately piqued Congressional interest. As soon as Pillsbury's article was published 
in September 1975, Members took notice and began to comment on it. Senator Taft 
publicly endorsed Pillsbury's proposals, echoing Pillsbury's argument that the sale of 
defensive arms to China would strengthen the Sino-American relationship, help forestall a 
potential Sino-Soviet rapprochement, and hopefully act as a constraint on increasingly 
aggressive Soviet behaviour.486 Taft then continued to advocate on behalf of the idea on 
the Senate floor.487 
Although such support for Pillsbury's ideas was not widespread at the time, the 
moderately positive overall reception, and particularly the support from the Hill from 
conservatives, gave Pillsbury and allies hope that they could eventually convince enough 
people within the government that their ideas could become policy.488 The public debate 
increased through the fall of 1975 and into 1976. A New York Times editorial in December 
1975 echoed Pillsbury's argument and supported the idea of military assistance, and even 
the possibility of arms sales to China to build it up as a counterweight to the Soviet 
Union.489 Taft immediately wrote a letter to the Times supporting their position and 
arguing that 'the US should be willing to provide . . . defensive weaponry and weapons 
technology to deter or, if necessary, defeat, a Soviet conventional attack'. Such sales, he 
485 Correspondence with Michael Pillsbury, 6 September 2009. 
486 Senate floor statement by Robert Taft, 9 October 1975, Congressional Record. 
487 Senate floor statement by Robert Taft, 23 September 1975, Congressional Record. 
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argued, would not be a threat to US interests, but only 'to the 50 Soviet divisions lined up 
along its frontier'.490 
Support was expressed by Democrats, as well. No less a figure than Senate 
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield also spoke late in 1975 in favour of selling arms to 
China should the Chinese request them. He noted that, being a communist country, 
current law prohibited the sale of weapons to China, and that implementation of a policy 
of arms sales to Beijing would therefore require legislation (and hinting that he would 
possibly be favourably disposed to such legislation).491 
Over the next three years after the initial publication of Pillsbury's ideas, as 
competing bureaucratic interests argued over them within the Ford and Carter 
Administrations, a series of hearings were held by various House panels on the topic of 
the Sino-Soviet-American triangle and potential Sino-American security cooperation. 
From October 1975 to June 1976 the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy of the 
House International Relations Committee, chaired by Lester Wolff, held a series of 
hearings on the triangle, in which witnesses representing different perspectives examined 
the various aspects of the debate, educating Members and the public as to the issues 
involved.492 The subcommittee had been created in January 1975 as part of the larger 
reorganisation of the House and particularly of the Foreign Affairs Committee (whose 
name changed to the Committee on International Relations) in order to give the House a 
platform from which to provide structural analysis of foreign policy trends and options.493 
In the subcommittee hearings Members probed Administration officials over the 
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debate within the Executive Branch, attempting to obtain information regarding the 
current status of policy on this issue.494 Kissinger's characteristic use of secrecy and 
deception of the Congress obtained in this area of policy as well. Reflecting the fact that 
Kissinger, the primary Administration figure involved in the issue, wished to keep 
Administration thinking on this topic from Congressional knowledge and from public 
view, Congressional probes did not elicit an accurate picture of the current state of debate 
within the Administration. As one example, Winston Lord misleadingly responded to a 
question from Lester Wolff in March 1976 regarding whether the issue of military 
assistance and arms sales to China was at that time being debated within the 
Administration by stating that 'It hasn't been an active issue'.495 Lord's response was 
typical of the misleading communications between Kissinger, who was Lord's boss, and 
the Congress. Although it was true that the debate within the Administration was in 
embryonic form, it was not true that it had 'not been an issue' as the disagreement over 
policy towards the Soviet Union and over the place that Sino-American ties should hold 
in larger American strategy had been one of the major, unacknowledged causes for the 
firing of James Schlesinger. 
Congress received misleading information about the potential for Sino-American 
security ties from the Chinese, as well. The House Armed Services Committee also held a 
series of hearings on the issue beginning in October 1975, and a special panel of the 
committee travelled to China in August 1976 in order to discuss potential military 
cooperation with the Chinese leadership. The panel came away from its visit with an 
inaccurate impression that the Chinese did not want a military relationship with the 
494 Interview with Joyce Lasky Shub, the subcommittee staff member who organised the hearings, 21 July 
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United States. The panel's trip report recorded that the Chinese 'expressed no interest at 
all in acquiring US weapons or military technology, preferring instead to rely on 
“independence and self-reliance”'.496 Partially, the impression given the panel was given 
by members of the radical faction of Chinese leadership who truly did not wish to have a 
military relationship with the United States. However, even at this high-tide of radical 
influence in the Chinese government, Chinese probes for Western military technology 
continued through other channels.497 This indicates that, while the radicals may have had 
control over much of the propaganda in Beijing and held a few leadership posts, they did 
not, even at the height of their influence, have unchecked control over policy. It is also an 
indication that Kissinger was correct in his conviction that national interests trumped 
ideology as a determinant of national policy, even in a nation as seemingly ideologically 
driven as Maoist China. 
Another reason that the House panel was not informed about Chinese interest in 
western arms and dual-use technology was that the Chinese did not wish to broadcast 
their need for such weapons and technological modernisation, which would amount to a 
public admission of weakness.498 In the belief that any frank discussion of such Chinese 
needs with a Congressional delegation would likely have been leaked by the Members, 
those Chinese officials who were in favour of Chinese purchases of Western weaponry 
and military technology were reluctant to share their interest, deeming it safer to make 
such inquiries in an unofficial capacity that was more low key and had the benefit of 
deniability should news of the approach be leaked.499 
496 Report of the Visit to the People's Republic of China by the Special Study Panel of the Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C., 1976).
497 See New York Times, 25 April 1976; Aviation Week, 24 May 1976; Forbes, 1 June 1976, and South 
China Morning Post, 11 June 1976. 
498 Correspondence with Michael Pillsbury, who remained a point of contact on the part of the Chinese for 
such inquiries, August 2009. Also,Michael Pillsbury to Henry Kissinger, 13 October 1975, from the 
private collection of Banning Garrett. 
499 ibid. 
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The result was the receipt of inaccurate information by the panel and, therefore, an 
inaccurate perception of Chinese desires. This was beneficial to Kissinger, who shared 
with the Chinese a desire to keep secret Chinese interest in this area. Due to Kissinger's 
need to give the impression that the Sino-American relationship was moving forward 
despite lack of progress on normalisation and to attempt to regain leverage over the 
Soviets, he pursued a policy shift in 1975 and 1976 that involved a departure from the 
evenhanded approach which he had to that point pursued between Beijing and Moscow. 
Accordingly, Kissinger secretly informed the British in late 1975 that he approved of 
them selling Rolls-Royce jet engines to China, which was in violation of COCOM 
regulations (the Coordinating Committee of NATO allies plus Japan that governed the 
transfer of advanced technology to communist nations), despite publicly protesting the 
move, and informed the Chinese that the move had his approval.500 A year later, Kissinger 
instructed the NSC to approve the sale to China of Control Data Corporation's Cyber 172 
computer, a move that was protested by Moscow.501 The departure from the policy of 
evenhandedness that had characterised the Nixon and Ford Administration's handling of 
the Sino-Soviet-American triangle to that point was a major one, and was made with no 
consultation within the Administration, much less with the Congress. 
Beijing did not respond to Kissinger's overtures, having come to the conclusion 
that he was merely attempting to use China in order to better Washington's relations with 
Moscow.502 Kissinger's move was a tactical one, made out of frustration and a desire to 
reinvigorate cooling Sino-American ties and regain leverage over Moscow. Part of the 
purpose of the hearings of the House Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy, however, 
500 Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989 (Stanford, 1995), 
p.89. 
501 The decision was reported in Aviation Week and Technology Review, 25 October 1976 issue, p.18. 
502 Ali, US-China Cold War Collaboration, p.108. 
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was to examine some of the fundamental issues surrounding the debate over potential 
Sino-American security ties that appeared to be unaddressed within the Administration. 
Wolff and his staff hoped that the hearings would address fundamental questions such as 
whether the development of a de facto coalition with China, even a limited one, was 
consistent with the goal of furthering US-Soviet détente, and what the precise role of 
Sino-American relations should play with regard to US strategy towards Moscow.
Doak Barnett led those Sinologists who testified against development of a Sino-
American military relationship, arguing that the United States knew too little about 
decision-making in Moscow and Beijing to justify the risk of attempting to work one side 
against the other – a point of view with which Wolff was sympathetic.503 Michael 
Pillsbury testified in favour of developing security cooperation with China, repeating the 
argument made in his article: that a limited military relationship would serve to bolster 
American credibility as a dependable counterweight to the Soviets, strengthen the pro-
American element within Beijing (including giving the Chinese military a vested interest 
in the continued growth of the relationship with Washington), forestall potential Sino-
Soviet reconciliation, and, if the level of military cooperation kept limited, serve as an 
inducement to the Soviet Union to moderate its behaviour while not sparking an angry 
counter-reaction on Moscow's part.504 
Other hearings that touched on the subject of Sino-American security cooperation 
during 1976 included those by Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of 
the House International Relations Committee, which looked at the export licensing of 
advanced technology with an emphasis on dual-use technology transfers to China. These 
hearings examined questions such as whether the export of military technology, such as 
503 'United States, Soviet Union, China:The Great Power Triangle' hearings. 
504 ibid. 
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the recently approved British sale of Spey jet engines to China, would in any way harm 
American interests or those of America's allies, or would primarily serve to strengthen 
China's defensive strength vis-a-vis a potential Soviet attack.505 The primary division in 
this debate was over the issue of evenhandedness, which many believed an essential 
element of a US-Soviet-Chinese triangular dynamic that would most benefit Washington. 
In all of these hearings, the witnesses displayed major disagreement over the key issues 
addressed, mirroring the lack of consensus within Congress over these issues. The lack of 
consensus, however, masked the fact that the most important effect of the debate was the 
fact that it was occurring at all. 
Conclusion
Congressional attitudes toward normalisation with China did not evolve 
significantly during Gerald Ford's tenure in the White House, despite the decision on the 
part of the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders to support normalisation on Beijing's 
terms. Nixon had told Zhou in February 1972 that he believed he could mould 
Congressional attitudes over time. Had Watergate not intervened, that may have been 
true. Gerald Ford faced an increasingly assertive Congress, had inherited a weak 
Executive, and was not in a position to confront conservatives in his party. However, Ford 
was a former well-respected Congressional leader with much experience building 
coalitions within Congress, and despite this background put forth little effort to address 
Congressional concerns, short of misleading conservatives by telling them that he did not 
intend to cut ties with Taiwan and to recognise Beijing on its terms should he win re-
election. The Administration also made no attempt to answer the widespread 
Congressional concern that breaking the long-held American commitments to Taiwan 
505 See 'Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review', Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, Part II, 12 April 1976. 
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would harm American credibility, and its disingenuous attempts to convince 
conservatives that it did not plan to normalise with Beijing at the cost of ties with Taiwan 
were disbelieved partially due to Kissinger's lack of credibility with Congress. The result 
was not just a lack of movement toward normalisation, but an increase of distrust between 
the two branches. 
The example of the Congressional impact on debate over Sino-American security 
ties reveals an increasing level of involvement from the early 1970's onwards, as the 
Congress was made aware of Executive Branch consideration of such ties under 
Presidents Nixon and Ford, and began to educate themselves on the issues involved after 
learning of the Executive Branch debate over the issue. Kissinger did not appreciate the 
Congressional attempt to involve itself with this issue, an attitude that was noted by 
Members and Congressional staff, who attributed it to institutional arrogance.506 
In fairness to Kissinger, it should be noted that when he took office with Nixon in 
1969, he and Nixon had very large security challenges to face and confronted a Congress 
hostile to defence spending, weapons programs, military activity undertaken in opposition 
to communist actions, and the foreign basing of American military personnel. All of these 
were important aspects of national strength that both Nixon and Kissinger believed must 
be upheld if the United States were to remain strong in a world in which they believed 
America's national strength to be declining in relative terms. The delicate balancing act 
that Kissinger believed needed to be undertaken in order to ensure success in balancing 
relations with China and the Soviet Union and playing each off against the other was not 
one that he believed could be run by committee, particularly a very large, unwieldy 
organisation known for its lack of ability to keep secrets.507 Also, Kissinger believed that 
506 This perception of Kissinger's attitude towards Congress was confirmed in numerous interviews of 
former Members and Congressional staff. 
507 A Washington Post article by Victor Zorza reported that Pillsbury's article had annoyed Kissinger, who 
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public examination of the mechanics of playing a 'China card' undercut his strategy due to 
the fact that the card was most effective when it was implied and covert, not when it was 
overt. A public debate over the issue, in Kissinger's mind, made use of the card less 
effective. 
As his strategy was failing, however, Congressional examination of the issue in 
1975 and 1976 helped, not hurt. The statements of individual Members on the issue, the 
various committee hearings, and CoDels, all began a process of educating the public and 
the Members themselves on the issues, a process that would lead to stronger appreciation 
of China and its role in American security strategy, thereby helping to build public 
support for a potential policy shift in favour of security ties with China. Congressional 
consideration of this issue illustrates the role that Congressional attention can play in 
evaluating an idea and providing it with momentum as a policy option within the 
government. In this case, Congressional debate over the issue of potential security ties 
with China helped to 'normalise' the concept and make it more likely to be accepted by 
the national security bureaucracy as a legitimate policy option later in the decade as US-
Soviet relations further deteriorated and Washington began to search for greater security. 
did not want attention drawn to the fact that he was considering such a relationship with China. On 13 
October 1975, Pillsbury wrote to Kissinger, pleading his case and apologising for any annoyance he 
may have caused through the publication of his article. Pillsbury's letter was released to Banning 
Garrett in response to a FOIA request and given to the author.  
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CHAPTER 4: 1977–1978 - 
CONGRESS CIRCUMVENTED AND A TILT TOWARD  CHINA 
As a new Administration took office in Washington the relationship with China 
had been stagnating for several years due largely to Congressional opposition to 
normalisation on Beijing's terms. Although there had been some movement toward 
greater acceptance that ties with Taiwan would have to be at least lessened somewhat in 
order to pursue normalisation with Beijing, Congress nevertheless remained unanimously 
opposed to normalisation on terms that would leave Taiwan vulnerable to coercion from 
Beijing. Also, although appreciative of the strategic value of relations with China in the 
face of the growing threat from the Soviet Union, Congress did not believe, as Carter 
came to believe, that Taiwan should be sacrificed in order to pursue closer security 
cooperation with China. 
This chapter will focus on these two primary issues, the debate over normalisation 
and the nature of the post-normalisation relationship with Taiwan, and the debate over the 
role of China in Washington's attempt to come to grips with a quickly growing threat from 
the Soviet Union. The continuing disconnect between White House and Congressional 
attitudes toward Taiwan and the manner in which the White House undertook 
normalisation, with little reference to Congressional concerns, resulted in deepened 
distrust between the Executive and Legislative branches, ensured a lack of political 
consensus to support the White House initiative, and also ensured that the bilateral 
relationship, which would become the nation's most important, would be given an 
unstable foundation. Similarly, the White House policy shift away from a position of 
evenhandedness between Moscow and Beijing and toward a greater tilt toward Beijing 
was also undertaken with no consultation, which further weakened support for the 
Administration's China policy despite growing Congressional sentiment in favour of a 
205
limited security relationship with China. 
Circumventing Congress 
Jimmy Carter's statements during the campaign that he would be reluctant to cut 
ties with Taiwan had worried the Chinese, but were likely merely the expediencies of a 
presidential campaign. Carter was aware that polls showed the public to be 
overwhelmingly opposed to the cutting of ties with Taiwan. When he took office, 
however, several key members of his foreign policy team were committed to early 
normalisation. Aside from the President himself, the key actors within the Administration 
were Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the 
NSC staff member for China, Michael Oksenberg. At the State Department, Vance and 
Holbrooke each were very aware of the role that had been played by Congress in blocking 
the path to normalisation under President Ford, and Vance, in particular, showed a 
realisation that Congressional support was necessary for any normalisation agreement if 
the relationship was to be given a firm foundation for the future. The efforts of these men, 
however, were undermined by Carter's perception of Congress as a hindrance to be 
circumvented, and the disdain with which Brzezinski held Congress. 
Carter and Brzezinski's attitudes shaped the broader culture among Administration 
officials who dealt with Congress, who had a reputation for being insensitive to 
Congressional wishes and refusing to take part in the system of compromise and 
exchanging of favours that was necessary to pass the President's legislative agenda. 
Hamilton Jordan, Carter's chief of staff, and Frank Moore, the head of the White House 
Office of Congressional Liaison, both had extremely difficult relations with 
Congressional leaders.508 The Administration's failure to effectively deal with Congress 
508  See 21 February 1977 exchange between Frank Moore and Jimmy Carter on this issue, White House 
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undermined its foreign policy across the board, including in the area of China policy. 
From the spring of 1978 onward, as the President grew impatient with the Soviets, 
he came increasingly to share Brzezinski's view of the utility of closer relations with 
China. Brzezinski's China hand, Michael Oksenberg, met with Members and key 
Congressional staff taking soundings of Congressional attitudes regarding potential 
normalisation formulas, giving the impression that the NSC was attempting to actively 
consult. The record of the next two years, however, would show that the NSC's primary 
goal was to circumvent Congress. Oksenberg shared Brzezinski's perspective on the 
strategic importance of normalisation, as well as his boss's view of Congress as a barrier 
that needed to be overcome. Partially due to Soviet aggressiveness, which assisted 
Brzezinski's ability to shape the President's thinking in a manner more critical of Moscow, 
China policy came increasingly to be controlled by Brzezinski and the NSC rather than 
the State Department during 1978, which contributed to Congress being frozen out of the 
process. Brzezinski sought quick normalisation due to his belief in the strategic 
importance of ties to China in the context of US-Soviet relations, and, like Kissinger, was 
willing to sacrifice Taiwan for the sake of the strategic benefits that he envisioned would 
accrue to Washington through normalisation. However, while Nixon and Kissinger had at 
least lobbied and misled Congress so that they could be assured of broad Congressional 
support for their initiative, Carter and Brzezinski ultimately ignored Congress and 
undertook the policy shift in complete secrecy. The result was that a critical opportunity 
to build consensus behind normalisation and the new relationship was lost, and the 
consequent Congressional action ensured that Taiwan remained a divisive issue both in 
Sino-American relations and in American domestic political debate over China policy. It 
is somewhat ironic that although the White House sought to minimise the Congressional 
Office of Congressional Liaison (hereafter, WHOCL), Box 26, Carter Library. 
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role, the manner in which it pursued normalisation effectively ensured a long-term 
Congressional oversight role with regard to policy toward Taiwan. 
The Carter Administration faced, if anything, a tougher task in pursuing 
normalisation than had Nixon in his pursuit of the original opening in terms of gaining 
Congressional support. The problem was partly of Carter's own making. The President 
believed that the rightness of his policy choices were self-evident, and that he should not 
have to explain his reasoning nor lobby Congress to support his positions. Tip O'Neill, the 
Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives, decried this attitude on the part of 
the President, noting that much more could have been accomplished, given the fact that 
Democrats controlled both the White House and both chambers of Congress, had Carter 
made a more serious attempt to engage Congress.509 Members of Carter's cabinet, 
similarly, recall that he saw lobbying the Congress as being somehow beneath him, and 
viewed interaction with Congress with a certain amount of distaste.510 This attitude was 
bolstered by his view that Congress had been allowed to short-circuit the progress of 
normalisation.511 These attitudes and beliefs on Carter's part, combined with Brzezinski's 
disdain for the role of Congress512, ensured that little effort would be expended by the 
White House to attempt to build a consensus in support of normalisation. 
Carter entered office proclaiming an intention to make Congress a partner in the 
policy-making process.513 These pronouncements were seen by many on the Hill, 
however, and even by some within his own Administration, as largely lip-service 
necessitated by the obvious difficulties that his predecessors had had with Congress over 
509 Tip O'Neill, with William Novak, Man of the House:The Life and Political Memoirs of Speaker Tip 
O'Neil (New York, 1987). 
510 Interview with James Schlesinger, who also served as CIA Director under Nixon, Secretary of Defense 
under Nixon and Ford, and Secretary of Energy under Carter, 8 August 2012, Arlington, Virginia. 
511 Carter, Keeping Faith, p.197. 
512 Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, 6 October 2009, Washington, D.C. 
513 New York Times, 13 January 1977. 
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foreign policy and Executive powers.514 Within two weeks of taking office, one of the 
White House staff responsible for liaison with the Senate reported that Scoop Jackson, 
who was deeply disappointed that Carter's early decisions projected an overly-dovish 
image, 'is extremely upset with the President' and 'believes all of the President's talk about 
consultation, cooperation and coordination with the Congress is a lot of bunk'.515 
Jackson's criticism cannot be dismissed simply due to the obvious differences in 
geostrategic views between himself and the new, liberal President. The next day, Frank 
Moore reported to Carter that 'Jackson exemplifies a growing sentiment in the Senate 
among some of the older heads that the President is insulating himself from them and 
avoiding even soliciting their advice'.516 This belief among Senate leaders was reinforced 
by the fact that Carter discontinued the tradition, which had dated back to the 1930's, of 
holding meetings with the bipartisan Congressional leadership.517 A Congressional liaison 
staff member warned that this lack of consultations was ultimately going to hurt 
Administration foreign policy, but was ignored.518 
In addition to this lack of interest in consulting Congress, Carter had none of 
Nixon's political advantages in seeking to advance the relationship with China. Whereas 
Nixon had entered office having a reputation as a tough anticommunist, which he 
leveraged in order to minimise conservative opposition to the opening to China, Carter's 
early days in office reinforced conservative views that he was a dove, leaving him 
vulnerable to conservative attacks on his approach to relations with the Soviet Union as 
well as on the Sino-American normalisation issue. Even Senate Democratic leaders 
including Majority Leader Robert Byrd and John Glenn, chairman of the Subcommittee 
514 Interview with James Schlesinger. 
515 Dan Tate to Frank Moore, 3 February 1977, WHOCL, Box 24, Carter Library.  
516 Frank Moore to Jimmy Carter, 4 February 1977, ibid.
517 Max Friedersdorf to Howard Baker, 19 December 1977, SENATE LADERSHIP FILE, Box 1, Howard 
Baker Papers. 
518 Ann Dye to Frank Moore, 12 July 1977, WHOCL, Box 21, Carter Library. 
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on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, doubted Carter's approach to the Soviets.519 Carter's 
aloof attitude did not help matters.520 These patterns did not portend a successful 
resolution of the issue of normalisation, which so clearly required presidential credibility 
and a substantial investment of presidential energy and attention to Congress. 
Brzezinski and Vance took the initial steps toward normalisation. Even before the 
inauguration, Vance assembled a team of Asia and China specialists, which included 
Holbrooke and Oksenberg, and gave them access to what Nixon and Ford papers were 
available with instructions 'to argue the case for normalisation in a relatively short period 
of time'.521 Vance forwarded the result of their research to the President, and argued that 
normalisation would reinvigorate the Sino-Soviet-American triangle, and, hence, US-
Soviet détente, would contribute toward the 'stabilisation' of East Asia, and that Taiwan 
would survive normalisation but that delay would give Taipei 'opportunities to attempt 
spoiling efforts (lobbying the Congress, etc.)'.522 Although noting that 'the American 
people overwhelmingly favor continued close ties with Taiwan' and that 'a demonstrable 
“sellout” of Taiwan would provoke a serious outcry', Vance argued that, if handled in such 
a way that Taiwan's future security were protected and the US were able to retain 
significant relations with Taipei, the public would support normalisation.523 Vance's 
assertion was correct that broad support existed for normalisation provided the two 
concerns that he listed were addressed. Also, despite referring to Congress as a potential 
'spoiler', he took Congressional concerns seriously, shared many of those concerns, and 
519 See Frank Moore to Jimmy Carter, 16 February 1977, Box 24, ibid.; 
Frank Moore to Jimmy Carter , 14 December 1978, Ibid; and
Frank Moore to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 4 April 1977, Box 87, ibid. 
520 ibid.; Frank Moore to Jimmy Carter, 23 August 1977, Box 18, ibid.; and interview with  James 
Schlesinger. 
521 Vance, Hard Choices, p.76; Cyrus Vance to Jimmy Carter, 15 April 1977, Plains File, Box 6, Carter 
Library. 
522 ibid. 
523 ibid. 
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realised the need to work with Congress to build consensus behind normalisation. In 
addition to the concerns over Taiwan, Vance also shared Congressional concern that if the 
United States pursued normalisation in such a way that the rest of the world perceived 
Washington as betraying Taiwan, or reneging on treaties and years of repeated 
commitments because those treaties and commitments were no longer convenient, 
American credibility would be severely harmed – a theme that would be repeated by 
many Members of both parties over the next two years.524 
From the beginning of 1977, conservatives in Congress watched for any signs that 
the new Administration was willing to acquiesce to Beijing's demands and to cut ties with 
Taiwan. Noting that Oksenberg had advocated, while part of the University of Michigan 
faculty, that President Ford acquiesce to Beijing's demands and that he now held a key 
position at the NSC, Barry Goldwater labelled this fact 'highly disturbing', and reminded 
the Administration of the 'clear majority' of the House of Representatives which had 
signed onto the previous year's House Concurrent Resolutions expressing opposition to 
such a course of action.525 Goldwater also reminded the White House of 'Mr. Carter's 
pledge to just tap the sound common sense and the good judgement of the American 
people in developing our foreign policy', implying that a decision to cut ties with Taiwan 
would contradict Carter's promise given overwhelming public support for continuing ties 
with Taipei.526 
The Congressional concerns that had been raised in the previous several years 
were repeated to the new Administration, including concerns about the moral import of 
renouncing years of commitments to Taiwan, and the damaging impact on American 
524 Vance, Hard Choices, p.77. 
525 Senate floor speech by Barry Goldwater, 7 February 1977, Congressional Record. 
526 ibid. 
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credibility of appearing to leave a close ally vulnerable to takeover.527 The President's 
vocal emphasis on human rights as a centrepiece of American foreign policy created a 
new point of leverage for conservatives, who believed that Carter's emphasis in this area 
made him vulnerable since he did not offer even the most gentle criticism of Beijing, 
despite the fact that China had arguably a worse human rights record than did the Soviet 
Union.528 Typical of conservative arguments was a speech by Senator Jesse Helms, which 
asserted that 'The disappearance of 16 million Taiwanese into the limbo of totalitarianism 
might be regarded as a more significant setback for human rights than the arrest of a few 
Soviet dissidents'.529 530 The paradox between Carter's proclamation that universal human 
rights would be a centrepiece of his Administration's foreign policy, on the one hand, and 
his public determination to normalise relations (with the implications that this had for 
Taiwan) with a nation that had perhaps a worse human rights record than even the Soviet 
Union, on the other, was indeed a point on which Carter was vulnerable, nor did the 
527 See Harry Byrd, Jr., to a constituent, 27 December 1978, MSS 10320-a,-b, Box 266, Harry Byrd, Jr. 
Papers; 
House floor speech by Robert McClory, 4 October 1977, Congressional Record; 
Report by Senator Jacob Javits of a trip to East Asia, December 1977, SENATE LEADERSHIP FILE, 
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529 Senate floor speech by Jesse Helms, 24 June 1977, Congressional Record. 
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Administration have a strong defence of itself to this criticism. 
Many moderates and liberals agreed with their conservative colleagues that 
China's poor record on human rights protections dictated an approach to normalisation 
that would not leave Taiwan vulnerable to the Mainland or result in Taiwan being brought 
under Communist rule. While  acknowledging the political repression that also existed on 
Taiwan, some House liberals argued that 'There is appreciably more freedom on Taiwan 
than on Mainland China, although Taiwan has a long way to go by our standards'.531 The 
White House never responded to these Congressional charges, although Brezinski noted 
in a memo to Carter that Congressional objections on human rights grounds to leaving 
Taiwan vulnerable to coercion by Beijing had a valid point.532 Brzezinski's pursuit of 
normalisation and a tacit security alliance with China appeared to validate conservative 
accusations hypocrisy, since it appeared that the White House was punishing some Asian 
allies, such as the Philippines and South Korea, over human rights concerns even as it 
ignored China's much poorer record. Cyrus Vance, in distinction to Brzezinski, agreed 
with the Congressional conviction that the American relationship with China was limited 
in some important areas due to the complete lack of human rights protections in China.533 
Oksenberg and Holbrooke did meet with some key Members in order to get a feel 
for attitudes toward normalisation. In early May, Oksenberg lunched with Scoop Jackson 
and reported that primarily due to Jackson's belief that ties with China were of great 
benefit to Washington in its competition with Moscow, he remained supportive of 
normalisation. Oksenberg found that Jackson 'seems willing to play a leading role in 
Congress in generating the support necessary for such a move', as long as 'an adequate 
531 House  floor statement by Paul Simon, 6 June 1977, Congressional Record. 
532 Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 'The Taiwan Lobby and Its Significance', 29 July 1977, NSA, 
Brzezinski Materials, Subject Files, Box 41, Carter Library.  
533 Memcon between Cyrus Vance and Senators Abraham Ribicoff, Sam Nunn, Adlai Stevenson, and 
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substitute for the Defense Treaty with Taiwan can be arranged'.534 Over the next year, 
however, Jackson's continuing disenchantment with Carter's approach to the Soviet Union 
limited his willingness to work with the Administration to advance the cause of 
normalisation.535 
Throughout 1977 and 1978, Congress continued to express its concern, which had 
been consistently expressed since 1973, that the Executive Branch would move to meet 
Chinese terms for normalisation, leaving Taiwan vulnerable. Now it began to emphasise 
that any change of China policy must be taken only after consultation with Congress, and 
that the Administration must attempt to build a consensus behind an approach to 
normalisation that had broad support. Shortly after Oksenberg's meeting with Jackson, 
Clement Zablocki, now chairman of the House International Relations Committee, gave a 
major address on China policy in which he emphasised the need to build a 'broad 
consensus on the major outlines of our strategy and goals', and that if a fully normalised 
relationship were to be successful in the long term, 'it needs to have broad bipartisan 
support'.536 Zablocki called on the Administration to consult with Congress, warning that 
precipitate action would 'set off a bitter debate and undermine policy before it is set'.537 
Zablocki's warning appears prescient in light of subsequent events. 
Administration policy toward normalisation began to take shape with Presidential 
Review Memorandum (PRM) 24, a broad Administration study of options with regard to 
normalisation that was commissioned in April 1977 and completed that summer. The 
study listed four options for normalisation: 1) acquiescence to Beijing's demands and 
534 Far East to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 11 May 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, Subject Files, Box 41, 
Carter Library.  
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cutting all formal ties with Taiwan, 2) recognition of China while retaining diplomatic 
and military ties with Taiwan, 3) a unilateral effort on Washington's part, during which 
Washington would gradually reduce ties with Taipei on its own terms, and 4) continue all 
diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan while simultaneously pursuing a military 
relationship with China. The Presidential Review Committee unanimously recommended 
the first option.538 Members of Congress were aware that the study was being undertaken 
and were intensely curious as to its conclusions, but its recommendations were tightly 
held. The only thing that Members could do was to watch for signs from the 
Administration that would give them some clue as to which direction policy was going. 
Administration actions during the summer of 1977 indicated to Members that their 
concerns were being ignored, which further increased Congressional nervousness. 
Carter's commencement address at Notre Dame University on 22 May, in which 
he said that the relationship with China was 'a central element in our global policy' and 
spoke of the intention to complete normalisation, sparked fears again in Congress that 
some Administration action on China was imminent, despite the lack of consultations.539 
A month later, as a preliminary draft of PRM-24 had been completed, Vance gave an 
address billed as a major statement of Administration foreign policy, in which he 
reiterated Carter's statement of intent to complete the normalisation process. Troubling 
from the perspective of many Members was Vance's statement that, 'We acknowledge the 
view expressed in the Shanghai Communiqué that there is but one China'.540 While this 
wasn't technically a concession, merely an acknowledgement of China's view, many 
Members did not see it that way, and being unaware of the extent of Vance's sympathy 
538 Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 'China Policy Review:Recent Developments', July 1977, NSA, 
Staff Material, Far East, Box 4, Carter Library. 
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with their views, feared the worst. The next day, Carter held a news conference in which 
he expressed the hope that Vance's trip would lead to an agreement resulting in full 
normalisation.541 Conservative Republicans and Democrats immediately expressed 
concern that the Administration might be planning to cut ties with Taiwan.542 
The Administration also revealed in June that Vance would visit China in late 
August, which elicited worried expressions from Capitol Hill that the Administration not 
betray Taiwan and recapitulations of the arguments that caution be used in approaching 
normalisation.543 When PRM-24 was discussed by the Policy Review Committee in late 
June, Vance and Holbrooke raised several Congressional concerns that they believed the 
Administration should address, noting that 'the Congressional role in normalization will 
be important'.544 Vance suggested that 'Congress should be brought openly into the issue 
before his trip', but David Aaron, the assistant national security advisor, retorted that 
confiding in Congress would be 'premature'.545 Congress, therefore, was told nothing, with 
the result that its fears continued to grow about what was occurring behind closed doors. 
David Aaron's disposition against including Congress in the normalisation process 
reflected the attitude of both Brzezinski and Carter. In late July, in preparation for Vance's 
trip, Brzezinski wrote a memo to Carter warning him that Taiwan and Taiwan's friends in 
Congress were 'actively campaigning to derail recognition'.546 The memo reflected 
Brzezinski's perception of Congress as an obstacle to be bypassed, and played on that 
sentiment within Carter. Brzezinski went on to outline some of the arguments being made 
541 President's press conference, 30 June 1977, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Jimmy 
Carter, 1977-1981. 
542 House floor statement by John Ashbrook, 12 July 1977, Congressional Record. 
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by Taiwan and its Congressional supporters against cutting ties with Taipei,  stressing that 
Taiwan's supporters in Congress were not as powerful as some in the Administration 
feared, and concluding that, 'The Taiwan Lobby does not constitute a major obstacle to 
normalization. The real issue concerns our willingness to grasp this thorny issue at a time 
that is strategically and politically advantageous to us'.547 [Emphasis in the original.]
As this memo makes clear, Brzezinski saw Congress as an obstacle to 
normalisation with China that had as its primary goal the gaining of leverage over the 
Soviet Union. Brzezisnki's estimation that Congressional supporters of Taiwan would be 
unable to stop normalisation was accurate. However, the memo is also revealing for what 
it says about how greatly the White House misunderstood attitudes in Congress toward 
normalisation. Although a very small minority among conservatives was opposed to 
normalisation, the vast majority of Congress supported it. As will be seen, even arch-
conservatives such as Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Lester Wolff, who was 
very close to Taipei, supported the goal of normalisation with China provided US-Taiwan 
relations remained close and an adequate substitute was found to the Mutual Defense 
Treaty to ensure Taiwan's security. Brzezinski under-estimated the breadth of support 
within Congress for Taiwan's security, as shown by his dismissive statement, 'The ROC is 
good at using mirrors to make us think they have a constituency'.548 Although Carter and 
Brzezinski, if they had had an accurate understanding of each of these points, were still 
likely to have attempted to bypass Congress rather than to work with it due to their 
personal inclinations, the factors illustrated above are evidence that space did exist within 
which the White House could have worked with Congress in an attempt to reach a 
consensus on normalisation. Its decision not to do so was not borne out of necessity, but 
547 ibid.
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personal inclination. 
During the summer of 1977 the White House continued to ignore repeated 
warnings from key Members that normalisation not occur at the cost of ties with Taiwan. 
John Sparkman, Fulbright's successor as SFRC chairman, visited Taipei and issued a 
strong statement in favour of retaining ties with Taiwan. Intentionally signalling the 
Administration prior to Vance's trip, Sparkman publicly promised Taipei that Washington, 
'will not alter its relations with the Republic of China' as it considered formulas for 
normalisation with Beijing, and declaring that 'it is both unwise and unnecessary' to 
accept Beijing's normalisation terms.549 Howard Baker, Hugh Scott's successor as Senate 
Minority Leader, also advocated such a position on the Senate floor and in speeches 
around the country during the summer of 1977.550 
As Vance's trip neared, Congressional warnings increased. Senator Bob Dole 
reminded the Administration of the oft-repeated Congressional expectation that no 
normalisation agreement be reached in the absence of Chinese 'assurances of a 
peaceful resolution' of the Taiwan issue.551 The strongest statements, as usual, came 
from Barry Goldwater, who reprised the threat he had made to Gerald Ford the 
previous year, and threatened Carter with impeachment should he attempt to 
unilaterally abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty, arguing that Carter did not have the 
constitutional authority to do so without Senate approval.552 Conservatives also 
noted the pressures on China from the Soviet Union and the Chinese need for trade 
and US and Western technology, arguing that the Administration should use this 
549 Quoted by Allan Brownfeld,  'We Must Not Sell Out Taiwan', Lima News (Georgia), 18 July 1977; read 
into the Congressional Record by Representative Larry McDonald on 28 July 1977. 
550 Senate floor statement by Howard Baker, 2 August 1977, Congressional Record. 
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552 See 'Goldwater Warns on Taiwan Treaty', Reuters, 27 August 1977; and Barry Goldwater, 'Abrogating 
Treaties', New York Times, 11 October 1977.
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leverage to demand concessions from Beijing due to the fact that 'it is the Chinese 
mainland that stands to gain by a more formal relationship with the US'.553 In the 
absence of communication regarding the negotiating position that would be pursued 
by Vance, Congressional suspicions continued to be shaped by the signals that 
emanated from the Administration, which Congress saw was a conscious distancing 
of the Administration from Taipei. Congressman Larry McDonald's (D-GA) question 
was representative: 'If we are not preparing to abandon Taiwan, what is the purpose 
of such actions?'554 
Members would have been surprised and heartened had they known that 
Vance's negotiating position sought to address Congressional concerns. Vance told 
the Chinese that he and Carter had determined 'that we must be partners with 
Congress in both the formulation and the implementation of foreign policy'.555 And 
since Congress, while supporting normalisation, would not accept it on Beijing's 
terms, Beijing would need to compromise.556 Vance then offered the same 
negotiating position that had previously been suggested by both Scoop Jackson and 
Henry Kissinger, and firmly rejected – that the Chinese allow Washington to 
maintain official representation in the form of a Liaison Office in Taipei, just as they 
now had in Beijing. Vance also asked the Chinese to soften their militant rhetoric on 
the forceful reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland, appealing to the impact of 
this rhetoric on Congressional and public support for normalisation.557 Vance's 
consistent positions in internal Administration discussions are evidence that he was 
not merely using Congress as a bargaining lever in his negotiations with Beijing. 
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Further commending this negotiating position, however, was the fact that his visit 
coincided with the beginning of a bruising Senate battle over the Panama Canal 
Treaty, which foreclosed the Administration's ability to undertake any other 
controversial foreign policy initiative that required legislative action, as de-
recognition of Taiwan certainly would, until well into 1978.558 
The Chinese were not receptive to Vance's offer and appeal to domestic 
political factors, just as they had not been when such proposals had been made 
previously.559 They also viewed Vance, whose priority was completing the SALT II 
negotiations with the Soviets, as being overly-sympathetic to Moscow – just as they 
had perceived Kissinger to be.560 Deng Xiaoping, who had just returned from his 
most recent political purging but had not yet consolidated his position in Beijing, 
angrily rejected the offer as a renunciation of Ford's promises made in December 
1975. 
Upon the failure of Vance's trip, Oksenberg expressed concern that 
normalisation may not be politically possible since the Chinese were sticking to 
their militantly expressed demands regarding Taiwan, and Congressional and public 
opposition seemed to foreclose Carter's ability to accept those demands.561 The 
situation contributed to Oksenberg being in sympathy with Brzezinski and Carter's 
perception of Congress as an obstacle. This was particularly the case given the high 
value Oksenberg, like Brzezinski, placed on the strategic value of improved 
relations with China. Oksenberg complained to Brzezinski, 'One wishes that we 
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could legally obtain more information about the activities of the Taiwan Lobby'.562 
Congress continued to send signals that autumn of its expectation to be consulted 
prior to any change of policy. During September and October 1977 the House 
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, chaired by Lester Wolff, held a series of 
hearings which examined the broader implications of normalisation for 'our policy 
throughout Asia, as well as with the Soviet Union'. Wolff emphasised that the hearings 
were meant to examine methods with which normalisation might take place, possible 
formulas that allowed continued close relations with Taiwan, broader implications for 
America's foreign policy, etc., but not whether normalisation should take place.563 That 
issue was treated as having been settled, even by someone known to be as strongly 
supportive of Taiwan as was Wolff, illustrating that Congressional opposition was not to 
the goal of normalisation but to the manner in which it might take place. Just as 
importantly, Wolff emphasised that giving Congress a voice in the normalisation process 
would result in a much less contentious China policy. He wrote in the forward to the 
hearing report that 'It is my hope that these hearings . . . will help . . . avoid the divisive 
sort of debate presently taking place on the Panama Canal, where a fait accompli of sorts 
has created uncertainty and mistrust'.564 The White House continued to ignore these 
repeated warnings. 
Although it was clear to Congress that Vance's trip had failed to produce any 
movement toward normalisation, with little information flowing from the Administration, 
Members had to continue to hunt for signals of its intentions. Clement Zablocki had 
gained intelligence that the NSC had helped to write a recent speech given by Ted 
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Kennedy calling for normalisation on Beijing's terms.565 Accordingly, Zablocki sought a 
meeting with Oksenberg in late September to discover whether Kennedy's recent speech 
reflected the results of PRM-24 and, hence, White House policy. Oksenberg denied 
collaboration with Kennedy on his speech, and told Zablocki that, although he had seen a 
draft of Kennedy's speech as a Kennedy staff member had asked him to do so in order 'to 
check it for accuracy' - 'This I would do for any Congressman or Senator, no matter what 
positions were represented in the speech'.566 After Oksenberg's denial, Zablocki asked to 
see a copy of the completed study (PRM-24)  in order to understand how the 
Administration was approaching the issue of normalisation. Oksenberg demurred, instead 
summarising the four options outlined in the study and telling him that 'we had not 
selected from among the options, but were still in the process of exploring ways we could 
improve our relations with the PRC'.567 
Oksenberg was less than honest on both counts, which Zablocki likely realised 
given Oksenberg's refusal to let him view PRM-24. While it was technically true that the 
Administration had not formally committed itself to the first option – that of acquiescing 
to Beijing's demands, it was also true that the Presidential Review Committee had 
unanimously supported that option.568 Only the timing was undetermined, in terms of 
when the Administration believed it would have a window of opportunity in the midst of 
its other foreign policy objectives that required Congressional action. Regarding White 
House collaboration with Kennedy, Zablocki's suspicions were also correct. Oksenberg 
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met regularly with Kennedy and/or his foreign policy aide, Jan Kalicki, and privately 
referred to Kennedy as 'a spearcarrier on China policy for the Administration from the 
very offset'.569 
The White House was attempting to use a very limited number of liberal Senators, 
including Kennedy and Alan Cranston, to attempt to push Congressional opinion in the 
direction of acceptance of Beijing's normalisation terms. This was not a very effective 
method of shaping Congressional opinion since conservatives, whose concerns most 
needed addressed, were not likely to be swayed by speeches by Senate liberals, and 
moderates, too, were reticent to cut ties with Taiwan and not likely to be convinced by 
liberal advocacy for that course of action. What was needed was presidential lobbying 
aimed at convincing conservatives and moderates that the Administration would ensure 
Taiwan's future security, and that relations between the United States and Taiwan, even if 
unofficial, would remain close. 
Unfortunately, Carter had placed himself in a position from which his lobbying of 
Congress in this way, even had he been inclined to do so, was not likely to have been 
effective. His consistent demonstration of ambivalence toward Capitol Hill had alienated 
much of Congress. Also, conservatives, moderates and even some liberals were sceptical 
of his leadership, as demonstrated by the extreme difficulty in gaining passage of the 
Panama Canal Treaty and the doubts that most political observers had that the SALT II 
treaty would pass the Senate even prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.570 
Whereas the White House was unwilling to attempt to address Congressional 
concerns, Deng Xiaoping, aware that Congressional reticence had been a key factor 
slowing progress toward normalisation, attempted to lower Congressional opposition 
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beginning in early 1978. Alan Cranston, together with Kennedy one of the few liberal 
Senators with whom the White House had good relations,571 had been chosen by the NSC 
to lead a joint delegation of the SFRC and the House International Relations Committee 
to China in January 1978.572 Fortuitously, Cranston's trip came at a time when Deng 
Xiaoping was beginning to consolidate his position in Beijing, and attempting to soften 
Chinese rhetoric regarding the forceful 'liberation' of Taiwan which had been so dominant 
since 1974. Cranston's delegation was the first to note this change of tone. Deng 
expressed his 'hopes that the “reunification” of China would be peaceful and in the distant 
future', which message Brzezinski reported to Carter as a hopeful sign.573 
Simultaneous with this signal, Brzezinski began pushing that Carter send him to 
Beijing to begin normalisation talks, placing the issue in the context of worsening 
relations with Moscow.574 Shortly afterwards, Kennedy gave another Senate speech 
advocating normalisation that was meant to support movement in that direction by the 
Administration.575 That March, the NSC sketched out a potential strategy, with a 
calculating eye toward how to use increasing tensions with Moscow to overcome  
objections from conservatives. Michael Armacost, who together with Oksenberg was 
responsible for East Asia policy at the NSC, argued that, 'Politically, the time is ripe for 
this. Rapid normalisation is more palatable when the Soviets are acting up'.576 Armacost's 
analysis, while correctly estimating that conservatives understood the strategic value of 
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improving relations with China, miscalculated that this appreciation would result in a 
willingness to cut ties with Taiwan. Also, the memo did not suggest an attempt to ease 
concerns regarding Taiwan's future security, but seemed to assume that such concerns 
could be ignored and emphasis on the anti-Soviet aspects of normalisation would be 
sufficient to gain conservative support. 
The strategic rationale behind closer relations with China was understood and 
appreciated by conservatives, moderates, and liberals, but few believed it to outweigh 
considerations of national credibility and the practical consideration of how to ensure 
Taiwan's future security.577 Additionally, conservatives believed that the military pressure 
on China was far greater than that faced by the United States, and that, therefore, Beijing 
had far more to gain by normalisation than did Washington and should show some 
willingness to compromise.578 The NSC, given its belief in the over-riding importance of 
the strategic benefits of normalisation to the United States, found it hard to believe that 
conservatives would not be swayed by the strategic logic they believed to be so 
persuasive. And unlike Nixon, who had overseen a lobbying effort to convince 
conservatives (although disingenuously) that he would continue to protect Taiwan, there 
is no evidence that the Carter White House sought to address such concerns. 
Beginning the previous November, Brzezinski had gradually gained Carter's 
permission to take control of China policy from the State Department, and by late 
February had gained his permission to travel to China to attempt to start normalisation 
negotiations. Soviet aggressiveness also helped Brzezinski to convince Carter that 
normalisation should be pursued as a means of moderating Soviet behaviour.579 He 
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travelled to China with a negotiating position now supported by Vance that recanted 
Vance's earlier request to retain a liaison office in Taipei, and for the first time confirmed 
Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford's earlier concessions. Brzezinski's talks with Deng set off 
several months of talks in Beijing which the Administration sought to keep secret. 
Their suspicions aroused by Brzezinski's trip, Members continued to worry about 
Administration intentions over the coming months. Even most conservatives favoured 
normalisation. As Michael Armacost had correctly noted, conservatives supported the 
idea that closer relations with China would send a signal to Moscow. As Howard Baker 
wrote to a conservative Senate colleague, 'advantages do accrue to the US from improved 
relations with Peking'.580 The future security of Taiwan continued to be a sticking point, 
however. Even arch-conservative Republican Senator Jesse Helms appreciated the 
strategic logic and was willing to support normalisation 'provided we can remain 
confident that Taiwan's security will not be effected'.581 Other conservatives had 
communicated the same attitude to the White House. Space existed for the Administration 
to work with conservatives and others who shared these concerns, despite their distrust of 
Carter's foreign policy in general, to win their support for normalisation by convincing 
them that Taiwan's security would not be put at risk. Such an effort would also have met 
Congress's expectation that it be consulted and made part of the normalisation process. 
The White House made no such effort, and Carter and Brzezinski kept the 
negotiations secret. Nevertheless, the watchful Congress saw more signals that the 
Administration continued to distance itself from Taiwan. Noticing this, Vance reiterated 
his belief that consensus must be built before any movement on normalisation, arguing 
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for 'the fundamental importance of advance consultations . . . with the top congressional 
leadership'.582 He was again rebuffed. 
While concrete information regarding the normalisation negotiations in Beijing 
did not leak, unconfirmed reports reached Capitol Hill that the Administration was 
planning a major shift in China policy without consulting Congress. Fearing that the 
Administration would attempt to unilaterally abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty without 
Senate action, Senators Bob Dole and Richard Stone (D-FL), a member of the 
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, authored an amendment to the 
International Security Assistance Act of 1978 that legally required the Administration to 
consult with the Senate prior to making any changes that would alter the defence 
agreement with Taiwan. A bipartisan group of eighteen senators co-sponsored the 
amendment. Jan Kalicki, Ted Kennedy's aide, gave Okenberg advanced warning of the 
planned amendment, which allowed Oksenberg to work with Kennedy, Cranston, and 
John Glenn to water it down so that it no longer represented a legally binding requirement 
but simply an expression of Senate expectation.583 This was, nevertheless, only a partial 
victory for the White House, as the resolution passed unanimously, indicating that even 
such White House allies as Kennedy and Cranston expected that the Senate's institutional 
prerogatives be recognised and that it be consulted. 
Conservatives in the House introduced a total of nine resolutions during 1977 and 
1978 (four of them authored by Democrats) expressing the expectation that relations with 
Taiwan remain close and that Taiwan's future security be ensured. Although the White 
House ignored these Congressional expressions, the Chinese took a very different 
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approach than did the White House, attempting to address these concerns. Deng's 
consolidation of power had provided him with a more firm political position from which 
he could moderate the militant rhetoric employed by the Chinese since 1974, and he had 
been attempting to do so since Cranston's delegation had visited in January. 
In July, as Leonard Woodcock had begun a series of presentations to the Chinese 
on the Administration's proposal for normalisation, Deng chose a visiting delegation of 
House Members led by Lester Wolff to send a message both to Congress and the 
Administration that Beijing was for the first time prepared to show some flexibility on the 
issue of Taiwan. Wolff, along with many of his colleagues, were known to be highly 
sympathetic to Taipei, making them the perfect audience for such a gesture. Wolff had 
spent the past several years hiring staff with China expertise and building bridges to the 
appropriate offices within the State Department in order to increase his ability to shape 
China policy.584 There is little evidence that his efforts were succeeding, however, until his 
delegation's conversation with Deng turned to the issue of Taiwan's future. 
Wolff's delegation had requested, as virtually all CoDel's did, to meet with China's 
top leadership. China's leadership viewed House Members as less important in the 
American political firmament than were Senators, however, and such requests usually 
went unfulfilled.585 To the surprise of all involved, from the delegation itself to their 
Chinese handlers, the request for a meeting with Deng was suddenly granted.586 Deng first 
addressed the strategic rationale for normalisation, asserting that the mere fact of 
normalisation would give Moscow pause.587 Then, after rejecting Wolff's suggestion that 
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the Japanese formula would not work for the United States and that Washington needed to 
retain an official presence on Taiwan, Deng laid out a quid pro quo. 
In exchange for Washington taking a tougher stand on the Soviet Union and for its 
agreement not to recognise Vietnam, which Beijing saw as part of the Soviet attempt to 
encircle China, Deng offered a compromise on Taiwan. Referring to the history of past 
collaboration between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalists, Deng 
suggested that cooperation between the two sides remained possible, implying a 
negotiated reunification based upon a 'united front'. Deng also would ensure that Chinese 
leaders no longer spoke of 'liberating' Taiwan by force and, while Beijing could not make 
a public declaration that it would renounce the potential for military force, it would 
announce that it would do all in its power to ensure that the eventual unification of 
Taiwan with the mainland was peaceful.588 Deng emphasised that the delegation was to 
publicly announce his offer, indicating that he was seeking to use the Congressional 
propensity to leak to the press in his favour in order to impact American public opinion.589 
590 
The news of this offered compromise was welcomed both at the State 
Department and the White House.591 This Chinese effort to compromise evidenced 
Deng's understanding of the constraining influence which Congressional and US 
public opinion had had upon Washington's ability to move forward in the 
transcripts of the meeting were taken by USLO staff who took part in the meeting with the delegation. 
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normalisation process. It was ironic that, although the White House had done little to 
address Congressional fears regarding Taiwan's security and to build a case for 
normalisation through dialogue with Members, Deng attempted to do so by 
addressing their fears on Taiwan and arguing for the strategic benefits of 
normalisation. 
While Deng's outreach did not erase Congressional fears or reduce Members' 
determination to provide for Taiwan's security, it did serve to lessen their mistrust of 
Beijing's intentions.592 The  delegation was so impressed by Deng's compromising 
tone and offer that they titled their trip report 'A New Realism'. The report 
recommended that the Administration explore the new Chinese attitude, but also 
repeated the admonition that the Administration needed to demonstrate 'full 
cooperation with Congress regarding its normalisation plans and policies'.593 
The Administration did not follow Deng's example of attempting to address 
Congressional concerns, but did turn to a high profile Republican to assist them in 
their attempt to get around Congress when the normalisation negotiations reached a 
denouement. As normalisation talks progressed, the Administration sought 
confidential advice from Herbert Brownell, who had served as Attorney General in 
the Eisenhower Administration, on how to terminate the mutual security treaty in a 
way calculated to allow the Senate as little grounds for complaint as possible. State 
Department lawyers argued that Senate approval for treaty abrogation was not 
necessary because once Carter had withdrawn diplomatic recognition from Taiwan, 
it would no longer have the legal status of a state, thereby automatically nullifying 
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the security treaty.594 Brownell, too, concluded that Senate consent was technically 
not needed, but advised that the Administration terminate the treaty in compliance 
with its provisions, by giving one year's notice to Taipei, so as to minimise as much 
as possible Congressional anger.595 Brownell's advice proved useful to the White 
House, which followed his suggestion when normalisation was announced, but the 
Administration's use of Brownell also came close to breaking the veil of secrecy 
when a TIME Magazine journalist discovered why Brownell was being consulted. 
With secrecy difficult to sustain, by mid December, just days before Carter 
expected to make a public announcement, Vance, Holbrooke, and Warren Christopher, 
Deputy Secretary of State, all advocated bringing Congressional leaders into their 
confidence. Vance argued that it would be a needless insult to continue to hide from 
Congress the fact that such an important policy shift was about to occur, particularly 
when Congress had so clearly and repeatedly expressed its expectation to be consulted. 
Oksenberg and Brzezinski disagreed and convinced Carter that the risks of giving 
Taiwan's supporters a chance to scuttle normalisation, even at this late date, was far 
greater than the risk of Congressional anger at learning that they had been cut out of the 
decision.596 
In addition to its argument for Congressional consultation, the State Department 
challenged  Brzezinski over the terms of the emerging agreement, being convinced that 
those terms would not meet even Congress's minimum concerns. The State Department, 
from which Brzezinski and Oksenberg had hid the cables from Beijing for a brief but 
crucial period near the end of the negotiations, was brought back into the loop to discover 
that there was no clear statement of Chinese understanding that Washington would 
594 Vance, Hard Choices, p.77. 
595 Tyler, A Great Wall, p.258; Tucker, Strait Talk, pp.104-5. 
596 Vance, Hard Choices, p.118. 
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continue to sell defensive weapons to Taipei. Particularly with the absence of a Chinese 
pledge to not use force, they argued, Congress would never support the agreement if such 
a statement were not made explicit, and that would scuttle normalisation. Brzezinski was 
prepared to ignore their protest until a brief discussion with the head of the Chinese 
Liaison Office made it clear that the Chinese, too, had understood that Washington had 
agreed to permanently cease all arms sales to Taiwan.597 A heated last-minute meeting in 
Beijing between Deng and Leonard Woodcock achieved grudging Chinese acceptance of 
continuing arms sales.598 
As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker has noted, everyone knew normalisation was 
coming at some point in the not too distant future.599 However, an announcement at 
that point had been unexpected, partially due to the fact that the Congress had 
recessed for Christmas and would need to act quickly to provide the legal 
framework for continuing economic and cultural relations with Taiwan in the 
absence of diplomatic relations, and also because Congress believed that it had 
received a commitment from the Administration that it would consult Congress prior 
to making a decision.600 When Carter had asked John Glenn to come to the White 
House on 15 December to be briefed about an undefined, imminent presidential 
announcement, his aide, Carl Ford, suggested that the announcement might be about 
normalisation. Glenn replied, 'That's impossible – the Administration has not 
consulted with us on a change of China policy yet!'601 Also making it unexpected for 
Glenn was the fact that he had visited Carter in the White House the previous day in 
597 Memcon between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Chai Zemin, 15 December 1978, Vertical Files, China, MR-
NLC-98-2(5)(3) through Concorde, Airplane, Box 41, Carter Library. 
598 Interview with Stapleton Roy, 21 September 2009, Washington, D.C. 
599 Tucker, Strait Talk, p.100. 
600 Congress and the Nation, Vol. V, 1977-1980:  A Review of Government and Politics (Washington, D.C., 
1981), p.377.
601 Interview with Carl Ford, Senator Glenn's aide for policy towards China on the Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, 9 September 2009, Tyson's Corner, Virginia. 
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order to discuss Senate debate on the SALT II Treaty, and the President knew that 
Glenn would be travelling to China in early January, yet had mentioned nothing.602 
In the House of Representatives, likewise, neither Clement Zablocki nor Lester 
Wolff had any awareness that such a decision was pending.603 The manner in which 
Carter and Brzezinski managed the process and the announcement angered even 
Administration supporters, who felt that Carter had openly slighted Congress, and 
ignited a political backlash as Vance had predicted.604
Although there was some liberal praise for the secret initiative605, far more 
noticeable were expressions of anger at the complete lack of consultations. 
Congressional leaders were informed of the decision at a meeting in the White 
House an hour prior to Carter's nationally-televised address. Brzezinski made a brief 
appearance at the meeting out of necessity, then left as quickly as possible so as not 
to be made a target of Congressional scorn.606 Following President Carter's brief 
announcement to the Congressmen and Senators, Zablocki, his anger evident, asked, 
'Would it be fair to say that what we've just heard are the “consultations” that you 
promised? Is this it?'607 Zablocki's personal notes on the announcement, made the 
next day, sum up well the Congressional reaction, which was strikingly uniform, and 
illustrate why the creation of a new domestic political consensus regarding China 
policy remained out of reach. Zablocki confided in his diary his impression that 
Carter was determined to pursue normalisation 'at any cost', and that Carter had 
'caved in to all the demanded conditions of the PRC'. Zablocki's private venting 
602 Frank Moore to Jimmy Carter, 14 December 1978, WHOCL, Box 18, Carter Library; Interview with 
Carl Ford. 
603 Interviews with Lester Wolff. 
604 'Old China Debate Flares', New York Times, 17 December 1978. 
605 Press release by office of Senator Harrison Williams, 15 December 1978, WHOCL, Box 219, Carter 
Library. 
606 Interview with Walter Mondale. 
607 ibid.
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reflected the myriad concerns that were so prominent within Congress, not just 
about the Administration's lack of consultation, but also regarding the expectation 
that abrogation of the defence treaty opened Taiwan to eventual takeover by Beijing, 
and the impact of this move on American credibility.608 
These concerns, and anger at what was perceived to be an act of contempt for 
Congress as an institution, crossed partisan and ideological boundaries, and none 
believed that Taiwan's future security had been provided for. Members as diverse as 
John Glenn, Howard Baker, Thomas Eagleton, Barry Goldwater, Joe Biden, Jacob 
Javits, Clifford Case and Harry Byrd, Jr., in the Senate, and Clement Zablocki, 
Lester Wolff and Minority Leader John Rhodes, in the House, all expressed their 
anger, distrust, and in some cases, sense of betrayal, both privately to the White 
House and publicly.609 The most forceful response was that of Barry Goldwater and 
a bipartisan group of twenty four other Members, who filed a lawsuit in federal 
court asking that the judicial branch declare unconstitutional Carter's unilateral 
action abrogating the defence treaty.610 Five days after the announcement, 
Oksenberg, in an understatement, reported to Brzezinski that the Congressional 
reaction had been 'more difficult than expected'.611 The overwhelming dynamic in 
the face of Carter's announcement was a sense of institutional aggrievement and a 
bipartisan conviction that Congress needed to step in and ensure Taiwan's future 
security. 
608 Personal notes by Clement Zablocki, 16 December 1978, Series FA-3.1, Box 2, Clement Zablocki 
Papers. 
609 Howard Baker to Jimmy Carter, 18 December 1978, WHOCL, Box 219, Carter Library; Bennett to 
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Vance had been correct when he later wrote that the risk of offending Congress 
had far outweighed the risk of a leak.612 Carter and Brzezinski had incorrectly believed the 
opposite to be the case. History had repeated itself, and once again, a White House had 
used secrecy to micromanage a process that led to closer relations with China in pursuit 
of strategic goals with disregard for the negative repercussions of their choices. This time 
the White House in question, due to the personality and inclinations of the President and 
his national security advisor, had not made an effort to ensure that Congressional support 
was sufficient to secure the success of their course of action. The White House had 
succeeded in forcing the completion of the normalisation process, but the manner in 
which it had done so had resulted in a relationship lacking the consensus that was needed 
to ensure solid footing for the future and instead ensured continuing conflict, both 
between Washington and Beijing and between the Administration and Congress. 
Shifting Strategic Perceptions and a Tilt Toward with China 
When Jimmy Carter took office in January 1977 the domestic political scene was 
characterised by widely divergent views of the international security environment. A 
substantial portion of the American public was growing increasingly sceptical that US-
Soviet détente was beneficial to the United States, and the political right, as well as many 
moderates and liberals, saw a security environment that was continuing to deteriorate 
before what looked like an unrelenting Soviet bid for military and geopolitical superiority. 
The new President, on the other hand, initially believed the security environment to be 
relatively benign. His commencement address at Notre Dame University on 22 May 
1977, in which he declared a determination to normalise with China, deplored 'an 
inordinate fear of communism' within American politics.613 This, and many other signals 
612 Vance, Hard Choices, p.118. 
613  Department of State Bulletin, 13 June 1977, p.625. 
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early in his Administration, including appointments to key positions with relevance to 
national security and arms control negotiations with the Soviets, led to the widespread 
opinion among not just conservatives, but also many Democratic Congressional leaders, 
that Carter held an overly-benign view of the strategic environment.614 
Although Carter had narrowly defeated Ford in 1976, several important 
Congressional races, particularly in the Senate, replaced more liberal Republicans with 
conservatives. This ideological shift, coming just over a year after Congressional 
attention had begun to be paid to the issue of potential Sino-American security 
cooperation, would have an impact on Congressional attitudes toward the development of 
a security relationship with China by increasing the number of Senators who were not 
concerned that such ties would offend Moscow. A trend within Congress toward greater 
support for defence spending and a harder line on the Soviet Union had begun in 1975 
with the loss of Southeast Asia and the faltering of détente, and was reinforced by the 
continued degeneration of détente and of US public support for it at the end of the decade. 
The views of moderate and even some liberal Senators had been evolving due to the 
above dynamics, and continued to do so in 1977 and 1978. As one example, Edward 
Brooke explained in March 1977 that 'changed strategic circumstances' had caused him 
'as well as others to review previous positions advocated in the late 1960's and early 
1970's'.615 Writing to a constituent a few weeks later, Brooke concluded that, given the 
geostrategic trends, the United States 'can no longer afford to show unilateral restraint as 
it has for the past decade'.616 
614  Frank Moore to Jimmy Carter, 16 February 1977, WHOCL, Box 24, Carter Library. 
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The political right had always been convinced that the Soviet threat was an 
existential threat which needed to be met with all of the resources at Washington's 
disposal. Conservatives were now being joined by many moderates. Those who took a 
more benign view of Soviet intentions, including Carter and Vance, believed, as had 
Nixon and Kissinger, that an interlocking network of legal agreements would give 
Moscow a greater stake in the existing global order. These assumptions highlighted a key 
factor in the debate over Sino-American security ties, which was the issue of whether or 
not the Soviet Union and China each remained revolutionary powers or were becoming 
status quo powers. Vance and, initially, Carter, believed that the Soviet Union was 
becoming a status quo power, a view that was shared by many Congressional liberals, 
including Ted Kennedy, Alan Cranston and Adlai Stevenson. From this assumption came 
the belief that détente should be reinvigorated and that the development of military ties 
with China would be counterproductive. 
Brzezinski was the most forceful advocate within the Administration of the belief 
that the Soviet Union remained a revolutionary power, and was joined in his advocacy by 
Michael Oksenberg and General William Odom, Brzezinski's military assistant at the 
NSC.617 Congressional conservatives shared this assumption, believing that Soviet 
behaviour was aggressive in any case and that the only thing that constrained Moscow 
was forceful action.618 The difference in assumptions in 1977 between Vance, Carter and 
most Congressional liberals on the one hand, and Brzezinski and Congressional 
conservatives, moderates and a few liberals on the other, regarding whether the Soviet 
Union remained a revolutionary power or was becoming a status quo power, shaped each 
group's strategic perceptions and attitude toward the relationship with China. Another 
617  Oral History Interview with General William Odom, 18 February 1982, Miller Center Interviews,  
 Research Room Copy, Box 3, Carter Library. 
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area of dispute was over the effectiveness of American attempts to influence Chinese and 
Soviet behaviour, respectively, and estimations on how policy toward one would affect 
the behaviour of the other. 
Three general schools of thought existed within both the Executive Branch and 
Congress in relation to the 'China card'. The one with the fewest adherents held that Sino-
American relations had little impact on the Soviet Union. The US ability to gain leverage 
over Moscow through increasingly close relations with Beijing, therefore, was not likely 
to have any effect, and by the same token closer Sino-American relations would do little 
to harm US-Soviet détente. The other two schools of thought each believed that Sino-
American relations did, indeed, influence Soviet behaviour, yet each came to the opposite 
conclusion regarding the proper course of action. One side contended that the United 
States should seek to use its relations with Beijing to gain as much leverage as possible 
over Moscow, while the other argued that the United States should be aware of the impact 
that policy toward one of the communist giants had on the other, but should not attempt to 
manipulate that dynamic in any way.  
In policy terms, this clash translated into a debate over whether the United States 
should be 'evenhanded' in its dealings with the Soviet Union and China. Those on the Hill 
who shared Vance's perspective opposed tilting toward China and favoured 
'evenhandedness' in American treatment of the two communist giants. When discussing 
possible sale of advanced technology, particularly technology or equipment that might 
have military application, liberals such as Alan Cranston, Ted Kennedy, Adlai Stevenson, 
and Abraham Ribicoff, in the Senate, and Lester Wolff, in the House, argued that this 
would be perceived as movement toward an anti-Soviet military alliance with Beijing and 
rejected the concept as one that would be likely to elicit a violently negative Soviet 
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reaction.619 
Although liberals continued to support Vance's positions, as relations with the 
Soviet Union continued to deteriorate in the winter, Carter himself became increasingly 
frustrated with the Soviets and more receptive to Brzezinski's appeals to move toward at 
least limited security cooperation with Beijing.620 Within Congress, although some 
liberals would remain reticent to move in the direction of leaning toward China in the 
area of trade policy or security cooperation, others began to increasingly doubt Soviet 
intentions and to show a greater willingness to use relations with China, albeit cautiously, 
to effect a positive change in Soviet behaviour. Throughout 1978, many liberals were 
becoming just as frustrated as were their moderates and conservative colleagues with 
Soviet behaviour and were asking the Administration to do something 'to clamp down on 
the Russians'.621 
Conservatives, although unanimous in their view that the Soviet Union remained a 
revolutionary power, were split over the issue of security ties with Beijing, dividing the 
second school of thought described above into two camps. The protective attitude held by 
conservatives toward Taiwan made many of them reticent to take any steps that might 
build China's national power and industrial and military capability, fearing that that new 
power might then be directed toward Taiwan.622  As relations with Moscow worsened and 
fear of growing Soviet power and lack of constraint on Moscow's part increased, attitudes 
began to shift. Yet Congressional concerns that the Carter Administration would not 
ensure Taiwan's security and future survival continued to act as a brake on wholehearted 
619 Interviews with Lester Wolff; Telephone interview with Adlai Stevenson, III; Interview with Arthur 
Houe. 
620 Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 11 April 1978, NSA, Staff Material–Far East, Armacost–Chron 
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621 Evans-Novak Political Report, 28 February 1978. 
622 House floor speech by Robert Lagomarsino, 19 April 1977, Congressional Record; House floor speech 
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conservative support for closer security ties with Beijing until normalisation and passage 
of the TRA ensured a strong Congressional role in this matter.623 A belief that China was 
evolving and leaving its Maoist past behind and becoming, in contrast with the Soviet 
Union, more supportive of the existing order, resulted from Deng Xiaoping's policy 
reforms beginning 1978 and also helped to lessen opposition to a closer cooperative 
relationship with China. 
The Congressional role in lending credibility to the idea that Sino-American 
security ties was a legitimate policy option, which had begun with publication of 
Pillsbury's Foreign Policy article in 1975, continued in 1977. Lester Wolff had chaired a 
series of hearings from late 1975 through mid 1976  that had examined some of the 
fundamental issues raised by the Sino-Soviet-American triangle and the possibility of 
military relations with China. In August 1977 he published a summary of those hearings 
and wrote an updated introduction that again addressed some of the vital questions that 
impinged upon whether Washington should seek closer cooperative relations with 
Beijing. Wolff did not reach any conclusions, as the purpose of the hearings and the report 
had been to spur debate, not necessarily to reach conclusions. Both the hearing report and 
communication among Members over these issues made clear, however, that Congress 
wanted to be involved in formulating policy in such an important area, and Wolff 
emphasised issues in his introduction that he believed were not getting adequate attention 
from executive branch officials.624 
One of the reasons that Wolff's hearings had been held was out of a belief that 
there had been no well-thought out policy within the Ford Administration that 
623 Richard McCormack to Cran Montgomery, Undated 1979, SENATE LEADERSHIP FILE, Box 12, 
Howard Baker Papers. 
624 'United States-Soviet Union-China: The Great Power Triangle', Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
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systematically considered US policy toward China in light of US-Soviet relations.625 One 
of the characteristics of the various Congressional hearings from 1975 onwards that 
touched on the security aspect of Sino-American relations was that most of them 
attempted to deal with these questions in a more holistic way than the pattern of debate 
within the Executive Branch indicates was the case there. Executive Branch decision-
making tended, under Nixon, Ford and Kissinger, to be characterised more by an ad hoc 
pattern – responding to crises with tactical moves, but not with an overarching strategic 
plan to guide decisions. There is more evidence, however, that in contrast with its 
predecessors, the Carter Administration did attempt to undertake a somewhat more 
systematic examination of the implications of the Sino-Soviet-American triangle and of 
Sino-American security ties. The Administration created an 'East-West Planning Group', 
made up of academics and area specialists which met to discuss big-picture issues for the 
Administration under the supervision of Samuel Huntington, the NSC's Soviet specialist. 
One of the areas the group examined was the complex interrelation between the Soviet 
Union, China and the United States.626 However, neither the fact that the Administration 
undertook such a series of discussions nor the results of those discussions were shared 
with Congressional leaders, once again leaving Congress to guess as to the assumptions 
that underlay Administration policy in such an important area. 
As he had with normalisation, Deng Xiaoping also did more to lobby Congress for 
stronger defence ties between Washington and Beijing than did the White House. 
Throughout 1978 Deng signalled to Washington his desire for closer relations and 
Members began to see signs that China was changing and becoming less radical and more 
supportive of existing international norms. This changed attitude became increasingly 
625 Interviews with Lester Wolff. 
626  East-West Planning Group to Zbigniew Brzezinski, et al., 22 March 1978, NSA Material, Office Files, 
Box 40, Carter Library. 
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evident in talks with visiting CoDels throughout 1978, as Deng consolidated power. 
Oksenberg noted Beijing's new attitude and tentative policy changes in the spring of 1978 
and remarked to Brzezinski that 'after 20 years in search of a distinctive path to 
modernity, the Teng-administered regime appears to be joining the rest of the world'.627 
The perception by Members of Congress that China was, indeed, 'joining the rest of the 
world' did much to alter Congressional perceptions of China as a revolutionary power. 
One of the most noticeable symbols of China's opening and reform, and having a large 
impact on Congressional attitudes, were the negotiations between Beijing and Coca Cola 
in late 1978 that culminated in December in the signing of a contract that marked the 
return of this symbol of American culture and capitalism to China after a thirty year 
absence.628 In short, it appeared that, unlike the Soviet Union, China 'was becoming like 
us'.629 
The Chinese had always emphasised with visiting Members of Congress their 
desire that Washington be a stronger bulwark against Soviet expansionism, but now in 
such meetings Deng placed particular emphasis on the common Sino-American interest in 
opposing Moscow, even broaching the topic of Sino-American cooperation to that end. 
Beijing's perceptions of a deteriorating security environment mirrored American 
perceptions, and Members, both liberal and conservative, were increasingly sympathetic 
to the Chinese suggestion that Washington and Beijing develop a closer consultative 
relationship.630 
Surprised to see such signs from Beijing prior to the completion of normalisation, 
627 Evening Report from Far East to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 6 April 1978, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, Staff 
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Brzezinski and Carter, who was by now becoming increasingly frustrated with Moscow, 
responded positively. Brzezinski began to argue with increasing energy from the spring of 
1978 onward that one of the most effective means the Administration had of gaining 
leverage over Moscow was to initiate some form of security cooperation with China, 
initially by agreeing to the sale of advanced technology to China that was denied to the 
Soviet Union.631 Carter's decision to send Brzezinski to Beijing that May to attempt to 
start normalisation talks signified his frustration with the Soviets as much as his desire to 
normalise with the Chinese.632 This frustration led to a major shift in policy, in which the 
Administration began to veer away from a policy of strict evenhandedness. 
Just as Nixon and Kissinger early in the decade, however, Carter and Brzezinski 
actively misled Congress regarding this policy shift. Carter continued to pay official 
homage to the policy of evenhandedness and to deny any intention of entering into any 
type of military alliance with China or favouring China in any way in his press 
conferences and speeches, and Brzezinski misled Members in his communications with 
them.633 Regarding both the centrality that the strategic dimension held for Brzezinski and 
his intention to mislead regarding his plans, Brzezinski records in his memoir that: 'I . . . 
thought of it [the Soviet dimension] a great deal, even though I knew that publicly one 
had to make pious noises to the effect that US-Chinese normalization had nothing to do 
with US-Soviet rivalry'.634 When he travelled to Beijing in May, he had initiated what 
became an extensive security relationship with the Chinese. Vance, of course, was not 
informed that Brzezinski planned to offer Beijing an informal security alliance, despite 
631 Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 11 April 1978, NSA, Staff Material–Far East, Armacost–Chron 
File, 4/11-18/78 through 6/14-30/78, Box 7, ibid. 
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the fact that it marked a crucial departure from the policy of evenhandedness to which the 
Administration was officially still committed.
Brzezinski offered the Chinese an informal alliance aimed at strengthening China's 
ability to resist Soviet pressure and at the long-term strengthening of China's military-
industrial capacity. Samuel Huntington and Morton Abramowitz, now the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific, had travelled with 
Brzezinski to Beijing and briefed Chinese military leaders on the findings of PRM-10, the 
military posture and force review that provided the Administration's policy framework for 
its global strategic posture.635 Brzezinski also gave the Chinese classified information 
related to Soviet military deployments on the Sino-Soviet border and classified American 
analysis of Soviet strategic strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, he had brought with 
him science and technology and military affairs specialists who briefed the Chinese on 
such areas as methods of gathering intelligence on Soviet military forces, and ways that 
the United States might be able to assist China to build its military-industrial capacity.636 
Finally, China was offered Landsat infrared scanning gear, equipment which would have 
been denied Moscow, that could assist the Chinese military in monitoring the movement 
of Soviet military forces near China.637 White House Science Advisor Frank Press led a 
delegation to China in July which was a follow-on to the talks on science and technology 
cooperation during Brzezinski's trip, and further such talks followed in the autumn. 
Upon Brzezinski's return the media reported, accurately, that he had initiated a 
security relationship with China, disclosing some of the areas in which intelligence had 
been shared and cooperative planning begun. John Glenn, having read these reports, 
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wrote Brzezinski asking for a detailed accounting of what had taken place. Congress itself 
had been unable to gain information from the Administration on PRM-10, and Glenn, a 
believer in the policy of evenhandedness, was concerned both that that policy was being 
abandoned and that the White House was hiding this fact from the Senate. Brzezinski 
wrote back assuring Glenn that the media accounts 'were way out of proportion to what 
actually happened'. Trying to placate Glenn, Brzezinski told him that he would send 
Samuel Huntington to the Hill to brief Glenn on the contents of PRM-10.638 Repeated 
attempts by Glenn and his SFRC colleagues to gain information on what type of 
collaboration was taking place were met with artful dodges.639 
Although the White House was hiding from Congress its decision to pursue 
security cooperation with Beijing, Deng Xiaoping attempted to build support for security 
cooperation with each Congressional delegation with which he met, speaking openly with 
Members of the need to cooperate to constrain Soviet power. In his meeting with Lester 
Wolff's delegation, Deng explained his motivation for seeking normalisation by referring 
to the greater opportunities that would then be possible for joint action against Moscow.640 
In this case, Wolff was interested in cooperation on certain issues, but was not in favour 
of any type of military alliance, believing that it would be counterproductive.641 
For their part, the Soviets spared no effort to attempt to dissuade Congress from 
supporting any type of a tilt toward China. Each time Brezhnev met with Members of 
Congress visiting the Soviet Union, he addressed the issue of China and threatened 
unnamed repercussions should Washington pursue even a limited alliance with China 
against the Soviet Union. During the summer and autumn of 1978 Brezhnev saw signs, as 
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did Congress, that something was afoot with Sino-American relations and took advantage 
of the visit of a pro-détente Ted Kennedy in early September to tell Kennedy that he was 
'deeply disturbed by China's new initiatives and improving Chinese-US relations'. As the 
CIA reported the conversation to the White House, 'In his strongest language, Brezhnev 
characterises US China policy . . . as a “myopic and dangerous line”. . . . He states flatly 
that making common cause with China on an anti-Soviet basis would 'inflict irreparable 
harm to Soviet-American relations'.642 The Soviets also made known their sensitivity 
about a tilt toward China in the area of trade policy. When a Senate delegation met with 
Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in late 1978, Kosygin warned Congress not to authorise a 
grant of MFN to China in the absence of such a grant to the Soviet Union.643 
Trade policy was another important focal point around in which the debate over 
evenhandedness revolved. The business interests which had supported the initial 
rapprochement had pushed for the lowering of trade barriers with China, yet legislation to 
grant MFN trade status to China had languished in Congress since the early 1970's. The 
most important reason for this was that debate over trade with China became caught up in 
the larger debate over relations with the Soviet Union, reflecting the dominance of the 
Soviet Union as the primary focus of American foreign policy during the 1970's. The 
debate over trade policy had become increasingly contentious from mid-decade onward 
as US-Soviet détente came under growing attack from the right, and as the national 
conversation over the interrelation of policy toward the Soviet Union and China became 
increasingly heated. The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act had blocked 
MFN trade status for Moscow due to the fact that the Soviets had rejected the 
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amendment's demand that Moscow agree to emigration quotas. By the late 1970's, 
therefore, Moscow still did not enjoy MFN trade status, and Congress was reticent to 
grant such status to Beijing without also granting it to Moscow. Vance sought to reinforce 
this Congressional sentiment.644 
While Vance was encouraging Senate liberals to continue to support an 
evenhanded approach to Moscow and Beijing, Brzezinski was actively misleading 
Senators regarding the White House intention to play China off against the Soviet Union 
and to develop security ties with Beijing. When a Senate delegation to Moscow met with 
Brzezinski for a briefing on US policy toward the Soviet Union, discussion turned to the 
issue of 'the China Card' and the interrelation of the United States, China and the Soviet 
Union. Brzezinski denied that he and the President were trying to use China to gain 
leverage over the Moscow. He explained away the 'regular consultations on international 
developments' with Beijing by saying that 'we would do this regardless of Soviet-US 
relations – this activity is not anti-Soviet'.645 In an attempt to keep them from being 
swayed by Soviet complaints, Brzezinski told the Senators to expect Soviet charges that 
the Administration was allowing the sale of arms to China from its Western European 
allies. Without admitting that the White House was doing so, Brzezinski obfuscated on 
this issue, implying that it was unreasonable for Moscow to expect Washington to 
'organize an international boycott of such arms sales', and that Washington couldn't really 
control Western Europe.646 
Throughout that autumn Congressional liberals continued to advocate a policy of 
evenhandedness, unaware that the White House was shifting away from such a position. 
644 Memcon between Cyrus Vance and Abraham Ribicoff, et al., 8 November 1978, Box 572, Abraham  
Ribicoff Papers. 
645  Memcon between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Abraham Ribicoff, et al., 9 October 1978, ibid. 
646  ibid. 
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Although the NSC had used Kennedy and Cranston to attempt to advance its goal of 
normalisation, it had told neither of the security relationship it was developing with 
China, knowing that they would have opposed such a relationship. In a late October 1978 
speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in Chicago, Kennedy warned that 'We 
should not try to manipulate our relationships, one against the other, for short-term 
advantage'.647 The Administration continued to pay formal homage to the policy of 
evenhandedness, leading Congress to believe that nothing had changed, and in meetings 
Oksenberg held with Senators he studiously avoided any mention that a major policy shift 
had taken place. 
Although a number of Congressional liberals did to object to a departure from the 
policy of evenhandedness, the rise of Cold War tensions in 1978 accelerated the trend 
within Congress toward distrust of Soviet intentions and a willingness to take more 
forceful action that would help restrain Soviet power.648 Members from across the 
political spectrum were becoming interested in security ties with China, as Congressional 
talks with Chinese leaders in early 1979 would highlight. Although conservatives were 
prone to support a policy designed to place greater pressure on Moscow, and some did 
support the development of security ties, as shown in the previous  chapter, concern for 
Taiwan's security limited conservative support for the development of China's military 
strength through 1978. 
Through hearing reports and communications with the White House, Members 
had communicated their desire to have a role in a policy debate that had such import for 
the Cold War. As with normalisation, however, Brzezinski sought to thwart Congressional 
647 Speech by Senator Ted Kennedy before the Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, 23 October 1978,    
Box 594, Averell Harriman Papers. 
648 See Press release by office of Senator Edward Brooke calling for suspension of SALT talks due to 'the 
continuing Soviet military build-up and the growing imperialism of the Soviet Union in Africa and 
elsewhere', ca. September 1978, Box 487, Edward Brooke Papers. 
248
involvement and successfully kept the Congress in the dark over White House activities 
and intentions in this area through 1978. The result was a major shift of Cold War policy 
from which Congress was excluded. 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has shown, widespread Congressional opposition to normalisation 
on Beijing's terms, the aim of which Congress accurately understood to be the isolation of 
Taiwan followed by its forced reunification with China, should not be confused with 
blanket opposition to normalisation. Over the years since the initial opening, Congress 
had become aware that this was Beijing's goal, and it was to this that Congress objected, 
not to the idea of normalisation. Even Senators such as Jesse Helms and staunch friends 
of Taipei such as Lester Wolff supported the goal of normalisation.649 Space had therefore 
existed in which Carter could have pursued normalisation in a less divisive manner. 
Members needed to be assured that Taiwan's future security would be ensured, that close 
US-Taiwan relations would continue, and that they were being included in the 
normalisation process. The fact that Carter and Brzezinski approached normalisation in 
such a way that they appeared indifferent, at best, to Taiwan's security, and contemptuous 
of Congressional expectations to be consulted, needlessly added to the conflict over an 
already sensitive issue. The decision to pursue normalisation in this way also denied the 
new Sino-American relationship the strong basis of domestic political support that it 
required, and deepened the already large amount of distrust between the branches. 
Further, although the White House had sought to minimise the Congressional role in 
China policy, the manner in which it pursued normalisation ensured an enlarged and 
ongoing oversight role with regard to policy toward Taiwan. 
649 Evening Report from Far East to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 31 May 1978, RAC, NLC-10-12-1-19-6, Carter 
Library; Interviews with Lester Wolff. 
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The White House use of secrecy to hide the policy shift away from 
evenhandedness and toward a security relationship with China succeeded in thwarting 
Congressional interference in an area that the White House considered its prerogative.650 
The existential threat posed by the Soviet Union made the high-stakes debate over this 
issue highly contentious, yet that same growing threat had contributed to a process by 
which Congressional attitudes had become more favourable to the idea of a tilt toward 
China. More fundamentally, the growing appeal of the idea of Sino-American security 
ties highlighted the extent to which the continuing Congressional role in making such a 
policy option a matter of public debate since 1975 had succeeded in normalising a 
previously radical concept and broadening its level of support in Washington. 
650 'Executive-Legislative Consultations on China Policy, 1978-1979', Report Prepared for the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives by the Congressional Research Service 
(Washington, D.C., 1980)
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CHAPTER 5: 1979–1980 -
DEEPENING DISTRUST, CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE AND THE 
FLOWERING OF SINO-AMERICAN SECURITY TIES
The same two factors which had most shaped interaction between Congress and 
the Carter Administration over China policy in 1977 and 1978,  continued to do so in 
1979 and 1980: the widely differing attitudes toward Taiwan between the White House 
and Congress, and deep distrust on the part of Congress. President Carter's leadership 
'was under attack on a broad front' in foreign policy in 1979.651 This was partially due to 
policy disagreements, particularly over the issues of whether a stronger American defence 
posture was needed in the face of the growing Soviet threat, and the belief that the 
Administration had taken too soft a negotiating stance with Moscow in arms limitation 
talks.652 A large part of the problem, however, continued to be Carter's aloof and distant 
(and at times hostile) attitude toward Congress. This attitude, and his unwillingness to 
lobby Congress and involve himself in the process of political compromise, made it 
difficult for him to build the political consensus necessary to adequately support his 
policy initiatives.653 
This obduracy on Carter's part shaped Administration interaction with Congress 
during Congressional consideration of the Taiwan Relations Act. After passage of the Act, 
Executive-Legislative relations over policy toward China and Taiwan continued to be 
characterised by deep distrust. As had occurred with normalisation, Congress was also left 
out of the discussion regarding another major policy shift when the Administration 
abandoned its policy of evenhandedness toward Moscow and Beijing and quickly 
developed a de facto anti-Soviet coalition with Beijing from late 1979 onward. 
651 'Deep Differences Mixed With Air of Tolerance', Washington Post, 19 June 1979. 
652 Commencement address by Senator Henry Jackson at Seattle University, 3 June 1979, SENATE 
LEADERSHIP FILE, Box 9, Howard Baker Papers. Jackson's position was widely shared. 
653 Evans-Novak Political Report, 18 September 1979; 'What amazes us', Evans and Novak reported, 'is the 
Administration's disinclination', to address Senatorial concerns over the SALT II treaty 'even a little bit'.
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Congressional support for a tilt toward China grew during 1979 and 1980 due to the rapid 
downturn of relations with the Soviets. However, many Members believed the 
Administration to be rushing too quickly into a military relationship with little reflection, 
and that more reflection and a more measured pace was necessary for the development of 
sound policy. The Administration's dismissive attitude and misleading communications on 
this issue, too, guaranteed dissension and continuing conflict in an area in which a 
growing proportion of Congress agreed with the basic thrust of Administration policy. 
The TRA and Executive-Legislative Conflict Over Normalisation and Taiwan's Status
As even the State Department noted following the normalisation announcement, a 
survey of press coverage of the decision emphasised the fact that Taiwan was left very 
vulnerable and, aside from the American statement that retained the right to sell arms to 
Taiwan, without security guarantees.654 The insecure position in which Taiwan was left 
was one of the major emphases of Congress as it significantly reshaped the legislation 
submitted to it by the Carter Administration that would govern unofficial relations with 
Taiwan. The other two emphases were to ensure that the United States would have as 
close relations with Taiwan as possible given their now unofficial nature, and that 
Congress would be guaranteed an oversight role over US relations with Taiwan and that 
the future Congressional role would not be left to the goodwill of the Executive Branch. 
Barry Goldwater, who had threatened legal action should Carter unilaterally 
abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty and bypass the Senate in the process, made good on 
his promise. Together with Senator Harry Byrd, Jr. and a bipartisan group of twenty three 
other Senators, he filed a lawsuit in the US District Court in the District of Columbia 
declaring the President's action unconstitutional, and asking the court to halt action on 
654 Hodding Carter, III, to the Deputy Secretary of State, 9 January 1979, Brzezinski Collection, 
Geographic Files, Box 9, Carter Library; Tucker, Strait Talk, p.114. 
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abrogating the treaty with Taiwan. Actual court consideration of the case was months 
away, and, aside from the filing of legal briefs, Congress and the Administration each 
turned their attention to the Taiwan enabling legislation. 
Shortly after Carter's normalisation announcement, former President Richard 
Nixon wrote Carter admonishing him to take Congress seriously and to not treat Taiwan's 
supporters in Congress merely as obstacles to be overcome. Nixon counselled:
Unless their opposition is mitigated, you will probably still win the battle: but you 
may lose the war because the fallout on future foreign and defense policy battles 
you will have to fight will make the Panama Canal controversy look like a Sunday 
School picnic in comparison.655 
Nixon's counsel was that by continuing his present course Carter would undermine his 
own foreign policy by guaranteeing lack of consensus behind it. Given the fact that Carter 
had viewed the record of Nixon and Kissinger's China talks and was doubtless aware of 
their misleading of Congress, he may well have dismissed Nixon's advice as hypocritical. 
The advice was, however, sound, and Carter dismissed it to his own detriment. 
While Carter was not inclined to expend much effort attempting to address 
Congressional concerns, Deng Xiaoping was inclined to do so. In early January, a Senate 
delegation including John Glenn, Sam Nunn, William Cohen and Gary Hart travelled to 
Beijing, where Deng continued his campaign to mitigate Congressional concern for 
Taiwan, emphasising China's peaceful intent. The vision of reunification he offered was 
that Taiwan could remain exactly as it now was, retaining its government, its armed 
forces, its economic and social system, etc.: 'The only thing they have to do is drop the 
655 Richard Nixon to Jimmy Carter, 20 December 1978, Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski 
Collection, Geographical File, China, [People’s Republic of --], Alpha Channel:[2/72-11/78] through 
China,[People’s Republic of --], President’s Meeting with [Vice Premier] Deng [Xiaoping:12/19/78-
10/3/79], Box 9, Carter Library. 
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ROC flag. . . . We extend a welcome to them to enjoy full autonomy'.656 Cyrus Vance 
reported Deng's talk with the Senators and its positive impact on Congressional attitudes. 
Vance noted that 'The Vice Premier and his colleagues have clearly made a decision to 
help us with our domestic problems concerning normalization', and surmised that Deng 
was likely to continue this pattern during his upcoming visit to Washington.657 Vance was 
correct, and Deng seemed willing to expend far more effort to address Congressional 
concerns than did the White House itself. Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States in 
late January and early February 1979 saw the continuation of the Chinese 'charm 
offensive' aimed at winning over Congressional and American public opinion. 
Deng proved much more adept at charming and persuading Members of Congress 
than was President Carter, using a cherubic face, a charming manner and self-deprecating 
humour to attempt to win over Members.658 Deng's primary goals were to continue his 
campaign of calming Congressional fears regarding Taiwan, to build sympathy with 
Congress ahead of his planned invasion of Vietnam, and to build long-term Congressional 
support for China's development effort. Taipei was watching Deng's trip carefully, 
particularly his interactions with Congress.659 While Deng was given a positive reception 
from Members, they did not lessen their determination to ensure that Taiwan's security 
was sure and that Congress had the ability to monitor Executive Branch compliance with 
principles that Congress laid out, however. In fact, one incident during Deng's meeting on 
Capitol Hill with members of the SFRC may have strengthened their resolve further. 
Deng complained about the American determination to continue to sell weapons to 
656 ibid. 
657 Cyrus Vance to Jimmy Carter, 'Scope Paper for the Visit of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the People's 
Republic of China, January 29–February 5, 1979', 26 January 1979, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, VIP 
Visit File, Box 3, Carter Library. 
658 Interviews with numerous former Members and staff who met with Deng on his visit attested to this 
fact. 
659 CIA study, January 1979, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, VIP Visit File, Box 2, Carter Library. 
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Taiwan and attempted to dissuade the Senators from writing strong security language into 
the legislation they were about to begin considering to regulate post-normalisation 
relations with Taiwan. The Senators responded by informing Deng that the US 
Constitution gave Congress the authority to write legislation and they would do as they 
saw fit.660 
While Deng's visit went very well, despite the obvious difference of opinion 
between Deng and Congress over arms sales to Taiwan, relations between the 
Administration and Congress, and particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
were toxic. Charges that the Administration had deliberately misled Congress contributed 
to the already poisonous atmosphere that had resulted from the Administration's handling 
of normalisation. The sharpest of these came from Jesse Helms, an SFRC member, who 
charged that Michael Oksenberg had assured Helms' foreign policy aide, John Carbaugh, 
in September 1978 that no change of China policy was in the cards and that the White 
House would consult with Congress prior to any decision on normalisation. When Carter 
made his normalisation announcement, Helms took the meeting notes that had been made 
by Carbaugh and gave them to the New York Times in an attempt to prove White House 
perfidy. Oksenberg's defence, which was that 'the president had made no decision on the 
timing or modalities for normalization',661 as of the previous September, when the pledge 
was made, seemed to be a legalistic and less than forthright explanation that confirmed 
Helms' story. 
This already toxic environment was further worsened by the continuation of a 
high-handed approach on the part of the Administration as Congress moved to consider 
legislation to regulate relations with Taipei in the wake of de-recognition. The breaking of 
660 Correspondence with Michael Pillsbury, a Senate staff member. 
661 See 'Helms Implies He Was Misled on China Plans', New York Times, 20 December 1978; and 'A 
Senator Charges Deceit on China Tie', New York Times, 20 December, 1978.  
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formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan had left a legal void, one having no precedent, as 
the more than fifty agreements governing every area of Taiwan-US relations from mail 
delivery to air transport to finance and trade needed replaced. The most glaring deficiency 
of the Administration-sponsored legislation was the lack of adequate plans for Taiwan's 
security. When speaking with Deng in Beijing the previous May, Brzezinski made a 
reference to the need to define US-Taiwan relations after de-recognition, which period he 
referred to as 'historically transitional' - an apparent reference to an expectation on his 
part that Taiwan would be absorbed by the Mainland before too much time passed.662 An 
SFRC staff member, upon seeing the legislation submitted by the Administration, 
remarked that 'The legislation was completely contemptuous of Congress, and in some 
respects almost completely contemptuous of Taiwan. . . . It almost read . . . as if they 
expected Taiwan to vanish'.663 
The perception that the Administration was 'contemptuous' of Congress was 
reinforced by the fact that the Administration submitted its bill to Capitol Hill on 29 
January, with the demand that Congress just pass the Administration-authored bill with no 
amendments, and do so by 1 March, the date at which relations with Taiwan would no 
longer be official. Regarding Taiwan's security, Administration arguments that the 
Chinese had given private 'assurances' in place of a public renunciation of force, that the 
PLA did not have the capability of invading, and that geostrategic circumstances and 
national interest would also constrain China from making such a choice, were not viewed 
by Congress as satisfactory reasons for neglecting to make certain that Taiwan would 
retain a future choice regarding reunification.664 It appeared that the Administration was 
662 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.214. 
663 Quoted in Tucker, Strait Talk, p.118. 
664 'Diplomatic Relations with the People's Republic of China and Future Relations with Taiwan', 
December 1978, NSA, Staff Material, Box 65, Carter Library. 
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saying 'trust us', and trust was obviously in short supply.665 
Communication between the Administration and Congress during the course of 
debate over the Taiwan legislation was highly contentious. Warren Christopher, testifying 
before the SFRC in early February as hearings began on the Administration's Taiwan 
legislation, assured the Senators that 'a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is a 
fundamental part of the structure of normalization'. Members believed the 
Administration's bill did little to ensure Taiwan's future security, however, and, hence, 
also did not protect American credibility.666 The prevailing Congressional attitude toward 
Taiwan and normalisation was perhaps best expressed by Jacob Javits, ranking 
Republican on the committee, who would make a large contribution to shaping the 
security language included in the final form of the bill. In the opening committee hearing 
on what became known as the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Javits said: 
I believe in the policy which the United States has adopted, but I believe the 
policy is incomplete, and that the second half of the policy must be respect for our 
solemn responsibility to Taiwan. . . . We must substantively protect our 
responsibility to Taiwan, and it is in our highest national interest to do so. . . . This 
is not just a matter of de-recognizing Taiwan or of normalising relations with the 
People's Republic. It is a strategic decision on the part of the United States, 
equivalent, in my judgement, to our relations with the Soviet Union.667 
The sense that Taiwan's security had not been provided for adequately, and that 
American credibility was at stake, was shared by Senate liberals. Attempts to give this 
concern legislative expression elicited differing responses on the part of the State 
665 Interview with Carl Ford. 
666 Interviews with Harry Byrd, Jr., and Lester Wolff. 
667 Opening statement of Senator Jacob Javits, 5 February 1979, Taiwan:Hearings Before the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, on S. 245 (hereafter, Senate TRA hearings), (Washington, 
D.C., 1979), pp.11, 18. 
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Department and the White House, respectively, starkly illustrating the differing attitudes 
on the part of each both toward Taiwan and toward the contribution Congress was 
attempting to make. Alan Cranston and Ted Kennedy, the  Administration's 'spear carrier' 
on normalisation in 1977 and 1978, significantly authored a resolution together with the 
staunch Taiwan supporter Lester Wolff because, in Cranston's words, 'Since the People's 
Republic of China will not give an express pledge not to use force against Taiwan, the 
United States should refrain from closing its own options to respond, in the unlikely event 
that force is used'.668 The Kennedy-Cranston-Wolff bill enjoyed strong support, being 
cosponsored by twenty five other Senate Members and more than one hundred House 
Members. The vast majority of these Members were Democrats, many of them from the 
now dominant liberal wing of the party – including such well known liberal luminaries as 
George McGovern, making it difficult for the White House to ignore.669 
The squabble over the bill between Congress, the White House, and the State 
Department illustrated, as had the record of the debate within the Administration over 
normalisation in 1977 and 1978, that the State Department was more in sympathy with 
Congressional concern regarding Taiwan than was the White House. Kennedy and 
Cranston's staff, as well as, presumably, Wolff's, collaborated with the State Department 
in drafting the bill language.670 The resolution was introduced on 25 January, four days 
prior to the introduction of the Administration's Taiwan legislation. The next day, Carter 
warned that the Kennedy-Cranston-Wolff bill was not acceptable.671 House Speaker Tip 
O'Neill, however, stated that Cyrus Vance had assured him that the legislation was 
acceptable, and a couple of days later the State Department spokesman stated: 'We do not 
668 Statement of Senator Alan Cranston, Senate TRA hearings, p.377. 
669 Only three of the twenty-seven Senate cosponsors were Republicans. 
670 CQ Weekly Report, 27 January 1979, p.141. 
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see in the Kennedy-Cranston resolution anything which is basically inconsistent with our 
policy statement or with our agreement with China on the establishment of diplomatic 
relations'.672 On 1 February, the White House issued a statement reiterating White House 
opposition: 'The position of the Administration is that a resolution is not necessary'.673 
The staff of Clement Zablocki, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
noted the disconnect between White House and State Department attitudes toward the 
resolution, calling to Zablocki's attention the fact that Vance had testified before the 
committee that he did not believe the resolution to be incompatible with the normalisation 
agreement.674 The Kennedy-Cranston-Wolff bill was referred to the Senate Foreign 
Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees, respectively, and did not emerge from 
either in order to be voted on by the respective chambers. The attitudes embodied in the 
bill, however, and much of the language, were incorporated into the final version of the 
TRA. 
Congressional consideration of the TRA was marked by regular White House 
statements that it saw no need for legislation beyond what the Administration had itself 
submitted to Congress, and threats to veto any legislation that contained language that the 
Administration considered to be too strong. In early February, as Congressional debate 
began, Carter communicated a veto threat to SFRC chairman Frank Church, and 
throughout February publicly opposed Congress doing much other than simply endorsing 
the legislation that his Administration had submitted to the Hill. A few days after his talk 
with Frank Church, Carter made a statement at a press conference that was indicative of 
his attitude throughout: 
I don't think a resolution is necessary, because the legislation we proposed to 
672 'Resolution of Taiwan Stirs Struggle', Washington Post, 2 February 1979. 
673 ibid.
674 Lew Gulik to Clement Zablocki, 6 February 1979, Series FA-3.1, Box 2, Clement Zablocki Papers. 
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Congress, in my opinion, is adequate. . . . And I think that any resolution or 
amendment that would go as far or further with the defense commitments to 
Taiwan would be unacceptable.675  
The NSC and the State Department shared lobbying responsibilities – attempting 
to convince the SFRC and the House Foreign Affairs Committee to soften some of the 
stronger amendments offered. Although the working relationship between these 
Congressional panels and their Administration interlocutors was not particularly good, the 
Administration had some success. After the first week of March, the State Department 
reported that several amendments that it had opposed had been defeated 'after intense 
lobbying by the Administration'.676 One amendment by Senator Charles Percy would have 
characterised an attack on Taiwan as a threat to US 'security interests', and another 
introduced in the House by Representative Ken Kramer (R-CO) that used similar 
language was likewise defeated. Also in the House, an amendment by Dan Quayle (R-IN) 
proposing that the American presence on Taiwan be characterised as a 'liaison office', 
which would have upgraded the representation beyond unofficial status, was defeated, as 
was an amendment by Robert Lagomarsino (R-CA) which called for the de-recognition of 
Beijing if China attacked Taiwan. Illustrating how strong was sentiment in Congress in 
favour of close relations with Taiwan, the Quayle amendment was only defeated by a vote 
of 181-172.677 
In early March, as further attempts to strengthen the security language of the bill 
were being made, the Administration issued a statement that argued that 'Any change in 
security language is harmful. We're against any amendments'.678 Simultaneously, Carter 
675 The President's News Conference of 12 February 1979, Public Papers of the Presidents.
676 State Department Legislative Report, 12 March 1979, Donated Historical Material, Mary King, Box 16, 
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repeated his veto threat, pointedly reminding Congress that by using the veto he would be 
'leaving it illegal to deal with Taiwan in any effective way'.679 Some have posited that the 
the NSC may have pushed Carter to take a rather recalcitrant position vis-a-vis Congress 
so as to assuage Chinese anger at Congressional action.680 Carter's attitude toward and 
record of dealing with Congress in general, however, indicates that, although the NSC 
may have made this suggestion, Carter was predisposed to taking this type of position and 
likely would have done so anyway. 
Despite its apparent successes in defeating the amendments it most opposed, the 
State Department knew that, given the strength of Congressional passions on this issue 
and the Administration's lack of credibility, the Administration's ability to shape the 
legislation was limited. The final bill contained strong language asserting that not just a 
military attack, but also any attempt on the part of China to coerce Taiwan through 
'boycotts or embargoes' or 'any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than 
peaceful means' was 'of grave concern to the United States'.681 It further stated that the 
United States was establishing diplomatic relations with China based 'upon the 
expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means'.682 Ensuring 
that a determination of what constituted a serious threat to Taiwan would be a joint 
decision of the Executive Branch and Congress, the bill included the requirement that 
Congress be informed by the Executive Branch in the event of a threat to Taiwan. 
Even more expansively, in order to ensure that policy toward Taiwan would be 
jointly managed by the Executive Branch and Congress, Congress legislated reporting 
procedures which ensured close Congressional oversight. One example included the 
679 Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York, 2010), 7 March 1979 diary entry, p.299. 
680 Tucker, Strait Talk, p.121. 
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requirement that agreements reached with Taiwan by the American Institute on Taiwan 
(AIT), the unofficial instrumentality that now represented American interests on the 
island, needed to be submitted to Congress for review and approval. The Act also required 
the Secretary of State to report to Congress semi-annually on the status of US-Taiwan 
relations, and required the President to report to the Hill any regulations which he might 
formulate in relation to carrying out TRA provisions for three years following passage of 
the Act. Also, the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees were 
given responsibility to monitor relations with Taiwan independently of the Executive 
Branch, as well as to monitor Executive Branch implementation of the Act, and to report 
the findings to their respective chambers.683 Congress, therefore, made it clear that the 
future relationship with Taiwan would no longer be entrusted to the Executive Branch 
alone, but would be jointly managed with Congress. Lastly, the SFRC and its East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee concluded an understanding with Richard Holbrooke 
and the State Department that they would be involved in the future decision-making 
process for arms sales to Taiwan.684 
The Chinese, as expected, complained vigorously that the TRA came very close to 
violating their agreement with the Carter Administration. Two weeks after passage, a 
Senate delegation led by Frank Church visited China, and Deng claimed that the Act 
'interfered in the basic understanding reached during the normalization of relations', and 
'has negated the political basis for the normalization of Sino-US relations'. Deng warned 
that any further Congressional actions along these lines 'will affect our unity' to the 
benefit of Moscow.685 Deng's attempt to appeal to the Senators' known appreciation for the 
683 ibid. 
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685 Memcon between Deng Xiaoping and Senators Frank Church, Jacob Javits, Joe Biden and Paul 
Sarbanes, 19 April 1979, SENATE LEADERSHIP FILE, Box 12, Howard Baker Papers. 
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strategic value of normalisation, fell on deaf ears. Church firmly defended Congressional 
action:  
We know about the disagreement with the US Congress regarding the TRA, but 
the first sentence in that Act is that the US recognizes the PRC as the government 
of China, and the US is withdrawing recognition from Taiwan. The purpose of this 
Act is to establish non-governmental relations with the people on Taiwan. So 
Congress is being consistent, and President Carter would not have signed the Act 
if it was not.686 
In keeping with its commitment to monitor Executive Branch treatment of Taiwan, 
Congress was sensitive to signs that the Administration was attempting to further 
diminish Taiwan's status due to possible pressure from Beijing, and reacted swiftly to 
such indications. During the TRA hearings, Members, with a view to strengthen the level 
of Administration commitment toward the relationship with Taiwan, specifically asked 
whether the Administration planned to end or alter any other of the more than fifty 
agreements which governed various aspects of relations with Taiwan. The Administration 
pledged that, with the obvious exception of the Mutual Defense Treaty, no other treaties 
would be changed.687 Specifically listed was the Air Transport Agreement, an agreement 
that regulated civil air traffic between the United States and Taiwan. 
News came from China in early September, however, that again brought charges 
of Administration dishonesty. Vice President Mondale had travelled to China in late 
August and early September 1979, and had had a very successful visit, pledging that the 
Administration would submit to Congress legislation granting China MFN trade status 
and growing the security relationship with Beijing. As Mondale was ending his very 
686 ibid. 
687 Senate TRA hearings, p.77. 
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successful visit, however, he also announced that the Administration would replace the 
Air Transport Agreement, which was a formal agreement, with an informal one. The 
announcement itself was unwelcome, and the fact that he had made it while in China gave 
the appearance that he was responding to Chinese pressure to continue to lower the status 
of Taiwan and to further distance Washington from Taipei. Congress immediately reacted. 
Barry Goldwater's office saw the announcement as evidence that 'The State Department 
has begun a new campaign to belittle Taiwan'.688 Similarly, Howard Baker's office 
believed the announcement indicating the beginning of a campaign on the part of the 
Administration to reduce Taiwan's status, as well as yet another indication of dishonesty. 
An aide wrote to Baker that: 'This action is contrary to repeated Administration 
assurances to both Taipei and Congress that with the exception of the Defense Treaty, all 
existing treaties and agreements would remain in force'.689 
Richard Holbrooke was the first to face fierce Congressional questioning on this 
point. Jacob Javits, from the Republican Party's shrinking liberal wing, questioned 
Holbrooke at a late September hearing on the Indochinese refugee situation. As Javits 
explained in a letter to Goldwater: 
I made it clear that I was dissatisfied with the lack of consultation on this matter. 
Secretary Holbrooke assured me that the Department would definitely consult in 
advance of future plans to renegotiate or terminate any existing agreements. I also 
made it clear that while certain agreements might require renegotiations at some 
point for legitimate substantive reasons, I oppose any general policy of 
renegotiating our agreements with Taiwan to downgrade their status. Mr. 
Holbrooke assured me there was no such policy and that each agreement would be 
688 Terry Emerson (of Goldwater's staff) to Cran Montgomery (of Baker's staff), 28 September 1979, 
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handled sui generis. . . . I think he is now fully aware of the concern of the Senate 
on this score, and of the close scrutiny that such proposals will receive.690 
The same day, a group of six conservative Senators, including Goldwater, wrote Vance, 
complaining that: 
At the time of Congressional debate on the legislation implementing our new 
relations with Taiwan, the Administration gave no indication of intent to terminate 
either in form or substance any agreement with that nation other than the Mutual 
Defense Treaty. . . . The Administration's action . . . is consequently surprising, 
and makes us wonder if this step is only a component of an overall strategy being 
revealed to Congress piecemeal.691 
The State Department responded in writing in late October to Javits' request for 
clarification and confirmation of Holbrooke's denial in Congressional testimony, assuring 
Javits that 'we do not have a policy to convert or terminate all of the agreements we 
maintain with Taiwan. Each agreement, as the circumstances require, will be treated on its 
own merits on a case-by-case basis'.692 Just to ensure that the Administration received the 
message that Congress would not allow Taiwan's status to be further diminished, Howard 
Baker pointedly met with the new head of Taiwan's unofficial representative office in 
Washington in his Senate leadership office.693 China's official news agency responded by 
complaining that 'Two Chinas, Again, Stalks the Hill'.694 China's statement likely only 
confirmed Congressional suspicions that it was Beijing which had instigated the 
Administration's action. 
The intense Congressional attention paid to this issue continued for weeks, 
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illustrating how deep-seated was the distrust. In early November Warren Christopher was 
called to the Hill to testify before both Lester Wolff's and John Glenn's subcommittees 
regarding Administration intentions. As Vance reported to Carter after Christopher's 
appearances, Christopher also denied any intent to systematically downgrade agreements 
with Taiwan in a manner calculated to lower Taiwan's status. Unsurprisingly, 
Christopher's denials were not entirely believed. Vance reported that, 'Zablocki and other 
Members said they intend to keep a close watch on our treatment of Taiwan, particularly 
in the arms sales area, and expected the Administration to consult more closely with 
them'.695 
Adding to the already considerable contention over China policy that autumn was 
fact that the Federal District Court in Washington was scheduled to rule on the Senate 
lawsuit against the Administration over termination of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense 
Treaty. Although Herbert Brownell had counselled that a Senate legal challenge to 
Carter's ability to unilaterally terminate the treaty would fail, the suit spearheaded by 
Senators Goldwater and Harry Byrd, Jr. (of Virginia - no relation to Senate Majority 
Leader Robert Byrd of West Virginia) threatened to severely disrupt Carter's plans. On 17 
October 1979, Judge Oliver Gasch of the US District Court for the District of Columbia 
ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, ruling that 'Treaty termination generally is shared power', 
and that the President 'is clearly not the sole maker of foreign policy'. He thus declared 
that Carter's notice of treaty termination must receive the approval of two thirds of the 
Senate or the majority of both houses of Congress in order to be valid, and ordered the 
Administration to refrain from taking any steps to implement Carter's notice until 
Congress had so acted. The next day, a spokesman for the Chinese embassy said that 
Gasch's ruling poses 'serious problems' for the future of Sino-American relations, and 
695 Cyrus Vance to Jimmy Carter, 8 November 1979, Plains File, Box 14, Carter Library. 
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called on the Administration 'to take necessary measures'.696 The Administration 
immediately appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, urging the court to reverse Gasch's 
ruling 'without delay'. Warren Christopher submitted an affidavit to the court warning 
that, 'If this situation is not finally resolved in advance of December 31, the consequences 
could be serious indeed–and of long-lasting disadvantage to the United States'.697 
In the wake of Gasch's ruling, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd declared that 
'The Senate ought to vote expeditiously to end the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, and 
at the same time should outline its role in the termination of future treaties'.698 The 
Majority Leader disagreed with the ruling and believed that Carter's action had been 
constitutional, but Gasch's ruling threatened to 'leave a very important foreign policy 
decision up in the air'.699 He believed that a majority vote was all that was required, that a 
strong majority existed in the Senate in support of abrogation due to the security offered 
by the TRA, and that Senate action would remove the danger to the unravelling of Sino-
American normalisation that the Administration threatened would result if the treaty 
remained in force. 
In a meeting of Republican Senators three days after the Majority Leader's public 
statement, Goldwater reported that he and Harry Byrd, Jr., had met with the Majority 
Leader the previous Friday, 19 October, and had asked him to communicate an offer to 
the President. Goldwater said that if 'the President should submit the treaty termination to 
a vote in the Senate, . . . he would support the President's position, and believed the 
matter would be passed'.700 Howard Baker endorsed Goldwater's proposal. Goldwater's 
offer indicated that his primary concerns were the institutional prerogatives of the Senate. 
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Four days after the discussion with the Majority Leader, there had been no response from 
either Robert Byrd or the White House on Goldwater's compromise offer.701 Republicans 
asked Baker to inform Carter that the Republican members of the Senate wished to 
endorse Goldwater's proposal and proceed with such a vote, with the expectation that 
Carter's abrogation would be confirmed.702 
The silence that emanated from the White House communicated Carter's response. 
Although agreeing to Goldwater's offer would have likely resulted in the abrogation of 
the security treaty, it would also have established the principle that the Senate should have 
been allowed to vote on treaty abrogation and, implicitly, been an admission that the 
President was wrong to abrogate in the manner in which he did. Carter was unwilling to 
establish such a precedent and to concede that the presidency did not have the power to 
unilaterally abrogate treaties. Nixon, in his letter to Carter after the normalisation 
announcement, had agreed that Carter should set no precedent undermining Presidential 
prerogatives, but nevertheless argued that for the sake of good working relations with the 
Senate, Carter should 'voluntarily' offer to submit any future similar decisions to the 
Senate.703 Carter had rejected the advice. 
In mid November Robert Byrd made a floor statement to the effect that he had met 
with Goldwater, Harry Byrd, Frank Church and Jacob Javits in an attempt to reach an 
agreement on legislative language regarding treaty termination, blaming Goldwater and 
Harry Byrd for the impasse.704 With no movement taking place in negotiations for a 
Senate vote on the matter, in late November, the Circuit Court of Appeals intervened to 
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overturn the District Court's ruling. The attorneys for Goldwater, et al., immediately 
appealed to the Supreme Court. Finally, on 13 December 1979, less than three weeks 
before the deadline, the Supreme Court made a 6-3 decision that had the effect of 
confirming the Court of Appeals' decision, with four of the majority ruling that this was a 
political dispute in which the judicial branch should not involve itself and the other two 
that the plaintiffs 'lacked standing' to bring a suit. The Administration breathed a sigh of 
relief.705 
On 1 January 1980, not only had the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty expired, 
but so had the one year moratorium on US arms sales to Taiwan, to which Carter had 
committed as part of the normalisation agreement, eliciting, once again, Congressional 
charges of a lack of consultations and dishonesty on the part of the Administration. On 3 
January, the Administration released a list of items that it was prepared to sell Taiwan, 
which included some sophisticated defensive weapons. Members felt that the list did not 
go far enough in providing Taiwan's needs, largely because it neglected Taiwan's need for 
a new fighter aircraft – an exclusion that Congress suspected was due to an 
Administration fear of offending Beijing. More important than the difference of opinion 
over the type and amount of weapons provided to Taiwan, however, was the fact that the 
Administration had simply informed Congress of its decision, with no attempt being 
made to consult. 
SFRC members asked the Administration to show them the list of military items 
Taiwan had requested, but were refused. The committee then asked Holbrooke to meet 
with them to explain the Administration refusal. Holbrooke did so, contending that arms 
sales to Taiwan were governed the same way as were arms sales to other countries – that 
705 Warren Christopher to Jimmy Carter, 13 December 1979, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, Brzezinski Office 
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Congress had the right to reject a completed sales package, but did not have the authority 
to involve itself in the creation of that package. Committee members asserted that the 
TRA had given Congress that authority, placing arms sales to Taiwan in a very different 
category than arms sales to other countries. The Senators further believed that they had 
also received an oral commitment from Holbrooke that arms sales to Taiwan were to be 
jointly managed between the committee and the Administration.706 Once again, charges of 
dishonesty on the part of the Administration poisoned the atmosphere. 
Holbrooke's assertion that arms sales to Taiwan were to be handled no differently 
than were arms sales to any other nation was based upon the fact that State Department 
attorneys had requested, the previous year, that language be inserted into the TRA just 
prior to final passage that stated that US arms sales to Taiwan would be conducted in a 
manner 'consistent with US law and common practice'. No Members had been aware of 
the apparently innocuous language addition. State Department attorneys had cleared the 
language addition with committee staff who had had no objection, not realising that it had 
given the State Department a pretext for excluding consultations with the committee on 
arms sales to Taiwan. Now realising that State Department attorneys had deliberately 
misled the committee the previous year, Frank Church, John Glenn, Jacob Javits and 
other committee members accused Holbrooke of being less than forthright. They 
strenuously asserted that their intent in the TRA was that relations with Taiwan, 
particularly the arms sales, be managed jointly between the Hill and the Administration – 
and that he had understood that. Faced with a rebellion and charges of dishonesty once 
again, the State Department was forced to show the committee the list of weapons that 
had been requested by Taipei.707 Pressure from the Senate continued throughout 1980. In 
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January the Administration had denied Taiwan's request for a new jet fighter, but in June 
the Administration announced that it would allow the sale to Taiwan of the FX jet fighter, 
partially due to pressure from SFRC member Richard Stone and others on the Hill.708 
The TRA had given the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations 
Committees responsibility to report to their respective chambers how well the Executive 
Branch was doing implementing the requirements of the Act. Accordingly, the SFRC held 
a workshop in March 1980 to examine that issue. In the introduction to the workshop 
report, John Glenn illustrated well the starkly different attitudes toward Taiwan and its 
impact on the Sino-American relationship held by Congress, on the one hand, and by the 
White House, on the other, when he wrote:
I do not believe that we can over-estimate the importance of Taiwan in our China 
policy. Although the new official relationship with the PRC must be given close 
attention, failure to cultivate to the fullest our unofficial relationship with Taiwan 
could prove to be a complication, both internationally and domestically, to our 
China policy. As an official of the American Institute on Taiwan recently 
commented, 'unless the Taiwan part of the equation works, the overall US policy 
toward China cannot work',709 
The Administration ignored the workshop and the Congressional statements that came out 
of it. Underneath the surface agreement between the Administration and Congress 
regarding the need to have normalised relations with Beijing, deep disagreement 
continued to fester between the two branches over the nature of continuing relations with 
Taiwan and a sense that the Administration was less than forthcoming with Congress, 
continued to undermine China policy. 
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The Abandonment of 'Evenhandedness', and the Politics of the Tilt Toward China
Carter's pursuit of normalisation with China had largely been an expression of his 
growing frustration with the Soviet Union, yet in early 1979 he remained formally 
committed to a policy of evenhandedness toward Beijing and Moscow. Although 
opposition to a tilt toward China remained strong on the part of Vance and many 
Congressional liberals, trends in the international environment as well as domestically 
resulted in a shift in favour of more forceful action vis-a-vis the Soviets.  Internationally, 
the continued deterioration of relations with Moscow and a series of American setbacks 
globally created a feeling of national impotence, which was reinforced by economic 
stagnation at home. The rising influence of conservatism also contributed to the trend in 
favour of a harsher line toward Moscow. In the Senate the elections of 1976, 1978 and 
1980 each increased the number of conservatives in that body, and since the beginning of 
the decade the SFRC saw the loss of names like William Fulbright, Stuart Symington and 
a series of liberal Republicans, and the addition of names like Richard Stone, Jesse 
Helms, S.I. Hayakawa, and Richard Lugar. 
As has been shown, moderates and liberals were also concerned about the 
increasingly threatening international environment and coming to believe more forceful 
action to be necessary. Throughout 1979 and 1980 sentiment within Congress became 
increasingly favourable to a tilt toward China. In the area of trade preferences, a grant of 
MFN trade status to China was delayed throughout 1979 by a continued adherence to a 
policy of evenhandedness both among liberals in Congress and by the State Department, 
an adherence reflecting the continued hope that Soviet-American relations could be 
repaired. By late 1979 reticence among liberals to depart from strict evenhandedness was 
lessening, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that December removed what liberal 
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reticence had remained to a grant of MFN to China without such grant to Moscow. 
In the area of security cooperation, both liberals and conservatives became 
increasingly prone to support a security relationship with China through 1979 and 1980. 
Congress expected, however, to be involved in a policy shift that had such import for 
relations with the Soviet Union, and believed that such a relationship should be pursued at 
a measured pace with adequate reflection to how it fit into Washington's larger foreign 
policy framework. In each of these areas, Congress found the Administration's pursuit of 
such a relationship lacking, which added to Congress's frustration with the lack of 
consultation on China policy and deprived the Administration of the benefit to policy 
formulation that could have been provided by Congressional examination of big-picture 
questions, such as where this new relationship was going. 
When Deng travelled to Washington in late January 1979, in addition to calming 
Congressional concerns about Taiwan and building support for normalisation, he also 
attempted to develop Congressional sympathy and support for China's development 
efforts and confrontation with the Soviet Union. Deng's reform efforts, which had been 
begun in late 1978, depended upon the importation of capital equipment and advanced 
technology from the West, the United States being the best source for much of what was 
needed. Deng therefore needed to cultivate Congressional willingness to export advanced 
technology to China, and to grant MFN trade status and extend Export-Import (ExIm) 
Bank credits, both of which would greatly increase China's ability to purchase the 
equipment and technology that was needed. Both the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 
1974 Trade Act, which demanded commitments from all non-market (communist) 
economies to allow free emigration, and the advocacy of a policy of evenhandedness by 
Vance and many Congressional liberals, however, were obstacles to a grant of MFN for 
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China since Moscow did not yet have such trade status.710 
The Jackson-Vanik amendment had contained a provision that allowed the 
extension of MFN trade status to a communist country if the President signed a waiver 
that such a grant was in the national interest. The Administration was interested in 
pursuing a presidential waiver, but only if Congress would support a waiver for both 
Moscow and Beijing.711 Vanik, who chaired the trade subcommittee of the powerful 
House Ways and Means Committee, supported such an approach, while Scoop Jackson 
strongly opposed it, believing that MFN for China and the Soviet Union should be 
separate issues.712 Vance argued just prior to Deng's visit that, 'to extend MFN and to 
extend export credits and not to do so for the Soviet Union, would involve us in a China 
tilt, a development which would have the utmost gravity for the conduct of US foreign 
policy'.713 Vanik agreed, as did key Senators such as John Glenn, Abraham Ribicoff, who 
chaired the Senate Finance Committee's Subcommittee on International Trade, and Adlai 
Stevenson, who chaired the Senate Banking Committee's International Finance 
Subcommittee.714 During Deng's visit to Washington, he addressed, both with the 
Administration and in meetings with Members of Congress, China's willingness to meet 
the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik amendment.715 He continued to do so in Seattle, 
where he was hosted by Scoop Jackson, repeatedly giving assurances 'that China intends 
to pursue liberal emigration policies'.716 
Meanwhile, Members who supported the policy of evenhandedness attempted to 
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halt the slide that they perceived to be occurring within the Administration in the direction 
of an overt tilt toward China. In addition to speaking on the House and Senate floor 
advocating their position, some sought to use Congressional hearings to get 
Administration witnesses to publicly commit themselves to evenhandedness. Vance's 
allies on the Senate Banking Committee, for example, including Adlai Stevenson, used 
this tactic, using committee hearings to question witnesses from the Departments of State, 
Defense, Commerce and Energy on their varying approaches to the sale of technology to 
the Soviet Union and China.717 
While liberals such as Stevenson, Ribicoff and Glenn were attempting to stem the 
tide in favour of an overt tilt toward China, others were growing increasingly open to the 
idea that such a tilt would help balance Soviet power. The visit of an SFRC delegation to 
Beijing in April 1979 provided public evidence both that China was very interested in 
such things as intelligence cooperation and the purchase of military hardware from the 
United States, and that support for such cooperation and sales existed even among some 
Senate liberals. Following passage of the TRA, perhaps the most important issue 
discussed in the Senate was that of the verifiability (through electronic surveillance) of 
Soviet compliance with the SALT II agreement, which was not yet complete, but which 
would require Senate confirmation. The American ELINT (electronic intelligence) 
stations which had monitored Soviet missile tests and military communications from 
northern Iran had just been lost due to the Islamic revolution, leaving a gap in 
Washington's verification capabilities. The long Chinese border with the Soviet Union 
provided a perfect location with which to replace that monitoring capability if the Chinese 
were willing. 
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In a meeting with Deng Xiaoping, Joe Biden, a committee member, asked Deng 
whether China would be amenable to placing electronic monitoring stations in Xinjiang, 
in China's northwest, where they could detect Soviet missile tests and monitor Soviet 
communications. Deng immediately responded in the affirmative.718 Jacob Javits then 
followed up with a related question. A Chinese official had suggested to the delegation 
the previous day the creation of an informal alliance between China, Japan, the United 
States and Western Europe. Javits was intrigued and sought to discover whether this idea 
had Deng's approval. Deng signalled that it did.719 Proving once again that he was adept at 
framing an appeal in a manner most likely to elicit support for his goals, Deng drew a link 
between Washington's support for his modernisation programme (which he had labelled 
'The Four Modernisations') and China's ability to contribute to a balancing of Soviet 
power: 'The strengthening of China's economy and the realisation of the Four 
Modernisations is very beneficial to the global strategic balance. . . . If China is stronger, 
the Soviet Union will become more cautious'.720 Deng then used that argument to appeal 
for a grant of MFN trade status to China.721 
Deng also used the situation to openly discuss China's desire to purchase advanced 
weapons systems from the United States. The question of security cooperation having 
been raised by Biden and Javits, Deng used the opportunity to tell the group that, should 
Washington be willing to sell advanced US military aircraft, China would buy them.722 To 
the Senators and staff involved in the trip, Deng's affirmative response to their question 
about possible intelligence sharing, as well as his clear desire to purchase advanced 
718 19 April 1979 memcon between Deng Xiaoping and Senators Joseph Biden, Frank Church, Paul 
Sarbanes and Jacob Javits. SENATE LEADERSHIP FILE, Box 12, Howard Baker Papers. 
719 ibid. 
720 ibid. 
721 ibid. 
722 ibid. 
276
American weaponry, was eye-opening.723 Deng's desire for security cooperation had been 
communicated to various delegations since early 1978, but this conversation provided the 
clearest and most detailed exposition of how far Deng wished to go in that direction. 
Those within the Administration and Congress who had been opposed to a tilt toward 
China, either in relation to trade or in relation to potential security ties, had argued, with a 
growing body of evidence to the contrary, that China did not wish to develop a security 
relationship with Washington. Deng's acknowledgement that China did, indeed, wish to 
pursue such a relationship, however, was given wide press in the United States after being 
leaked by Biden, undermining their argument.724 Consistent with the bureaucratic 
divisions that had characterised the debate over such ties to China to this point, the Vance, 
who continued to oppose such ties, tried to minimise Deng's conversation with the 
Senators so as to downplay the issue.725 
More evidence appeared in the coming months for the growth of support for 
security ties with China. The powerful chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, Al Ullman, visiting China three months after the SFRC trip, told the Chinese 
that Congress might agree to arms sales to China due to a growing belief among the 
Members 'that it is important for this country [China] to be strong' - i.e. as a 
counterweight to growing Soviet power.726 In implying the need for Congressional 
acquiescence to any arms sales to China, Ullman was referring to the legislative 
prohibition on military assistance to communist states (embodied in the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961), as well as the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which had 
given Congress a legislative veto over the arms sales decisions of the Executive Branch. 
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As the Carter Administration pursued an ever deepening security relationship with China, 
an increasingly supportive Congress nevertheless remained jealous of its institutional 
prerogatives and closely monitored whether Administration decisions triggered the 
oversight responsibilities expressed in the above legislation (the Administration ensured 
that they did not, so as to avoid Congressional oversight). 
Support for a security relationship with China was also growing among 
conservatives who had previously rejected such ties out of concern for Taiwan's  security. 
In an important memo, Howard Baker's staff described the incredible growth of Soviet 
military power and simultaneous weakening of the American deterrent, concluding that 
'We are going to have to get some major help from the East, from Japan and from China'. 
The author elaborated: 
All of us who strongly support the security of Taiwan have instinctively opposed 
the idea of any form of military ties to Communist China. However, in recent 
years, the military power of the US in relation to that of the Soviet Union has 
deteriorated seriously. . . . The only way I see to guarantee peace and stability 
during these next crucial years is to cultivate our relationship with the Communist 
Chinese. I would not propose a formal military alliance, but I certainly would 
advocate the kind of steps that the British are already taking. This includes 
consultations between their most senior military brass, and some degree of 
weapons sales. In and of themselves, the Chinese will not be able to do more than 
bloody the Soviets in the event of an attack. . . . But . . . China can become part of 
a coalition which, if united and determined, could successfully face down any 
Soviet conventional threat. And I would hope that we would now not prevent the 
preliminary steps which are necessary for us to have the option of closer military 
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ties should the need for them suddenly arise.727 
It is likely that this shift in conservative attitude, which was motivated primarily by the  
Soviet Union, was also helped by the passage of the TRA, which gave Congress an 
important oversight role in ensuring Taiwan's future security, which therefore meant that 
Taiwan's security was not dependent upon the good graces of Beijing or of the Carter 
Administration. 
Fully aware of the depth of Chinese interest in a collaborative relationship, and 
believing that the goals and assumptions of such a relationship required scrutiny, in the 
spring of 1979 Lester Wolff and Clement Zablocki jointly commissioned a study by the 
Congressional Research Service examining the issues surrounding the Sino-Soviet-
American triangle and their implications for American policy.728 The study gave 
committee members a detailed overview of the policy implications in each of these areas 
that was helpful as they educated themselves on the issues involved. It was completed in 
October and examined, at Zablocki's request, such fundamental issues as the effect of 
Sino-Soviet relations on US interests, the question of whether US policy toward China 
had significantly influenced Sino-Soviet relations since Nixon's opening to China, the 
current state of the debate over US relations with China and its impact on the Soviet 
Union, the affect of the Sino-Soviet-American triangle on the SALT I and SALT II talks, 
and how the American force posture in Asia impacted the situation.729 Zablocki and Wolff 
had, throughout the 1970's, sought to question Executive Branch policy assumptions in 
this area and to add reflection to a policy process which they believed was characterised 
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by too little reflection on the part of the Executive Branch.730 
Brezinski, whose opinion regarding the effect of Sino-American ties on US 
relations with the Soviets accorded with the growing body of sentiment on Capitol Hill, 
nevertheless ignored completely the deliberations and studies undertaken by Congress, 
seeing it as irrelevant to a foreign policy process in which he saw himself as the centre.731 
Whether Brzezinski believed that Congress was helping to shape policy or not, it clearly 
was, in terms of the educative impact on Members and the informed public of various 
committee hearings and studies, and also in terms of the interaction that various Members 
were having with the Chinese leadership on their visits. In fact, had Brzezinski paid more 
attention to Congressional thinking and activities regarding China policy, he could have 
made better use of those Members who shared his perspective on the Sino-Soviet-
American triangle, who could have been leveraged to bring political pressure to bear on 
the position of his bureaucratic opponents, particularly Cyrus Vance and those liberals on 
Capitol Hill who shared Vance's views. Vance made use of his Congressional allies in 
order to bolster his preferred policy position in support of what ended up being a losing 
cause.732 Had Brzezinski done so, particularly given the fact that Congressional opinion 
was trending in the direction of his policy preferences, he could have been even more 
effective than he already had proved to be at the task of creating bureaucratic pressure in 
favour of his preferred policy outcome, and seen a stronger consensus develop behind his 
policy preferences. 
The tilt toward China continued to develop in the latter half of 1979. Scoop 
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Jackson travelled to China in August, just prior to a visit by Vice President Mondale. The 
Chinese, realising that they had a sympathetic listener, lobbied for Jackson's help in 
strengthening China against the Soviet threat, both through the sale of military equipment 
and weapons, and through a grant of MFN trade status and the extension of ExIm Bank 
credits. A trade agreement had been signed by the Administration in July in Beijing, and 
the Chinese had repeated to the Administration assurances on emigration which it could 
use to justify a presidential waiver as per the terms of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and 
had received a commitment that the Administration would quickly submit the agreement 
to Congress for approval. The Administration, however, had still not done so when 
Jackson visited the next month. The NSC had been pushing for quick submission to 
Congress, but was being opposed by the State Department, which was worried that it 
would anger the Soviets.733 The Chinese, aware that they had a sympathetic audience in 
Jackson, complained that they 'had done everything the US side had asked and recalled 
that they had been assured that there would be quick action in Congress on the trade 
agreement and the extension of MFN'.734 The Chinese, as Jackson, were frustrated, and 
believed it to be unfair that the Administration was withholding MFN status from Beijing 
because it was unable to provide such status to Moscow. 
The Chinese knew Jackson to be influential, and their complaints to him 
succeeded in placing pressure on the Administration. Jackson told Leonard Woodcock, 
the American ambassador to China, that during Mondale's visit he should give the 
Chinese assurances that the Administration would submit the bill to Congress quickly 
since the Chinese 'would look upon continued delay as breaking of the US word',735 The 
733 Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 5 July 1979, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, Brzezinski Office Files, 
Box 80, Carter Library. 
734 Evening Report from Far East to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 8 August 1979, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, 
Staff Evening Reports File, Box 22, Carter Library. 
735 ibid. 
281
Administration's continued commitment to evenhandedness was harming the relationship 
with China, Jackson charged. The Chinese also gave Jackson a tour of a portion of the 
Sino-Soviet border, showing him the location in which they alleged that the Soviets had 
engaged in live-fire exercises as an act of intimidation when China had invaded Vietnam 
the previous February. China's attempt to increase Jackson's sympathy for their positions, 
and, through him, to pressure Washington for a deeper American security relationship 
with Beijing was effective. Jackson returned from his trip advocating for the Chinese 
purchase of 'anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons' to strengthen its defence capabilities vis-
a-vis the Soviets.736 
Chinese complaints and Jackson's advocacy for quick movement on the trade 
agreement received attention at the White House, where Mondale was advocating with 
Carter on behalf of prompt submission of the China Trade Act to Congress.737 During 
Mondale's visit, Deng repeated the complaint that had been made to Jackson that a grant 
of MFN status to China should not be delayed out of an  Administration desire to grant 
such status to Moscow simultaneously.738 Illustrating the fact that Deng was following the 
debate over evenhandedness in Congress, Deng pointed out a recent statement made by 
Lester Wolff to the effect that MFN should not be granted to Beijing in the absence of 
such a grant to Moscow, condemning that position. Seeking to mollify Chinese 
frustration, Mondale promised that the Administration would submit the trade agreement 
to Congress by the beginning of November. Mondale's talks with Chinese leaders, and a 
public speech at Beijing University, also included discussions of the beginnings of a 
security relationship and public indication that Washington was tilting further away from 
736 China and the United States: Report of Henry M. Jackson to the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, US Senate (Washington, D.C., 1979)
737 Evening Report from Far East to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 8 August 1979; Walter Mondale to Jimmy 
Carter, 3 August 1979  WHOCL, Box 223, Carter Library. 
738 Interview with Walter Mondale. 
282
Moscow and toward Beijing.739 While Vance and some Members of Congress continued 
to fight for evenhandedness back in Washington, Mondale's trip signalled that they were 
losing the policy battle. 
As the NSC planned to further the cooperative relationship with China in the wake 
of Mondale's visit, consistent with the manner in which the White House had approached 
normalisation, it saw secrecy as being of paramount importance. Communicating this 
policy shift to Congress, Oksenberg and David Aaron implied in a memo to Brzezinski, 
ran the risk of running into opposition among some Members. Therefore, Congress was 
not to be informed until 'our ducks [are] lined up'.740 Oksenberg and Aaron then laid out 
rules that they hoped would minimise a paper trail and keep the relationship secret. As 
with normalisation, Congress was portrayed as an obstacle to Administration policy goals. 
Although some amount of secrecy was understandable given the sensitivity of the topic 
and the need to avoid leaks, and some Members later expressed an appreciation for this 
fact, the decision to share almost nothing with Congressional leaders and the chairman of 
the relevant committees added to the existing distrust between the branches that had been 
created by the normalisation process. The result, as with normalisation, was that while 
much of Congress was in sympathy with the growth of a security relationship, they also 
expected to be part of that discussion from the beginning, and were frustrated at the 
Administration's refusal to consult.741 
While evenhandedness continued to have adherents, such as Lester Wolff and 
some Senate liberals, a greater proportion of Congress was coming to believe China to 
739 ibid.; Speech by Vice President Walter Mondale at Peking University, 27 August 1979, Box 154.K.2.5B 
(Box 11), Walter Mondale Vice Presidential Papers, Minnesota State Historical Society, St. Paul, 
Minnesota; Department of State Bulletin (October 1979), pp.10-3; New York Times, 28 August 1979. 
740 Michael Oksenberg and David Aaron to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 4 September 1979, NSA, Staff Material, 
Far East, Box 34, Carter Library. 
741 'Executive-Legislative Consultations on China Policy:1978-1979', Report Prepared by Congressional 
Research Service for the US House Foreign Affairs Committee (Washington, D.C., 1980); Interview 
with Carl Ford. 
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merit different treatment than the Soviets, and one of the most articulate proponents of 
this view, Scoop Jackson, used his trip report in September to continue to forcefully argue 
this point. Referring to the Administration's delay in submission of the China trade 
agreement to Congress after promising the Chinese that it would do so quickly, he wrote, 
'This is a classic example of how not to treat the Chinese'.742 He went on to argue: 
The doctrine of evenhandedness has been at the heart of the Administration's delay 
in submitting the trade agreement to Congress, and at the root of the 
Administration's explanation for the delay. . . . China and the Soviet Union are two 
very different countries at different stages of development, with different 
ambitions, different associates and allies, and different relations with this country. 
They should be treated on separate tracks, and, in our own national interests, they 
should not be treated alike. . . . Since the Chinese had met the conditions for the 
waiver on MFN and credits, there has been no justification for the delay in 
submitting the trade agreement to Congress.743 
Jackson ended by noting that Mondale had, as Jackson had urged, assured the Chinese 
that the trade bill would be submitted to Congress by November. Jackson couldn't help 
but end his report with one last criticism of the Administration's dedication to 
evenhandedness: 
Vice President Mondale's reassurance came just in time to prevent a serious 
deterioration in Chinese-American relations. Whether the Administration – and 
notably the State Department - has finally shaken itself free of the misguided 
doctrine of evenhandedness, remains to be seen.744 
742 China and the United States: Report of Henry M. Jackson to the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate (Washington, D.C., 1979).
743 ibid. 
744 ibid.
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Soviet actions during the autumn of 1979 continued to undermine the position of 
those who continued to advocate on behalf of evenhandedness. The discovery that the 
Soviets had placed a brigade of combat troops in Cuba angered Senators who would be 
deciding the fate of the recently-signed SALT II treaty, further lessening concern about 
Soviet sensitivity to an American tilt toward China.745 The evolution of views would be 
evident as Congress considered MFN for China, as well as the issue of the sale of 
advanced technology to China. 
The White House finally decided to time the submission of the China Trade Act to 
Congress for 23 October to coincide with the visit to Washington of the Chinese Trade 
Minister, whom the White House hoped to use to lobby Congress on behalf of the 
agreement.746 It almost appeared that, given poor White House relations with Congress, 
the White House deemed Chinese officials to be far better at lobbying Capitol Hill than 
Administration officials. Abraham Ribicoff, chairman of the International Trade 
Subcommittee, who had previously advocated evenhandedness, hosted the Chinese Trade 
Minister for a breakfast on Capitol Hill in which he promised 'priority attention' to the 
agreement, and assured the minister that 'both Republicans and Democrats are eager to 
extend' MFN.747 The agreement received a positive response, overall, in subcommittee 
hearings in both chambers, but after having been passed out of the relevant 
subcommittees and committees, was not moved forward on the legislative calendars of 
each chamber for a floor vote, partially out of some continuing opposition on the part of 
some liberals who still believed that a tilt toward China posed unacceptable dangers. 
Charles Vanik, in the House, and Senate liberals, notably Adlai Stevenson, continued to 
745 Press release from the office of Senator Abraham Ribicoff, 6 September 1979, Box 153, Abraham 
Ribicoff Papers. 
746 Evening Report from Far East to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 2 October 1979, NSA, Staff Material, Far East, 
Box 40, Carter Library. 
747 Remarks by Senator Abraham Ribicoff in honour of Li Qiang, Trade Minister, People's Republic of 
China, Wednesday, 24 October 1979, Box 153, Abraham Ribicoff Papers. 
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slow passage of the Act for this reason.748 
Despite this lingering opposition, Members were far more open in late 1979 than 
they had been early in the year to significantly increasing trade with China even while 
trade with Moscow remained limited. This growing willingness to approach the two 
countries differently was also evident in the area of technology transfers. Many Members 
criticised and opposed technology transfers to the Soviet Union out of concern that the 
technology would then be put to use by Moscow to strengthen its military potential, 
something which the Soviets had done repeatedly earlier in the decade. Those same 
concerns were diminishing in relation to China, however, as illustrated by the invitation 
extended to a Chinese embassy official to testify before the joint hearings of two 
subcommittees of the House Committee on Science and Technology that met to consider 
technology transfers to China simultaneous with House consideration of the China Trade 
Act.749 Never before had the official of any communist nation testified on the record 
before Congress, which was received with quite a bit of surprise by the Commerce 
Department and the NSC.750 
After having been voted out of committee in both chambers, Congressional 
leadership did not immediately move the bill up the legislative calendar for a vote by the 
full House and Senate, respectively. Frustrated by the lack of movement, Brzezinski 
wrote Vice President Mondale on 30 November, hoping to use Mondale's history as a 
member of the Senate to press Majority Leader Robert Byrd to move more quickly on the 
748 Telephone interview with Adlai Stevenson. See also Stevenson's statement in 'Agreement on Trade 
Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic of China', Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, US Senate, on S.Con.Res.47, 15 
November 1979 (Washington, D.C., 1980). 
749 Testimony of Li Wei, First Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 13 November 1979, 
as part of Technology Transfer to China:, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Science, Research and 
Technology and the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science and 
Technology, US House of Representatives (Washington, D.C., 1980).
750 Evening Report from Far East to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 20 November 1979, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, 
Staff Evening Reports File, Box 25, Carter Library. 
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legislation.751 Part of the issue slowing Congressional consideration remained the 
requirements of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, with several Members wanting to see 
evidence that China would allow free emigration.752 Additionally, the Senate was to begin 
debating the SALT II agreement which Carter and Brezhnev had signed the previous June 
and that, too, provided a conflict between those who remained committed to Vance's 
foreign policy approach and those who viewed the issue as did Brzezinski. Brzezinski's 
memo to Mondale implied that he believed the delay to be due to Vance's allies on the 
Hill slowing consideration of the measure by their full chambers out of an unwillingness 
to allow US policy to shift further in Brzezinski's direction. 
Although Mondale had come to support the development of a security relationship 
with China, he had also been assigned by Carter, due to the twelve years he had spent in 
the Senate, to spearhead the Administration's efforts at lobbying that body for support for 
the SALT II agreement, thus creating something of a conflict for him.753 Not wishing to 
become publicly involved in this struggle on the Hill over the direction of policy, 
Mondale refused to contact Byrd on the matter, telling Brzezinski 'it would be better if 
you were to call the Majority Leader'.754 
In the House, a little over a week after Mondale's memo, the Ways and Means 
Committee passed the Act on to the full chamber with strong support. Surprisingly, 
Charles Vanik had also come to support a grant of MFN to China, despite several weeks 
earlier warning that he suspected such a grant was an unwise attempt to 'play the so-called 
751  Zbigniew Brzezinski to Walter Mondale, 30 November 1979, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, Country  
File, China: 12/78 through China: 3/80, Box 9, Carter Library. 
752  'China Pact Hits Snag on Emigration', Washington Post, 2 November 1979. 
753  Gerstenzang, James, 'Mondale Picks Up A Fulltime Job:He's Carter's Chief Lobbyist on the SALT II  
 Treaty', AP, 24 June 1979. 
754  Denis Clift, national security advisor to Walter Mondale, to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 4 December 1979, 
ibid. 
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China card'.755 756 Two days after the Ways and Means Committee vote, Abraham Ribicoff 
requested that Warren Christopher meet with several members of the Senate Finance 
Committee to go over the assurances the Administration had received from the Chinese 
on emigration. Christopher immediately did so, and Vance reported to the President that 
the Senators 'now seem satisfied' and would support a presidential waiver.757 Still, 
however, the legislation had not been brought to a vote by the full chambers by the 
Christmas recess, causing much frustration within the NSC. 
In the end, it wasn't White House prodding, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in late December 1979 that ultimately cleared the remaining opposition, illustrating the 
role that considerations of evenhandedness had played in the delay even late in the year, 
despite the growth of anti-Soviet sentiment in Congress. The China Trade Act was passed 
by both chambers in January by wide margins in a vote that the liberal Democratic Study 
Group saw as a reaction to the invasion.758 The invasion also acted as an accelerant to 
nascent Sino-American security cooperation, completing the shift within Washington 
away from evenhandedness. Despite the decisive shift both within the Administration and 
Congress away from evenhandedness, the stage was now set for conflict between the 
Administration and Congress over lack of consultations regarding the accelerated 
development of Sino-American security ties. 
Defense Secretary Harold Brown had been scheduled to visit China in early 
January 1980. The visit would mark the first time that an American defence chief would 
755 United-States-China Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee 
on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, on agreement on trade relations between the United 
States and the People's Republic of China, and H.Con.Res. 204. 
756 Warren Christopher to Jimmy Carter, 13 December 1979, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, Brzezinski Office 
Files, Box 74, Carter Papers. 
757 Cyrus Vance to Jimmy Carter, 15 December 1979, Plains File, Box 14, Carter Library. 
758 Democratic Study Group Legislative Report, China Trade, 24 January 1980, MS 324, Morris Udall 
Papers, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library Manuscript Collection, University of 
Arizona, Tucson.
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visit China, and the SFRC wanted to know what Brown intended to discuss with the 
Chinese. In mid December, the SFRC asked to meet with Brown and prepared a series of 
questions regarding the purpose of his visit.759 Brown met the committee in executive 
session, sharing with them in rough outline his instructions for the trip. The committee 
was told that the Administration's purposes for Brown's trip were to be 'limited' and 
'mostly of a symbolic nature' - to sound out the Chinese on their strategic views and to 
send a signal to Moscow.760 After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, ten days later this 
changed significantly as the Administration sought quick development of the security 
relationship. 
At the beginning of January, a week after the Soviet invasion, an NSC meeting 
was held to discuss Brown's instructions for his upcoming trip. Brown's trip instructions 
had been strengthened in the previous week, and Brzezinski now argued to strengthen 
them further to include an offer of over-the-horizon radar. Realising that he was losing 
control of the direction of policy, Vance argued that the Administration needed to get 
Congressional approval prior to moving ahead with a deeper military relationship or 
Congress would have 'a very bad reaction'.761 Brzezinski, argued strongly in favour of the 
strategic wisdom of a deepening security relationship with China, ignoring Vance's appeal 
to Congress. Vance then appealed directly to Carter, repeating his assertion that the 
Administration should consult with Congress before heading any further in this direction. 
Carter, clearly angered by the Soviet move and never sympathetic to the idea that 
Congress needed to be involved in an Executive Branch policy initiative, responded 
brusquely that he 'did not have to consult Bob Byrd', and asserted that 'We should sell 
759 Carl Ford and Diana Smith to all PRM's, 11 December 1979, SENATE LEADERSHIP FILE, Box 12, 
Howard Baker Papers. 
760 Carl Ford to Senators Church, Javits and Glenn, 22 January 1980, Box 58, John Glenn Papers. 
761 NSC Meeting notes, 2 January 1980, NSA, Staff Material, Middle East, Box 98, Carter Library. 
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weapons to China, including F-16's'.762 Carter's reference to F-16's indicated that he was 
aware that Deng Xiaoping had expressed interest in F-16's to the SFRC delegation the 
previous year. It was clear that Vance had lost the policy debate within the 
Administration, and that Carter, backed by Brzezinski, had no intention of consulting with 
Congressional leaders. 
Although Vance's consistent record of urging consultation with Congress over 
China policy argues for its genuineness, it is also probable that his urging that the 
Administration do so in this instance was motivated to some extent by his knowledge that 
certain Congressional liberals in key positions would support his argument that 
evenhandedness should not be abandoned. He was isolated within the Administration, and 
liberal Congressional leaders appeared to be the only supporters he had left. The next day, 
Brzezinski followed up with a memo to Carter in which he again urged a stronger tilt 
toward China, including a willingness to sell defensive weapons to China, and addressed 
Vance's warning about Congress by telling Carter, 'I believe Congress will support you'.763 
Brzezinski's assertion that Congress would support such a relationship was correct, but 
ignored the fact that Congress expected to be made part of the discussion regarding such 
an important policy shift. Just as with normalisation, however, Brzezinski and Carter had 
no desire to include Congress in the discussion, which would again have negative 
repercussions. 
Brown went to China with an expanded set of instructions that now included an 
offer of over-the-horizon radar, other defensive arms to be made available on a case-by-
case basis, and a broad range of other initiatives meant to dramatically deepen the 
embryonic security relationship.764 While still in China, Brown made a public 
762  ibid. 
763  Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 3 January 1980, Plains File, Box 1, Carter Library. 
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announcement that made clear that he had entered into a deeper consultative relationship 
with China and that the Administration had discussed much stronger cooperative efforts 
with the Chinese than had been indicated to the committee. Although aware that the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed the strategic environment within which Brown 
travelled to China, the committee nevertheless did not expect the Administration to 
attempt to develop security ties so dramatically and so quickly – particularly in the 
absence of any communication to that effect from the Administration.765 
More details were released publicly, adding to the committee's frustration, in a 
Washington Post article.766 The public announcement that a serious security relationship 
had been initiated without the knowledge of the appropriate Congressional leaders 
reinforced the Congressional sense that the Administration still did not respect their role. 
One of the major reasons put forward by Administration officials to explain why they did 
not wish to consult with Congress over this issue was the fact that the Administration 
itself had still not come to a unified view on these issues, with the consequence that it 
would not have been helpful to expose its internal divisions to Congress.767 However, this 
argument is undermined by the fact that the Administration's internal divisions were well 
known. Vance's appeal to consult Congressional leaders was likely an attempt to gain 
some support for his position from Senate liberals. When Brzezinski advised Carter that 
'Congress will support you', but continued to argue against consultations on the issue, he 
showed that he had no desire to allow Congress to weigh in on a policy battle within the 
Administration that he was winning. His estimation that Congress would generally 
support such a relationship was correct, but, as with normalisation, he ignored the cost 
765  Carl Ford to Senators Church, Javits and Glenn, 22 January 1980, Box 58, John Glenn Papers; 
Interview with Carl Ford. 
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that the Administration would pay in deepened resentment and distrust. 
Despite understanding the strategic rationale for the attempt to increase the level 
of security cooperation, and supporting a deepening of the relationship in principle, the 
SFRC was frustrated with the lack of consultations, and concerned that the 
Administration might be rushing things without adequate reflection as to where this new 
relationship might be headed and what policy goals it allowed the United States to reach. 
John Glenn took Brown to task, saying that he was: 
Somewhat surprised by a number of the announcements that you made while in 
China. Why wasn't it possible for you to mention to us before you left that the 
Administration was considering a Washington-Peking 'hot line', had approved 
LANDSAT, and were near a decision on launching a communications satellite for 
the Chinese? These are important steps with obvious foreign policy implications 
that I believe the committee should have been informed about before a public 
announcement.768 
Brown used carefully prepared talking points for his meeting with the committee769, and 
while admitting to what had already been made public and taking a somewhat apologetic 
tone for the lack of consultations, nevertheless did not promise future consultations. The 
Administration only gave the committee the barest of outlines of the type of cooperation 
it sought with China, and no discussion took place examining the long-term repercussions 
of the new policy departure or the underlying assumptions guiding the new policy.770 
The Administration followed the same pattern with the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee and the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Although Richard 
768  Carl Ford to Senators Church, Javits and Glenn, 22 January 1980, Box 58, John Glenn Papers. 
769  Evening Report from Far East  to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 23 January 1980, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, 
 Staff Evening Reports File, Box 26, Carter Library. 
770  Interview with Carl Ford. 
292
Holbrooke attempted to make Clement Zablocki and Lester Wolff feel as if they were part 
of the process of policy formulation, it was clear that they were not. In hearings before 
Wolff's subcommittee, Holbrooke repeatedly dodged questions meant to elicit a 
commitment to enter meaningful consultations on the development of security relations 
with China.771 Zablocki and Wolff each believed, as did their Senate counterparts, that the 
Administration was pursuing the relationship for short-term tactical advantage without 
adequately thinking through the long-term policy repercussions.772 Although they 
understood and appreciated the strategic logic behind a tilt toward China, they believed 
that such a policy decision should be examined more carefully rather than rushed. Like 
their Senate counterparts, Zablocki and Wolff could get virtually no information shared 
by the Administration regarding the dramatic tilt toward China being undertaken. 
Hopes had been held by some in Congress that after the discord following the 
normalisation announcement and the debate and passage of the TRA, passions would 
subside, some trust between the branches could be rebuilt, and China policy could again 
become a cooperative effort.773 The continuing pattern of Administration misleading and 
refusing to meaningfully consult ensured that an atmosphere of mistrust continued to 
dominate the dialogue between the branches over China policy. The conflict over 
weapons sales to Taiwan recounted earlier occurred simultaneously with the conflict over 
the lack of consultations over Brown's visit and the deepening of the security relationship. 
After the invasion of Afghanistan and the Brown visit, Vance continued to fight a 
rearguard action to halt the slide of American policy away from a dedication to 
reinvigorate détente and towards an informal alliance with China.774 By this time, 
771 Interviews with Chris Nelson; Jim Przystup (a defence specialist on the subcommittee staff), 1 
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however, it was obvious that his position no longer enjoyed the President's support. Vance 
resigned as Secretary of State in April, ostensibly over the failed American military 
mission to rescue the diplomatic hostages held in Tehran, but also due to the sharp 
downturn in Soviet-American relations and his loss of influence on the President's 
thinking.775  His departure removed Brzezinski's chief bureaucratic rival, and the pace of 
the tilt toward China quickened. Despite broad Congressional support for some type of  
cooperative relationship with China, the quickening pace with which the White House 
approached the new security relationship continued to elicit Congressional statements of 
concern that the pace was overly-hasty and that little long-term reflection was guiding the 
policy decisions. 
Sino-American consultations that began with Brown's trip included the May 1980 
visit to Washington of Geng Biao, China's Vice Premier and a powerful defence official. 
Continuing the pattern begun by Deng Xiaoping of Chinese leaders building relations 
with Congress during visits to Washington and attempting to lobby their cause, Geng held 
a series of three highly symbolic meetings on Capitol Hill: one with Scoop Jackson and 
Armed Services Committee chairman John Stennis, the second with the House Armed 
Services Committee, and the third with the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs.776 As with Deng's efforts to lobby Congressional support for Sino-
American cooperation, Geng, too, seemed to make a greater effort to build that support 
than did the Administration itself. Illustrating the support for cooperation that existed 
when Members felt themselves to be consulted, Senator Charles Percy, who would the 
next year succeed Frank Church as chairman of the SFRC, asked Geng what the United 
775 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p.981. 
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States and China could do cooperatively to hinder the Soviets in Afghanistan. Percy also 
attempted to discover the content of Geng's talks in that regard with Administration 
officials. The fact that a Congressional leader needed to ask a Chinese leader what was 
being discussed with the Administration illustrated the paucity of information flowing in 
this regard from the Executive to Congress. Geng, likely aware of the lack of 
communication between the branches and not wanting to get involved, sidestepped the 
question.777 
The Carter Administration's speedy development of its security relationship with 
China was abruptly halted by Carter's loss to Ronald Reagan in the presidential election 
that November, a campaign in which the deteriorating international environment, and 
Carter's response to it, played a significant role. Even the matter of Sino-American 
security cooperation briefly became an issue in the campaign. One of the most significant 
examples of security cooperation had come out of the April 1979 conversations between 
Deng Xiaoping and SFRC members – the establishment in early 1980 of joint ELINT 
stations in northwest China that would monitor Soviet missile tests, military 
communications and satellite transmissions.778 A media story in September 1980, based 
upon a leak from the NSC, blamed pro-Taiwan statements on the part of Ronald Reagan 
for endangering the intelligence sharing arrangement with China. Howard Baker, 
believing that the White House had leaked this classified information in order to boost 
Carter's image as taking a tough stand on the Soviets and to denigrate Reagan as 
irresponsible, angrily responded, demanding that Brzezinski provide a reckoning of NSC 
actions.779 In what was perhaps a fitting note on which to end Congressional interaction 
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with the Carter White House over China policy, no response was ever sent. 
Conclusion
Jimmy Carter's attitude toward Capitol Hill guaranteed conflict with Congress, not 
just because the attitude itself was dismissive, but also due to the fact that his 
Administration fell within a decade in which Congress was re-asserting itself in an 
unprecedented manner. By the late 1970's Congress had grown accustomed to challenging 
presidential authority and expected its new role in foreign policy formulation to be 
respected. This was particularly the case with China policy, which had been the subject of 
intense Congressional attention since the late 1940's and on which Congressional 
expectations of consultation had been made clear. 
The conflict between the Carter Administration and Congress over China policy 
evidenced some continuities with Carter's predecessors, the most significant being that at 
the root of the conflict was the widely differing attitudes on the part of the White House 
and Congress toward Taiwan and the nature of US commitments to Taiwan. However, the 
poisonous atmosphere between the branches over China policy during the Carter 
Administration was primarily one of Carter's own making. The patterns by which the 
Administration related to Congress over China policy in 1977-1978 continued in 1979-
1980, ensuring that interaction between the two branches remained marked by distrust 
and resentment, and weakening the political base of support for Administration policy. 
Finally, dialogue with Congressional leaders over the development of the security 
relationship with China would likely have strengthened policy through a consideration of 
Congressional concerns related to the goals for such a relationship and how if fit into the 
Administration's larger foreign policy framework. Refusal to dialogue in even a limited 
manner on these issues denied the new policy the advantages that such reflection might 
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have brought to its development. 
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CONCLUSION
Without an understanding of Congressional attitudes and actions in relation to 
China policy, only a truncated understanding of Executive Branch actions in pursuit of 
rapprochement and normalisation is possible. One of the aims of this thesis, therefore, has 
been to trace the development of Congressional attitudes towards China, and to examine 
the various factors that influenced these attitudes. Numerous international, domestic and 
institutional factors combined to shape Congressional attitudes. The foundational 
international factor, without which rapprochement would not have been possible, was the 
Sino-Soviet split, which dramatically altered the strategic environment within which 
policy was made and convinced Members of Congress that a unique strategic opportunity 
was available to the United States, and thereby contributed to Congressional willingness 
to re-evaluate the existing American policy of containment and isolation of Beijing. 
American involvement in the Vietnam war became the cause for the sustained 
challenge to the existing policy of containment and isolation. It spurred the ideological 
transformation within the Democratic party and also among liberal Republicans, and 
helped to increase support for an opening to China out of the hope that such an opening 
could possibly help to bring an end to that conflict. Considerations related to the Soviet 
Union heavily shaped Congressional debate over China policy. The belief on the part of 
many  conservatives that an opening to China would give Washington leverage over the 
Soviet Union was one of the major reasons for conservative support for rapprochement 
with China. As US-Soviet détente foundered, the value of China in relation to the Soviet 
Union was again brought to the fore, and Congress began to consider the wisdom of 
possible military cooperation with Beijing aimed at containing Soviet power. 
The concept of 'evenhandedness', the belief that the triangular relationship 
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between Washington, Moscow and Beijing functioned best, and that relations between 
Washington and the two communist giants were strongest, when the United States treated 
each evenhandedly was very influential among Members of Congress for most of the 
decade. It was one of the major reasons Congress remained reticent for so long to grant 
China MFN trade status in the absence of such status for the Soviet Union, constrained 
Congressional willingness to see advanced technology that would not be sold to the 
Soviet Union licensed for export to China, and was one of the factors suppressing 
Congressional willingness to support the development of security ties with China. This 
was another area in which worsening relations with Moscow impacted Congressional 
attitudes, causing Members to become less committed to an evenhanded approach as 
evidence of Soviet aggressive intentions multiplied. 
Taiwan, and the history of close relations between Taipei and Washington, was the 
single most important factor that shaped Congressional attitudes toward China policy, and 
the one issue that remains a central factor in Sino-American relations today. Congress's 
protectiveness of Taiwan and belief that breaking American commitments to Taiwan and 
leaving it vulnerable to coercion from Beijing had both negative normative and practical 
implications for the United States, including an undermining of American credibility, 
remained the most important domestic constraint on Sino-American normalisation. Given 
the vast gulf between Executive Branch and Legislative Branch attitudes toward Taiwan, 
it also provided the biggest point of conflict between the two branches over China policy. 
Changing perceptions of China on the part of many Members of Congress also 
played an important role in determining Congressional responses to China during the 
1970's. At the beginning of the decade, although continuing to see China as hostile to the 
United States, China was no longer viewed by many Members as having the strength to 
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actually harm American interests, and many noted the distinction between China's hostile 
rhetoric and its cautious behaviour. Another important shift in perceptions came in 1978, 
when Deng Xiaoping initiated his reforms and appealed to Congress for help in 
implementing those reforms and modernising China. As Members saw China leave its 
radical, Maoist past behind and undertake reforms that put it in the mainstream of a 
Western understanding of modernity, they became more sympathetic to China. The sense 
that China was evolving in a positive direction and becoming more supportive of the 
existing international order contributed to Congress's willingness to assist in China's 
development efforts, and in conjunction with the breakdown of relations with the Soviet 
Union also contributed to Congressional support for the development of a military 
relationship with Beijing. 
Institutionally, the decade of the 1970's was a period of dramatic change within 
Congress, both ideologically and structurally, that helped to shape Congressional actions, 
as well as the nature of Congressional interaction with the Executive Branch. The 1970's 
began with the New Left dominating the Senate, saw a revolution by young, assertive 
liberals in the House determined to shape foreign and national security policy in early 
1975, and ended with conservatives in the ascendancy in the Senate and the breakdown of 
relations with the Soviet Union having completely reshaped the domestic political 
landscape. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the challenge to the Nixon Administration's 
foreign policy was based as much on ideological as on institutional concerns, and arose 
most strongly from the Senate, while the House remained more supportive of Nixon due 
to the fact that the House leadership was composed of the more traditional, Cold War 
Democrats whose perspectives on foreign and national security policy tended to have 
more in common with the views of Richard Nixon than those of William Fulbright. 
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Over the course of the decade, this dynamic was reversed. The House became 
increasingly liberal in its orientation, while the Senate became increasingly conservative. 
The changes in the membership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee between early 
in the decade and late in the decade were a microcosm of the larger political changes 
taking place in Washington. Early in the decade, the SFRC was chaired by William 
Fulbright, whose criticism of existing foreign policy was in harmony with that of the New 
Left, and the Republican members of the committee mostly came from the sizeable liberal 
wing of the GOP. By mid-decade Fulbright had been forceably retired by the voters in his 
home state of Arkansas, and by 1979 the Republican ranks of the committee were 
dominated by new conservatives such as Jesse Helms, Richard Lugar and S.I. Hayakawa. 
In addition to tracing the evolution of Congressional attitudes toward China, this 
thesis has examined the means that Congress used in its attempts to influence policy 
development, and, crucially, analysed how Congress and the Executive Branch interacted 
in the making of China policy. Nixon and Kissinger, in their memoirs, paint an image of a 
White House courageously advocating fundamental change of China policy in the face of 
almost overwhelming opposition from the Executive Branch bureaucracy as well as from 
Congress. The historical record, however, illustrates that by the time Richard Nixon took 
office two major changes had taken place within Congress that opened the door to a 
fundamental change of China policy. 
One was the ideological transformation within the Democratic party beginning in 
the mid 1960's, in which liberals within that party began to question the anti-communist 
assumptions that had undergirded US Cold War policy to that point. This challenge to 
existing foreign policy orthodoxy was shared by liberal members of the Republican Party 
(at a time when the liberal wing of the Republican Part represented a sizeable minority of 
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the GOP), creating a liberal coalition that contested US foreign policy generally, and in 
particular policy toward Asia, in which Washington was then embroiled in yet another 
massive land war, the aim of which was to contain Chinese communism. The second 
domestic change that was taking place by the time Richard Nixon took office was the 
weakening of the China Lobby, which significantly reduced the political risks to the 
President of pursuit of policy change. Without these important shifts in the Congressional 
dynamic, it is difficult to imagine any President, even one with as tough an anti-
communist reputation as Richard Nixon, being willing to pursue and capable of 
successfully bringing to fruition such fundamental policy reform. 
Together, these changes indicated a major transformation of the domestic 
environment that opened the door to China policy reform. Fatigue with the militarised and 
seemingly endless confrontation with the communist world, and the extreme domestic 
stresses of the late 1960's, had created ready constituencies for policies of conciliation 
with the nation's opponents. This was particularly true in the case of China, the 
containment of which was one of the primary rationales which had been used by the 
Johnson Administration to justify the escalating American military, political and financial 
commitment to the war in Vietnam. As the American intervention in Vietnam bogged 
down in stalemate, so a major new initiative towards China became politically possible. 
The transition in the Congressional attitude toward China from the early 1950's 
through the late 1960's illustrates one of the most effective means Congress used 
throughout the Cold War to shape policy toward China - the power of its known attitudes 
to define the space within which the Executive Branch was able to operate. During the 
1950's and early 1960's, Congressional determination to contain and isolate China, and 
Congress's vigilant opposition to attempts on the part of the Executive Branch to revisit, 
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even marginally, any portion of this policy framework reinforced the existing policy and 
strictly defined the bounds within which the Executive Branch was able to act. The 
Republican accusation that the Democrats, through the Truman Administration, had 'lost 
China' to communism, added a large element of partisan tension to the issue, and was a 
consideration during the Johnson Administration's debate over even incremental policy 
reform.780 From 1965 onwards, however, vehement opposition to a critical rethinking of 
China policy within Congress lessened considerably due to growing frustration with the 
conflict in Vietnam and the national stresses that accompanied it, and the related, and 
dramatic, ideological shift among Congressional liberals that altered thinking regarding 
America's role in the world and approach to communism. 
Simultaneous to this lessening of opposition to China policy reform, through 
speeches and public hearings, Congress significantly contributed to reshaping the way 
that policy-makers and the public thought about China policy, both by emphasising the 
withering of militant opposition to a rethinking of China policy, and by making positive, 
constructive policy suggestions. This Congressional challenge dovetailed with the 
growing willingness of American society to challenge existing ways of doing things. The 
revolutionary fervor of the period multiplied the effect that a robust Congressional 
challenge to presidential policy would normally have had on political debate. 
By the time Richard Nixon took office, the dramatic, and very vocal, change in 
Congressional and public attitudes toward China had set a new direction for policy and 
redefined and enlarged the space within which the Executive Branch could operate with 
respect to China policy. Without this expanded political space and altered attitudes, no 
opening to China would have been possible. With it, the Executive Branch not only had a 
much greater range of options at its disposal with which to attempt to address the major 
780 James Thomson to Jack Valenti, 1 March 1966, Document 129, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXX, China. 
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international issues facing the United States, but new departures in policy that had as their 
goal conciliation with the nation's opponents. 
The ability of Congress to define the political space within which the Executive 
Branch had the freedom to operate also helped to define the course of US policy toward 
China throughout the 1970's, shaping both the process of diplomatic normalisation and 
consideration of a potential Sino-American security relationship aimed at containing the 
Soviet Union. The most obvious example was the vast gulf between Congressional and 
Executive Branch attitudes toward Taiwan and the constraining influence this had on the 
Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations' ability to complete the process of normalisation 
on Beijing's terms. Likewise, knowledge of a lack of Congressional support for defence 
spending and Pentagon programmes of any kind in 1974 slowed more extensive 
consideration within the Executive Branch of the possibility of an informal security 
alliance with China in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Although the existence of a permissive environment can be sufficient grounds for 
a given foreign policy initiative on the part of the Executive Branch, active support 
provides much greater legitimacy for policy. The opening to China pursued by Richard 
Nixon grew out of a political environment that was not only permissive to change, but 
actively supportive of that change. Of the three men who served as President during the 
1970's, Nixon seemed to best understand the importance of support for the success of a 
policy initiative. From 1969-1972, Nixon proactively lobbied to increase conservative 
support for an opening to China by emphasising the strategic benefits to the United States 
of rapprochement. He also sought to minimise opposition and to build support by 
addressing, albeit disingenuously, bipartisan Congressional concerns that continuing 
American commitments to and longstanding ties with Taiwan not be harmed by the 
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opening to Beijing. Had Nixon not lost his office, and contributed in dramatic fashion to 
the weakening of the Executive Branch through the self-wounding of Watergate, the 
course of the Sino-American normalisation process would likely have looked very 
different, and would quite possibly have been resolved in a much more positive fashion, 
despite the fact that Nixon had made his task more difficult by conceding much to the 
Chinese and then hiding those concessions from Congress. 
Presidents Ford and Carter did not have Nixon's ability to mould Congressional 
opinion to their own ends, with negative consequences for their China policy, as well as 
for their foreign policy as a whole. Gerald Ford, despite having been well respected by 
both parties as a Republican Congressional leader, showed no ability as President to 
shape Congressional attitudes. It is true that Ford faced an extremely assertive Congress, 
had inherited a weakened Executive Branch, and did not hold a strong position within the 
his own party. However, Ford had long experience building coalitions on Capitol Hill. Yet 
rather than trying to change the weak position within which he found himself and to 
attempt to positively shape Congressional attitudes, he seemed content to accept a passive 
role. Jimmy Carter took a more assertive stance vis-a-vis Congress, but alienated 
Congress through a distant and disdainful attitude rather than attempting to lead through 
consultations and through proactively but cooperatively shaping attitudes, as Nixon had 
done. The result was that diplomatic normalisation finally occurred, but at the cost of a 
deepened distrust between the branches of government which weakened support for 
Carter's China policy. 
The manner in which Carter pursued both normalisation and the development of a 
Sino-American security relationship illustrates the pitfalls of pursuing a policy course 
with little reference to Congress. Although Congress objected to aspects of Carter's China 
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policy, particularly its apparent lack of concern for Taiwan's security and the closeness of 
future US-Taiwan relations, the broad thrust of Carter's policy, which sought closer 
relations and full diplomatic normalisation with Beijing, was widely supported. As shown 
in Chapters 4 and 5, broad support existed for normalisation of relations with China, even 
among the most conservative Senators, such as Jesse Helms, and among House Members, 
such as Lester Wolff, who were known to have closer relations with Taipei than anyone 
else in Congress.781 Although Carter was correct to note that Congressional reticence to 
meet Beijing's demands for normalisation had slowed the process, space existed within 
which he could have worked with Congress to assure it both that the Administration 
would ensure that Taiwan's future security would never be in doubt, and that its views 
were being considered and that it was a partner in the process of policy formulation. 
Carter's most significant error in pursuit of normalisation was one of process, not 
policy. Treating Congress as if it was irrelevant was widely seen as an affront to the 
institution, and angered even Administration supporters, such as Alan Cranston and Ted 
Kennedy. Carter compounded the problem by demanding that Congress quickly pass the 
Administration's 'enabling legislation' to regulate unofficial relations with Taiwan with no 
amendments and little debate. One result was greatly increased friction between the 
branches and lessened support for Carter's foreign policy. Another was that the very thing 
that Carter had sought to prevent, a strong Congressional role in shaping policy toward 
Taiwan and China, was ensured as Congress took an aggressive stance in defence of its 
prerogatives and reshaped in some important ways the nature of the normalisation 
agreement which Carter had reached with Deng Xiaoping. 
The refusal on the part of the Executive Branch to communicate with Congress at 
times successfully gained space within which a given Administration could pursue its 
781 Interviews with Joyce Lasky Shub, Chris Nelson, Jim Pzrystup, and Jim Lucier. 
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goals unhindered by Congressional interference. Nixon and Kissinger's ability to play 
China off against the Soviet Union in the early 1970's without the knowledge of Congress 
was a case in point. However, one of the dangers of this approach is that Members of 
Congress usually have vast experience in how Washington works, and therefore develop 
over time skills that enable them to gain information (which has been called 'the currency 
of power' in Washington) regarding whatever is being hidden from them. As one example, 
Senator Richard Stone, who was concerned that the Carter Administration was not 
treating Taiwan with due respect, gained a copy of the talking points the White House had 
given to a State Department official who was scheduled to meet with Taiwan's Vice 
Foreign Minister and called the State Department to complain.782 
The most significant example of this, however, and the example that had the 
greatest impact on the process of normalisation, was the gradual learning process on the 
part of Members of Congress regarding Beijing's expectations with regard to Taiwan and 
the terms of normalisation that took place due to the initiation of a programme of 
Congressional trips to China. The disconnect between what Members had been told by 
Nixon and Kissinger, that no concessions regarding Taiwan had been made, and the 
expectations they discovered on the part of the Chinese leadership in Beijing, highlighted 
the disingenuous nature of Nixon's assurances, and began a process by which Congress 
began to wrestle with the implications for US policy – that the process of normalisation 
was likely to require greater sacrifice on the part of Washington than they had been led to 
believe. The historical record indicates, therefore, that Congress usually discovers what 
has been hidden from it, which results in a deepened distrust of the Executive Branch and 
undermines support for policy. 
As pointed out in the Introduction, Congress's contribution in the area of foreign 
782 Interview with Chas Freeman. 
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and national security policy is often one of raising the 'big picture issues' that those in the 
Executive Branch, who have become wedded to a given approach, and/or are so at the 
mercy of constant crises that they do not have sufficient time to reflect on many of the 
larger issues underpinning their preferred policies, many times don't address. The 
Zablocki and Fulbright hearings of 1965 and 1966 provided a clear example of this ability 
of Congress to contribute to the making of sound policy in this way. During the 1970's, 
this contribution was most evident in the debate over the impact of Sino-American 
rapprochement and normalisation on the international security structure. From 1972 
onward, through such means as making speeches, holding hearings, and authoring articles 
for publication, Congress played a similar constructive role in public debate over the 
meaning of the new relationship with China in the context of the Cold War. In 1972 and 
1973, although largely supportive of Nixon's attempt to restructure the international 
security environment and to give the opening to China a large place in that endeavour, 
hearings, such as those held by Clement Zablocki in 1972, aimed to strengthen a policy 
with which it agreed through a critical examination of assumptions that Zablocki did not 
believe was taking place within the Administration. Similarly, when the Carter 
Administration moved to quickly develop a security relationship with China in light of 
the dramatic breakdown in US-Soviet relations at the end of the decade, although largely 
supportive, Congress nevertheless believed the relationship to be moving too quickly and 
that a more measured pace and reflective approach would yield stronger policy. 
This contribution on the part of Congress is diminished when the Executive 
Branch withholds information or misleads the Congress and attempts to deny it a role in 
the policy-making process. The Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations all saw 
Congressional involvement in this policy debate as unwanted and ignored Congress's 
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contribution in this area. However, in the case of the debate over Sino-American security 
ties, the attempt on the part of Ford and Carter to shut Congress out of the policy process 
was only partially successful. Perhaps the most important contribution that Congress 
made on this issue was the very fact that it undertook to examine the issue publicly, 
despite the existence, at least initially, of deep disagreements on Capitol Hill regarding its 
wisdom, as well as the scepticism with which many in the national security bureaucracy 
held the idea earlier in the decade. The large amount of very public attention which 
Congress paid to this issue helped to 'normalise' what had been a very 'radical' concept – 
that of a potential security relationship with Communist China aimed at the containment 
of the Soviet Union. This 'normalising' process contributed to the idea gradually 
becoming more acceptable to an inherently cautious national security bureaucracy. The 
power that Congressional attention had to spread the appeal of this idea was also seen in 
the fact that Michael Oksenberg and Zbigniew Brzezinski referenced these ideas as 
potential policy goals in their first week in office in January 1977.783 Congressional 
consideration of this idea sheds light on how ideas are evaluated in Washington, and the 
path they take from being a topic of mere abstract discussion, to active consideration, to 
policy implementation. The case of Congressional debate of potential Sino-American 
security cooperation supports Lee Hamilton's assertion that 'public debate gives 
legitimacy to policy'.784 
In the case of Sino-American normalisation and US relations with Taiwan, the 
Executive Branch's consistent unwillingness through the 1970's to open its China policy 
to public debate, or to consult with Congress, denied its policy the benefit of domestic 
783 Michael Oksenberg to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 19 January 1977, NSA, Staff Material – Far East – 
Armacost, Evening and Weekly Reports, File/Chron File, 1-2/78 through 2/7-10/77, Box 1, Carter 
Library. 
784 Address by Lee Hamilton, 'Congress and Foreign Policy', 13 March 1982, p.135. 
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political consensus. Although this pattern on the part of the Executive Branch is 
understandable in some instances, one example being Nixon's over-estimation of the 
ability of conservatives to block rapprochement in the period 1969-1971, this behaviour is 
less defensible in others. The most obvious example of this during the 1970's was the 
Carter Administration's complete lack of willingness to allow Congress any role in the 
decision-making or to even keep Congress minimally informed regarding the decisions 
that led to the severing of security and diplomatic ties with Taiwan and the establishment 
of full diplomatic ties with China on Beijing's terms. The example of policy formulation 
with regard to China in the 1970's, therefore, illustrates the necessity of building domestic 
political consensus in support of a given foreign policy. 
The various Congressional mechanisms for influencing policy, and the points of 
conflict between the two branches that have been highlighted in this study of policy 
toward China, have long characterised the struggle between the Executive and Legislative 
branches for control over the direction of policy. In another sense, however, the struggle 
between the branches over China policy during the 1970's was characterised by a unique 
set of circumstances and dynamics. Interaction between the branches during the 1970's 
took place within the environment that resulted from Congressional determination, in the 
wake of the experience of Vietnam, to delimit Executive power and to take greater 
responsibility over foreign and national security policy. Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter 
each faced an assertive Congress that required that it be treated as a partner in policy 
formulation, a trend Nixon assisted in dramatic fashion through the weakening of the 
Executive Branch due to Watergate. 
Although the Congressional challenge to Executive Branch authority had grown 
from Nixon's first year in office, the high tide of Congressional assertiveness took place 
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from 1973 through 1976. Prior to 1973, Congressional attempts to significantly limit 
Executive Branch prerogatives had met with only very limited success. The weakening of 
the Nixon Administration due to Watergate, however, provided an opening that Congress 
took advantage of, passing, over a presidential veto, the War Powers Resolution in 1973, 
which sought to limit the President's ability to commit US armed forces to conflict in the 
absence of Congressional authorisation. Congressional liberals also finally succeeded in 
the summer of 1973 in cutting off funding for American military operations in Southeast 
Asia, an action that played a role in Zhou Fenland’s discussions with the Warren 
Magnuson CoDel in August 1973. 
The mid-term 1974 Congressional elections, which took place shortly after 
Nixon's resignation, saw a decimation of Republican ranks in Congress and the election 
of a large, liberal, and very assertive freshman class determined to shape policy by first 
reducing the authority of the House leadership and committee chairmen, and secondly by 
then challenging the Executive Branch. Their attempt to cause power in the House to 
devolve downward to subcommittee chairmen and rank and file Members such as 
themselves was successful, which served to exacerbate the conflictual relationship 
between the Ford Administration and the House. Their actual ability to influence policy, 
however, was limited both due to the fact that the success of their 'democratic revolution' 
had caused power in the House to become too diffuse, thus limiting the chamber's ability 
to exert influence, and due to the fact that the growth of conflict with the Soviet Union 
weakened the appeal of their arguments (and heightened the appeal of conservative 
arguments). 
One of the reasons Jimmy Carter's attempt to circumvent Congress met with such 
a vehement reaction was that it took place in a decade in which Congress had become 
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increasingly assertive of its role as a partner in policy formulation. Additionally, Congress 
had made its expectation to be consulted on China policy in particular very clear. 
Throughout the 1970's, the Executive Branch sought to exclude Congress as much as 
possible from having a direct influence over development of China policy, and Congress 
sought to ensure that it had as great an influence as possible. Neither branch was entirely 
successful in their endeavour. 
Although this study has shown that there were limits on Congress's ability to 
directly influence China policy throughout the 1970's, it has also demonstrated that 
Congress had a much greater impact on the development of China policy during that 
decade than has previously been acknowledged. Foreign policy has always had a close 
connection with domestic politics, a fact which the example of China policy during the 
1970's bears out. The previous attempts to understand the development of the Sino-
American relationship during the period of rapprochement and normalisation with little 
reference to the role of Congress and of domestic politics had created a truncated 
understanding of the process. Placing Executive Branch actions, as this thesis has aimed 
to do, in the context of domestic political trends and Congressional attitudes and actions, 
has added an essential element enabling a more complete understanding of Washington's 
behaviour during what was both a critical period of the Cold War and a foundational 
period in the development of the Sino-American relationship. 
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